1. The present Interim Application has been filed under the provisions of Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“R.P. Act") read with Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC"), seeking dismissal of the captioned Election Petition.

2. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is useful for context to set out the following facts, which are not in dispute, viz.,

                   2.1. The Applicant and the Respondent No. 1, i.e., the Petitioner in the captioned Election Petition, were both candidates from Constituency No. 181, i.e., the Mahim Constituency, in the 15th Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections, which were held on 20th November 2024 (“the Election"). For the sake of convenience, Respondent No. 1 to this Application shall be referred to as the Petitioner in this Order.

                   2.2. The results of the Election were declared on 23rd November 2024, and the Applicant was declared the returned candidate with 50,213 votes, whereas the Petitioner polled 48,897 votes, which was the second highest number of votes polled.

                   2.3 It is the Petitioner's case that the Applicant had, in the Affidavit (Form 26) which is attached to the Nomination Paper, failed to disclose the following, viz.,

                   i. The chargesheet filed in Case No. 734/PW/2023 in FIR No. 569/2022 registered with Dadar Police Station in which the maximum punishment of imprisonment may extend to three years or a fine or both.

                   ii. The pendency of Case No. 201/PS/2024 in FIR No. 52/2023 registered for offences punishable u/s 37(3) and 135 of Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, for organising a political protest. The Punishment for the said offence u/s. 37(3) r/w s. 135(3) of Maharashtra Police Act, 1951, is a fine which may extend to two thousand and five hundred rupees.

                   iii. Case No. 131/SW/2016 was filed before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 5th Court, Dadar, Mumbai, u/s. 15 and 19 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, and Noise Pollution Rules, 2000, for noise pollution, the punishment for which is five years or a fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or both.

                   iv. Case No. 1728/Misc./2022 was filed before the Additional. Chief Judicial Magistrate, 5th Court, Dadar, Mumbai, u/s. 15 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, and Noise Pollution Rules, 2000, for noise pollution, the punishment for which is five years or a fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or both.

                   2.4. The Petitioner thus filed the captioned Election Petition, inter alia, alleging that the Applicant had, by failing to disclose (i) to (iv) above, committed a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the R.P. Act. Resultantly, the election was liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(ii) of the R.P. Act, and the election result was liable to be set aside in terms of Section 101(b) of the R.P. Act.

                   2.5. Conversely, it is the Applicant’s case that the Petition is liable to be dismissed under the provisions of Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act read with the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The grounds for dismissal of the Petition under the provisions of Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act he submitted were as follows viz.

                   I. That the Petition was presented by the Petitioner’s Advocate and not the Petitioner himself, and hence the Petition was not in compliance with Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act.

                   II. That the concise statement of material fact, the statutory affidavit and the receipt of security deposit were filed after the prescribed period and, hence, the Petition was barred by limitation under Section 81(1) r/w Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act.

                   III. That the copy supplied to the Applicant was not attested as per Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act.

                   IV. That the Petition was presented without the security deposit and hence was not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act.

                   V. That the security deposit was made by the Petitioner’s Advocate, and not by the Petitioner after the Petition was presented, and hence the Petition was not in compliance with Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act.

Submissions on behalf of the Applicant:

3. Mr. Karande, in support of each of the above grounds for seeking dismissal of the Election Petition under the provisions of Section 86 of the R.P. Act, made the following submissions:

I. The Petition was presented by the Petitioner’s Advocate and not the Petitioner himself, and hence the Petition was not in compliance with Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act.

4. At the outset, he pointed out that it was evident from the face of the record that the Petition had not been presented by the Petitioner himself but had instead been presented by the Petitioner’s Advocate, and also that the Petition was registered only on 8th January 2025, i.e., after the expiry of the forty-five-day limitation period prescribed under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act. He took pains to point out that the Petitioner had not denied this in the Affidavit in Reply.

5. Mr. Karande then also pointed out that the Petition had not been affirmed before the Registry of this Court but had been affirmed before a notary public, which further demonstrated the fact that the Petitioner was not personally present when the Petition was presented. It was thus that he submitted that the Petition was not a valid Election Petition, since the mandatory requirements of Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act had not been complied with by the Petitioner.

