THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 2019

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INTRODUCTION

The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 was enacted with the objective of safeguarding consumer

rights, providing effective redressal mechanisms, and ensuring accountability in the market for

goods and services. It replaced the earlier Consumer Protection Act, 1986, with a more

comprehensive and contemporary framework that addresses the challenges of the modern

consumer market, including e-commerce, misleading advertisements, and product liability.

The Act begins with Chapter I (Preliminary), which lays down the short title, extent,

commencement, application, and key definitions that form the foundation of the legislation.

Chapter II establishes the Consumer Protection Councils at the central, state, and district

levels. These councils are advisory bodies intended to promote and protect the rights of

consumers, ensure consumer welfare, and guide policy in this regard. The Central Consumer

Protection Council, the State Consumer Protection Councils, and the District Consumer Protection

Councils are set up with clearly defined objectives and procedures for functioning.

Chapter III introduces the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA), a regulatory

body with wide powers to protect and enforce consumer rights. It provides for the establishment,

composition, and functioning of the Authority, including the qualifications and appointment of the

Chief Commissioner and Commissioners, the creation of an Investigation Wing, and powers to

recall goods, initiate actions against false or misleading advertisements, and conduct search and

seizure. The CCPA is also empowered to refer matters to regulators, impose penalties, and file

complaints before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions.

Chapter IV deals with the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions (CDRCs) at the

district, state, and national levels. It prescribes the establishment, composition, qualifications,

jurisdiction, and procedures of these quasi-judicial bodies. The District Commission, State

Commission, and National Commission adjudicate consumer disputes based on pecuniary

jurisdiction, with provisions for filing complaints, conducting mediation, review of orders,

appeals, transfer of cases, enforcement of decisions, and penalties for non-compliance. This

chapter ensures a structured, tiered mechanism for grievance redressal, enabling consumers to

seek justice efficiently.

Chapter V introduces Mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. It

provides for the establishment of consumer mediation cells, empanelment and appointment of

mediators, duties and disclosures, procedures for mediation, and recording of settlements. This

promotes speedy and amicable settlement of disputes outside the formal adjudicatory process.

Chapter VI deals with Product Liability, a significant addition under the 2019 Act. It

defines the liability of product manufacturers, service providers, and sellers for harm caused to

consumers due to defective products or deficient services. It also lays down exceptions to such

liability. This chapter strengthens consumer rights by holding all stakeholders in the supply chain

accountable.

Chapter VII prescribes Offences and Penalties for violations under the Act. It includes

penalties for non-compliance with the directions of the Central Authority, punishments for

misleading advertisements, and stringent provisions against the manufacture, storage, sale, or

distribution of adulterated and spurious goods. The chapter also provides for cognizance of

offences by courts and safeguards against vexatious searches.

Chapter VIII contains Miscellaneous Provisions, including measures to prevent unfair

trade practices in e-commerce and direct selling, recognition of officials as public servants,

compounding of offences, protection of actions taken in good faith, and rule-making powers of the

central and state governments as well as the regulatory bodies. It also contains provisions for

repeal and savings to ensure continuity of law.

The Consumer Protection Act, 2019, thus provides a holistic framework for consumer

welfare by strengthening advisory bodies, empowering a central regulatory authority, enhancing

the adjudicatory mechanism, promoting mediation, introducing product liability, and ensuring

strict penalties for violations. It represents a modern consumer law that addresses emerging

challenges in the marketplace and seeks to ensure fair, transparent, and accountable business

practices while protecting the interests of consumers at all levels.

The Consumer Protection Act, 2019

was enacted on 9th August 2019 with the primary

objective of ensuring the protection of consumer interests in India. The Act provides a

comprehensive legal framework to safeguard consumers against unfair trade practices, defective

goods, deficiency in services, and misleading advertisements while also ensuring effective

redressal of consumer grievances. It aims to establish authorities for timely and effective

administration and settlement of consumer disputes, reflecting the growing need for consumer

empowerment in an evolving marketplace.

The Act begins with Chapter I – Preliminary, which deals with its short title, extent,

commencement, and application. It is called the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, and extends to

the whole of India except the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Act came into force on

such dates as notified by the Central Government, and different provisions could be enforced at

different times across various States. It is made applicable to all goods and services unless

specifically exempted by the Central Government through a notification.

This preliminary framework lays down the foundation of the Act by clarifying its scope,

territorial extent, applicability, and commencement. Unlike earlier legislations, the Consumer

Protection Act, 2019 adopts a wider approach by explicitly including all goods and services within

its ambit unless excluded, thereby strengthening consumer rights in a more dynamic and inclusive

manner. Through this, the Act not only reaffirms the commitment of the Indian legal system to

protect consumers but also adapts to contemporary challenges posed by e-commerce, digital

transactions, and modern market practices.

IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS

Section 2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines "advertisement" as any audio or visual

publicity, representation, endorsement or pronouncement made by means of light, sound, smoke,

Act No. 35 of 2019

gas, print, electronic media, internet or website and includes any notice, circular, label, wrapper,

invoice or such other documents.

Scope and Application

The scope of this definition is notably wide, encompassing traditional forms of communication

such as print and broadcast media as well as contemporary digital platforms, including the internet

and websites. The legislative intent is to regulate all possible modes through which commercial

messages may reach consumers. By explicitly including documents such as labels, wrappers,

invoices, and circulars, the provision ensures that promotional activities are not confined merely to

mass media campaigns but extend to all materials that might influence consumer choice. This

extended scope is particularly relevant in the digital economy, where endorsements by influencers

or representations on e-commerce websites may have significant impact on consumer decisions.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of this statutory definition may be distilled as follows. First, the presence of

publicity, representation, endorsement, or pronouncement is necessary, indicating that the

communication must be of a promotional or persuasive nature. Second, the mode of

communication is immaterial, as the Act recognises both traditional media such as print and

electronic broadcasts and modern digital media including internet-based platforms. Third, the

inclusion of physical instruments like notices, labels, wrappers, and invoices makes it clear that

even packaging or billing materials fall within the ambit of "advertisement" if they carry

promotional content. Finally, the emphasis is not on the form but the effect of the communication,

that is, whether it is intended to create awareness, promote sales, or otherwise influence consumer

behaviour.

Judicial interpretation has underscored the importance of regulating misleading or unfair

advertisements in safeguarding consumer rights. In Horlicks Ltd. v. Zydus Wellness Products

Ltd.

, the Delhi High Court reiterated that advertisements must not mislead or disparage

competing products, thereby affirming that the statutory definition serves as a foundation for

judicial scrutiny. Similarly, the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020, read with this

provision, place obligations on e-commerce entities to ensure transparency and prevent

dissemination of misleading advertisements. Through this broad definition, the Act reflects the

legislative recognition that advertisements, in all their varied forms, significantly influence

consumer decisions and must therefore be subject to scrutiny under consumer protection law.

APPROPRIATE LABORATORY

Section 2(2) defines "appropriate laboratory" to mean a laboratory or an organisation (i)

recognised by the Central Government; or (ii) recognised by a State Government, subject to such

guidelines as may be issued by the Central Government in this behalf; or (iii) established by or

under any law for the time being in force, which is maintained, financed or aided by the Central

Government or a State Government for carrying out analysis or test of any goods with a view to

determining whether such goods suffer from any defect.

Scope and Application

(2019) SCC OnLine Del 7762

The definition of "appropriate laboratory" is essential in the functioning of consumer dispute

redressal mechanisms, particularly in cases involving alleged defects in goods. The statutory

framework ensures that only credible and officially recognised laboratories are authorised to

conduct tests or analyses that may form the basis of adjudication. The provision extends

recognition to three categories of institutions: those recognised by the Central Government, those

recognised by State Governments under central guidelines, and those established by law and

supported by government funding. The inclusion of these categories ensures both central oversight

and flexibility for states to recognise laboratories within their jurisdictions, while maintaining

uniform standards.

Essential Elements

The definition rests on certain core elements. First, there must be recognition either by the Central

or State Government, which ensures legitimacy and adherence to prescribed standards. Second,

where recognition is granted by a State Government, it must be in accordance with guidelines

issued by the Central Government, thereby maintaining uniformity across the country. Third,

laboratories established under a statute and supported or financed by the government

automatically fall within the ambit of "appropriate laboratory," even without a separate

recognition process. Finally, the purpose of such laboratories is specifically tied to the analysis or

testing of goods to determine the presence of any defect, linking their function directly to

consumer protection adjudication.

The Supreme Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh

emphasised the

importance of scientific and technical evidence in consumer disputes, highlighting that expert

reports form a crucial part of adjudication where goods or services are alleged to be defective.

Although the case was not directly about "appropriate laboratories," it underlines the necessity of

reliable institutional mechanisms for consumer protection. Thus, the definition of "appropriate

laboratory" ensures that consumer forums rely on credible, standardised, and government-

recognised institutions for scientific testing, thereby enhancing the integrity and accuracy of

decisions in disputes relating to defective goods.

BRANCH OFFICE

Section 2(3) defines "branch office" to mean (i) any office or place of work described as a branch

by the establishment; or (ii) any establishment carrying on either the same or substantially the

same activity carried on by the head office of the establishment.

Scope and Application

The statutory definition of "branch office" has significant implications for determining jurisdiction

in consumer disputes. The Consumer Protection Act permits complaints to be filed not only where

the cause of action arises but also where the opposite party has a branch office. This provision

ensures greater accessibility for consumers, enabling them to approach the nearest forum rather

than being compelled to pursue litigation in distant jurisdictions where the head office may be

situated. The inclusion of establishments carrying on the same or substantially the same activity as

the head office extends the scope beyond merely formal branches, thereby preventing corporations

from evading liability by restricting operations to satellite offices without officially designating

them as branches.

(2004) 5 SCC 65

Essential Elements

The definition of "branch office" can be broken down into two essential components. First, an

office or workplace explicitly described by the establishment as a branch falls within this

definition, regardless of the scale of its activities. This formal recognition ensures that an entity

cannot disown its declared branch office in proceedings before consumer fora. Second, even if an

office is not formally called a branch, it will still qualify as one if it carries on the same or

substantially the same activities as the head office. The expression "substantially the same" is

significant, as it extends the coverage to situations where the activities may not be identical but are

closely related in nature, ensuring that consumers are not deprived of a forum merely due to

technical differences in nomenclature or organisational structure.

Judicial interpretation has reinforced this expansive view. In Sonic Surgical v. National

Insurance Co. Ltd.

, the Supreme Court held that the presence of a branch office of the opposite

party does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction on a consumer forum unless the cause of action also

arises within that jurisdiction. However, the definition of "branch office" under the Act remains

relevant in ascertaining where an establishment can be said to operate for the purposes of

entertaining complaints. Accordingly, the definition of "branch office" under Section 2(3) ensures

both formal and functional recognition of an establishment’s operational units, balancing the

interests of consumers in accessing redressal mechanisms with safeguards against forum shopping.

CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 2(4) defines "Central Authority" to mean the Central Consumer Protection Authority

established under Section 10 of the Act.

Scope and Application

The Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) represents one of the most significant

institutional innovations introduced by the 2019 legislation. Unlike the earlier framework under

the 1986 Act, which primarily focused on redressal of individual consumer grievances through

adjudicatory fora, the present Act establishes the CCPA as a regulatory body with wide-ranging

powers to protect consumer rights, prevent unfair trade practices, and ensure that markets operate

in a fair and transparent manner. The scope of the term “Central Authority,” therefore, extends

beyond mere adjudication and embraces regulatory, investigative, and enforcement functions of

national significance.

Essential Elements

The essential elements embedded in this definition are twofold. First, the Central Authority is a

statutory creation, established specifically under Section 10 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

This ensures its legitimacy, permanence, and independence within the framework of consumer

protection law. Second, its powers and functions are derived entirely from the statute, which

entrusts it with duties such as issuing guidelines, conducting inquiries, recalling unsafe goods,

discontinuing unfair practices, and imposing penalties for misleading advertisements. The

statutory foundation also distinguishes it from consumer forums, as its role is preventive and

regulatory rather than adjudicatory.

(2010) 1 SCC 135

The functioning of the Central Authority has already been tested in practice. For instance,

in Central Consumer Protection Authority v. Flipkart Internet Pvt. Ltd., the CCPA directed e-

commerce entities to withdraw misleading advertisements and ensure compliance with consumer

protection norms. This demonstrates that the Authority operates as a proactive regulator capable of

addressing systemic issues affecting consumers at large, rather than confining itself to individual

disputes. In essence, the definition of "Central Authority" under Section 2(4) must be read in light

of its statutory establishment under Section 10. It symbolises the legislative intent to create a

national-level body with regulatory and enforcement powers, thereby elevating consumer

protection in India from a purely adjudicatory model to a more comprehensive regulatory regime.

COMPLAINANT

Section 2(5) defines "complainant" to include (i) a consumer; or (ii) any voluntary consumer

association registered under any law for the time being in force; or (iii) the Central Government or

any State Government; or (iv) the Central Authority; or (v) one or more consumers, where there

are numerous consumers having the same interest; or (vi) in case of death of a consumer, his legal

heir or legal representative; or (vii) in case of a consumer being a minor, his parent or legal

guardian.

Scope and Application

The definition of "complainant" plays a pivotal role in determining locus standi under the Act. By

widening the category of persons and bodies who may approach consumer fora, the legislature has

ensured that consumer protection is not confined to individual consumers alone but extends to

collective, governmental, and representative mechanisms. This inclusive approach is consistent

with the broader objective of safeguarding consumer rights in a market economy where the

imbalance of bargaining power often disadvantages individuals. The provision also bridges

practical difficulties such as the death of a consumer or the incapacity of a minor by allowing

heirs, legal representatives, parents, or guardians to continue proceedings.

Essential Elements

The definition highlights several essential elements. First, an individual consumer who alleges

infringement of rights is the most direct form of complainant. Second, voluntary consumer

associations, duly registered, are empowered to initiate proceedings, reflecting recognition of

collective action and the role of civil society in advancing consumer interests. Third, the Central

Government, State Governments, and the Central Authority are expressly included, thereby

institutionalising public interest actions where violations affect large segments of consumers or

public health and safety. Fourth, the provision permits representative complaints by multiple

consumers with the same interest, thus echoing the principle embodied in Order I Rule 8 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and preventing multiplicity of proceedings. Fifth, the law accounts

for continuity in rights of action by allowing heirs or legal representatives to step into the shoes of

a deceased consumer, ensuring that legitimate grievances do not abate. Sixth, in cases involving

minors, the law recognises the parent or legal guardian as the appropriate party to institute

proceedings, thereby safeguarding vulnerable sections of society.

Judicial pronouncements have elaborated on the scope of the term "complainant." In

Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the Supreme Court underscored the remedial

and beneficial nature of consumer law, holding that its provisions must be interpreted liberally to

(1994) 1 SCC 243

empower complainants in securing justice. Similarly, in Common Cause, A Registered Society v.

Union of India

, the Court upheld the standing of voluntary consumer associations to file

complaints in the larger public interest. These cases affirm that the statutory expansion of the term

"complainant" aligns with the consumer welfare orientation of the legislation. Accordingly,

Section 2(5) provides a comprehensive and inclusive framework for recognising who may institute

proceedings under the Act, thereby reinforcing access to justice and ensuring that consumer

protection is not undermined by procedural limitations on standing.

COMPLAINT

Section 2(6) defines "complaint" to mean any allegation in writing, made by a complainant for

obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act, that—(i) an unfair contract or unfair trade

practice or a restrictive trade practice has been adopted by any trader or service provider; (ii) the

goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him suffer from one or more defects; (iii) the

services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from any deficiency;

(iv) a trader or a service provider, as the case may be, has charged for the goods or services a price

in excess of the price (a) fixed by or under any law for the time being in force; or (b) displayed on

the goods or any package containing such goods; or (c) displayed on the price list exhibited by

him by or under any law for the time being in force; or (d) agreed between the parties; (v) the

goods, which are hazardous to life and safety when used, are being offered for sale to the public

(a) in contravention of standards relating to safety of such goods as required to be complied with,

by or under any law for the time being in force; or (b) where the trader knows that the goods so

offered are unsafe to the public; (vi) the services which are hazardous or likely to be hazardous to

life and safety of the public when used, are being offered by a person who provides any service

and who knows it to be injurious to life and safety; (vii) a claim for product liability action lies

against the product manufacturer, product seller or product service provider, as the case may be.

Scope and Application

The definition of "complaint" is central to the operation of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, as

it identifies the circumstances under which a consumer or other authorised entity may invoke the

jurisdiction of consumer fora. The scope is significantly broader than under the 1986 Act,

reflecting the expansion of consumer rights and the need to address emerging challenges such as

unfair contracts, hazardous services, and product liability. The provision ensures that complaints

are not confined merely to defective goods or deficient services, but extend to unfair trade

practices, overcharging, violation of safety standards, and injurious conduct that threatens

consumer welfare. By expressly recognising product liability actions, the Act further strengthens

consumer rights against manufacturers, sellers, and service providers alike.

Essential Elements

Several essential elements emerge from the definition. First, a complaint must be in writing,

thereby providing a formal basis for adjudication. Second, it must be made by a complainant as

defined under Section 2(5), ensuring proper locus standi. Third, the complaint must allege a

statutory ground that is expressly recognised under the Act. These include adoption of unfair or

restrictive trade practices, sale of defective goods, rendering of deficient services, charging in

excess of the lawful or agreed price, offering hazardous goods or services in violation of statutory

standards or with knowledge of their dangerous nature, and claims arising from product liability.

(1997) 10 SCC 729

Fourth, the objective of filing the complaint must be to obtain relief available under the Act,

ensuring that consumer forums are not converted into general courts of law.

Judicial interpretation has underscored the liberal construction of the term "complaint" in

furtherance of consumer welfare. In Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia

, the Supreme

Court recognised the right of not only the direct consumer but also the beneficiaries of the services

to maintain a complaint, thereby expanding the remedial scope of consumer law. Similarly, in

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors

, the Court clarified the ambit of complaints

arising out of commercial transactions, holding that consumer jurisdiction is not ousted merely

because a transaction has a commercial element, unless the dominant purpose is commercial in

nature. Thus, Section 2(6) provides a comprehensive statutory framework for defining what

constitutes a complaint, balancing procedural formality with substantive inclusivity, and thereby

reinforcing the remedial and protective objectives of consumer law in India.

CONSUMER

Section 2(7) defines "consumer" as any person who—(i) buys any goods for a consideration which

has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred

payment, and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for

consideration when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a

person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or (ii) hires or avails of

any service for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly

promised, or under any system of deferred payment, and includes any beneficiary of such service

other than the person who hires or avails of the services when such services are availed of with the

approval of the first-mentioned person, but does not include a person who avails of such service

for any commercial purpose.

