Nivedita P. Mehta, J.
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.03.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur in Sessions Case No.16/2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one year. The appellant has, however, been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC.
2. In nutshell the case of the prosecution is as follows:
The informant Smt. Anita Sanjay Roy widow of deceased Sanjay Roy lodged a report that on 20.10.2017 at Police Station Ramnagar, Chandrapur stating that about 8-00 pm. while she was present at her residence, the appellant Nagesh came in front of her house and started abusing in filthy language. At that time, her husband Sanjay returned from work and attempted to pacify the appellant. However, the appellant threatened him with dire consequences and suddenly came from behind and assaulted the husband of the informant. He caught hold of his collar and dragged him down and then sat on his person and started inflicting blows on his stomach. On witnessing the assault, the informant’s son Sahil intervened in an attempt to rescue his father by hitting the appellant by a stick. It was only when the appellant was hit by stick on his head that it was possible to set free Sanjay from the clutches of the appellant. Due to assault, Sanjay, the husband of the informant had sustained injuries and, therefore, was immediately taken to the hospital for treatment. Subsequently, the informant lodged the report. Based on the said report, Crime No. 1471 of 2017 came to be registered against the present appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294, 504 and 506 of IPC. During the course of treatment, the husband of informant succumbed to his injuries on 27.10.2017 and consequently Section 302 of IPC was added.
3. During investigation, the Investigating Officer visited the spot, prepared necessary panchnamas, seized incriminating articles and recorded statements of witnesses. Incriminating articles were referred to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Nagpur for obtaining C.A. Reports. The medical papers and post-mortem report were also collected. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions, where Charge came to be framed against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 504 and 509 of the IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution examined in all eleven witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded, wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances and set up a defence that, in the course of a scuffle, the knife came into his hand and the injuries might have been caused in that process. It is pertinent to note that counter case arose out of the same incident wherein wife of the appellant lodged the report alleging assault by the deceased and his son leading to registration of separate crime, which was registered vide C.R. No. 1473/2017 under Section 326 of IPC. Both the matters were tried as cross cases.
4. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, held that the death of Sanjay Roy was homicidal. The testimonies of PW1 Anita and PW2 Shubham were found to be consistent and reliable and duly corroborated by the evidence of PW3 Khushal, who was treated as an independent eye-witness. The learned trial Court further observed that the ocular version of the incident was supported by the medical evidence, which indicated that the injuries sustained by the deceased were the result of a sharp weapon and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The defence theory that the injuries were caused accidentally in the course of a scuffle or that the death was due to medical complications was not accepted. On cumulative consideration of the evidence, the learned trial Court concluded that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, while acquitting him of the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 509 of the IPC.
Hence, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law and on facts. It is contended that the evidence of PW1 Anita and PW2 Shubham, being interested witnesses, suffers from material omissions and contradictions and does not inspire confidence. It is further submitted that the independent witness PW3 has not fully supported the prosecution case and his testimony requires cautious scrutiny. Learned counsel would submit that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution version inasmuch as the injuries initially noted were simple in nature and the death having occurred after about seven days, the possibility of complications arising out of surgical intervention and septicemia cannot be ruled out. It is further contended that no dying declaration of the deceased was recorded despite him surviving for several days. Attention is also invited to the fact that the appellant himself sustained injuries in the same incident and a counter case was registered, which probabilises the defence version. It is, therefore, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under Section 302 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt and, at the highest, the case would fall under a lesser offence. It is also canvassed that the appellant is behind bar since nine years.
6. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the evidence of PW1 Anita and PW2 Shubham is natural and trustworthy and stands corroborated by the testimony of PW3 Khushal, an independent witness and further contends that ocular testimony of eye-witnesses has greater evidentiary value and cannot be discarded solely on the basis of minor discrepancies in medical evidence. It is further submitted that the ocular evidence is consistent and finds due support from the medical evidence, which establishes that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Medical evidence when read as a whole supports the prosecution case, the injured was admitted to hospital and underwent surgery which indicate the injuries were serious in nature. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submits that the defence theory of possible medical negligence or wrong blood transfusion is purely speculative and unsupported by any cogent evidence. The injuries inflicted by the accused set in motion a chain of events culminating in the death and, therefore, the trial Court has convicted the accused under Section 302 of IPC, which is just and proper. It is, therefore, submitted that no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
7. We have heard Mr. R.M. Daga, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. A.B. Badar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent–State. We have carefully gone through the evidence on record, the impugned judgment and the material placed before us. Upon such consideration, the following points arise for our determination:
Points for Determination –
| Sr. No. | Points | Findings |
| (i) | Whether the prosecution has proved that the death of Sanjay Roy was homicidal? | In the Affirmative. |
| (ii) | Whether prosecution has proved that the appellant caused the death of Sanjay Roy? | In the Affirmative |
| (iii) | Whether interference is called for in the impugned judgment? | In the Negative. |
| (iv) | What order? | As per Final Order. |
As to Point No. (i):
8. At the outset, it is required to be considered whether the death of Sanjay Roy was homicidal. The fact that Sanjay Roy sustained multiple injuries on 20.10.2017 and succumbed on 27.10.2017 during the course of treatment is not in dispute.