6. Mr. Karande placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G. V. Sreerama Reddy & Anr. v. Returning Officer & Ors.(AIR 2010 SC 133.) to point out that the presentation of an Election Petition through an advocate was impermissible. He pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had expressly held that an Election Petition must be presented personally by the candidate or an elector and that presentation through an advocate amounts to improper presentation and would be liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

II. The concise statement of material fact, the statutory affidavit and the receipt of security deposit were filed after the prescribed period, and hence, the Petition was barred by limitation under Section 81(1) r/w. Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act.

7. Mr. Karande then pointed out that the date of election of the Applicant as the returned candidate was admittedly 23rd November 2024, and hence the forty-five-day period of limitation as prescribed by Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act expired on 7th January 2025. He further pointed out that as per the Office/Registry Note, the office objections with regard to the concise statement of material facts, the statutory affidavit and the security deposit receipt were removed only on 8th January 2025, on which date the Petition was registered. It was thus submitted that the Petition was barred by limitation since the Registry did not have any authority to permit removal of office objections after the expiry of limitation. He reiterated that since the Petitioner had not filed the concise statement of material facts, the Affidavit as per Section 83 of the R.P. Act and also not deposited the security for costs at the time of presentation of the Election Petition, the presentation of the Election Petition itself was defective and therefore liable to be dismissed under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act.

8. Mr. Karande placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shirgaonkar(2009 AIR SCW 6812.) from which he pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had specifically held that all material facts must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up in the Petition within the period of limitation, and failure to state even a single material fact would entail dismissal of the Election Petition. He also placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Ashok s/o. Tapiram Patil @ A. T. Nana Patil v. Dr. Gurumukh Mehrumal Jagwani & Ors.(2007 (1) ALL MR 355.) to point out that an Election Petition must be presented as per the provisions of the R.P. Act and that the Rules framed by the High Court would not prevail over the statutory provisions of the R.P. Act. He also pointed out that this Court had, in the case of Chandrabhan v. Nitin(2003 SCC OnLine Bom 211.) held that an Election Petition is to be filed within forty-five days from the date of the election of the returned candidate, which, in this case, he reiterated expired on 7th January, 2025. He thus submitted that since the objections were removed on 8th January 2025 and the Petition was numbered on the same day, the Petition was filed beyond limitation.

III. The copy supplied to the Applicant could not be said to be an attested true copy of the Petition and hence the Petition was not in compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act.

9. Mr. Karande then invited my attention to Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act to submit that the Petitioner was mandatorily required to supply to each Respondent a true copy of the Election Petition duly attested by the Petitioner. He pointed out that the copy of the Petition served upon the Applicant was clearly not in compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act, since the first and last pages differed in appearance from the remaining pages, including in terms of colour and formatting. He also pointed out that the signatures of the Petitioner appearing on the first three pages of the index were inconsistent with the signatures appearing on pages 45 and 46 of the Petition, including the verification page. Basis this, Mr. Karande submitted that it was evident that the Petitioner had, at best, attested only the first and last pages of the Petition which was served upon the Applicant and not each page as mandated under the provisions of Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act.

10. Mr. Karande further submitted that the Applicant cannot be expected to assume that the copy of the Election Petition which was served was accurate, particularly when such discrepancies give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the copy may not faithfully reflect the contents of the Election Petition. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh v. Usha Rani(AIR 1984 SC 956.) to submit that the law does not require a returned candidate to scrutinise the entire record to ascertain which pages are correct. He also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore(AIR 1964 SC 1545.), to point out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that every page of every copy of an Election Petition served upon the Respondent must be attested as a true copy under the signature of the Petitioner.

11. In the present case, Mr. Karande submitted that since every page of the copy served upon the Applicant had not been duly attested by the Petitioner, and the pages that were purportedly attested suffered from inconsistencies, the copy of the Petition served upon the Applicant cannot be regarded as a “true copy” within the meaning of Section 81(3), and thus there was non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act, and consequently, the Election Petition was liable to be dismissed under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act.

IV. The Petition was presented without the security deposit and hence was not in compliance with the provisions of Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act.

12. Mr. Karande took pains to point out that the Petitioner had, in the Affidavit in Reply, expressly admitted that the Petitioner had not, at the time of presentation of the Petition, deposited the security for costs, and the same was deposited only on 6th January 2025, after an objection was raised by the Registry. He pointed out that Section 117 of the R.P. Act mandated that the Petitioner at the time of presentation of an Election Petition, is required to personally deposit the security for costs. He submitted that since the Petitioner had admittedly not done so, the Petition would have to be dismissed in limine under Section 86(1) read with Section 98(a) of the R.P. Act, with costs.