The Explanation clarifies: (a) the expression "commercial purpose" does not include use by

a person of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by

means of self-employment; and (b) the expressions "buys any goods" and "hires or avails any

services" include offline or online transactions through electronic means or by teleshopping or

direct selling or multi-level marketing.

Scope and Application

The definition of "consumer" is the cornerstone of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, since the

rights, remedies, and jurisdiction of consumer fora revolve around identifying who qualifies as a

consumer. The scope is both broad and nuanced. It covers not only purchasers or hirers who

directly transact but also users and beneficiaries of goods and services, provided such use is with

the approval of the purchaser or hirer. By excluding persons obtaining goods or services for resale

or for commercial purposes, the legislature has maintained the distinction between consumers and

traders. However, the inclusion of livelihood through self-employment as an exception to

"commercial purpose" demonstrates the Act’s social orientation, ensuring that small entrepreneurs

and individuals are not deprived of consumer protection. The explicit recognition of e-commerce,

teleshopping, direct selling, and multi-level marketing ensures that the definition keeps pace with

the changing modes of trade in the digital economy.

Essential Elements

(1998) 4 SCC 39

(2023) 4 SCC 513

Several essential elements emerge from this definition. First, there must be consideration, whether

paid, promised, partly paid, or under deferred payment, thereby accommodating diverse

contractual arrangements. Second, the protection extends to users and beneficiaries beyond the

purchaser, emphasising the end-user’s rights. Third, the exclusion for resale or commercial

purpose narrows the definition but is tempered by the exception for livelihood activities by self-

employment. Fourth, the statute expressly includes digital and modern trade mechanisms,

reflecting the realities of a contemporary marketplace.

Judicial interpretation has provided authoritative clarity. In Laxmi Engineering Works v.

P.S.G. Industrial Institute

, the Supreme Court held that a consumer does not include persons

obtaining goods for commercial purposes, but clarified that self-employment for earning

livelihood would not disqualify an individual as a consumer. This principle is now incorporated in

the Explanation. In Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia

, the Court recognised both

the person who hires services and the beneficiary of such services as consumers, thereby

expanding the remedial scope. More recently, in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia

Motors

, the Court revisited the meaning of "commercial purpose," reiterating that consumer

jurisdiction depends upon the dominant purpose of the transaction rather than its mere commercial

form. Accordingly, Section 2(7) provides a carefully balanced definition of "consumer,"

combining inclusivity with necessary exclusions, and establishing the foundation upon which the

entire Act operates.

CONSUMER DISPUTE

Section 2(8) defines "consumer dispute" to mean a dispute where the person against whom a

complaint has been made denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint.

Scope and Application

This provision establishes the threshold at which a grievance matures into a legally recognisable

consumer dispute. A complaint by itself is only an allegation; it becomes a "dispute" when the

opposite party contests, denies, or challenges those allegations. The scope of this definition is

critical for consumer fora because their adjudicatory function commences only once a dispute

exists. Without such denial, the matter would either stand uncontested, leading to ex parte orders,

or may not require adjudication at all. The definition also ensures that consumer fora are not

converted into advisory bodies, but remain adjudicatory institutions dealing with contested claims

within the statutory framework.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a "consumer dispute" are twofold. First, there must be a complaint filed

by a "complainant" as defined under Section 2(5), alleging contravention of rights or obligations

recognised under the Act. Second, the opposite party must deny or dispute such allegations. It is

this contestation that transforms the matter into a consumer dispute, thereby triggering the

adjudicatory jurisdiction of consumer fora under the Act. The provision thus provides procedural

clarity, distinguishing mere grievances from disputes requiring adjudication.

(1995) 3 SCC 583

(1998) 4 SCC 39

(2023) 4 SCC 513

Judicial pronouncements have recognised this distinction. In Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd.

v. N.K. Modi

, the Supreme Court clarified that once allegations in a complaint are denied by the

opposite party, the consumer fora are competent to adjudicate the matter, even if alternative

remedies exist under other laws. Similarly, in Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board v.

Bishambar Dayal Goyal

, the Court reiterated that consumer fora acquire jurisdiction when a

dispute arises from denial or contestation of consumer allegations, emphasising the mandatory

nature of adjudication once a dispute is established. Accordingly, Section 2(8) plays an important

role in demarcating the functional jurisdiction of consumer fora by clarifying when a complaint

crystallises into a dispute, thereby providing procedural certainty in consumer adjudication.

CONSUMER RIGHTS

Section 2(9) defines "consumer rights" to include the right to be protected against the marketing of

goods, products or services which are hazardous to life and property; the right to be informed

about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods, products or services so as

to protect the consumer against unfair trade practice; the right to be assured, wherever possible,

access to a variety of goods, products or services at competitive prices; the right to be heard and to

be assured that consumer interests will receive due consideration at appropriate fora; the right to

seek redressal against unfair trade practice or restrictive trade practice or unscrupulous

exploitation of consumers; and the right to consumer awareness.

Scope and Application

The provision serves as a statement of the core entitlements that underpin consumer protection law

in India. It draws inspiration from international standards such as the United Nations Guidelines

for Consumer Protection (1985), while adapting them to the Indian socio-economic framework.

The scope of consumer rights under this section is both preventive and remedial: preventive in the

sense of ensuring safety, information, and awareness before harm occurs, and remedial in terms of

ensuring access to redressal mechanisms once injury or exploitation has taken place. These rights

also function as guiding principles for the interpretation of the Act, shaping the obligations of

manufacturers, service providers, and regulators alike.

Essential Elements

The definition identifies six essential entitlements. First, the right to safety, which protects

consumers against hazardous goods and services. Second, the right to information, requiring

disclosure of material particulars to enable informed choice and prevent deception. Third, the right

to choice, ensuring access to a variety of goods and services at fair and competitive prices. Fourth,

the right to be heard, mandating that consumer concerns receive due consideration in both

adjudicatory and regulatory fora. Fifth, the right to redressal, which allows remedies against unfair

or restrictive practices and exploitation. Sixth, the right to consumer awareness, recognising that

informed consumers are essential to the functioning of fair markets. Collectively, these

entitlements form the substantive and procedural pillars of consumer protection.

Judicial recognition of consumer rights has been consistent. In Lucknow Development

Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the Supreme Court highlighted that consumer protection statutes must

be interpreted to advance consumer welfare, reinforcing the right to redressal. In Indian Medical

(1996) 6 SCC 385

(2014) 16 SCC 24

(1994) 1 SCC 243

Association v. V.P. Shantha

, the Court emphasised the right to safety in the context of medical

services. More recently, in Reckitt Benckiser (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI

, the Delhi High Court

underscored the right to information by upholding regulatory measures against misleading

advertisements. Thus, Section 2(9) not only enumerates the substantive rights of consumers but

also lays the foundation for interpreting and applying the Act in a rights-based manner, ensuring

that consumer protection in India is aligned with both domestic needs and global standards.

DEFECT

Section 2(10) "defect" as any fault, imperfection or shortcoming in the quality, quantity, potency,

purity or standard of goods which is required to be maintained under any law for the time being in

force, or under any contract, express or implied, or as claimed by the trader in any manner

whatsoever in relation to any goods or product.

Scope and Application

The definition of defect is central to consumer protection jurisprudence, as a substantial portion of

complaints relate to the supply of defective goods. The scope of this provision is broad, covering

not merely statutory and contractual standards but also representations made by the trader in

advertisements, product packaging, or any other form of assurance. It applies equally to goods

sold in the traditional retail setting and those offered through e-commerce platforms, direct selling,

or other modern channels. Importantly, the definition aligns consumer rights with legal and

contractual obligations imposed upon manufacturers and sellers, thereby making the marketplace

more accountable.

Essential Elements

Several essential elements can be discerned from this definition. First, the existence of a "fault,

imperfection or shortcoming" is necessary. This may arise from manufacturing, design, storage, or

distribution processes. Second, the defect must relate to aspects such as quality, quantity, potency,

purity or standard. These terms capture both tangible characteristics (like durability or

composition) and intangible assurances (such as efficacy in the case of medicines). Third, the

standard against which the defect is judged may arise from three sources: statutory prescriptions,

contractual terms (express or implied), or representations made by the trader. Thus, even an

exaggerated claim in an advertisement may form the basis of a defect if it creates a legitimate

consumer expectation. Finally, the defect must be in relation to "goods," distinguishing it from

"deficiency" under Section 2(11), which concerns services.

Judicial interpretation has played an important role in shaping the understanding of defect.

In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar

, the Supreme Court emphasised

that goods must conform not only to contractual stipulations but also to statutory standards. In

Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot Ahluwalia

, while the case primarily dealt with services, the

Court reiterated the consumer’s right to goods and services free from imperfection or shortcoming.

In Bikram Chatterjee v. Union of India

, concerning defective housing services and materials, the

Court underscored that developers and traders are bound to deliver goods and works free from

(1995) 6 SCC 651

2019 SCC OnLine Del 9521

(2000) 5 SCC 346

(1998) 4 SCC 39

(2019) 19 SCC 161

defects as represented. Accordingly, Section 2(10) provides a wide and consumer-centric

definition of defect, ensuring that traders and manufacturers are held accountable not only to

statutory and contractual obligations but also to the expectations they themselves create in the

minds of consumers.

DEFICIENCY

Section 2(11) "deficiency" as any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality,

nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the

time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract

or otherwise in relation to any service, and includes any act of negligence or omission or

commission by such person which causes loss or injury to the consumer and deliberate

withholding of relevant information.

Scope and Application

The concept of deficiency is distinct from defect, in that it relates to services rather than goods.

The provision widens the scope of accountability for service providers, requiring them not only to

adhere to statutory and contractual standards but also to perform services in a manner consistent

with the expectations reasonably created by their undertakings. The inclusion of negligence,

omissions, commissions, and deliberate withholding of material information within the definition

ensures that consumers are protected against both active misconduct and passive failure. It is

applicable to a wide range of service sectors, including healthcare, education, housing, banking,

insurance, telecommunications, and other public utilities. The provision also addresses the

evolving nature of services in the digital economy by ensuring that services delivered through

online and technology-based platforms are equally subject to scrutiny for deficiency.

Essential Elements

The essential components of deficiency may be classified as follows. First, there must be a fault,

imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the service rendered. This inadequacy is assessed in

terms of quality, nature, or manner of performance. Second, the benchmark for determining

deficiency may be statutory standards, contractual obligations, or reasonable expectations created

by the service provider. Third, the provision explicitly recognises negligence and omissions or

commissions as constituting deficiency, thereby aligning the law with principles of tortious

liability. Fourth, deliberate withholding of relevant information is also classified as deficiency,

highlighting the duty of candour owed by service providers to consumers. This ensures that a

consumer’s decision is based on complete and accurate disclosure, particularly in sensitive sectors

such as insurance, healthcare, or finance.

Judicial precedents have considerably shaped the scope of deficiency. In Indian Medical

Association v. V.P. Shantha

, the Supreme Court held that medical services fall within the ambit

of "service" under the Consumer Protection Act and that medical negligence constitutes

deficiency. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the Court ruled that failure to

deliver housing in accordance with promised terms amounted to deficiency in service. Similarly,

in Punjab National Bank v. K.B. Shetty

, the National Commission observed that mismanagement

and failure in rendering banking services amount to deficiency. These decisions establish that the

(1995) 6 SCC 651

(1994) 1 SCC 243

(1991) CPJ 335 (NC)

scope of deficiency is both wide and consumer-oriented. Section 2(11) thus codifies a

comprehensive standard for service accountability, ensuring that consumers receive not merely

formal compliance with contract terms but also fair, efficient, and transparent service delivery.

DESIGN

Section 2(12) defines "design" as the features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornament, or

composition of lines or colours applied to any article, whether in two-dimensional or three-

dimensional form, or in both forms, by any industrial process or means, whether manual,

mechanical or chemical, separate or combined, which in the finished article appeal to and are

judged solely by the eye, but does not include any mode or principle of construction, or anything

which is in substance a mere mechanical device, and does not include any trademark, property

mark or artistic work as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957.

Scope and Application

The definition of design under the Act is primarily borrowed from the Designs Act, 2000. Its

incorporation within the Consumer Protection Act is significant because it extends consumer

rights into areas involving aesthetic features of goods, particularly those that influence consumer

choice and marketability. The scope of the provision lies in protecting consumers against

deceptive practices involving imitation of design or misrepresentation of the originality of the

product’s appearance. While the Consumer Protection Act is not an intellectual property statute,

the definition of design is relevant for the purpose of identifying defects or misrepresentations in

goods sold to consumers where the visual appeal or appearance is a material factor in the

transaction.

Essential Elements

The essential ingredients of a design under this provision are: first, it must consist of features

relating to shape, configuration, pattern, ornament, or composition of lines or colours; second,

such features must be applied to an article by an industrial process or means, whether manual,

mechanical, chemical or a combination; third, the resultant appearance must be judged solely by

the eye, thus emphasising the aesthetic appeal rather than functional utility; fourth, the provision

specifically excludes from its scope any mode or principle of construction, any mere mechanical

device, as well as trademarks, property marks, or artistic works which are protected under other

legislations.

Judicial interpretation under the Designs Act is relevant in understanding this definition. In

Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd.

, the Supreme Court explained that for a

design to be valid, it must be new or original and not previously published. While the case arose

under the Designs Act, its reasoning illuminates the consumer law context by highlighting how the

appearance of goods influences consumer perception and purchasing decisions. Similarly, the

Delhi High Court in Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar & Co.

, noted that a design must be novel and

appeal to the eye, distinguishing it from artistic works under copyright law. In the consumer

protection framework, the reference to design thus supports consumer claims where

misrepresentation or defects pertain not only to the functional quality of goods but also to their

promised aesthetic attributes. Section 2(12) thereby ensures that the visual appeal and originality

(2008) 10 SCC 657

2009 (40) PTC 519 (Del)

of goods, which often form a decisive factor in consumer choice, are safeguarded against unfair

practices.

DIRECT SELLING

Section 2(13) defines “direct selling” as the marketing, distribution and sale of goods or provision

of services through a network of sellers, other than through a permanent retail location.

Scope and Application

The inclusion of “direct selling” within the definitional framework of the Act recognises the

growing significance of non-traditional channels of commerce. Unlike conventional retail which

operates through permanent physical establishments, direct selling allows goods and services to be

marketed and distributed directly to consumers through a network of individual sellers. This

includes models such as door-to-door sales, personal referrals, and increasingly, multi-level

marketing systems. The statutory definition expressly excludes permanent retail outlets, thereby

distinguishing direct selling from conventional trade practices. The scope of this provision has

particular relevance in the context of consumer protection, as direct selling models often create

vulnerabilities where consumers may be misled, pressured, or exploited.

Essential Elements

The essential components of the definition are: first, the activity must involve marketing,

distribution, or sale of goods, or provision of services; second, it must be carried out through a

network of sellers, implying a structured chain of individuals or entities engaged in selling; third,

it must not involve a permanent retail location, which is the defining distinction between direct

selling and conventional retail operations.

Judicial and regulatory scrutiny of direct selling models has largely focused on

distinguishing legitimate direct selling from fraudulent pyramid or money circulation schemes. In

State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha

, the Supreme Court examined the nature of money

circulation schemes under the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978,

and emphasised that business structures designed primarily to exploit consumers under the guise

of trade are impermissible. While not directly on the Consumer Protection Act, the reasoning

provides a useful analogy in understanding how direct selling structures are tested for legitimacy.

Further, the Department of Consumer Affairs has issued Direct Selling Guidelines, 2016, and later

the Consumer Protection (Direct Selling) Rules, 2021, which regulate entities and individuals

engaged in direct selling. These rules impose obligations such as registration, grievance redressal

mechanisms, and prohibition of pyramid schemes, thereby reinforcing the consumer-centric intent

of Section 2(13). Thus, Section 2(13) provides the foundational definition that enables the

regulation of direct selling within the broader consumer protection framework, ensuring that while

innovative trade models are accommodated, consumer interests remain safeguarded against

exploitative practices.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL

Section 2(14) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines “Director-General” to mean the

Director-General appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act.

(1982) 1 SCC 561

Scope and Application

The reference to the Director-General in this provision is closely tied to the statutory framework

created under Section 15, which deals with the establishment of the Central Consumer Protection

Authority (CCPA) and its administrative hierarchy. The Director-General is envisaged as a high-

ranking authority within the institutional setup of consumer protection, empowered to assist the

Central Authority in carrying out its mandate under the Act.

The appointment of a Director-General reflects legislative intent to provide a specialised

officer with sufficient powers and expertise to oversee matters of investigation, enforcement, and

supervision in relation to consumer rights. The role is akin to a regulatory head, ensuring that

consumer welfare and market fairness are protected in accordance with the objectives of the Act.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of this definition are as follows: first, the Director-General is not a generic

post but a specific statutory office created under Section 15(2); second, the appointment is to be

made by the Central Government, thereby underscoring the official and institutional character of

the office; third, the Director-General functions within the structure of the CCPA, with

responsibilities that generally relate to conducting inquiries, overseeing investigations, and

ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws.

While case law under the 2019 Act specifically dealing with the Director-General is still

developing, the functional analogy may be drawn with similar regulatory offices under other

statutes, such as the Director-General of Investigation under the Competition Act, 2002. In CCI v.

Steel Authority of India Ltd.

, the Supreme Court recognised the importance of investigative

wings led by a Director-General in maintaining the integrity of regulatory regimes. By analogy,

the Director-General under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 plays a similar role in ensuring

transparency, accountability, and effective enforcement. Thus, Section 2(14) provides only a

definitional clarity, but its true import lies in linking the office of the Director-General with the

substantive powers conferred under Section 15 and related provisions. It ensures that the

administrative structure of consumer protection is not merely declaratory but backed by an

empowered official capable of enforcing statutory rights.

DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 2(15) defines “District Commission” as the District Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission established under sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act.

Scope and Application

The District Commission is the primary adjudicatory forum under the three-tier redressal

mechanism envisaged by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, consisting of the District

Commission, the State Commission, and the National Commission. The establishment of the

District Commission under Section 28(1) is central to ensuring access to justice at the local level

for consumers aggrieved by unfair trade practices, defective goods, or deficient services.

The scope of the District Commission extends to the adjudication of complaints where the

value of goods or services paid as consideration falls within the pecuniary jurisdiction prescribed

(2010) 10 SCC 744

under Section 34(1). The forum is designed to be accessible, inexpensive, and consumer-friendly,

thereby realising the constitutional objective of access to justice under Article 39A.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of this definition are, first, that the District Commission is a statutory

adjudicatory body constituted under Section 28(1) by the State Government; second, it exercises

powers and jurisdiction specifically conferred under the Act, particularly in relation to consumer

disputes; third, its territorial jurisdiction is confined to the local limits of the district for which it is

established, subject to provisions enabling the filing of complaints at the place where the cause of

action arises, as recognised under Section 34(2).