9. The prosecution has relied upon the medical evidence of PW4 Dr. Meshram, PW5 Dr. Kalpana Gulwade, PW6 Dr. Mayur Bandawar and PW8 Dr. Bhalerao, who conducted the post-mortem examination. PW4 Dr. Meshram, who first examined the injured, noticed multiple injuries on the person of Sanjay and opined that they were caused by a hard and sharp object. Upon examination he found following injuries-
(i) Cut lacerated wound (CLW) size 2 x 1 x 1/2 cms over back on left side.
(ii) CLW 3 x 2 x 1/2 cm over abdomen on left side.
(iii) CLW 2 x 2 x 1/2 cm over abdomen in mid sternal line on medial side of wound no.2.
(iv) CLW 2 x 1 x 1/2 cm over abdomen on right side.
(v) CLW 1 x 1 x 1/2 cm over left hip joint on back side.
Though he described the injuries as simple in nature, he clarified that the examination was only external and the patient was referred for further surgical evaluation, thereby indicating the possibility of deeper internal damage.
10. The subsequent medical evidence assumes significance. PW5 Dr. Gulwade and PW6 Dr. Bandawar, who were associated with the surgical treatment of the deceased, have deposed that the patient had sustained multiple stab injuries over the abdomen and lumbar region, which had resulted in internal damage to organs including the stomach and intestines. PW5 further deposed that, at the time of admission of the patient Sanjay to her hospital, she noticed following injuries:
(i) 1 x 1 cm in left hypochondriac
(ii) 2 x 1 cm in right hypochondriac
(iii) 2 x 1 cm in right lumber
(iv) 1 x 1 cm in left lumber
(v) 1 x 1 cm in left iliac
(vi) 2 x 1 cm in scalp.
She deposed that the condition of the patient necessitated immediate surgical intervention. PW6, who performed the surgery, has deposed that upon exploratory laparotomy, he noted the following -
(i) There were 500 ml homo-purulent peritoneal fluid.
(ii) 1.5 x 1 cms dent in posterior wall of stomach.
(iii) 1 x 1 cms dent in transverse colen and
(iv) 0.5 x 0.5 cms dent in jejunum 3 fts distal to DJ.
PW6 has specifically stated that there was presence of homo-purulent fluid, indicating internal infection caused due to such injuries. He has categorically opined that the injuries were stab injuries and grievous in nature, caused due to penetration of the abdominal cavity.
The evidence of PW7 Dr. Tukdi further indicates that the patient had multiple stab wounds over the abdomen, with sonography revealing presence of blood in the abdominal cavity. The patient was in critical condition, with abdominal pain, breathlessness, high pulse rate and signs of internal bleeding. He opined that the injuries had resulted in haemoperitoneum due to rupture of internal vessels and were serious in nature, capable of causing death.
11. The post-mortem evidence of PW8 Dr. Bhalerao assumes crucial significance. Upon examination he found following external injuries:
(i) Surgical intervention seen as wound for drainage tube over right side of chest wall in 4th inter-postal space region, of size 2 x 1 cms (drainage wound).
(ii) Surgical intervention seen as wound for drainage tube over right lumber region of abdominal wall region, of size 1.5 cms x 1 cms (drainage wound).
(iii) Surgical intervention seen as stitched wound of 18 cms with 18 stitches present over abdomen in mid line extending from epi-gas- tric region to 3 cms below umbilicus region (laparotomy).
(iv) Surgical intervention seen as stitch wound with two stitches, present over right epi-gastric region, 1 cm lateral to injury no.3. After opening the stitches stab wound of size 2 cms x 1 cm x cavity deep, obliquely placed. Its lower end is situated 25 cms above pu- bic symphysis.