13. He then placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sitaram v. Radhye Shyam Vishnav and Others(AIR 2018 SC 1298.) to point out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had unequivocally held as follows:

                   “36. The learned single Judge placed reliance on Charan Lal Sahu (11) (AIR 1975 SC 1288) (supra) and came to hold that Rule 79(2) in relation to the deposit of the security along with the petition is mandatory and since on facts it is not in dispute that on 21st February, 1978, when the election petition was filed, it was not presented along with a deposit of Rs. 50/- as required for the costs of the opposite party, the legal and logical consequences would be that the election petition could not be deemed to have been presented under the Rules as per the mandate of Rule 79(2) of the Rajasthan Panchayat and Nyaya Panchayat (Election) Rules, 1960. Being of this view, the learned single Judge opined that there was no valid election petition before the Election Tribunal.

                   37. … In the case at hand, Rule 3(5)(d) commands that the election petition shall be accompanied by the treasury challan. The word used in the Rule is 'accompanied' and the term 'accompany' means to co-exist or go along. There cannot be a separation or segregation. The election petition has to be accompanied by the treasury challan and with the treasury challan, as has been understood by this Court, there has to be a deposit in the treasury. The 2012 Rules, when understood appropriately, also convey that there has to be deposit in the treasury. Once the election petition is presented without the treasury challan, the decisions of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu (I) (AIR 1973 SC 2464) (supra) and Aeltemesh Rein (AIR 1981 SC 1199) (supra) pertaining to non-deposit will have full applicability. The principle stated in M. Karunanidhi (AIR 1983 SC 558) (supra), K. Kamaraja Nadar (AIR 1958 SC 687) (supra), Chandrika Prasad Tripathi (AIR 1959 SC 827) (supra) and other decisions will not get attracted.

                   38. Mr. Jain would submit that this is not an incurable defect as the deposit has been made within the period of limitation. The said submission leaves us unimpressed inasmuch as Rule 7 leaves no option to the Judge but to dismiss the petition. Thus, regard being had to the language employed in both the Rules, we are obligated to hold that the deposit of treasury challan which means deposit of the requisite amount in treasury at the time of presentation of the election petition is mandatory. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that no valid election petition was presented. In such a situation, the learned Additional District Judge was bound in law to reject the election petition.”

                   (emphasis supplied)

Basis the above, he submitted that since it was an admitted position that the Petition when presented did not have the security for costs deposited as required under Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act, the Petition was defective and would have to be dismissed/rejected as such.

V. The security deposit was made by the Petitioner’s Advocate, and not by the Petitioner and hence the Petition was not in compliance with Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act.

14. Mr. Karande also pointed out that the security for costs was not even deposited by the Petitioner as mandated under Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act but was deposited by the Petitioner’s Advocate as was evident from the receipt dated 6th January 2025, which was in the name of the Petitioner's advocate and not in the Petitioner’s name. Mr. Karande thus submitted that since the Petitioner had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act, the Petition would have to be dismissed at the threshold under the provisions of Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act.

15. Mr. Karande submitted that, apart from warranting dismissal under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act for the reasons set out in (I) to (V) above, the Petition was also liable to be rejected under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC since the Election Petition did not disclose any cause of action and was devoid of the necessary material facts. He then pointed out that, since Section 87 of the R.P. Act provided that an Election Petition is to be tried “as nearly as may be” in accordance with the provisions of the CPC, Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC would apply to an Election Petition with full force. He therefore submitted that if on a plain reading of an Election Petition it was found to be bereft of material facts or noncompliance with the mandatory statutory provisions, of the R.P. Act, an Election Petition was liable to be rejected at the threshold under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

16. Mr. Karande placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar and Others,(AIR 2024 SC 2193.) which inter alia held as follows:

                   “12. At the outset, it may be noted that as per the well settled legal position, right to contest election or to question the election by means of an Election Petition is neither common law nor fundamental right. It is a statutory right governed by the statutory provisions of the RP Act. Outside the statutory provisions, there is no right to dispute an election. The RP Act is a complete and self-contained code within which any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute must be found. The provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the extent as permissible under Section 87 of the RP Act.