The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Co-op.

Society

, upheld the constitutional validity of consumer fora and recognised their role as quasi-

judicial bodies created to provide inexpensive and speedy redressal to consumers. By extension,

the District Commission, as the first-tier forum, carries a crucial responsibility in handling

consumer disputes efficiently and expeditiously. Accordingly, Section 2(15) defines the District

Commission not merely as an administrative body but as a specialised judicial forum vested with

statutory powers. It forms the foundation of the consumer dispute resolution mechanism and

thereby ensures the realisation of consumer rights at the grassroots level.

E-COMMERCE

Section 2(16) defines “e-commerce” as buying or selling of goods or services including digital

products over digital or electronic networks.

Scope and Application

The introduction of e-commerce within the statutory framework of consumer protection reflects

the rapid transformation of trade and commerce in the digital era. The scope of the definition is

intentionally broad, encompassing not only physical goods but also digital products and services.

By expressly referring to digital or electronic networks, the Act covers online marketplaces, direct

sellers operating through websites, mobile applications, tele-shopping, and other internet-based

modes of commerce.

The application of this definition is significant in bringing within the purview of consumer

law the transactions occurring through e-commerce entities, which had earlier posed challenges

due to their cross-border and often unregulated nature. The definition also serves as the basis for

the Central Government’s rule-making power under Section 101, leading to the Consumer

Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020, which govern issues of unfair trade practices, consumer

consent, information disclosure, and grievance redressal mechanisms in the e-commerce sector.

Essential Elements

(2003) 2 SCC 412

The essential elements of this definition are, first, that the activity must involve buying or selling;

second, it must pertain to goods, services, or digital products; third, the medium of transaction

must be a digital or electronic network. The inclusion of digital products marks a significant

departure from the earlier Act of 1986, thereby acknowledging the evolution of commerce in the

virtual domain.

In Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd

, the Delhi High

Court recognised the obligations of online marketplaces in relation to consumer rights, particularly

with regard to authenticity of products and unfair trade practices. Although decided under the

earlier law, the reasoning of the Court strengthens the application of the present definition of e-

commerce by emphasising accountability of digital platforms. Thus, Section 2(16) places e-

commerce transactions firmly within the domain of consumer law, ensuring that the shift from

traditional to digital commerce does not erode consumer rights but rather strengthens their

enforceability in the online marketplace.

ELECTRONIC SERVICE PROVIDER

Section 2(17) defines “electronic service provider” as a person who provides technologies or

processes to enable a product seller to engage in advertising or selling goods or services to a

consumer, and includes any online marketplace or online auction sites.

Scope and Application

The definition of electronic service provider significantly broadens the ambit of consumer

protection law by including intermediaries who act as facilitators of digital commerce. Unlike

traditional sellers, such entities may not directly sell goods or services but provide the

technological infrastructure necessary for sellers and buyers to transact. The provision thereby

addresses the complex chain of accountability in online trade, ensuring that platforms and

facilitators are not absolved from responsibility where consumer rights are implicated.

The application of this provision is especially relevant in the regulation of online

marketplaces such as Amazon, Flipkart, or auction-based platforms like eBay. These entities,

though often positioning themselves as neutral intermediaries, are recognised under law as

electronic service providers with specific obligations. The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce)

Rules, 2020 operationalise this definition by requiring such providers to establish grievance

redressal mechanisms, disclose seller information, and ensure that consumer consent is explicit

and informed.

Essential Elements

The essential features of the definition are: first, the entity must provide technologies or processes

rather than the goods or services themselves; second, the purpose must be to enable a product

seller to engage in advertising or sale; third, it expressly includes online marketplaces and auction

platforms. The emphasis is on the facilitative role of such providers, which directly impacts

consumer transactions.

In Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi High

Court underlined that online platforms cannot entirely disassociate themselves from the sale of

goods occurring through their medium. This reasoning aligns with the statutory recognition of

2019 SCC OnLine Del 10701

electronic service providers in the 2019 Act, holding them accountable for ensuring that the rights

of consumers are safeguarded against unfair trade practices and defective products. Therefore,

Section 2(17) bridges the regulatory gap between product sellers and digital intermediaries,

ensuring that all actors in the online transaction chain are brought within the ambit of consumer

protection law.

ENDORSEMENT

Section 2(18) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines “endorsement,” in relation to an

advertisement, to mean: (i) any message, verbal statement, or demonstration; or (ii) depiction of

the name, signature, likeness, or other identifiable personal characteristics of an individual; or (iii)

depiction of the name or seal of any institution or organisation, which makes the consumer believe

that it reflects the opinion, finding, or experience of the person making such endorsement.

Scope and Application

The provision seeks to delineate the ambit of what constitutes an “endorsement” in advertising.

Unlike a mere advertisement prepared by a manufacturer or seller, an endorsement relies upon the

credibility or perceived trustworthiness of a person, institution, or organisation. The law

recognises that such endorsements exert significant influence on consumer behaviour, often

creating the impression of authenticity, safety, or desirability of the product or service being

promoted.

The application of this definition becomes particularly relevant under Section 21 of the

Act, which empowers the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) to impose penalties and

issue directions against false or misleading advertisements. Since endorsements are expressly

included, both the advertiser and the endorser may be held liable if the endorsement misrepresents

facts or misleads consumers. This statutory clarity has widened the accountability net to cover not

only manufacturers and traders but also endorsers, thereby addressing the growing impact of

celebrity and institutional endorsements in modern commerce.

Essential Elements

Three essential elements emerge from the definition. First, the act of endorsement may take the

form of a message, verbal statement, demonstration, or other communicative act. Second, an

endorsement may include the use of personal identifiers such as name, signature, likeness, or any

other recognisable characteristic of an individual, ensuring that even implicit associations are

covered. Third, institutional endorsements, through the use of name or seal, are also brought

within the definition, recognising that organisations may equally influence consumer perceptions.

The common thread is that such endorsements must induce the consumer to believe that they

reflect genuine opinion, experience, or findings of the person or entity depicted.

The regulatory scrutiny of endorsements has been illustrated in practice. For instance, in

CCPA v. Ranveer Singh & Others (2023) and CCPA v. Amitabh Bachchan & Others (2023),

notices were issued to celebrities for endorsing products alleged to be harmful or misleading.

Although still in the domain of administrative action, these proceedings highlight how

endorsements are now a legally regulated category of advertisement. Thus, Section 2(18) provides

a comprehensive statutory framework for identifying endorsements in advertisements, ensuring

that those who lend their reputation or identity to products and services cannot escape

accountability when consumers are misled.

ESTABLISHMENT

Section 2(19) defines “establishment” to include an advertising agency, commission agent,

manufacturing or trading entity, or any other commercial agency which carries on any business,

trade, profession, or any work in connection with or incidental or ancillary to any commercial

activity, trade, or profession. It also extends to such other class or classes of persons, including

public utility entities, as may be prescribed.

Scope and Application

This definition adopts an inclusive character, meaning it does not restrict itself to the entities

expressly named but also covers other similar commercial undertakings engaged in business,

trade, or profession. The provision ensures that all agencies and organisations participating in the

chain of commerce—whether directly selling, producing, promoting, or indirectly facilitating

trade—are accountable under the Act.

The express mention of advertising agencies and commission agents is particularly

significant. Advertising agencies are instrumental in creating representations that reach

consumers, while commission agents act as intermediaries in trade. By including these within the

term “establishment,” the legislature ensures that liability is not confined to manufacturers and

traders alone but extends to all entities connected with commercial activities that may affect

consumer rights.

Essential Elements

From the definition, the following essential elements emerge:

1. It must be an agency, entity, or organisation engaged in business, trade, or profession.

2. It may involve not only core commercial activities but also ancillary or incidental

activities.

3. It expressly includes advertising agencies, commission agents, and public utility entities,

thereby covering both private and public dimensions of commercial activity.

4. The Central Government has the power to prescribe additional classes of persons to be

treated as establishments, ensuring flexibility and adaptability with changing commercial

practices.

Judicial and Practical Relevance

Courts and consumer fora have consistently interpreted similar terms in a broad sense to ensure

effective protection of consumers. In Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha (1995), the

Supreme Court included medical services within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act,

emphasising that the legislative intent was to cover all service providers impacting consumers.

Similarly, under the 2019 Act, by broadening the term “establishment,” entities like e-commerce

platforms, online intermediaries, and even public utilities are brought under consumer law

oversight.

EXPRESS WARRANTY

Section 2(20) defines “express warranty” as any material statement, affirmation of fact, promise or

description relating to a product or service, warranting that it conforms to such material statement,

affirmation, promise or description. The provision further clarifies that an express warranty also

includes any sample or model of a product warranting that the whole of such product conforms to

such sample or model.

Scope and Application

The statutory inclusion of “express warranty” reflects the legislature’s intent to secure consumer

confidence by holding manufacturers and service providers accountable for their representations.

The concept is rooted in the principle that consumers often rely upon assurances given at the time

of purchase or during pre-sale representations, whether through catalogues, packaging,

advertising, or demonstrations.

The scope of an express warranty is broad, as it encompasses not merely contractual

promises but also any material statement or affirmation of fact that forms the basis of consumer

reliance. Thus, even promotional claims, descriptive literature, or sample demonstrations that

induce the consumer to purchase fall within the ambit of this provision. The incorporation of

“services” within its coverage ensures that consumers of non-tangible transactions are equally

protected.

Judicial precedent has consistently recognised the binding nature of warranties and

representations. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Susheel Kumar Gabgotra

, the Supreme Court affirmed

that representations in warranty clauses must be construed strictly, and the manufacturer cannot

escape liability for defects contrary to the assurance given. Though the case was decided under the

1986 Act, the principle directly aligns with the legislative intent under the 2019 Act.

Essential Elements

The essential features of Section 2(20) may be delineated as follows. First, there must be a

material statement, affirmation of fact, promise, or description relating to the product or service.

Second, such a representation must amount to a warranty that the product or service conforms to

the statement made. Third, the provision explicitly extends the meaning of express warranty to

include samples or models, ensuring that the entirety of the product conforms to the demonstrated

or exhibited exemplar. Fourth, consumer reliance on such warranties is implicit, as the rationale

behind the provision is to protect consumers against misleading or unfulfilled assurances.

The emphasis of Section 2(20) is thus on the reliability of claims made by manufacturers,

traders, and service providers. It ensures that consumers are not misled into purchasing goods or

availing services based on assurances that later prove false or exaggerated. In contemporary

markets, where consumer choices are significantly shaped by advertisements, demonstrations, and

promotional materials, the recognition of express warranty provides a critical safeguard against

unfair or deceptive practices.

GOODS

Section 2(21) of the Act defines “goods” as having the same meaning as assigned to it in the Sale

of Goods Act, 1930. By incorporating this external statutory definition, the Consumer Protection

Act ensures consistency across legislative frameworks governing commercial transactions and

consumer rights.

Scope and Application

(2006) 4 SCC 644

The Sale of Goods Act, 1930, under Section 2(7), defines goods as “every kind of movable

property other than actionable claims and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops,

grass, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale

or under the contract of sale.” By importing this definition, the Consumer Protection Act extends

its coverage to virtually all movable goods that are the subject of consumer transactions, except

money and actionable claims.

The scope of the term “goods” within the Consumer Protection Act is significant, as most

consumer disputes arise in relation to defects in goods purchased. The statutory link with the Sale

of Goods Act also allows the application of well-established doctrines such as caveat emptor (let

the buyer beware) and its exceptions, especially where warranties, misrepresentations, or implied

conditions are involved. This ensures that consumer jurisprudence develops within a coherent

legal framework while safeguarding consumer interests.

Essential Elements

The essential components of “goods” under Section 2(21), read with the Sale of Goods Act, may

be summarised as follows. First, goods must be movable property, excluding actionable claims

and money. Second, the inclusive part of the definition brings within its fold intangible movable

property like stocks and shares, as well as tangible items like crops and things attached to the earth

agreed to be severed before sale. Third, the definition ensures flexibility by accommodating both

tangible and intangible forms of property that may constitute the subject of trade and commerce.

Judicial interpretation has clarified the scope of goods in consumer law. In Tata

Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar

, the Supreme Court observed that goods

must be capable of being bought and sold, thereby emphasising their commercial character.

Similarly, in Vikas Motors Ltd. v. Dr. P.K. Jain

, the Court affirmed that vehicles, as goods, must

conform to the contractual and statutory standards, thereby reinforcing consumer rights in relation

to defective goods. The inclusion of “goods” within the Consumer Protection Act thus provides a

statutory foundation for consumer claims involving defective products, hazardous items, or goods

failing to meet express or implied warranties. By aligning with the Sale of Goods Act, the

legislature ensures doctrinal clarity while promoting consumer welfare.

INJURY

Section 2(23) defines “injury” to mean any harm whatsoever illegally caused to any person, in

body, mind or property.

Scope and Application

The statutory definition of injury under Section 2(23) is deliberately broad, encompassing

physical, mental, and proprietary dimensions of harm. Its significance lies in its application across

consumer disputes, particularly in cases of product liability, medical negligence, misleading

advertisements, or unfair trade practices where the consumer suffers detriment as a consequence

of the acts or omissions of traders, manufacturers, or service providers. The inclusion of injury to

the mind is noteworthy, as it allows courts and commissions to address non-physical forms of

harm such as mental harassment, emotional distress, or psychological trauma resulting from

defective goods or deficient services. The provision operates in tandem with Section 2(22), which

defines “harm.” While Section 2(22) sets out the categories of compensable harm, Section 2(23)

(1964) 6 SCR 885

(2000) 8 SCC 720

provides the general concept of injury, thereby acting as a foundational provision applicable in a

wide array of consumer claims. Together, they form the basis for assessing damages and awarding

compensation.

Essential Elements

The definition of injury under Section 2(23) contains three essential aspects. First, the harm must

be illegally caused, signifying that the wrongful act of the trader, manufacturer, or service provider

is a necessary condition. Second, injury may be caused to the body, encompassing physical hurt,

illness, or disability resulting from defective goods or deficient services. Third, the term extends to

the mind, recognising psychological harm, and to property, covering damage or destruction caused

by unsafe products or negligent services.

Judicial precedents under the earlier regime have recognised the compensability of mental

injury in consumer law. For instance, in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the

Supreme Court held that compensation under consumer law is not confined to physical injury or

monetary loss, but includes mental or emotional suffering caused by arbitrary or negligent acts of

service providers. The broad wording of Section 2(23) reflects this judicial approach and ensures

continuity under the 2019 Act. In essence, Section 2(23) establishes a comprehensive definition of

injury that not only facilitates the adjudication of consumer disputes involving tangible loss but

also acknowledges the significance of intangible harm suffered by consumers in the marketplace.

MANUFACTURER

Section 2(24) defines “manufacturer” with respect to goods as a person who:

(i) makes or manufactures any goods or parts thereof; or

(ii) does not make or manufacture any goods but assembles parts thereof made or manufactured by

others; or

(iii) puts or causes to be put his own mark on any goods made or manufactured by another

manufacturer; or

(iv) makes a product and sells it under his own brand; or

(v) is a product seller of such goods who is not a manufacturer, but is made liable as a

manufacturer under this Act.

Scope and Application

The definition of manufacturer under Section 2(24) is drafted in an expansive manner to

encompass every person or entity who is substantially involved in the process of bringing goods

into the market under their name or brand. This broad construction reflects the policy intent of the

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 to ensure accountability at every stage of the production and

marketing chain. The provision ensures that liability cannot be evaded by outsourcing actual

manufacturing or merely branding goods made by third parties. The scope is particularly

significant in relation to product liability provisions under Chapter VI of the Act. By including

brand owners, assemblers, and even certain classes of sellers within the ambit of “manufacturer,”

(1994) 1 SCC 243

the statute ensures that consumers have direct recourse against the entity whose name or mark

induced reliance at the time of purchase.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 2(24) may be discerned as follows. First, the term applies to the

actual maker of goods or their parts. Second, it extends to assemblers, thereby recognising that

assembly is an integral stage of manufacturing. Third, it includes brand owners who affix their

mark on goods manufactured by others, thus recognising the commercial reality that branding

influences consumer reliance. Fourth, it applies to persons who manufacture and sell goods under

their brand. Lastly, it encompasses product sellers in circumstances where they are made liable as

manufacturers under the Act, thereby closing possible loopholes in accountability.

Judicial interpretations under the previous legislation have also supported a wide

construction of manufacturer liability. In Cosumer Unity & Trust Society v. Hindustan Coca Cola

Beverages Pvt. Ltd.

, the National Commission held that a company selling products under its

brand could not disown liability merely because the actual manufacturing was outsourced. This

reasoning aligns with the 2019 Act’s definition. The significance of this provision is that it

eliminates the possibility of evasion of liability by shifting responsibility down the production

chain. Consumers are thus empowered to hold accountable not merely the visible seller but the

entity responsible for putting the product into the market under its brand or mark.

MEDIATION

Section 2(25) defines “mediation” as the process by which a mediator appointed under Section 74

mediates the consumer disputes.

Scope and Application

The inclusion of mediation as a defined term under the Act is an important innovation

distinguishing the 2019 legislation from the earlier Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It reflects the

legislative intent to institutionalise Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) within the consumer

protection framework. The scope of mediation under this Act is confined to consumer disputes but

operates in a structured statutory mechanism through Consumer Mediation Cells established under

Section 74. The Act thereby provides a formal avenue for consensual resolution of disputes,

reducing the burden on Consumer Commissions while also facilitating quicker and cost-effective

redressal.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 2(25) are that mediation must be conducted by a mediator duly

appointed under Section 74, and that it must pertain to consumer disputes arising under the

provisions of the Act. Unlike private negotiations, mediation here is statutorily recognised,

ensuring neutrality and fairness in the process. The reference to mediation also indicates the

requirement of voluntary participation by the disputing parties, since settlement in mediation is

premised upon consent.

The introduction of mediation in consumer law was aimed at complementing the

adjudicatory mechanism of the Consumer Commissions. By providing for a structured, court-

(2000) 3 CPJ 18 (NC)

annexed mediation, the Act balances judicial oversight with the flexibility of ADR. In Emaar

MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh

, the Supreme Court emphasised the role of alternative dispute

resolution mechanisms in consumer disputes, affirming that consumer forums remain appropriate

fora for redressal but may benefit from mediation to expedite resolution. Though the judgment

predates the 2019 Act, its reasoning supports the legislative approach in institutionalising

mediation. Mediation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, therefore, embodies a paradigm

shift towards consensual dispute resolution, aiming at reducing pendency, promoting harmony

between consumers and traders, and strengthening consumer confidence in the justice delivery

system.