(v) Surgical intervention seen as stitched wound with four stitches, present over left side of anterior abdominal wall obliquely placed below left nipple. After opening the stitches would of size 4 cms x 1 cm x cavity deep. It is situated 22 cms above left anterior supe- rior illiac spine.
(vi) Surgical intervention seen as stitched wound with two stitches, present over left epi-gastric region of anterior abdominal wall obliquely placed below left nipple. After opening the stitches stab wound of size 2 cms x 1 cm x cavity deep. It is situated 2 cms lat- eral to injury no.3.
(vii) Partially healed stitched wound present over right parietal region of scalp, obliquely placed of 3 cms in length with 3 stitches. It is stab wound of size 3 cms x 1 cm x scalp deep.
(viii) Surgical stitched wound present over left buttock, obliquely placed of 2 cms in length with 3 stitches in situ. After opening stitches, it is stab wound of size 2 cms x 1 cm x muscle deep. 15 Sessions Case No. 16/2018.
(ix) Surgical stitched wound present over left buttock 10 cms below in- jury no.8 obliquely placed of 3 cms in length with 3 stitches in situ. After opening stitches it is stab wound of size 3 cms x 1 cm x muscle deep.
While examining the internal injuries he noted the following observation:-
“Stomach and its contents:
Evidence of stitched wound over lateral aspect of greater curvature of stomach of 4 cms in length with four stitches in situ. Contains 200 ml yellowish thick sticky fluid with no peculiar smell perceived, mucosa congested at places.”
He has found multiple stab wounds, though surgically treated, corresponding to internal injuries to the abdominal organs. He has opined that the injuries were ante-mortem and that the cause of death was “septicemia in an operated case of stab injury to abdomen.” He has further clarified that such septicemia develops as a consequence of injuries penetrating the abdominal cavity, and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
12. The defence has sought to contend that the death was on account of medical complications or septicemia arising independently of the injuries. However, the evidence of the medical experts consistently indicates that the septicemia developed as a consequence of the stab injuries sustained by the deceased. There is no material on record to show that the death was due to any independent or intervening cause unrelated to the injuries.
13. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the death of the deceased occurred on account of an alleged wrong transfusion of blood group is not borne out by the material on record. Though it is suggested that the deceased, having blood group ‘A’, was administered blood of group ‘AB+’, no cogent medical evidence has been adduced to establish that such transfusion was either incompatible or contributed to the death. On the contrary, the post-mortem report clearly opines that the cause of death was septicemia consequent to the injuries sustained. The material thus prima facie shows a direct nexus between the injuries and the death. The said contention is considered in detail while dealing with the subsequent point. Accordingly, it stands proved that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature.
In view of the consistent and cogent medical evidence on record, this Court finds that the death of Sanjay Roy was the result of injuries sustained by him and was clearly homicidal in nature. Accordingly, Point No. (i) is answered in the affirmative.
As to Point No. (ii):
14. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the evidence of PW1 Anita, PW2 Shubham and PW3 Khushal to establish that it was the appellant who assaulted the deceased. PW1 Anita, the wife of the deceased, has deposed that the appellant inflicted knife blows on the person of her husband. Her testimony finds material corroboration from PW2 Shubham, the son of the deceased, who has also attributed a specific role to the appellant in assaulting his father with a knife.
15. PW3 Khushal, an independent witness, has deposed that he saw the appellant assaulting the deceased with a knife. His presence at the spot has been explained and nothing material has been elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony. The evidence of PW3 thus lends assurance to the version of PW1 and PW2.
16. It is true that PW1 and PW2 are related to the deceased. However, it is well settled that the evidence of related witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship, if it is otherwise found to be credible and trustworthy. In the present case, their presence at the spot is natural and their testimonies inspire confidence. No material contradiction or omission of such magnitude has been brought on record so as to render their evidence unreliable.
It is well settled that merely because a witness is related to the deceased, his or her testimony cannot be discarded on that ground alone. In Brahm Swaroop and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 288, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that relationship is not a factor affecting credibility, if the evidence is otherwise cogent and trustworthy. The relevant paragraphs 26 and 28 of the said judgment are reproduced as under -
“26. Merely because the witnesses were closely related to the deceased persons, their testimonies cannot be discarded. Their relationship to one of the parties is not a factor that affects the credibility of a witness; more so, a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. A party has to lay down a factual foundation and prove by leading impeccable evidence in respect of its false implication. However, in such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse the evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible evidence. .....
28. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. ”
Similarly, in Baban Shankar Daphal vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 97, it has been reiterated that a related witness is often a natural witness to the occurrence and his evidence cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship, unless it is shown that such witness is actuated by motive to falsely implicate the accused. The relevant paragraphs 28 and 29 of the said judgment are reproduced as under –
“28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses, particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is often scrutinized. However, being a relative does not automatically render a witness "interested" or biased. The term "interested" refers to witnesses who have a personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for revenge or to falsely implicate the accused due to enmity or personal gain. A "related" witness, on the other hand, is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of their statements rather than labelling them as untrustworthy.
29. The distinction between "interested" and "related" witnesses has been clarified in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab 1954 SCR 145. where this Court emphasized that a close relative is usually the last person to falsely implicate an innocent person. Therefore, in evaluating the evidence of a related witness, the court should focus on the consistency and credibility of their testimony. This approach ensures that the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties, but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and consistency with other evidence in the case. This position has been reiterated by this Court in:
i. Md. Rojali Ali and Ors v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through secretary; (2019) 19 SCC567
ii. Ganapathi v. State of T.N. (2018) 5 SCC 549
iii. Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (2010) 1 SCC 199.”
In the present case, nothing has been brought on record to indicate any such motive, and therefore PW1 and PW2 being natural witnesses, their testimonies inspire confidence.
17. The defence has attempted to contend that there are inconsistencies in the version of the witnesses, particularly as regards the manner of assault. However, such minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the testimonies of witnesses who have witnessed a sudden incident and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. The core of the prosecution version, namely that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a knife, remains consistent.
18. It is equally well settled that minor discrepancies or omissions in the testimonies of witnesses do not affect the core of the prosecution case. In Mritunjoy Biswas vs. Pranab Alias Kuti Biswas and Another, (2013) 12 SCC 796, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that only such contradictions which go to the root of the matter and create serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness can be treated as material, and not every omission or inconsistency. The relevant paragraph No. 28 of the said judgment is reproduced as under :
“28. ...It is well settled in law that the discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, in-consistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission.”
In the present case, the alleged discrepancies are minor in nature and do not detract from the consistent version of the prosecution witnesses.
Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Kallappa Devu Girmal and another, 1988 MhLJ 147 to contend that inconsistencies in medical evidence would create a doubt in the prosecution case. In our considered view, the said decision is distinguishable on facts. In the said case, the medical evidence was found to be inconsistent with the ocular version to such an extent that it created a reasonable doubt about the prosecution case. In the present case, however, the ocular evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 is consistent and trustworthy and finds due corroboration from the medical evidence. The alleged discrepancies are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the matter. Hence, the reliance placed on the said decision is of no assistance to the appellant.
19. The evidence of the eye-witnesses is further supported by the medical evidence, which shows that the injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by a sharp-edged weapon like a knife. This lends further corroboration to the prosecution case.
20. The defence of the appellant that the injuries might have been caused in the course of a scuffle and without intention, is not borne out from the evidence on record. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the appellant inflicted multiple blows on the vital part of the body of the deceased.
21. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on paragraph 26 of Dashrath Singh vs. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 408 to contend that the time gap between the injury and death breaks the chain of causation. The said decision is clearly distinguishable. In that case, there was absence of post-mortem and lack of evidence regarding the post-operative condition, leaving scope for an intervening cause of death. In the present case, however, the prosecution has led cogent medical evidence and the postmortem report (Exh.61) specifically attributes the cause of death to septicemia arising out of the stab injuries. There is no material to suggest any independent intervening cause. Hence, the reliance placed on the said decision is misplaced in the present factual matrix.
22. The principal contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the death of Sanjay Roy was not the direct result of the injuries, but occurred due to medical complications, including septicemia, and, therefore, the causal link between the alleged assault and the death stands broken.
23. In this context, it is necessary to appreciate the medical evidence on record. PW5 Dr. Gulwade and PW6 Dr. Bandawar, who treated the deceased, have categorically deposed that the deceased had sustained multiple stab injuries to the abdomen resulting in internal damage to organs such as the stomach and intestines. PW6 has further explained that the presence of homo-purulent fluid was indicative of infection caused due to the spillage of intestinal contents following such injuries.