                   13. It hardly needs to be reiterated that in an Election Petition, pleadings have to be precise, specific and unambiguous, and if the Election Petition does not disclose a cause of action, it is liable to be dismissed in limine. It may also be noted that the cause of action in questioning the validity of election must relate to the grounds specified in Section 100 of the RP Act. As held in Bhagwati Prasad Dixit ‘Ghorewala’ v. Rajeev Gandhi (1986) 4 SCC 78 : (AIR 1986 SC 1534) and in Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (1987) Supp SCC 93 : (AIR 1987 SC 1577)., if the allegations contained in the petition do not set out the grounds as contemplated by Section 100 and do not conform to the requirement of Section 81 and 83 of the Act, the pleadings are liable to be struck off and the Election Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC.

                   14. …….A beneficial reference of the decision in case of Laxmi Narayan Nayak v. Ramratan Chaturvedi and Others ((1990) 2 SCC 173: (AIR 1991 SC 2001)) be also made, wherein this Court upon review of the earlier decisions, laid down following principles applicable to election cases involving corrupt practices:

                   “5. This Court in a catena of decisions has laid down the principles as to the nature of pleadings in election cases, the sum and substance of which being:

                   (1) The pleadings of the election petitioner in his petition should be absolutely precise and clear containing all necessary details and particulars as required by law …

                   (2) The allegations in the election petition should not be vague, general in nature or lacking of materials or frivolous or vexatious because the court is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike down or delete pleadings which are suffering from such vices as not raising any triable issue vide ….

                   (3) The evidence adduced in support of the pleadings should be of such nature leading to an irresistible conclusion or unimpeachable result that the allegations made, have been committed rendering the election void under Section 100 ….

                   (4) The evidence produced before the court in support of the pleadings must be clear, cogent, satisfactory, credible and positive and also should stand the test of strict and scrupulous scrutiny vide ….

                   (5) It is unsafe in an election case to accept oral evidence at its face value without looking for assurances for some surer circumstances or unimpeachable documents vide ….

                   (6) The onus of proof of the allegations made in the election petition is undoubtedly on the person who assails an election which has been concluded vide ….”

                   15. The legal position with regard to the non-compliance of the requirement of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and the rejection of Election Petition under Order VII Rule 11, CPC has also been regurgitated recently by this Court in case of Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar and Others (2023 SCC Online SC 573: (AIR 2023 SC 2366):

                   “28. The legal position enunciated in afore stated cases may be summed up as under:

                   i. Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act, 1951 mandates that an Election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies. If material facts are not stated in an Election petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone, as the case would be covered by Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code.

                   ii. The material facts must be such facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the cause of action, that is every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff/petitioner to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of court. Omission of a single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of plaint would become bad.

                   iii. Material facts mean the entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause of action. Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary.

                   iv. In order to get an election declared as void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, the Election petitioner must aver that on account of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or any rules or orders made under the Act, the result of the election, in so far as it concerned the returned candidate, was materially affected.

                   v. The Election petition is a serious matter and it cannot be treated lightly or in a fanciful manner nor is it given to a person who uses it as a handle for vexatious purpose.

                   vi. An Election petition can be summarily dismissed on the omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action, or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, in exercise of the powers under Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC read with the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the RP Act.”

                   (emphasis supplied)

17. Applying the aforesaid principles, Mr. Karande submitted that the present Petition would have to be rejected since the Petition was entirely lacking in the following material particulars, facts and pleadings: (i) actual knowledge on the part of the Applicant regarding the pendency of the cases alleged to have been suppressed; (ii) absence of any averment that such cases were of a heinous nature, involved moral turpitude, or constituted serious offences so as to mandate disclosure; (iii) no pleading as to how any electoral right was interfered with or how the voters were influenced by such alleged suppression so as to constitute undue influence under the provisions of Section 123(2) of the R.P. Act; (iv) the date on which cognisance was taken in the alleged cases so as to attribute knowledge to the Applicant; (v) the documents relied upon by the Petitioner, in fact, demonstrated that the Applicant had no knowledge of the filing of the chargesheet in FIR No. 569/2022; (vi) no pleading identifying which specific provision of law was violated and, crucially, (vii) how the result of the election, insofar as it concerns the Applicant, was materially affected by the alleged suppression.