MEDIATOR

Section 2(26) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines “mediator” to mean a mediator

referred to in Section 75 of the Act.

Scope and Application

The inclusion of “mediator” within the definitional framework of the Act reflects the legislative

intent to strengthen alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms in consumer disputes.

Mediation is designed to provide a speedy, cost-effective, and less adversarial mode of redressal in

comparison to formal adjudication. The mediator plays a facilitative role in helping the parties

arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement. Section 75 of the Act elaborates on the appointment

and functioning of mediators, thereby ensuring that consumer disputes can be resolved without

prolonged litigation. The definition thus serves as a cross-reference, linking the concept of a

mediator with the institutional mechanism provided under Chapter V of the Act.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of this definition are:

1. The term “mediator” is not an independent or general term but specifically tied to the

provisions under Section 75.

2. The mediator is a neutral third party appointed to assist in the settlement of disputes

between a complainant and the opposite party.

3. The mediator does not impose a decision but facilitates dialogue and negotiation, ensuring

that the outcome is voluntary and acceptable to both parties.

4. The mediator functions under the statutory framework of consumer mediation cells

established under the Act, thereby ensuring procedural fairness and institutional support.

The jurisprudence around mediation in India, though still evolving, has been recognised in

other branches of law. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P)

Ltd.

, the Supreme Court highlighted the significance of mediation as a dispute resolution process

and encouraged its wider use. By incorporating mediation into consumer protection law,

Parliament has institutionalised this progressive mechanism within the consumer justice system.

MEMBER

Section 2(27) defines the term “member” to mean a member of the District Commission or the

State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be.

(2019) 12 SCC 751

(2010) 8 SCC 24

Scope and Application

The definition of “member” clarifies the statutory identity of individuals who constitute the

adjudicatory bodies established under the Act. The three-tier redressal mechanism—District

Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, and

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission—requires both a President and other

members to form a valid bench. This definition ensures that the expression “member” is applied

exclusively to such persons appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules

framed thereunder. The application of this definition is significant as it helps to establish the

legitimacy of proceedings and orders, since only those delivered by duly constituted commissions

with recognised members possess statutory force.

Essential Elements

The essential aspects of this provision are as follows. First, the definition is exhaustive and limits

the meaning of “member” to the adjudicatory authorities under the Act, thereby excluding other

administrative or advisory personnel connected with consumer protection. Secondly, the

appointment, qualification, tenure, and service conditions of a member are not left to discretion

but are specifically regulated by the statute, thus ensuring independence and accountability.

Thirdly, the presence of members is integral to the functioning of the consumer fora, since

decisions require a valid quorum and the collective deliberation of the President and members.

Lastly, judicial interpretation has underlined the necessity of proper constitution of these fora. In

State of U.P. v. All U.P. Consumer Protection Bar Association

, the Supreme Court stressed that

the functioning of consumer fora depends on the availability of duly qualified members, without

which the object of the legislation would be frustrated.

MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT

Section 2(28) defines “misleading advertisement” in relation to any product or service. It states

that an advertisement is misleading if it falsely describes such product or service, or gives a false

guarantee that misleads consumers as to the nature, substance, quantity, or quality of such product

or service. It also includes any advertisement that deliberately conceals important information,

makes a false claim, or is likely to mislead the public regarding its intended use or performance.

Scope and Application

The definition of misleading advertisement has a wide ambit and serves as one of the key

consumer protection tools under the Act. It applies to advertisements issued in print, electronic, or

digital media, as well as any other promotional material used by manufacturers, sellers, or service

providers. The scope of the provision is not limited to direct misrepresentations but extends to

concealment of material facts and exaggerated claims. This provision has direct application to

matters concerning false claims in product efficacy, deceptive pricing, endorsements by

celebrities, and omission of warnings or disclaimers. It is also closely connected to the powers of

the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) under Chapter III of the Act, which is

empowered to prevent unfair trade practices and penalise misleading advertisements.

Essential Elements

(2017) 1 SCC 444

The essential components of a misleading advertisement under Section 2(28) can be identified as

follows. First, there must be an advertisement concerning goods or services, including any

representation in various media. Second, the advertisement must either make a false statement,

give a false guarantee, or omit material information such that it misleads consumers about the

product or service. Third, the effect of such advertisement must be to induce consumers into error

regarding the nature, substance, quality, or intended use of the product. Finally, endorsements,

whether by individuals or institutions, fall within this ambit if they create a false impression.

Judicial scrutiny in cases such as Horlicks Ltd. v. Zydus Wellness Products Ltd.

, has shown that

courts interpret misleading advertisements broadly, particularly where exaggerated health claims

can influence consumer choice.

NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 2(29) defines the term “National Commission” as the National Consumer Disputes

Redressal Commission (NCDRC) established under sub-section (1) of Section 53 of the Act. This

provision provides the statutory foundation for the highest adjudicatory body under the consumer

dispute redressal mechanism in India.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(29) lies in clarifying that the National Commission, as a statutory body,

functions as the apex consumer forum in the country. Its jurisdiction is both original and appellate.

In its original jurisdiction, the Commission entertains complaints where the value of goods or

services paid as consideration exceeds the pecuniary limit prescribed under Section 58. In its

appellate jurisdiction, the National Commission hears appeals against orders of the State

Consumer Commissions under Section 51, and it further has the power to exercise supervisory

jurisdiction over them. The application of this provision is of significance in consumer

jurisprudence as it provides the ultimate forum at the national level to secure justice for aggrieved

consumers.

Essential Elements

The definition under Section 2(29) contains certain essential elements. First, the National

Commission is not a mere administrative authority but a judicial body established by statute.

Second, it derives its creation and authority specifically from Section 53(1), thereby ensuring

constitutional validity and independence. Third, the Commission is entrusted with wide powers

including adjudication of consumer disputes of high pecuniary value, appellate scrutiny,

revisionary authority, and regulatory oversight over subordinate forums. In Ambrish Kumar

Shukla v. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.

, the National Commission clarified the scope of

pecuniary jurisdiction under the earlier Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a principle equally

relevant under the 2019 Act in defining its jurisdictional competence.

NOTIFICATION

Section 2(30) defines “notification” to mean a notification published in the Official Gazette and

the expression “notified” shall be construed accordingly. This provision ensures that statutory

instruments, directions, or rules under the Act attain legal force only upon their formal publication

in the Official Gazette.

2019 SCC OnLine Del 11951

(2017) 1 CPJ 1 (NC)

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(30) extends to all provisions of the Act where the Central Government,

State Government, or other competent authority is empowered to issue rules, regulations, or

directions. The application of this provision is significant because it lays down the formal

requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, which ensures transparency, legal

enforceability, and accessibility of delegated legislation or administrative action. Without such

publication, executive directions lack binding effect, as established in administrative law

principles.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of this provision are threefold. First, the definition restricts the validity of

“notification” strictly to those published in the Official Gazette, thereby excluding informal

circulars or press releases. Second, the term “notified” must be construed in relation to such

publication, meaning that any provision of the Act which comes into force “on such date as may

be notified” requires a formal Gazette notification for enforcement. Third, the provision aligns

with constitutional principles under Article 77 and Article 166 of the Constitution of India, which

require publication of executive actions for their enforceability. The Supreme Court in State of

Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar

, held that unless a notification is duly published, it cannot confer

enforceable rights or obligations, a principle directly relevant to the interpretation of Section

2(30).

PERSON

Section 2(31) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines the term “person” in an inclusive

manner to cover a wide spectrum of natural and juristic entities. It provides that “person” includes

(i) an individual, (ii) a firm whether registered or not, (iii) a Hindu undivided family (HUF), (iv) a

co-operative society, (v) an association of persons whether registered under the Societies

Registration Act, 1860 or not, (vi) any corporation, company or body of individuals whether

incorporated or not, and (vii) any artificial juridical person not falling within the preceding sub-

clauses.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(31) is expansive, reflecting the legislative intention to ensure that the

benefits and liabilities under the Act extend beyond individual consumers to collective or

institutional entities. By adopting an inclusive definition, the Act accommodates the changing

dynamics of trade, commerce, and service provision where entities other than individuals—such

as firms, associations, and companies—play a significant role as both consumers and service

providers. The provision applies not only to those who may file complaints under the Act but also

to those against whom complaints may be instituted, thereby covering the full range of

stakeholders in consumer transactions.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of this definition may be examined as follows. First, the inclusion of

individuals and firms recognises both personal and business participation in consumer markets,

irrespective of formal registration. Second, the recognition of Hindu Undivided Families and co-

(1987) 3 SCC 34

operative societies indicates the legislative awareness of traditional and cooperative forms of

ownership prevalent in India. Third, by covering associations of persons, whether registered or

not, the Act extends protection to informal collectives that may engage in consumer transactions.

Fourth, corporations, companies, and bodies of individuals, whether incorporated or

unincorporated, are expressly included, ensuring that large-scale entities fall within the ambit of

the Act. Finally, the residuary clause—“any artificial juridical person not falling within the

preceding sub-clauses”—broadens the scope further, covering statutory authorities, trusts, or other

juristic entities recognised by law.

The judiciary has consistently adopted a wide approach in interpreting the term “person” to

prevent technical objections from frustrating the objectives of consumer protection. For instance,

in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Ashok Iron Works Pvt. Ltd.

, the Supreme

Court held that a company registered under the Companies Act is a “person” capable of being a

consumer. This interpretation is in harmony with the present statutory definition under Section

2(31), which expressly includes corporations and other artificial persons.

PRESCRIBED

Section 2(32) provides that the term “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made by the Central

Government or, as the case may be, the State Government.

Scope and Application

The provision clarifies the legislative intent regarding the source of subordinate legislation under

the Act. Since the Consumer Protection Act is a central legislation with a federal dimension, the

authority to frame rules has been distributed between the Central Government and the State

Governments. The Central Government is empowered to frame rules for matters of national

applicability, uniform procedures, and central institutions, whereas the State Governments are

vested with the power to frame rules in matters specifically falling within their jurisdiction,

particularly regarding the functioning of State and District Commissions. Thus, Section 2(32)

functions as a key interpretative clause, guiding the understanding of any reference to the word

“prescribed” throughout the Act.

Essential Elements

The essential element of Section 2(32) is its linkage of the term “prescribed” directly to the rule-

making powers conferred upon the appropriate government. This ensures that wherever the Act

uses the expression “as may be prescribed,” it refers not to an undefined or discretionary standard

but to a set of rules that derive their validity from statutory authority. The rules made by either the

Central or State Government under the Act are subordinate legislation and must conform to the

parent Act. Judicial scrutiny is available to strike down any rule that exceeds the authority

conferred by the Act or is inconsistent with its provisions.

In St. John’s Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council for

Teacher Education

, the Supreme Court reiterated that rules framed under delegated legislation

cannot travel beyond the scope of the parent Act. Applying this principle, any prescription under

the Consumer Protection Act, whether by the Central or State Government, must remain within

the boundaries of legislative intent and statutory authority.

(2009) 3 SCC 240

(2003) 3 SCC 321

PRODUCT

Section 2(33) defines the term “product” to mean any article, goods, substance, or raw material, or

any extended cycle of such product, which may exist in gaseous, liquid, or solid state and

possesses intrinsic value capable of delivery, whether as a wholly assembled item or as a

component part, and is produced for introduction into trade or commerce. However, the provision

specifically excludes human tissues, blood, blood products, and organs.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(33) is wide, encompassing almost every tangible item that enters into trade

or commerce, irrespective of its form—solid, liquid, or gas—so long as it carries intrinsic value

and is capable of delivery. The inclusion of both wholly assembled products and component parts

recognises that liability under consumer law can arise not only in respect of final products but also

in relation to defective parts that are integrated into such products. The statutory exclusion of

human tissues, blood, blood products, and organs reflects a deliberate legislative intent to keep

medical donations and procedures outside the ambit of consumer-trade definitions, acknowledging

their ethical and humanitarian character rather than commercial nature.

Essential Elements

The essential features of Section 2(33) may be delineated as follows. First, a “product” must be an

article, good, substance, or raw material that has intrinsic value. The phrase “intrinsic value”

ensures that the item in question is recognised as having inherent worth in trade or commerce.

Second, the product must be capable of delivery, which establishes a practical dimension—only

items that can be transferred or supplied can fall within this definition. Third, the provision covers

both the final assembled product and its component parts, ensuring that liability is not confined to

manufacturers of complete goods but extends to suppliers of defective parts. Finally, the express

exclusion of human tissues, blood, blood products, and organs is critical, making clear that

medical donations and transplant-related procedures are governed by specialised legislation such

as the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994, and not by consumer protection

law.

The judiciary has, in various contexts, reinforced that definitions of “goods” or “products”

under consumer law must be interpreted broadly to secure consumer rights. For example, in Indian

Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha

, although decided under the 1986 Act, the Supreme Court

underscored that the consumer protection framework must balance the scope of definitions with

express statutory exclusions. By expressly excluding human tissues and organs, the 2019 Act

codifies such limits within the statutory framework itself.

PRODUCT LIABILITY

Section 2(34) defines “product liability” as the responsibility of a product manufacturer, product

service provider, or product seller, to compensate for any harm caused to a consumer by a

defective product manufactured, sold, or provided by such person. This provision forms the

cornerstone of the new consumer protection regime introduced in 2019, as it specifically

recognises liability arising out of defective products and inadequate services relating to such

products.

(1995) 6 SCC 651

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(34) extends to all actors in the chain of distribution—manufacturers,

service providers connected to the product, and sellers. Unlike the earlier 1986 Act, which did not

expressly codify product liability, the 2019 Act introduces a comprehensive framework that

enables consumers to directly seek compensation for harm caused by defective products. This

liability is civil in nature and is designed to ensure that consumer safety is prioritised over

commercial interests. Importantly, the liability may arise not only from defects in manufacture but

also from defects in design, failure to provide adequate warnings, misleading instructions, or

improper servicing connected to the product.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of product liability under Section 2(34) may be analysed as follows. First,

there must exist a “defective product,” which under Section 2(10) is defined broadly to include

manufacturing defects, design defects, deviation from manufacturing specifications, lack of

adequate instructions, or non-conformity to safety standards. Second, there must be harm caused

to the consumer, which is separately defined under Section 2(22) to include personal injury,

property damage, or mental agony. Third, liability attaches not only to the manufacturer but also

to the service provider and seller where their conduct contributes to the harm caused. This reflects

a shift towards shared accountability across the supply chain. Finally, the liability is compensatory

in nature, enabling consumers to seek redress for actual harm suffered rather than merely the

replacement or repair of defective goods.

The Indian judiciary has progressively expanded the notion of liability in consumer

jurisprudence. In Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot Ahluwalia

, the Supreme Court

underscored that compensation for defective services or products must reflect both the economic

and non-economic harm suffered by the consumer. While this case dealt with medical services

under the 1986 Act, its reasoning is germane to the product liability framework under the 2019

Act, which now explicitly recognises harm as extending beyond mere financial loss. The statutory

introduction of product liability in Section 2(34) codifies these judicial principles into a specific

consumer right, thereby strengthening the remedial architecture of consumer law in India.

PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTION

Section 2(35) defines a “product liability action” as a complaint filed by a person before the

District Commission, State Commission, or National Commission, as the case may be, for

claiming compensation for the harm caused to him. This provision provides the procedural entry

point for enforcing the substantive right of product liability created under Section 2(34).

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(35) is procedural in nature, as it identifies the mechanism through which a

consumer can seek redress for harm caused by a defective product. It enables consumers to

approach the appropriate forum under Chapter IV of the Act, depending on the pecuniary

jurisdiction, thereby ensuring that the remedy of product liability is made accessible across the

three-tier system of consumer dispute redressal agencies. The section applies broadly to all classes

of consumers, including individuals, legal heirs in the event of death, and guardians in the case of

minors, as recognised under Section 2(5). By explicitly recognising a product liability action, the

(1998) 4 SCC 39

Act creates a distinct category of consumer dispute separate from traditional claims relating to

“deficiency of service” or “unfair trade practice.”

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a product liability action under Section 2(35) are threefold. First, there

must be a complaint filed before one of the consumer dispute redressal commissions as constituted

under the Act. Second, the complaint must be specifically aimed at claiming compensation, thus

distinguishing product liability actions from complaints seeking other remedies such as

replacement or removal of defects. Third, the harm must arise from a defective product or from

negligence in the manufacturing, selling, or servicing of such a product, thereby linking the action

directly to the liability framework under Section 2(34).

Judicial recognition of consumer rights to compensation for defective products has been

established in earlier cases, even prior to the 2019 Act. For instance, in Indian Medical

Association v. V.P. Shantha

, the Supreme Court held that services provided in connection with

goods are within the ambit of consumer protection, allowing consumers to seek compensation for

harm. Although predating the codification of product liability, this line of reasoning laid the

foundation for the explicit recognition of product liability actions in the 2019 Act. By providing a

specific statutory remedy, Section 2(35) strengthens consumer rights by ensuring clarity and

procedural certainty in pursuing claims for harm caused by defective products.

PRODUCT MANUFACTURER

Section 2(36) defines a “product manufacturer” as a person who is engaged in the business of

manufacturing any product or its parts and includes any person who—(i) assembles parts made by

others; or (ii) puts his own mark on any product made by any other person; or (iii) makes a

product and sells it under the name of another person. The provision, therefore, widens the ambit

of who may be treated as a manufacturer for the purposes of product liability.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(36) is extensive, as it not only covers traditional manufacturers who

fabricate or assemble products but also extends liability to entities that exercise control over

branding, labeling, or putting their name on goods produced by third parties. This ensures that

companies cannot escape liability by outsourcing manufacturing while continuing to profit from

the sale of such goods under their own brand identity. It applies across industries, including food,

pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics, automobiles, and other goods introduced in the stream of

commerce. The section also contemplates situations of joint or composite responsibility, thereby

aligning with international consumer law practices on product liability.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a “product manufacturer” under Section 2(36) are as follows. First, the

person must be engaged in the business of manufacturing, whether by creating, assembling, or

fabricating products or their parts. Second, the provision explicitly includes those who affix their

own trade name, logo, or mark on goods manufactured by others, thereby treating them as

manufacturers in law. Third, a person who manufactures a product but permits another person to

(1995) 6 SCC 651

sell it under his name also falls within the definition. This wide formulation prevents evasion of

liability through contractual arrangements or rebranding exercises.