24. The post-mortem evidence of PW8 Dr. Bhalerao assumes significance. He has opined that the cause of death was “septicemia in an operated case of stab injury to abdomen” and has further clarified that such septicemia develops as a consequence of injuries penetrating the abdominal cavity. He has also stated that the injuries and their complications were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
25. The defence has sought to suggest that the septicemia might have resulted from improper medical treatment or wrong blood transfusion. In the context of medical jurisprudence, it is well established that transfusion of incompatible blood, such as administering AB+ blood to an individual of blood group A, may precipitate an acute hemolytic transfusion reaction due to antigen–antibody incompatibility. Such a reaction is typically immediate and manifests with distinct clinical features including fever, chills, lumbar or chest pain, hypotension, tachycardia, hemoglobinuria, jaundice, and in severe cases, acute renal failure and circulatory collapse. The onset of these symptoms is usually rapid, often occurring during or shortly after the transfusion, and, if untreated, may lead to death within a short span of time. In contrast, septicemia, a systemic infection of the bloodstream, develops over a comparatively longer duration and is characterized by sustained fever, signs of systemic inflammatory response, and progressive organ dysfunction. Therefore, where the clinical record and evidence do not disclose the hallmark immediate symptoms of an acute transfusion reaction, but instead indicate a progressive septic condition, the contention that death resulted from incompatible blood transfusion rather than the injuries sustained lacks medical substantiation.
26. Thus, the medical witnesses have not supported this theory. On the contrary, it has come in their evidence that septicemia in the present case was a sequel of the injuries sustained by the deceased. No material has been brought on record to establish any independent intervening cause which could be said to be responsible for the death.
Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh vs. Jaspal Singh and Others, Civil Appeal No. 7950 of 2002 to contend that where death occurs due to negligent medical treatment, the original act may not be the proximate cause of death. In our considered view, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case, the death was found to be attributable to an independent act of medical negligence, thereby breaking the chain of causation. In the present case, however, there is no material on record to establish any negligence in the medical treatment administered to the deceased. On the contrary, the evidence of the medical experts clearly indicates that the septicemia developed as a direct consequence of the injuries sustained by the deceased. Therefore, the reliance placed on the said decision is misplaced and does not advance the case of the appellant.
27. It is well settled that where the injuries inflicted are the proximate and efficient cause of death, the mere fact that death occurred after some time during treatment or due to complications arising therefrom would not absolve the assailant of criminal liability. In the present case, the chain of causation between the injuries sustained by the deceased and his death remains intact.
28. The principle relating to causation in cases where death occurs after a lapse of time is well settled. In Maniklal Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2025 INSC 1107, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that where the complications leading to death are a natural and probable consequence of the injuries sustained, the chain of causation remains intact and the accused cannot escape liability. Mere delay in death or intervening medical treatment does not break the causal connection unless an independent supervening cause is established. The extract of paragraph 69 of the above judgment is reproduced as under:
“69. We may highlight few broad principles that the courts must keep in mind.
a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC.
b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC.
c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.
d. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.
e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.
f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not merely of culpable homicide.
g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death.
h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance. What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course.
i. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.
In the present case, septicemia is clearly shown to be a consequence of the stab injuries, and therefore the causal chain remains unbroken.
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in B.N. Kavatakar And Another vs. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 304 to contend that where death occurs due to septicemia after a lapse of time, the offence may not fall under Section 302 of the IPC. In our considered view, the said decision is distinguishable on facts. In the said case, the medical evidence indicated uncertainty as to whether the death was directly attributable to the injuries sustained. However, in the present case, the evidence of the medical experts, particularly PW6 and PW8, clearly establishes that septicemia developed as a direct consequence of the stab injuries sustained by the deceased. There is no material to indicate any independent or intervening cause. Hence, in our view, the reliance placed on the said decision does not advance the case of the appellant.
29. In the absence of any credible evidence to show that the death was due to causes independent of the injuries, the contention raised on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. In view of the aforesaid discussion and settled legal principles, this Court holds that the prosecution has proved guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction under Section 302 of IPC is justified and sustainable in law. No case is made out for converting the conviction to a lesser offence. Accordingly, Point No. (ii) is answered in the affirmative.
As to Point No. (iii) :
30. Upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Court has meticulously analyzed both ocular and medical evidence and has recorded findings which are well supported by the material on record. The reasoning reflects proper appreciation of evidence and correct application of legal principles. The appellant’s contentions, including the theory of medical negligence, have been duly considered and rightly rejected. No perversity, illegality or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated so as to warrant interference. The view taken by the learned trial Court is a plausible and well-reasoned view, and therefore, we are of the opinion that no interference is called for in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, Point No. (iii) is answered in the negative.
31. Having answered first three points in the manner hereinabove, there is no substance in the appeal. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order :
ORDER
(i) The appeal is dismissed.
(ii) The judgment and order dated 17.03.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur in Sessions Case No. 16/2018 is confirmed.