18. Mr. Karande then took pains to point out that the Applicant had disclosed as many as twenty cases in the Affidavit in Form 26 attached to the Applicants nomination form and had therefore made a substantial disclosure of the Applicant’s antecedents. He submitted that information which the Petitioner alleged was suppressed pertained to minor offences which could not have in any manner affected the free exercise of electoral rights. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decisions in the case of Ravi Namboothiri v. K.A. Baiju(AIR OnLine 2022 SC 883.) and Satish Mahadeorao Uke v. Devendra Gangadhar Fadnavis(2016 (2) MhLJ 613.) to submit that non-disclosure of minor and trivial offences does not vitiate an election or the result thereof. Basis above, he submitted that the Interim Application ought to be allowed.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner:

19. Mr. Ghogare, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, at the outset submitted that the Election Petition as filed was fully compliant with the provisions of the R.P. Act and that all the grounds raised by the Applicant seeking dismissal of the Election Petition were entirely misconceived and devoid of merit. He thus submitted that the Election Petition would have to be heard and decided on merits.

20. Mr. Ghogare, then, in dealing with the Applicants’ contentions, submitted as follows:

I. Personal Presentation

21. Mr. Ghogare at the outset submitted that the contention that the Petition was not presented personally by the Petitioner but was presented by the Petitioner's advocate was ex facie untenable since the Office Note dated 6th January 2025, issued by the Assistant Prothonotary and Senior Master (Judicial), specifically recorded the personal presence of the Petitioner. Mr. Ghogare thus submitted that it was beyond the pale of doubt that the Petition was presented by the Petitioner and not the Petitioner’s Advocate.

22. Mr. Ghogare then pointed out that the Office Note dated 6th January 2025 also contained directions to accept the payment of the Rs 2,000, which he submitted was in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules framed by the Bombay High Court in regard to the Election Petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ("the Election Rules”). He thus submitted that the contention that the security deposit of Rs. 2,000 was made by the Petitioner's Advocate and not the Petitioner was also plainly untenable since the Petitioner had personally withdrawn the amount of Rs. 2,000 from the Petitioner's savings account through an ATM (ATM ID No. SB033102), as was evidenced by the ATM withdrawal slip and bank statement of the Petitioner, produced as Exhibits B and C to the Petitioner’s Affidavit in Reply. He also pointed out that the Petitioner’s advocate had filed a praecipe for deposit of the amount as per the established practice of this Court on the Original Side in which it was specifically requested that the deposit certificate be issued in favour of the Petitioner. In these facts he submitted, it could not be suggested that the Petitioner had not personally presented the Petition or had not personally deposited the security for costs and hence the decision in G. Sreerama Reddy would not apply.

23. Mr. Ghogare also submitted that the issue of personal presentation, being a disputed question of fact, cannot be adjudicated at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), since the Court must proceed on the basis of a demurrer and is not required to conduct a mini-trial. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma(AIR 2001 SC 36.).

II. Limitation and Compliance within Time

24. Mr. Ghogare then, with regard to the three office objections raised, pointed out that the concise statement of material facts formed an integral part of the Election Petition itself, as was evident from paragraphs 37 to 43 of the Petition and thus the objection in this regard was untenable. He also pointed out that Section 83 of the R.P. Act does not require the filing of a separate concise statement of material facts but only mandates that the material facts must be pleaded in the Petition, which requirement he submitted had been fully complied with.

25. Mr. Ghoghare submitted that the statutory Affidavit required to be filled under Section 83 of the R.P. Act was in fact annexed to the Petition at the time of its presentation, but since it did not expressly refer to Section 83, the confusion possibly arose. He invited my attention to the said Affidavit, as annexed to the Petition, to point out that it was dated 3rd January 2025 and was titled “Form 25 Affidavit", and when this was pointed out to the Registry, the objection was withdrawn. He also pointed out, from the payment receipt annexed at Exhibit D to the reply, that the security deposit was made on 6th January 2025, which was within the prescribed period of limitation and, hence, within time.

26. On the aspect of limitation, Mr. Ghogare submitted that since the election results were declared on 23rd November 2024, by virtue of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the said date would have to be excluded while computing limitation. He thus submitted that the forty five-day period under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act would therefore commence on 24th November 2024 and expire on 7th January 2025. He submitted that since the Petition was presented before that date, i.e., on 4th January 2025, the Petition was well within limitation.