Judicial pronouncements under the earlier framework of consumer law had already laid

emphasis on extending responsibility to those who exercise control over goods. In Kusum Sharma

v. Batra Hospital

, the Supreme Court reiterated that accountability in consumer protection must

extend to all actors responsible for harm caused by defective goods or services. Though not

dealing specifically with product liability under the 2019 Act, this judicial approach reflects the

principle that liability follows not just the physical manufacturer but also those who bring the

product into commerce under their own brand or representation. Section 2(36) thus strengthens the

consumer’s ability to hold all relevant parties accountable in a product liability action.

PRODUCT SELLER

Section 2(37) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines a “product seller” as a person who, in

the course of business, imports, sells, distributes, leases, installs, prepares, packages, labels,

markets, repairs, maintains, or otherwise is involved in placing a product for commercial use, but

does not include a product manufacturer. The definition, therefore, covers a wide category of

intermediaries who facilitate the availability of a product in the market, thereby subjecting them to

liability where their conduct contributes to consumer harm.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(37) is comprehensive, extending beyond mere retailers or distributors. It

applies to importers, wholesalers, service providers engaged in installation or maintenance, and

even entities that participate in packaging and marketing. By excluding the product manufacturer

(already defined under Section 2(36)), the Act clearly demarcates liability between manufacturers

and sellers, while still ensuring that consumers can hold sellers accountable where harm is

attributable to their role. This provision is particularly relevant in cases where sellers act

negligently in storing, labeling, or handling goods, or when they fail to exercise due diligence in

the supply chain. It also has significant implications in the age of e-commerce, as online

marketplaces and digital platforms can fall within the ambit of product sellers when actively

involved in marketing or distributing products.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a “product seller” under Section 2(37) may be summarised as follows.

First, the person must be engaged in the course of business, thereby excluding casual or private

transactions. Second, the activities covered are broad and include selling, distributing, importing,

leasing, installing, packaging, labeling, repairing, or maintaining products. Third, the provision

expressly excludes product manufacturers, ensuring that liability is appropriately divided but

potentially overlapping depending on the facts of the case. Finally, the liability of a product seller

arises not merely from the act of sale but from any involvement in the chain of distribution that

has a direct bearing on consumer safety and product quality.

Judicial understanding of seller liability under the consumer law regime can be seen in

Indian Oil Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council, Kerala

, where the Supreme Court

observed that liability may be fastened on entities in the supply chain where their conduct causes

or contributes to consumer injury. Though decided under the earlier 1986 Act, the principle

(2010) 3 SCC 480

(1994) 1 SCC 397

resonates with Section 2(37), which codifies the broader accountability of sellers in ensuring

consumer safety and fairness in the marketplace.

PRODUCT SERVICE PROVIDER

Section 2(38) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines a “product service provider” as a

person who provides any service in respect of a product. This provision extends the concept of

consumer protection beyond the physical goods to encompass services directly connected with

such goods, thereby recognising that harm or deficiency may arise not merely from the product

itself but also from the manner in which it is serviced, installed, maintained, or repaired.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(38) is intended to bring within its fold all entities or individuals who

render services pertaining to a product. This includes, for instance, technicians who install home

appliances, mechanics who repair automobiles, or agencies responsible for the maintenance of

equipment. It ensures that consumer redressal mechanisms are not limited to defects in goods but

also apply to negligence, inefficiency, or deficiency in services connected with the product. The

provision has particular importance in sectors such as automobiles, electronics, and medical

devices, where improper service or repair can have serious implications for consumer safety.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a “product service provider” under Section 2(38) are threefold. First, the

person must be engaged in providing a service; second, the service must relate specifically to a

product; and third, liability arises where such service is deficient or contributes to harm suffered

by the consumer. Unlike the definition of a “product seller” under Section 2(37), this provision

does not emphasise the act of distribution or placement in the market but rather focuses on the

after-sale or associated service component. This ensures that liability in consumer law is not

fragmented but extends comprehensively across the product’s life cycle.

Judicially, while direct case law under the 2019 Act on this definition is still evolving,

earlier precedents under the 1986 Act provide guidance. In Indian Medical Association v. V.P.

Shantha

, the Supreme Court held that services, even when provided by professionals, fall within

the ambit of consumer protection legislation. By analogy, product-related services rendered

negligently or deficiently would clearly bring the provider within the liability framework

envisaged under Section 2(38).

REGULATIONS

Section 2(39) defines “regulations” to mean the regulations made either by the National Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) or, as the case may be, by the Central

Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA). This statutory provision confers delegated legislative

powers upon these bodies, enabling them to frame detailed rules and procedural mechanisms

necessary for the effective implementation of the Act.

Scope and Application

(1995) 6 SCC 651

The scope of Section 2(39) is wide, as it includes all regulations framed by two distinct authorities

functioning under the Act, namely the National Commission and the CCPA. Regulations made by

the National Commission generally concern procedural matters, functioning of consumer fora, and

aspects related to the adjudicatory process. On the other hand, regulations framed by the CCPA

pertain to consumer rights, unfair trade practices, misleading advertisements, and mechanisms to

ensure compliance by traders, manufacturers, and service providers. The provision ensures that

both adjudicatory and regulatory bodies can fill legislative gaps by issuing binding norms within

their respective spheres of authority.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 2(39) may be summarised as follows. First, regulations must

emanate either from the National Commission or the CCPA; both are empowered to frame such

regulations as expressly authorised under the Act. Second, these regulations must remain

consistent with the Act and the rules made by the Central Government or the State Governments.

They cannot override or conflict with primary legislation. Third, regulations framed under this

provision have binding force, carrying the same enforceability as statutory rules, provided they are

intra vires the parent Act. This gives the regulatory framework both flexibility and legal authority

to adapt to evolving consumer market dynamics.

Judicial scrutiny of delegated legislation, including regulations under consumer law, has

been firmly established by the Supreme Court. In State of Karnataka v. Ganesh Kamath

, the

Court observed that rules and regulations made under the authority of a statute must be consistent

with the Act itself and cannot enlarge its scope. Applied to Section 2(39), this principle ensures

that the regulatory powers of the National Commission and the CCPA are exercised within the

boundaries of legislative intent, thereby protecting consumers without transgressing statutory

limits.

REGULATOR

Section 2(40) defines “Regulator” to mean a body or any authority established under any other law

for the time being in force. This definition incorporates into the consumer protection framework

all external regulatory authorities that are constituted under distinct legislations, thereby ensuring

coordination between the Consumer Protection Act and sector-specific regulatory regimes.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(40) is significant as it acknowledges that consumer disputes often overlap

with matters that fall under the jurisdiction of specialised regulatory bodies. For instance,

authorities such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Insurance Regulatory

and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI),

or the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) act as regulators in their respective

fields. The provision ensures that the Consumer Protection Act functions in harmony with these

bodies, avoiding jurisdictional conflict while ensuring consumer welfare. This definition is

especially relevant in cases where consumer grievances pertain to financial services, insurance,

telecommunication, or food safety, as such matters may also fall under the supervisory domain of

these regulators.

(1983) 2 SCC 402

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 2(40) are threefold. First, the term “Regulator” is not confined to

any specific authority under the Consumer Protection Act itself, but refers broadly to any authority

created by another law. Second, the existence of such a body must be statutory in nature, meaning

it must derive its establishment and powers from a specific law enacted by Parliament or State

Legislatures. Third, the inclusion of this definition allows for institutional synergy, enabling

consumer fora and commissions to recognise the jurisdiction of these regulators and, where

necessary, to seek their input or defer to their expertise in specialised matters.

Judicial interpretation has consistently stressed the need for balancing the jurisdiction of

consumer fora with that of regulators. In General Manager, Telecom v. M. Krishnan

, the

Supreme Court emphasised that where a special remedy exists under a specific statute governed

by a regulatory body, consumer fora may lack jurisdiction unless expressly preserved. Similarly,

in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Kumari Reshma

, the National Commission clarified that consumer fora

could entertain complaints even in regulated sectors, provided such jurisdiction was not expressly

barred. These decisions highlight the delicate balance between specialised regulators and the broad

consumer redressal mechanisms envisaged under the Act.

RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICE

Section 2(41) defines “restrictive trade practice” to mean a trade practice which tends to bring

about manipulation of price or conditions of delivery or to affect flow of supplies in the market

relating to goods or services in such a manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or

restrictions. It also includes any trade practice which requires a consumer to buy, hire or avail of

any goods or services as a condition precedent for buying, hiring or availing of other goods or

services, commonly referred to as “tie-in sales.”

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(41) is intended to safeguard consumer interests against practices that

distort competition or create artificial scarcity, thereby compelling consumers to pay higher prices

or accept unreasonable conditions. This provision directly relates to unfair market conduct,

ensuring that businesses do not indulge in anti-consumer practices under the guise of commercial

strategy. The application of this section extends across all sectors of trade and commerce, from

retail markets to service industries, ensuring that consumers are not coerced into disadvantageous

transactions. The Consumer Commissions are empowered to adjudicate upon complaints alleging

restrictive trade practices, thereby complementing the competition law framework under the

Competition Act, 2002.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a restrictive trade practice under Section 2(41) are: first, there must be a

manipulation of price, conditions of delivery, or supply in the market; second, such manipulation

must result in unjustified costs or restrictions imposed on the consumer; and third, the definition

specifically includes tie-in arrangements where the purchase of one product or service is made

conditional upon the purchase of another. These elements collectively ensure that practices which

limit consumer choice or artificially inflate consumer expenditure are prohibited.

(2009) 8 SCC 481

(2015) 1 CPJ 568 (NC)

Judicial pronouncements have elaborated upon this provision. In Telco v. Registrar of

Restrictive Trade Agreements

, the Supreme Court explained that restrictive trade practices are

those which impede competition and distort consumer choice. Similarly, in CERS v. LIC of

India

, the Court examined the practice of compelling consumers to buy additional policies or

services as a condition for availing primary benefits, categorising it as restrictive in nature. These

cases underline the judicial commitment to protecting consumer autonomy and preventing

exploitative commercial practices.

SERVICE

Section 2(42) defines “service” to mean service of any description which is made available to

potential users and includes, but is not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with

banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, telecom,

boarding or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of

news or other information. However, the definition specifically excludes services rendered free of

charge or under a contract of personal service.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(42) is comprehensive, designed to encompass a wide range of facilities

and activities provided in the modern economy. Its application extends beyond traditional service

sectors like banking and insurance to cover emerging domains such as telecom and information

services, reflecting the Act’s adaptability to technological and economic changes. The provision

ensures that consumers of essential as well as commercial services are protected from deficiencies,

unfair trade practices, or exploitation. However, by excluding free services and contracts of

personal service (for example, the relationship between a master and servant), the Act recognises

practical and legal limits to consumer remedies.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of the definition are threefold. First, there must be a service offered or

made available to potential users. Second, such a service must be provided for consideration,

either directly or indirectly, thereby excluding free services. Third, the service must not fall within

the category of a “contract of personal service,” which implies a relationship of control and

subordination as seen in employer-employee contracts. The distinction between “contract for

service” and “contract of service” is vital, with the former falling within the scope of consumer

protection while the latter remains excluded.

Judicial interpretation has played a crucial role in shaping the contours of this provision. In

Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the Supreme Court held that housing

construction services fell within the ambit of “service” under the Consumer Protection Act,

emphasising that the Act should be given a liberal interpretation to advance consumer rights.

Similarly, in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha

, the Court ruled that medical services

provided for consideration fall within the scope of “service,” except where rendered free of cost or

in the course of a contract of personal service. These cases highlight the expansive judicial

approach to ensure consumer welfare within the statutory framework.

(1977) 2 SCC 55

(1995) 5 SCC 482

(1994) 1 SCC 243

(1995) 6 SCC 651

SPURIOUS GOODS

Section 2(43) defines “spurious goods” as goods which are falsely claimed to be genuine. This

provision seeks to protect consumers against the dangers of counterfeit or fake products that

misrepresent their authenticity, quality, or origin.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(43) is primarily directed towards addressing the widespread menace of

counterfeit goods in the market. Spurious goods can be found across industries, ranging from

medicines and food products to electronics, clothing, and luxury items. The application of this

provision is crucial for safeguarding consumer health and safety, as spurious goods often pose

severe risks owing to their substandard quality or harmful ingredients. It also serves to protect the

integrity of legitimate businesses by curbing unfair competition arising from the circulation of

counterfeit products.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of “spurious goods” under Section 2(43) are: first, the goods in question

must be represented as genuine; second, such representation must be false, thereby misleading the

consumer into believing that the product is authentic. The misrepresentation may relate to the

manufacturer, brand, quality, or other identifying features of the goods. Unlike defective goods,

which may be genuine but suffer from faults in quality or performance, spurious goods are

inherently counterfeit in their origin or representation.

Judicial precedents have also reflected concerns over spurious goods, particularly in the

context of public health. In State of Orissa v. K. Rajeshwar Rao

, the Supreme Court emphasised

the seriousness of dealing with spurious drugs, noting that they not only amount to cheating but

also endanger the lives of consumers. Although the case arose under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,

the reasoning holds relevance under consumer law, as the definition of “spurious goods” under the

2019 Act incorporates similar policy considerations. Furthermore, in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v.

Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

, the Court stressed the importance of preventing consumer

confusion in cases of deceptive similarity, underscoring the link between consumer protection and

spurious goods. Thus, Section 2(43) seeks to provide a clear statutory mechanism to deal with

counterfeit products, reinforcing consumer rights to safety, quality, and authenticity in the

marketplace.

STATE COMMISSION

Section 2(44) defines the “State Commission” as the State Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission established under sub-section (1) of section 42 of the Act. This statutory body

functions at the State level within the three-tier redressal mechanism established for the

adjudication of consumer disputes.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(44) lies in recognising the State Commission as the appellate and

adjudicatory body within its territorial jurisdiction. It operates between the District Commission

and the National Commission in the consumer dispute resolution framework. Its jurisdiction

(1992) Supp (1) SCC 365

(2001) 5 SCC 73

includes hearing appeals against the orders of District Commissions within the State, entertaining

complaints where the value of goods or services paid as consideration exceeds the pecuniary limits

of the District Commission but falls within the prescribed pecuniary jurisdiction of the State

Commission, and taking up class action complaints or matters of greater consumer interest within

the State. The application of this provision ensures decentralisation of justice while maintaining a

hierarchical structure of appellate remedies under the Act.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of the definition under Section 2(44) may be identified as follows. First, the

State Commission is established under Section 42(1) of the Act, thereby deriving its statutory

authority directly from the legislation. Second, it serves as a consumer dispute redressal forum

specific to each State, thereby ensuring accessibility of remedies without compelling consumers to

approach the National Commission for grievances falling within their State boundaries. Third, the

State Commission functions both as a court of original jurisdiction for higher-value complaints

and as an appellate authority against District Commission orders.

The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Co-operative

Society

clarified the constitutional validity and importance of consumer fora, including State

Commissions, observing that these bodies play a vital role in providing inexpensive, speedy, and

accessible justice to consumers. Similarly, in Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory

, the Court

reiterated that consumer fora, including State Commissions, are empowered statutory authorities

and must exercise their jurisdiction strictly within the framework of the Act. Thus, Section 2(44)

provides a foundational definition for understanding the institutional structure of consumer fora at

the State level, highlighting its role in balancing accessibility, efficiency, and appellate review in

the redressal mechanism envisaged under the Act.

TRADER

Section 2(45) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines the term “trader” to mean any person

who sells or distributes any goods for sale and includes the manufacturer thereof, and where such

goods are sold or distributed in packaged form, the packer thereof. This definition is of particular

importance in determining liability under consumer law, as it identifies the category of persons

who may be held accountable for defective goods or unfair trade practices.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(45) extends to every individual or entity engaged in the distribution or sale

of goods, whether wholesale or retail, packaged or otherwise. It encompasses not only the

immediate seller but also the manufacturer and the packer when goods are distributed in packaged

form. The application of this provision ensures that the liability net is sufficiently broad to cover

every person in the supply chain whose conduct affects the consumer’s right to quality, safety, and

fairness. By including the packer of goods within its ambit, the provision addresses modern

market practices where packaging and labeling play a crucial role in influencing consumer choice

and expectation.

(2003) 2 SCC 412

(2012) 8 SCC 524

Essential Elements

The essential elements of the definition may be identified as follows. First, the subject must be a

person or legal entity engaged in the sale or distribution of goods. Second, the definition is

inclusive in nature, expressly incorporating the manufacturer of goods within the scope of a trader.

Third, in the case of packaged goods, the packer is also deemed a trader, thereby extending

liability to all contributors in the marketing chain. Fourth, the definition distinguishes a trader,

who deals in goods, from a service provider, who renders services; this distinction is central to the

scheme of the Act.

Judicial interpretation has reinforced the broad understanding of “trader.” In Lucknow

Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the Supreme Court emphasised that consumer protection

legislation must be interpreted in a manner that furthers its objective of shielding consumers from

exploitation, whether by traders or service providers. Although the case primarily addressed

services, the reasoning applies equally to traders, affirming that the statute must be liberally

construed to ensure consumer welfare. Similarly, in Vishwa Jyoti Printers v. Molins of India

Ltd.

, the National Commission held that the liability of traders extends beyond the act of sale to

include ensuring that the goods sold conform to reasonable standards of quality and performance.

Thus, Section 2(45) lays down the definitional foundation for determining liability of sellers,

distributors, manufacturers, and packers, thereby ensuring that consumers have effective remedies

against the entire supply chain.

UNFAIR CONTRACT

Section 2(46) defines “unfair contract” as a contract between a manufacturer or trader or service

provider on one hand, and a consumer on the other, having such terms which cause significant

change in the rights of such consumer. The provision exemplifies the legislative intent to address

exploitative contractual terms that disadvantage consumers in a grossly unfair manner, going

beyond the traditional concept of “unfair trade practice.”

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(46) is wide enough to cover all standard form contracts or consumer

contracts where bargaining power is inherently unequal. The definition applies to agreements

entered into in the course of trade, commerce, or service, wherein terms are imposed by the

manufacturer, trader, or service provider, leaving the consumer with little or no choice but to

accept them. The section specifically empowers consumer fora to scrutinise and declare such

contractual terms as void if they are found to be unfair. This marks a significant shift from earlier

jurisprudence under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which did not expressly deal with

contractual unfairness.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of an “unfair contract” may be identified as follows. First, there must exist

a contract between a consumer and a manufacturer, trader, or service provider. Second, the terms

of the contract must result in a significant alteration of the consumer’s rights to the consumer’s

detriment. Third, the unfairness of the terms is judged in light of the imbalance of bargaining

(1994) 1 SCC 243

(1992) 2 CPJ 275 (NC)

power between the parties. Fourth, the Act provides specific illustrations of unfair contract terms,

such as imposing excessive security deposits, disproportionately high penalty charges, refusal to

accept early repayment of debts, unilateral termination without reasonable cause, or clauses

limiting the legal remedies available to the consumer.

Judicial recognition of the concept of unfair contracts has been evident even before the

2019 Act. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly

, the

Supreme Court held that unconscionable contractual terms imposed by a party with superior

bargaining power could be struck down as opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872. Similarly, in LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre

, the

Court invalidated arbitrary terms in standard form contracts on the ground of fairness and

reasonableness. The 2019 Act thus codifies and advances this judicial approach by incorporating

the doctrine of “unfair contracts” directly into consumer law. In effect, Section 2(46) empowers

consumer fora to intervene against contracts that unjustly curtail consumer rights, thereby

advancing the objective of consumer welfare and ensuring a level playing field between

consumers and powerful commercial entities.

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE

Section 2(47) defines “unfair trade practice” as a trade practice which, for the purpose of

promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or services, adopts any unfair method or deceptive

practice, and includes a wide range of specified acts. This provision builds upon and significantly

expands the earlier definition under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, thereby strengthening

consumer rights against misleading, fraudulent, and manipulative commercial practices.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 2(47) is broad and preventive in nature. It is designed to protect consumers

from practices that distort their ability to make informed choices in the marketplace. The provision

applies across all sectors of trade, commerce, and services. The section enumerates several

categories of unfair trade practices, such as false representation regarding goods or services,

misleading advertisements, offering spurious goods, adopting deceptive promotional schemes,

withholding material information, and manipulating prices or supply. Importantly, the Act also

brings in liability for endorsements and celebrity advertisements that mislead consumers,

reflecting the legislative recognition of the influence of advertising in the modern economy.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of an unfair trade practice under Section 2(47) are, first, the presence of a

trade practice by a trader, manufacturer, or service provider. Second, such a practice must involve

an unfair or deceptive method, which is aimed at promoting the sale, use, or supply of goods or

services. Third, the statute expressly covers acts such as misrepresentation of standards, falsely

claiming sponsorship or approval, offering gifts without the intention of providing them, and false

or misleading advertisements. Fourth, the practice must have the effect of misleading consumers,

causing loss, injury, or influencing consumer decisions unfairly.

Judicial interpretation of unfair trade practices has been consistent with the legislative

intent to curb consumer exploitation. In Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL

, the Supreme Court held that

(1986) 3 SCC 156

(1995) 5 SCC 482

(1995) 5 SCC 139

misleading advertisements could amount to unfair trade practice under the 1986 Act. Similarly, in

Horlicks Ltd. v. Zydus Wellness Products Ltd.

, the Delhi High Court intervened against

disparaging advertisements that misled consumers. Under the 2019 Act, such judicial reasoning

finds statutory reinforcement, as misleading advertisements are explicitly recognised as a species

of unfair trade practice. By codifying and expanding upon the judicial and statutory framework,

Section 2(47) ensures that the marketplace remains transparent, competitive, and fair, thus

protecting the interests of consumers against deceptive and manipulative commercial conduct.

CHAPTER II

CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCILS

CENTRAL CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCIL

The Central Consumer Protection Council is constituted under Section 3 of the Consumer

Protection Act, 2019. Sub-section (1) provides that the Central Government shall, by notification,

establish the Council, to be known as the Central Council, from such date as may be specified in

the notification. Sub-section (2) declares that the Central Council shall function as an advisory

body and outlines its composition. Clause (a) specifies that the Minister-in-charge of the

Department of Consumer Affairs in the Central Government shall serve as the Chairperson.

Clause (b) empowers the inclusion of such number of other official or non-official members

representing various interests as may be prescribed by rules framed under the Act.

Scope and Application

The provision has a nationwide scope, being applicable to the whole of India. The Central Council

functions primarily as an advisory body, tasked with promoting and protecting the rights of

consumers as defined under the Act. Its recommendations and deliberations are intended to guide

the Central Government in formulating and implementing consumer protection policies. While the

Council does not possess adjudicatory powers, its advisory role is of significant importance in

shaping the legislative and administrative framework for consumer welfare. The applicability of

this provision is not limited to any specific class of consumers; rather, it extends to matters

affecting consumers across all sectors and regions of the country.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the statutory mandate for the Central Government to establish the

Central Council through a notification in the Official Gazette, which marks the legal

commencement of its existence. The second is the advisory character of the Council,

distinguishing it from adjudicatory forums under the Act such as District Commissions, State

Commissions, or the National Commission. The third essential element relates to composition.

The Minister-in-charge of the Department of Consumer Affairs serves as the Chairperson,

ensuring direct ministerial oversight. Additionally, the provision allows for the appointment of

both official and non-official members representing diverse interests, thereby facilitating multi-

sectoral representation. The prescribed rules under the Act provide further details regarding the

number, qualifications, and tenure of such members. In Union of India v. National Consumer

Protection Council

, although decided under the earlier enactment, the Supreme Court

(2019 SCC OnLine Del 7881)

(1995) 2 SCC 48

underscored the significance of such councils in furthering consumer education and awareness, a

principle equally relevant under the 2019 Act.

PROCEDURE FOR MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL

Section 4 prescribes the procedure governing the meetings of the Central Consumer Protection

Council. Sub-section (1) provides that the Council shall meet as and when necessary, subject to

the statutory minimum requirement that at least one meeting shall be convened in a year. Sub-

section (2) confers on the Chairperson the authority to determine the time and place of such

meetings and mandates that the Council shall conduct its business in accordance with the

procedure as may be prescribed by rules framed under the Act.

Scope and Application

The provision applies exclusively to the Central Council and regulates the modalities of its

functioning. Its scope is procedural, ensuring that the Council remains active in discharging its

advisory role while allowing sufficient flexibility in scheduling meetings. By requiring at least one

annual meeting, the legislature prevents the Council from becoming dormant, while at the same

time leaving room for additional meetings to be convened when policy needs or consumer welfare

considerations demand. The application of the prescribed procedural rules ensures uniformity in

the manner in which the Council’s deliberations are carried out, thereby enhancing transparency

and accountability.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the statutory minimum frequency of meetings, which creates a

binding obligation to hold at least one meeting every year. The second is the discretionary

authority of the Chairperson to decide the time and place of the meeting, ensuring administrative

convenience while maintaining flexibility. The third element is the procedural framework for

transacting business, which is to be laid down in the rules made under the Act. This delegated

legislation ensures that the Council’s proceedings are consistent, orderly, and in conformity with

the legislative intent. Though the section is procedural, its importance lies in providing continuity

and structure to the functioning of the Central Council, thereby reinforcing its role as a key

advisory body for consumer protection policy in India.

OBJECTS OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL

Section 5 states the objects of the Central Consumer Protection Council. It provides that the

primary object of the Central Council is to render advice on matters relating to the promotion and

protection of the rights of consumers under the Act. This provision establishes the advisory

character of the Council, emphasizing its role in consumer welfare policy.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is broad, covering all matters that concern the promotion and

protection of consumer rights as defined under the Act. It makes clear that the Central Council

does not exercise adjudicatory or enforcement powers; rather, its function is to guide, deliberate,

and advise the Central Government in formulating policies and measures aimed at consumer

welfare. The application of this provision extends to the entire range of consumer rights, including

protection against unfair trade practices, access to safe goods and services, the right to

information, the right to be heard, and the right to seek redressal, all of which are central to the

legislative intent of the 2019 Act.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the advisory role of the Central Council, which is confined to

rendering advice rather than executing or enforcing consumer protection measures. The second is

the focus on consumer rights, ensuring that all deliberations of the Council are aligned with the

statutory rights guaranteed under the Act. The third essential element is the policy-orientation of

the Council’s functions, whereby it contributes to the development of a consumer-centric

regulatory framework. The judiciary has consistently recognised the importance of advisory

councils in consumer protection. For instance, in Union of India v. National Consumer Protection

Council

, the Supreme Court highlighted the role of such bodies in strengthening consumer

awareness and advocacy, thereby reinforcing the significance of the objects provision under the

present Act.

STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCILS

Section 6 provides for the establishment and functioning of State Consumer Protection Councils.

Sub-section (1) mandates that every State Government shall, by notification, establish a State

Consumer Protection Council, to be known as the State Council, with effect from such date as

specified in the notification. Sub-section (2) defines the advisory nature and composition of the

State Council. It specifies that the Minister-in-charge of Consumer Affairs in the State

Government shall act as the Chairperson. Further, such number of official and non-official

members representing various interests as may be prescribed shall constitute the Council, along

with up to ten members nominated by the Central Government. Sub-section (3) requires that the

State Council meet as and when necessary, but not less than twice every year. Sub-section (4)

vests the Chairperson with the authority to fix the time and place of meetings, while mandating

that the Council observe the procedure for transacting business as may be prescribed by rules.

Scope and Application

The provision ensures that consumer protection is not confined to the central level but extends to

the States, thereby giving the framework a federal character. The State Council, much like the

Central Council, functions in an advisory capacity, with its scope directed towards promoting and

protecting consumer rights at the State level. Its application is comprehensive, encompassing

diverse consumer issues within the State and providing a platform for both official and non-

official members, including those nominated by the Central Government, to participate in

consumer policy formulation. The mandatory requirement of at least two meetings annually

ensures that consumer concerns are periodically addressed at the State level, thus maintaining

continuity and accountability in the functioning of the Council.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the statutory obligation imposed on every State Government to

establish a State Consumer Protection Council through notification, thereby ensuring that the

(1995) 2 SCC 48

advisory framework extends uniformly across the country. The second is the composition of the

Council. By making the State Minister-in-charge of Consumer Affairs the Chairperson, the statute

ensures direct ministerial oversight. The inclusion of official and non-official members

representing diverse interests provides multi-sectoral representation, while the nomination of up to

ten members by the Central Government strengthens coordination between the Centre and the

States in consumer protection policy. The third essential element is the mandatory frequency of

meetings. The requirement of at least two meetings a year ensures that the Council remains active,

responsive, and engaged in consumer welfare. The fourth is the procedural regulation of meetings,

which are to be held at the discretion of the Chairperson, but governed by prescribed rules,

ensuring consistency and legitimacy in the Council’s operations.

OBJECTS OF THE STATE COUNCIL

Section 7 defines the objects of every State Consumer Protection Council. It provides that the

object of the State Council is to render advice on matters relating to the promotion and protection

of consumer rights under the Act within the territorial limits of the State. This establishes the

advisory nature of the Council, with a focus on consumer welfare at the State level.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is confined to the respective State in which the Council is constituted.

It reflects the federal design of the Act by ensuring that consumer protection receives attention not

only at the central level but also within each State. The State Council is expected to advise the

State Government on consumer issues, thereby enabling the formulation of consumer-friendly

policies and measures suited to local conditions. The application of this provision extends to the

entire spectrum of consumer rights enumerated under the Act, including protection against unfair

trade practices, access to safe goods and services, the right to information, the right to be heard,

and the right to seek redressal. By focusing on the State level, this provision ensures that regional

consumer issues are addressed effectively.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the advisory character of the State Council, which, like its Central

counterpart, does not possess adjudicatory powers but is intended to provide policy guidance. The

second is the territorial limitation of its objects, restricting the scope of its advisory role to matters

arising within the State. The third element is the focus on consumer rights, which anchors the

Council’s advisory function in the statutory framework of the Act. In judicial interpretation under

the earlier enactment, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. National Consumer Protection

Council

, highlighted the importance of consumer councils in fostering awareness and policy

development. This rationale equally informs the objects of the State Council under the 2019 Act,

underscoring its significance in strengthening consumer protection mechanisms at the sub-national

level.

DISTRICT CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCILS

(1995) 2 SCC 48

Section 8 provides for the establishment of District Consumer Protection Councils. Sub-section (1)

mandates that every State Government shall, by notification, establish a District Council for each

district, to be known as the District Consumer Protection Council. Sub-section (2) declares the

District Council to be an advisory body and prescribes its composition. It specifies that the

Collector of the district (by whatever name called) shall act as the Chairperson, along with such

number of other official and non-official members representing various interests as may be

prescribed. Sub-section (3) requires that the District Council meet as and when necessary, with the

statutory minimum of two meetings per year. Sub-section (4) vests discretion in the Chairperson to

determine the time and place of meetings within the district and mandates that business shall be

transacted in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules.

Scope and Application

This provision extends the advisory framework of consumer protection to the grassroots level,

ensuring that consumer welfare is addressed in each district. Its scope is confined to consumer

issues arising within the district, thereby allowing localised problems to be identified and

conveyed to higher levels of government for appropriate policy formulation. The provision applies

to all members of the District Council, including official and non-official representatives, thereby

ensuring diverse perspectives in consumer-related deliberations. The requirement of at least two

annual meetings ensures that the District Council remains active and continuously engaged in

addressing consumer concerns at the local level.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the statutory mandate imposed on every State Government to

constitute a District Consumer Protection Council by notification, thereby ensuring uniformity

across districts. The second is the composition of the Council, with the Collector of the district

serving as the Chairperson, ensuring administrative authority and coordination. The inclusion of

official and non-official members representing varied interests promotes inclusivity and

responsiveness to local consumer concerns. The third essential element is the frequency of

meetings, with a minimum of two meetings annually, ensuring continuity in the functioning of the

Council. The fourth is the procedural regulation of meetings, determined by the Chairperson but

bound by rules framed under the Act. This combination of statutory compulsion and procedural

flexibility allows the District Council to function effectively as an advisory forum, bridging the

gap between consumers and policymaking authorities at the district level.

OBJECTS OF THE DISTRICT COUNCIL

Section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, defines the objects of every District Consumer

Protection Council. It provides that the object of the District Council is to render advice on matters

relating to the promotion and protection of the rights of consumers under the Act within the

district. This provision mirrors the objectives of the Central and State Consumer Protection

Councils but adapts them to the district level, ensuring that consumer rights are safeguarded

through a decentralised advisory framework.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the district for which the

Council is established. Its application is intended to address localised consumer grievances and

issues, enabling the Council to advise on measures best suited to the district’s circumstances. By

situating the advisory role at the district level, the Act ensures that consumer concerns arising

from local trade practices, services, and administrative contexts are given due consideration. The

District Council thus serves as a vital link between consumers at the grassroots and higher policy-

making bodies at the State and Central levels.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the advisory character of the District Council, which, consistent with

the federal design of the Act, does not exercise adjudicatory powers but focuses on providing

advice and recommendations. The second is the territorial limitation, restricting its advisory role

to matters affecting consumers within the district. The third is the focus on consumer rights as

defined under the Act, which include protection against hazardous goods and services, the right to

information, the right to be heard, and access to redressal mechanisms. By requiring district-level

advisory bodies to promote these rights, the statute seeks to integrate consumer welfare into local

governance. The role of such councils has been judicially acknowledged as essential in spreading

awareness and shaping policy, as observed in Union of India v. National Consumer Protection

Council

, a principle equally relevant to the objectives of the District Council under the 2019 Act.

CHAPTER III

CENTRAL CONSUMER PROTECTION AUTHORITY

ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL CONSUMER PROTECTION AUTHORITY

Section 10 provides for the creation of a regulatory body known as the Central Consumer

Protection Authority (CCPA). Sub-section (1) mandates that the Central Government shall, by

notification, establish the Authority with effect from such date as specified. The CCPA is

entrusted with the responsibility of regulating matters relating to the violation of consumer rights,

unfair trade practices, and false or misleading advertisements that are prejudicial to the interests of

the public and consumers. Its mandate extends not only to preventing such violations but also to

promoting, protecting, and enforcing the rights of consumers as a class. Sub-section (2) stipulates

the composition of the Authority, consisting of a Chief Commissioner and such number of other

Commissioners as may be prescribed, all of whom are to be appointed by the Central Government

to exercise powers and perform functions under the Act. Sub-section (3) provides that the

headquarters of the Authority shall be situated within the National Capital Region of Delhi, with

regional and other offices in different parts of India as determined by the Central Government.

Scope and Application

This provision marks a significant departure from the earlier legal framework by creating a

dedicated regulatory authority with wide powers to address systemic issues affecting consumer

rights. Its scope is both preventive and remedial, extending to the regulation of unfair trade

practices, the curbing of false and misleading advertisements, and the enforcement of consumer

rights at a collective level. Unlike the advisory role of the Central, State, and District Consumer

Protection Councils, the CCPA is vested with regulatory and enforcement functions, thereby

serving as the central institutional mechanism for consumer protection in India. The provision

applies nationwide and has implications for businesses, advertisers, manufacturers, and service

providers whose activities may adversely affect consumer interests.

(1995) 2 SCC 48

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the statutory mandate for establishment, whereby the Central

Government is obliged to create the Authority by notification, thereby institutionalising consumer

protection at the central regulatory level. The second is the regulatory jurisdiction of the CCPA,

which is explicitly directed at violations of consumer rights, unfair trade practices, and misleading

advertisements. This jurisdiction places the Authority in a proactive role, distinct from the

adjudicatory functions of consumer commissions. The third essential element is the composition of

the Authority. The presence of a Chief Commissioner and other Commissioners appointed by the

Central Government ensures a structured leadership and distribution of regulatory functions. The

fourth is the seat of authority. By situating its headquarters in the National Capital Region of Delhi

and allowing for regional and other offices across the country, the statute ensures both centralised

control and decentralised accessibility. The establishment of the CCPA reflects legislative intent to

strengthen consumer protection by creating a specialised body with powers of investigation,

inquiry, and enforcement, as later detailed in subsequent provisions of the Act.

QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF THE CHIEF

COMMISSIONER AND COMMISSIONERS

Section 11 empowers the Central Government to regulate the service conditions of the Chief

Commissioner and Commissioners of the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA). It

provides that the Central Government may, by notification, frame rules prescribing the

qualifications required for appointment, the method and procedure of recruitment, the term of

office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal, and other terms and conditions of service

applicable to these office-bearers.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is confined to the governance of appointments and service conditions

of the leadership of the CCPA. It ensures that the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners are

appointed through a regulated process and that their tenure, emoluments, and service conditions

are determined by rules made under the Act. The provision applies directly to the Chief

Commissioner and Commissioners and indirectly to the functioning of the Authority, since the

quality of leadership and its independence are closely linked to the qualifications and conditions of

service prescribed under this section. By delegating these matters to rule-making, the legislature

ensures flexibility, allowing the Central Government to revise or adapt service conditions in

response to evolving administrative needs without the necessity of amending the parent Act.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the delegated rule-making power conferred upon the Central

Government to prescribe qualifications, recruitment methods, and other conditions of service

through notification. The second is the scope of regulation, which extends to appointment

procedures, term of office, salaries, allowances, resignation, and removal, thereby covering the

full range of service-related matters. The third essential element is the assurance of transparency

and accountability in the appointment and functioning of the Chief Commissioner and

Commissioners, achieved through a statutory framework that subjects these appointments to rules

rather than unfettered executive discretion. The fourth element is the structural independence of

the Authority, safeguarded by providing statutory backing for service conditions, thereby

minimising the possibility of arbitrary interference by the executive. This framework aligns with

judicial observations in cases such as Union of India v. R. Gandhi

, where the Supreme Court

emphasised the importance of statutory clarity and independence in the appointment of members

of regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies. Although the case dealt with company law tribunals, the

principle is equally instructive for interpreting the significance of Section 11 in securing the

independence and efficacy of the CCPA.