27. Mr. Ghogare then took pains to point out that when the Petition was presented on 4th January 2025, no objections were raised. He submitted that the objections regarding the statutory affidavit, concise statement of facts and the security deposit receipt were raised only on 6th January, 2025, and were complied with on the same date. He submitted that since, the Registry on 7th January 2025, raised further objections regarding pagination which necessitated a fresh index to be filled, it was only this which was done in the morning, following which the Petition was registered. He submitted that the date of registration, i.e., 8th January 2025, was purely administrative and had no bearing on limitation since limitation ceases to run upon the presentation of a Petition which he submitted was the 4th of January 2025. He submitted that the interpretation advanced by the Applicant, equating registration with presentation, was contrary to settled legal principles.

III. Supply of Attested Copy

28. Mr. Ghogare submitted that the Applicant’s contention that the copy of the Petition which had been served upon the Applicant was not attested in accordance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act was wholly baseless and one of desperation. He first pointed out that the Registry had not raised any objection in this regard. He then submitted that the signatures appearing on the first three pages and all other pages of the Petition were those of the Petitioner and thus the copy served upon the Applicant was duly attested in accordance with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. In any event, he submitted that the allegations of non-attestation and mismatch of signatures were disputed questions of fact and would require parties to lead evidence. He placed reliance upon the decisions in Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma, Ritaben Ketankumar Patel v. Election Commission of India([Gujarat High Court] Order dated 20th September 2024 in Election Application No. 3 of 2024.), and M. Karunanidhi v. Dr. H.V. Hande((1983) 2 SCC 473.) to point out that where there is substantial compliance with the statutory requirements and the objections were merely technical, rejection under Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act was not warranted.

IV. Payment of Security Deposit under Section 117(1)

29. Mr. Ghogare submitted that the difference between the date of presentation, i.e., 4th January 2025, and the date of deposit of the Rs 2,000, i.e., 6th January 2025, arose because 5th January 2025 was a Sunday, on which the Registry was closed. Consequently, the Petitioner deposited the amount of Rs. 2,000 on the next working day. He submitted that the deposit was made in strict compliance with the Rules as also with Rule 39 and 365 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules (“BHC Rules”). He pointed out that Rule 25 mandates payment of security deposit in cash during office hours, and Rule 365 stipulates that cash deposits are not accepted after 12:00 p.m. on Saturdays. He submitted that the deposit, having been made on 6th January 2025, was in accordance with these Rules and, therefore, in compliance with the provisions of Section 117 of the R.P. Act.

30. Lastly, he submitted that under Rule 52 of the BHC Rules, once a party is represented by an Advocate, the party is not entitled to act or appear personally in the matter. Therefore, the issuance of the receipt in the name of the Advocate is merely procedural and does not imply that the Petitioner failed to personally deposit the amount.

V. Cause of Action and Material Particulars

31. Mr Ghogare submitted that the Election Petition fully disclosed a cause of action since the Petitioner had specifically and in detail pleaded the nondisclosure of the criminal cases by the Applicant in his nomination form filed under Section 33A(1)(i) of the R.P. Act.

32. He submitted that the Petition specifically set out that charges had been framed against the Applicant in the relevant criminal cases and that the Applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of these cases and of the statutory obligations to disclose the same in his nomination form. He submitted that the deliberate suppression of this information constituted corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the R.P. Act. He submitted that this fact distinguished the present case from Satish Mahadeorao Uke v. Devendra Gangadhar Fadnavis, in which the Petition had entirely failed to plead that charges had been framed against the candidate.

33. He then submitted that at the Order VII Rule 11 stage, the Court is required to read the Election Petition as a whole, and if any ground disclosed by the Petition justified its continuance, the Petition could not be rejected in limine. He pointed out that the standard at this stage was not proof of allegations but only whether a cause of action was disclosed. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the decisions in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma and Ritaben Ketankumar Patel v. Election Commission of India.

34. Mr. Ghogare, in these circumstances, prayed that the Application be dismissed and that the Election Petition be tried on its merits.