VALIDITY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 12 safeguards the functioning of the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) by

providing that no act or proceeding of the Authority shall be invalidated merely due to certain

defects. Clause (a) specifies that the existence of a vacancy in, or a defect in the constitution of,

the Authority does not render its proceedings invalid. Clause (b) provides that a defect in the

appointment of a person acting as the Chief Commissioner or as a Commissioner will not vitiate

the proceedings. Clause (c) clarifies that any irregularity in procedure, so long as it does not affect

the merits of the case, shall not invalidate the Authority’s acts or decisions.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is protective in nature. It ensures that minor procedural defects or

vacancies do not paralyse the functioning of the CCPA. The application of this provision extends

to all acts, decisions, and proceedings of the Authority, whether at its headquarters or regional

offices. Its purpose is to maintain continuity, stability, and effectiveness in regulatory functions,

even in the face of administrative or procedural lapses. Importantly, the saving clause in this

section does not extend to irregularities that affect the merits of a case, thereby maintaining a

balance between administrative efficiency and fairness to parties affected by the Authority’s

actions.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the saving of proceedings from invalidation due to vacancy or

defective constitution. This ensures that the Authority’s work is not stalled by unavoidable

administrative delays or temporary gaps in membership. The second is the saving against defects

in appointment. Even if the appointment of a Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner suffers

from a procedural flaw, the decisions taken during their tenure remain valid, provided they act

within the scope of authority. The third essential element is the limitation placed on procedural

irregularities. Only those irregularities which do not affect the merits of a case are condoned;

irregularities going to the root of fairness or legality would still render proceedings invalid.

Judicial interpretation of similar saving clauses, such as in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan

, has

emphasised that procedural defects that do not affect jurisdiction or merits cannot nullify

proceedings. This principle is equally relevant to Section 12, which seeks to insulate the CCPA’s

actions from technical challenges while upholding substantive justice.

(2010) 11 SCC 1

(1954 SCR 117)

APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS, EXPERTS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL

AUTHORITY

Section 13 deals with the staffing and expert support structure of the Central Consumer Protection

Authority (CCPA). Sub-section (1) provides that the Central Government shall make available to

the Authority such number of officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient

performance of its functions. Sub-section (2) mandates that the salaries, allowances, and other

empowers the Authority to engage experts and professionals possessing integrity, ability, and

special knowledge in relevant fields such as consumer rights, policy, law, medicine, food safety,

health, engineering, product safety, commerce, economics, public affairs, or administration, in

accordance with the procedure laid down by regulations.

Scope and Application

This provision recognises that effective consumer protection requires not only administrative staff

but also domain-specific expertise. The scope of the section is twofold: first, it authorises the

Central Government to provide officers and employees to ensure the Authority’s functioning;

second, it empowers the Authority itself to engage external experts and professionals. Its

application extends to the recruitment, appointment, and service conditions of the CCPA’s

workforce, as well as to the engagement of outside specialists. This framework is crucial for

enabling the Authority to regulate complex issues such as misleading advertisements, product

safety, and unfair trade practices, which often require technical and interdisciplinary knowledge.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the provision of officers and employees by the Central Government.

This ensures that the Authority has adequate administrative support and manpower to discharge its

statutory responsibilities. The second is the prescription of service conditions. By leaving matters

such as salaries and allowances to rules, the Act ensures flexibility while maintaining uniform

standards. The third essential element is the engagement of experts and professionals by the

Authority itself. This provision reflects a recognition that consumer protection increasingly

involves technical, medical, scientific, and economic complexities which go beyond routine

administration. The statutory requirement that such experts be persons of “integrity and ability”

ensures a measure of accountability and competence. Judicial decisions, such as Union of India v.

R. Gandhi

, have underlined the importance of including domain experts in regulatory bodies to

balance technical expertise with legal oversight. Section 13 embodies this principle by creating a

mechanism that combines administrative staff with subject-matter specialists to strengthen

consumer protection governance.

PROCEDURE OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 14 lays down the framework for the internal functioning of the Central Consumer

Protection Authority (CCPA). Sub-section (1) empowers the Authority to regulate its own

procedure for transacting business, including the allocation of responsibilities among the Chief

Commissioner and Commissioners, through regulations. Sub-section (2) vests the Chief

Commissioner with powers of general superintendence, direction, and control over all

(2010) 11 SCC 1

administrative matters of the Authority. The proviso, however, allows the Chief Commissioner to

delegate such administrative powers to any Commissioner, including regional Commissioners, or

other officers of the Authority, as deemed appropriate.

Scope and Application

This provision deals exclusively with the procedural autonomy and administrative hierarchy of

the CCPA. It ensures that the Authority can self-regulate its internal operations through

regulations rather than being rigidly bound by statutory procedures. The application of this section

is twofold: first, to the transaction and distribution of business between Commissioners; and

second, to the exercise of administrative authority by the Chief Commissioner, subject to

permissible delegation. In practice, this provision enables efficient decision-making and

decentralisation, particularly given the nationwide jurisdiction of the Authority and the

establishment of regional offices.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the power to regulate procedure through regulations. This reflects the

principle of institutional autonomy, allowing the Authority to frame flexible procedures suited to

its functions. The second element is the administrative primacy of the Chief Commissioner. By

vesting superintendence and control in a single office, the Act ensures accountability and

leadership within the Authority. The third element is the delegation of administrative powers. The

proviso strikes a balance between centralised leadership and decentralised efficiency by permitting

delegation to Commissioners and officers. Judicial pronouncements such as Barium Chemicals

Ltd. v. Company Law Board

have emphasised the necessity of clear procedural powers and

supervisory roles within regulatory bodies to prevent arbitrariness. Section 14 embodies this by

institutionalising both procedural self-regulation and hierarchical clarity within the CCPA.

INVESTIGATION WING OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 15 establishes the Investigation Wing of the Central Consumer Protection Authority

(CCPA), headed by a Director-General. Sub-section (1) mandates the creation of this Wing for

conducting inquiries or investigations as directed by the Authority. Sub-section (2) empowers the

Central Government to appoint the Director-General and other officers such as Additional

Director-General, Director, Joint Director, Deputy Director, and Assistant Director, from among

persons with investigative experience and prescribed qualifications. Sub-sections (3) and (4)

define the chain of command within the Investigation Wing, placing officers under the general

supervision of the Director-General, who may also delegate powers to subordinate officers. Sub-

section (5) provides that reports of inquiry or investigation conducted by the Director-General

must be submitted to the CCPA in the prescribed form, manner, and timeframe.

Scope and Application

The provision is crucial as it institutionalises the enforcement machinery of the CCPA. While the

Central Authority is the regulatory and decision-making body, Section 15 creates its investigative

arm to collect evidence, conduct inquiries, and investigate unfair trade practices, misleading

advertisements, and violations of consumer rights. This ensures that regulatory functions are

(1967) SCR 898

supported by fact-finding processes. Its application extends to all cases where the CCPA directs

investigation or inquiry, and it provides the legal foundation for the investigative competence of

officers at various hierarchical levels.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the establishment of an Investigation Wing, ensuring that regulatory

authority is complemented by investigatory powers. The second element is the appointment of the

Director-General and supporting officers by the Central Government, with a focus on professional

expertise in investigation. This reflects the principle of specialised administration in consumer

protection. The third element is the hierarchical control and delegation of powers. By granting the

Director-General supervisory authority and permitting delegation, the Act balances accountability

with operational flexibility. The fourth element is the submission of reports in prescribed form and

manner, which ensures standardisation and procedural regularity. Judicial precedents such as State

of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

emphasise that investigative powers must operate under a clear

statutory framework to prevent arbitrariness. Section 15 embodies this principle by providing both

structure and oversight in the investigative functions of the CCPA.

POWER OF DISTRICT COLLECTOR

Section 16 empowers the District Collector (by whatever name called) to act as a local

enforcement authority in matters concerning consumer protection. The provision authorises the

District Collector, either on the basis of a complaint or a reference from the Central Consumer

Protection Authority (CCPA) or the Commissioner of a regional office, to inquire into or

investigate violations of consumer rights, unfair trade practices, and misleading advertisements

within his territorial jurisdiction. The Collector is further required to submit the report of such

inquiry or investigation to the CCPA or the concerned regional Commissioner.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 16 extends to violations affecting consumers as a class within a district. It

decentralises the enforcement machinery by allowing District Collectors—who are already vested

with magisterial and administrative powers—to act as field-level protectors of consumer rights.

This provision ensures quicker access to justice and strengthens the effectiveness of the CCPA’s

regulatory framework. Its application is particularly relevant in cases involving localised unfair

trade practices, deceptive advertisements, or consumer rights violations that require immediate

intervention and fact-finding at the district level.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the jurisdiction of the District Collector to initiate inquiries either suo

motu on complaint or upon reference from higher authorities. This makes the District Collector a

key link between the CCPA and local enforcement. The second element is the subject matter of

investigation, which is limited to violations of consumer rights, unfair trade practices, and

misleading advertisements—thus preventing overreach into unrelated areas. The third element is

the reporting obligation, where the Collector must submit findings to the CCPA or the regional

Commissioner, ensuring accountability and central oversight. This reflects the principle of

(1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

cooperative federalism in consumer protection, wherein district-level machinery operates under

the overall supervision of the central authority. Judicial interpretations, such as in Indian Oil

Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.

, highlight the need for local authorities to act promptly against

unfair trade practices. Section 16 embodies this principle by equipping District Collectors with

investigatory competence while ensuring their actions feed into the central regulatory framework.

COMPLAINTS TO AUTHORITIES

Section 17 lays down the procedural mechanism for filing complaints in cases of violation of

consumer rights, unfair trade practices, or false and misleading advertisements that are prejudicial

to the interests of consumers as a class. The provision allows such complaints to be submitted

either in writing or through electronic mode to any one of three authorities: the District Collector,

the Commissioner of a regional office, or the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA).

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 17 is broad as it empowers consumers or consumer groups to approach

multiple authorities for redressal. By enabling both written and electronic submission of

complaints, it modernises consumer law in tune with digitalisation and ensures wider accessibility.

The application of this section is particularly significant in cases where consumers as a collective

body are harmed, such as misleading advertisements by corporations, systemic unfair trade

practices, or violations of consumer rights at a large scale. The multi-authority framework ensures

flexibility for complainants while strengthening the outreach of consumer protection enforcement.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the nature of the complaint, which must relate to consumer rights

violations, unfair trade practices, or misleading advertisements affecting consumers as a class.

This distinguishes it from individual grievances, which are dealt with by consumer commissions

under other provisions of the Act. The second element is the mode of filing, allowing both

traditional written form and electronic communication, thus recognising the need for accessible

and speedy consumer redressal in the digital era. The third element is the forum of complaint,

which includes the District Collector (local authority), Commissioner of a regional office (regional

authority), and the CCPA (central authority). This layered structure reflects a decentralised yet

interconnected system of consumer protection, enabling efficient coordination between local,

regional, and central levels. Judicial perspectives, as seen in Common Cause v. Union of India

have emphasised the importance of citizen-friendly mechanisms in public interest matters. Section

17 embodies this by creating simplified avenues for collective consumer grievances to be heard

and acted upon promptly.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 18 defines the substantive powers and functions of the Central Consumer Protection

Authority (CCPA), the apex body constituted under the Act. The provision confers on the CCPA

both regulatory and enforcement powers to safeguard consumer rights, prevent unfair trade

practices, and curb false or misleading advertisements. The section establishes the CCPA not

(2006) 6 SCC 736

(1997) 10 SCC 729

merely as an advisory body but as an active enforcement agency with wide-ranging jurisdiction

across India.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 18 is comprehensive, as it entrusts the Central Authority with the twin

responsibilities of promotion and protection of consumer rights and regulation and enforcement

against violators. Sub-section (1) lays down the broad mandates—protection of consumer rights,

prohibition of unfair trade practices, and prevention of misleading advertisements. Sub-section (2)

elaborates on these mandates by empowering the CCPA to conduct inquiries and investigations

suo motu or on complaints, file complaints before Consumer Commissions, intervene in ongoing

proceedings, issue safety notices, promote consumer awareness, and advise governments. The

application of this provision makes the CCPA the central enforcement agency in consumer

protection law, capable of acting both independently and in coordination with State and District-

level authorities.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the enforcement function, which authorises the CCPA to inquire into

violations, file complaints before consumer commissions, intervene in proceedings, and issue

directions or guidelines (s.18(2)(a)–(c), (l)). This empowers the Authority to act as a watchdog

over corporate and market practices. The second element is the advisory and research function,

which includes reviewing laws, recommending remedial measures, adopting international best

practices, and undertaking research in consumer rights (s.18(2)(d)–(f)). This places the Authority

at the intersection of policy-making and enforcement. The third element is the awareness and

preventive function, enabling it to spread consumer awareness, cooperate with NGOs, mandate

unique goods identifiers, and issue safety notices (s.18(2)(g)–(j)). Judicial support for such wide

powers can be seen in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Sub-Judicial Magistrate

, where the Court highlighted

that regulatory bodies must act to prevent unfair trade practices that harm public interest. The

integration of advisory, enforcement, and awareness roles in Section 18 ensures a holistic

consumer protection framework, aligning with the constitutional vision of access to justice and

fair trade under Article 39A.

POWER OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO REFER MATTER FOR INVESTIGATION OR

TO OTHER REGULATOR

Section 19 provides the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) with the authority to

undertake a preliminary inquiry and, depending on its findings, either conduct a full-fledged

investigation through its Investigation Wing or refer the matter to another statutory regulator. This

section ensures that consumer protection overlaps with sector-specific regulatory mechanisms

without creating jurisdictional conflicts.

Scope and Application

The section empowers the Central Authority to act upon information, consumer complaints, or

even suo motu directions from the Central Government. The scope of this power is wide, allowing

the Authority to intervene wherever consumer rights are threatened. Once a prima facie case of

violation of consumer rights, unfair trade practices, or misleading advertisements is established,

the Authority may direct the Director-General (Investigation Wing) or the District Collector to

(1998) 5 SCC 749

investigate. However, if the subject matter falls under the jurisdiction of another regulatory body

(such as SEBI, TRAI, FSSAI, or IRDAI), the Authority may refer the matter to such regulator,

thereby avoiding duplication of powers.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the preliminary inquiry requirement (s.19(1)), which serves as a

safeguard against frivolous or vexatious complaints by ensuring that only prima facie cases are

investigated. The second element is the investigative mechanism (s.19(1), (3)), which authorises

the Director-General or District Collector to summon persons, require production of documents,

and collect evidence, thus equipping them with quasi-judicial powers akin to investigative

agencies. The third element is the regulatory coordination function (s.19(2)), which allows the

CCPA to transfer matters to specialised regulators. This provision reflects the principle of

harmonious construction in administrative law, ensuring that overlapping statutory bodies

function without encroaching on each other’s jurisdiction. Judicial guidance can be drawn from

Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.

, where the Supreme Court stressed the

importance of jurisdictional balance between sector-specific regulators and general regulators.

Section 19 thus plays a pivotal role in preventing both regulatory overreach and regulatory

gaps. It ensures that consumer grievances are not ignored due to technical jurisdictional issues

while at the same time recognising the expertise of sector-specific regulators. The combination of

investigative power and referral authority makes the CCPA an effective coordinating agency in

India’s consumer protection framework.

POWER OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO RECALL GOODS, ETC.

Section 20 empowers the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) to take direct remedial

action against manufacturers, service providers, or traders whose goods or services violate

consumer rights, are unsafe, or involve unfair trade practices. This provision incorporates a

proactive consumer safety mechanism into Indian law, which was absent in the 1986 Act.

Scope and Application

The section operates where, on the basis of an investigation under Section 19, the Authority is

satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of violation of consumer rights. The scope is wide

enough to cover defective products, hazardous goods, unsafe services, and deceptive practices.

The Authority may then pass binding orders such as recalling goods, discontinuing services,

mandating reimbursements, and prohibiting continuation of unfair trade practices. Importantly, a

principle of natural justice safeguard is included, requiring that the concerned party be given an

opportunity of being heard before an order is passed.

Essential Elements

The first element is the power of recall and withdrawal (s.20(a)), allowing the Authority to compel

removal of goods or services from the market to prevent harm. The second element is the

reimbursement requirement (s.20(b)), which ensures restitution by mandating refund of purchase

prices to affected consumers. The third element is the injunctive function (s.20(c)), under which

the Authority can stop unfair or harmful practices from continuing. These powers are civil in

nature but have a preventive and corrective impact similar to regulatory interventions under

(2019) 2 SCC 521

product liability or food safety laws. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India

, the Supreme Court

emphasised the State’s obligation to protect the right to life and personal safety; Section 20

embodies this duty in the consumer context.

The provision is significant because it moves beyond individual redressal and addresses

consumer interests as a class. Unlike the 1986 Act, where recall mechanisms were absent, the

2019 Act aligns with global consumer protection frameworks (such as the EU’s General Product

Safety Directive and US Consumer Product Safety Commission powers). It strengthens preventive

regulation by enabling market-wide corrective measures rather than leaving the burden of

litigation solely on individual consumers.

POWER OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO ISSUE DIRECTIONS AND PENALTIES

AGAINST FALSE OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENTS

Section 21 empowers the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) to regulate, control, and

penalise false or misleading advertisements that are prejudicial to consumer interests. Sub-section

(1) authorises the CCPA, upon satisfaction after investigation, to direct the trader, manufacturer,

endorser, advertiser or publisher to discontinue such advertisement or modify it in the manner

prescribed. Sub-section (2) provides that, in addition to such directions, the CCPA may impose a

penalty up to ten lakh rupees on a manufacturer or endorser, which may extend to fifty lakh rupees

for subsequent contraventions. Sub-section (3) empowers the CCPA to prohibit an endorser of a

false or misleading advertisement from endorsing any product or service for up to one year, which

may extend to three years in case of subsequent contraventions. Sub-section (4) authorises

imposition of a penalty up to ten lakh rupees on publishers of misleading advertisements. Sub-

sections (5) and (6) provide statutory defences to endorsers and publishers respectively, subject to

conditions of due diligence and good faith. Sub-section (7) requires the authority to consider

factors such as the population impacted, frequency and duration of the offence, vulnerability of

affected consumers, and revenue earned through such misleading practices, before imposing

penalty. Sub-section (8) ensures observance of natural justice by mandating an opportunity of

hearing before passing any order.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 21 is deliberately wide so as to cover all entities connected with the chain of

advertisement—manufacturers, traders, endorsers, advertisers, and publishers. This provision

reflects a significant shift from the earlier regime under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986,

wherein misleading advertisements were addressed indirectly through the Consumer Protection

Councils or the voluntary Advertising Standards Council of India. By specifically empowering the

CCPA, the 2019 Act introduces a strong statutory mechanism to curb unfair influence on

consumer behaviour through deceptive claims. Its application is not confined merely to

commercial advertisements in the traditional sense but extends to all promotional materials in any

medium, including digital platforms. The section also applies not only to individual grievances but

to advertisements affecting consumers as a class.