Reasons and Conclusions:

35. Having heard Learned Counsel for the parties, perused the contents of the Petition and the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, as also the case law upon which reliance was placed, I find that the Application would have to be allowed. I say so for the following reasons:

                   A. Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act mandates the dismissal of an Election Petition which is not in compliance with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117 of the R.P. Act. Thus, if an Election Petition is found not to be in compliance with any of these Sections, the Court has no option but to dismiss the same, since under Section 86(1) there is no discretion vested in the Court to do otherwise. Section 117 of the R.P. Act mandates that the security for costs shall be deposited by the Petitioner at the time of presentation of the Election Petition. Thus, an Election Petition which is presented without the deposit for security cannot be said to have been validly presented as per Section 117 of the R.P. Act.

                   B. Crucially, the Applicant has, in the Affidavit in Reply, specifically admitted that the deposit of security for costs was not made when the Petition was presented, i.e., on 4th January 2025, but was made two days later, i.e., on 6th January 2025, after objections were raised. Furthermore, and importantly, the Petitioner has, in the Affidavit in Reply, not denied the Applicant’s specific case that “the Petitioner neither presented the Petition himself nor deposited the security for costs himself…”. Thus, plainly, the presentation of the Petition was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 117 of the R.P. Act.

                   C. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the case of Sitaram v. Radhye Shyam Vishnav and Others, specifically held that failure to deposit security for costs at the time of presentation of an Election Petition is an incurable defect, even if the deposit is subsequently made within the period of limitation. Hence, the said decision will squarely apply to the facts of the present case.

                   D. The Petitioner’s reliance upon Rule 25 of the Election Rules and Rule 39 and 365 of the BHC Rules to justify payment of the security on 6th January 2025 is entirely misplaced. Firstly, Rule 25 of the Election Rules only provides for the mode of payment of security for costs, i.e., in cash and nothing else, and Rule 365 only provides for the timing to make a cash deposit. The said rules do not and cannot in any manner supplant the provisions of Section 117 of the R.P. Act. Secondly, and crucially, as held in the case of Ashok s/o. Tapiram Patil @ A. T. Nana Patil v. Dr. Gurumukh Mehrumal Jagwani & Ors. an Election Petition must be presented as per the provisions of the R.P. Act, and Rules framed by the High Court will not prevail over the statutory provisions of the R.P. Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held in the case of Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram and Ors.((1974) 4 SCC 237.) that the High Court Rules cannot confer upon the Registry a power which is not specifically permitted under the statute.

                   E. As already noted above, Section 117(1) expressly requires that the Petitioner shall deposit the security for costs “at the time of presenting” the Election Petition, which admittedly was on 4th January 2025. The language of Section 117 of the R.P. Act makes the security for costs contemporaneous, if not a condition precedent, to the presentation of an Election Petition. Therefore, the requirement to deposit security for costs is not procedural but mandatory. The Petitioner, having chosen to present an Election Petition which, on the face of it, was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Section 117 of the R.P. Act, must therefore face the consequences of presenting such a defective Petition.

                   F. Also, in my view, the Petition is liable to be rejected under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, in light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar and Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shirgaonkar since the Petition is entirely lacking in the following material particulars, facts and pleadings with regard to: (i) absence of any averment that such cases were of a heinous nature, involved moral turpitude, or constituted serious offences so as to mandate disclosure; (ii) no pleading as to how any electoral right was interfered with or how the voters were influenced by such alleged suppression so as to constitute undue influence under the provisions of Section 123(2) of the R.P. Act; and, crucially, (iii) no averment on how the result of the election, insofar as it concerns the Applicant, was materially affected by the alleged suppression.

                   G. Additionally, and crucially, the Applicant has disclosed as many as 20 pending criminal cases in the Affidavit annexed to his nomination form. As held by this Court in the case of Satish Mahadeorao Uke v. Devendra Gangadhar Fadnavis, mere non-disclosure of information in Form 26 of the nomination form for election, does not ipso facto vitiate an election unless the Election Petitioner specifically pleads and establishes (i) deliberate and intentional suppression, (ii) materiality of the information, and (iii) that such suppression materially affected the result of the election within the meaning of Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Hence, as already noted, in paragraph (F) above, the Petition is lacking in the material facts as required under Section 83 of the R.P. Act and is liable to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 86 of the Act.

36. In light of the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following order:

                   a. The captioned Application is allowed and the Election Petition is accordingly rejected.

                   b. There shall be no order as to costs.