Essential Elements

(2017) 10 SCC 1

The first essential element under Section 21 is that there must be an advertisement that is false or

misleading in nature. The advertisement must also be prejudicial either to the interest of a

consumer or to consumer rights in general. Secondly, an investigation by the CCPA is a

precondition to exercise of the powers under this section, ensuring that the authority acts on

verified grounds rather than on mere allegations. Thirdly, liability is extended not only to the

manufacturer or trader responsible for the product but also to endorsers and publishers. This marks

a recognition of the influential role of celebrity endorsements in shaping consumer decisions.

However, endorsers are protected by sub-section (5) if they can establish that they exercised due

diligence in verifying the claims made in the advertisement. Similarly, publishers are insulated

under sub-section (6) if the publication occurred in the ordinary course of business without

knowledge of any prohibition order. Fourthly, while determining the quantum of penalty, sub-

section (7) requires consideration of the extent of consumer harm, thus aligning the penalty with

the principle of proportionality. Lastly, adherence to natural justice is embedded in sub-section

(8), which guarantees an opportunity of hearing before adverse orders are passed.

Judicial recognition of the scope of Section 21 has already emerged. In Central Consumer

Protection Authority v. Patanjali Ayurved Ltd., the Supreme Court took cognisance of misleading

advertisements issued by the company making unsubstantiated medical claims and directed strict

compliance with the provisions of the Act. The Court emphasised the statutory duty of the CCPA

to protect consumers from exploitative practices, thereby affirming the enforceability of Section

21.

POWER OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Section 22 provides for the authority to conduct search and seizure in cases where there is reason

to believe that consumer rights have been violated, an unfair trade practice has been committed, or

a false or misleading advertisement has been caused to be made. Sub-section (1) empowers the

Director-General, any officer authorised by him, or the District Collector, to enter premises at any

reasonable time, search for documents, records, articles, or other forms of evidence, and seize

them. The authorised officer may also prepare an inventory or require any person to produce

relevant records or articles. Sub-section (2) incorporates the provisions of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 relating to search and seizure, thereby ensuring procedural fairness and adherence

to established safeguards. Sub-section (3) mandates that any seized or produced documents,

records, or articles must be returned to the concerned person within twenty days, after certified

copies or extracts have been taken. Sub-section (4) deals with perishable items, allowing the

Director-General or authorised officer to dispose of them in the prescribed manner. Sub-section

(5) extends the provisions of Section 38(2)(c) concerning analysis or testing to non-perishable

articles seized under this section.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 22 extends to all cases where an inquiry under Section 19(1) is being

conducted into possible violations of consumer rights, unfair trade practices, or misleading

advertisements. The provision is preventive as well as investigative in nature, enabling the

competent authority to secure evidence that might otherwise be destroyed, altered, or withheld. By

incorporating the search and seizure provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature

has ensured a balance between the investigatory powers of the authorities and the protection of

individuals against arbitrary interference. The application of this section is not restricted to

commercial establishments alone but extends to any premises where relevant documents, records,

or goods may be located.

Essential Elements

The first essential element under Section 22 is the existence of "reason to believe" on the part of

the Director-General, authorised officer, or District Collector. This phrase, well-recognised in

Indian jurisprudence, ensures that search and seizure powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily but

must be grounded in reasonable and bona fide satisfaction. Secondly, the provision requires

adherence to procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, thereby

subjecting searches to judicially developed standards such as the requirement of warrants in

certain cases, preparation of panchnamas, and the presence of independent witnesses. Thirdly, the

obligation under sub-section (3) to return seized materials within twenty days after taking certified

copies underscores the principle that seizure should not result in undue deprivation of property or

disruption of business operations. Fourthly, the special treatment of perishable goods under sub-

section (4) reflects legislative pragmatism, preventing loss of value or wastage during

proceedings. Finally, sub-section (5) ensures that seized non-perishable articles are subjected to

proper analysis or tests under the procedure laid down in Section 38, thereby preserving

evidentiary integrity.

Judicial interpretation of search and seizure powers under consumer law remains at an

evolving stage. However, by analogy, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasised in cases

such as Income Tax Officer v. Seth Brothers

, that the phrase "reason to believe" imposes an

objective standard requiring tangible material, and not mere suspicion. Such jurisprudential

safeguards apply equally to the exercise of power under Section 22, ensuring that consumer

protection does not come at the cost of arbitrary intrusion.

DESIGNATION OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY AS CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 23 empowers the Central Government to designate any statutory authority or body to

function as the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA). The provision stipulates that if

the Central Government considers it necessary, it may, through a notification, assign to such

statutory authority or body the powers and functions otherwise conferred upon the Central

Authority under Section 10.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 23 lies in providing legislative flexibility in the institutional framework of

consumer protection. While the Act establishes the Central Consumer Protection Authority under

Section 10, this section recognises that administrative exigencies or overlapping regulatory

jurisdictions may require an existing statutory body to be entrusted with the same role. For

example, in sectors already regulated by specialised bodies such as the Telecom Regulatory

Authority of India (TRAI) or the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the

Central Government may consider it expedient to vest such bodies with the authority to act as the

CCPA for matters falling within their regulatory domain. The application of this section is

discretionary and contingent upon a government notification, thereby ensuring that such

designation is not automatic but based on careful consideration of necessity and efficiency.

Essential Elements

(1969) 74 ITR 836 (SC)

The first essential element of Section 23 is the discretionary power of the Central Government,

which is couched in the phrase "if it considers necessary." This highlights that the designation of a

statutory authority is not mandatory but situational, guided by administrative or regulatory

requirements. Secondly, the designation must be effected by way of a notification, ensuring

transparency and formal legal recognition. Thirdly, the statutory authority or body so designated

must exercise the full range of powers and functions of the Central Authority as referred to in

Section 10, unless otherwise limited by the notification. This implies that such a body, once

designated, is not acting concurrently with the CCPA but in substitution of it, for the specific

purposes outlined.

Although jurisprudence on Section 23 is yet to develop, parallels may be drawn from

judicial pronouncements dealing with delegation of statutory functions. The Supreme Court in

A.K. Roy v. Union of India

, emphasised that where Parliament vests discretionary powers in the

executive, such powers must be exercised reasonably and in conformity with the objectives of the

parent statute. Applying this principle, the designation of a statutory body under Section 23 must

serve the consumer protection objectives enshrined in the Act and cannot be exercised arbitrarily.

APPEAL AGAINST ORDERS OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Section 24 provides for the appellate remedy against the orders of the Central Consumer

Protection Authority (CCPA). It lays down that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the

Central Authority under Sections 20 or 21 may prefer an appeal before the National Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) within thirty days from the date of receipt

of such order.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 24 is confined specifically to orders passed by the Central Authority under

Section 20 (relating to recall of goods, withdrawal of services, reimbursement, and discontinuation

of unfair practices) and Section 21 (relating to directions and penalties against false or misleading

advertisements). The section thus ensures judicial oversight over significant regulatory measures

taken by the CCPA that have a direct and often substantial impact on traders, manufacturers,

endorsers, advertisers, or publishers. The provision creates a statutory right of appeal to the

National Commission, which functions as the apex consumer dispute resolution forum at the

national level.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is that the right of appeal arises only when an order is passed under

Section 20 or Section 21. Orders of the CCPA under other provisions of the Act, such as initiation

of investigations or search and seizure directions, are not appealable under this section. The

second element is the locus standi requirement—only a "person aggrieved" by such order can

prefer the appeal. This ensures that the appellate jurisdiction is invoked only by parties who suffer

a legal injury or are adversely affected by the order. The third essential element is the limitation

period: the appeal must be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order. However,

consistent with general principles of limitation law and appellate procedures, the National

Commission retains discretion to condone delay if sufficient cause is shown.

(1982) 1 SCC 271

In Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute

, the Supreme Court reiterated

that the right of appeal is a statutory right and must be exercised strictly within the framework

provided by the statute. Applying this reasoning, appeals under Section 24 are limited to the

subject-matter and forum specified therein and cannot be expanded by implication.

GRANTS BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Section 25 provides for financial support by the Central Government to the Central Consumer

Protection Authority (CCPA). It empowers the Central Government, after due appropriation made

by Parliament by law, to provide grants of such sums of money as it may deem fit to the Central

Authority for the effective discharge of its functions under the Act.

Scope and Application

This provision ensures that the Central Authority has access to adequate financial resources for

carrying out its wide range of regulatory, investigative, and enforcement functions. The scope of

Section 25 is confined to the financial framework, making clear that the CCPA is not an

autonomous body with independent sources of income but is funded by the Central Government,

subject to parliamentary approval. The provision thus integrates the financial management of the

CCPA within the constitutional scheme of legislative control over public expenditure.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the requirement of "due appropriation made by Parliament by law,"

which signifies that grants to the CCPA must flow from parliamentary sanction as part of the

annual financial exercise. This ensures accountability and transparency in the allocation of public

funds. The second element is the discretionary power of the Central Government to determine the

quantum of grants. The provision uses the phrase "such sums of money as that Government may

think fit," thereby vesting the executive with flexibility to decide the funding requirements from

time to time. The third element is the purpose restriction: funds granted under this section are to be

utilised only "for the purposes of this Act," which means that financial support must be directed

exclusively towards activities necessary for consumer protection, regulation of unfair trade

practices, and related statutory functions of the CCPA.

The significance of Section 25 lies in ensuring that the CCPA, as a specialized regulatory

authority, is not hampered by financial constraints in its mandate to safeguard consumer rights. At

the same time, the parliamentary appropriation requirement acts as a safeguard against unregulated

executive expenditure, maintaining a balance between functional autonomy of the authority and

legislative oversight over public funds.

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

Section 26 deals with the financial accountability framework of the Central Consumer Protection

Authority (CCPA). It mandates the maintenance of accounts, auditing of such accounts, and

(1995) 3 SCC 583

submission of audit reports to Parliament, thereby ensuring transparency and legislative oversight

over the financial functioning of the Authority.

Scope and Application

The provision ensures that the Central Authority, though empowered with wide-ranging regulatory

and enforcement functions, remains financially accountable in its operations. Section 26 applies to

all financial transactions of the CCPA, including grants received from the Central Government

under Section 25 and any expenditure incurred in discharge of its statutory mandate. The provision

situates the audit responsibility squarely within the jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor-

General of India (CAG), aligning the financial management of the CCPA with the broader

constitutional scheme of accountability in public finance.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the requirement under sub-section (1) that the Central Authority must

maintain "proper accounts and other relevant records" and prepare an annual statement of accounts

in a form prescribed in consultation with the CAG. This ensures uniformity and adherence to

national standards of public financial reporting. The second element, provided in sub-section (2),

is that the accounts of the CCPA are to be audited by the CAG at intervals specified by him, with

the costs of audit payable by the Authority. This embeds the principle of independent audit

oversight, preventing any conflict of interest in the financial scrutiny of the Authority’s

functioning. The third element, under sub-section (3), extends to the CAG or his appointee all

rights and privileges associated with government audits. This includes the power to demand

production of records, vouchers, and documents, and to inspect the offices of the Central

Authority. Such provisions ensure unfettered access to information necessary for a comprehensive

audit. Finally, sub-section (4) requires that the audited accounts, certified by the CAG, together

with his report, be forwarded annually to the Central Government, which must lay them before

both Houses of Parliament. This step reinforces parliamentary control, ensuring that the financial

performance and accountability of the CCPA are subjected to legislative scrutiny. The significance

of Section 26 lies in its alignment with the constitutional vision of financial propriety in statutory

bodies. It preserves the independence of the CCPA in its functioning while simultaneously making

it answerable in matters of finance through parliamentary processes. This dual framework of

autonomy and accountability ensures that funds granted under Section 25 are used effectively,

exclusively for the purposes of the Act, and in compliance with established norms of public

expenditure.

FURNISHING OF ANNUAL REPORTS

Section 27 establishes the mechanism for reporting and accountability of the Central Consumer

Protection Authority (CCPA) through the furnishing of annual reports and other returns. This

provision complements Section 26, which deals with accounts and audit, by ensuring that the

Authority is not only financially accountable but also operationally transparent in respect of its

activities and performance.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 27 extends to all activities carried out by the Central Authority in the

exercise of its statutory functions. This includes investigations initiated under Section 19,

enforcement actions such as recall of goods or discontinuation of unfair practices under Section

20, orders relating to misleading advertisements under Section 21, as well as its administrative and

regulatory initiatives. The provision ensures that the Central Government and, through Parliament,

the public at large, are informed of how the Authority has discharged its mandate.

Essential Elements

The first essential element of sub-section (1) is the obligation on the Central Authority to prepare

an annual report each year. The form, manner, and timing of this report are to be prescribed by

rules, thereby allowing flexibility while ensuring uniformity and detail in reporting. The annual

report must give a “full account” of the activities of the Authority during the previous year,

thereby encompassing not only regulatory actions but also administrative, educational, and policy-

related initiatives. Additionally, the Authority is required to submit such other reports and returns

as may be directed by the Central Government, ensuring that specific information needs of the

Government are met. The second essential element is contained in sub-section (2), which requires

that a copy of the annual report, once received by the Central Government, shall be laid before

each House of Parliament at the earliest opportunity. This ensures parliamentary oversight of the

Authority’s functioning, creating a mechanism for scrutiny, debate, and if necessary, policy

correction.

The significance of Section 27 lies in its reinforcement of democratic accountability. By

mandating transparency in the functioning of the CCPA, it strengthens public trust in consumer

protection mechanisms. The laying of reports before Parliament places the activities of the

Authority within the domain of legislative control, ensuring that an independent regulatory body

does not function in isolation but remains subject to the larger framework of constitutional

accountability.

CHAPTER IV

CONSUMER DISPUTER REDRESSAL COMMISSION

ESTABLISHMENT OF DISTRICT CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

COMMISSION

Section 28 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 lays the foundation for the district-level

adjudicatory framework by providing for the establishment of the District Consumer Disputes

Redressal Commission, commonly referred to as the “District Commission.” This provision

ensures that consumers have access to a localized, accessible, and specialized forum for redressal

of grievances relating to consumer rights, unfair trade practices, and deficient services.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 28 extends to all States and Union Territories, mandating the creation of

District Commissions as the first tier of the three-tier redressal mechanism under the Act, the other

two being the State Commissions and the National Commission. The section obligates the State

Government to establish a District Commission in every district by way of notification.

Importantly, the proviso empowers the State Government to establish more than one District

Commission within a district if the caseload, population, or other considerations so require,

thereby ensuring effective consumer access to justice.

Essential Elements

The first essential element under sub-section (1) is the statutory duty imposed upon the State

Government to establish the District Commission in each district. This mandatory nature

underscores the importance of consumer redressal at the grassroots level. The discretionary power

to establish multiple Commissions in one district reflects the legislative intent of accommodating

local circumstances and addressing the problem of pendency of cases. The second essential

element, contained in sub-section (2), relates to the composition of the Commission. Each District

Commission is required to consist of a President and not less than two members. The Act also

envisages the possibility of increasing the number of members beyond two, subject to prescription

by rules and in consultation with the Central Government. This consultative mechanism ensures

uniformity and consistency in the composition of District Commissions across States, while

allowing sufficient flexibility to address practical needs.

The importance of this provision lies in its attempt to balance accessibility and efficiency.

By decentralizing consumer dispute resolution to the district level, Section 28 provides a readily

available remedy to consumers without necessitating recourse to higher forums. At the same time,

the structure of the Commission, comprising a President and multiple members, is designed to

ensure that adjudication is both impartial and adequately representative. Judicial decisions under

the earlier Consumer Protection Act, 1986, such as State of U.P. v. All U.P. Consumer Protection

Bar Association

, have emphasized the obligation of State Governments to ensure the effective

functioning of consumer forums, including adequate staffing and infrastructure. The principles

underlying such decisions remain relevant under the 2019 Act, reinforcing the binding nature of

the duty imposed by Section 28.

QUALIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF

DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 29 empowers the Central Government to frame rules by notification regarding the

eligibility and administrative framework concerning the President and members of the District

Commission. This provision marks a significant departure from the earlier regime under the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, wherein such qualifications and appointments were largely left to

the discretion of State Governments, subject to broad guidelines. By centralizing rule-making

power, Section 29 seeks to introduce greater uniformity and transparency across jurisdictions.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision extends to all matters pertaining to the appointment and service

conditions of the President and members of the District Commission. The authority to regulate

such matters vests exclusively in the Central Government, ensuring consistency in the functioning

of District Commissions across the country. The section also reflects the legislative intent to avoid

disparities in qualifications or appointment procedures that might otherwise arise if left entirely to

individual States.

Essential Elements

(2017) 1 SCC 444

The essential elements of Section 29 can be understood in terms of the rule-making power of the

Central Government. First, the qualifications of the President and members are to be laid down by

rules. Typically, the President is expected to be a person with judicial experience, often drawn

from the ranks of the District Judiciary, while members are appointed from diverse backgrounds,

including law, commerce, economics, public administration, or consumer affairs, so as to bring a

multi-disciplinary perspective to adjudication. Secondly, the method of recruitment and procedure

for appointment are to be prescribed. This ensures that appointments are not arbitrary but follow a

transparent process, often involving selection committees and consultation with relevant

stakeholders.

Thirdly, the section contemplates rules on the term of office, resignation, and removal. The

fixation of tenure safeguards institutional independence, while provisions on resignation and

removal provide mechanisms to deal with contingencies such as incapacity, misconduct, or

voluntary demission of office. Importantly, removal provisions are typically designed to balance

accountability with the need to protect adjudicatory independence. Judicial interpretation under

the earlier law provides valuable guidance. In State of U.P. v. All U.P. Consumer Protection Bar

Association

, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of properly qualified members in

consumer fora and cautioned against ad hoc or irregular appointments. Similarly, the Court

underscored that independence of consumer adjudicatory bodies is integral to the effective

functioning of the consumer protection framework. Section 29, by vesting power in the Central

Government to prescribe uniform qualifications and procedures, directly addresses these concerns.

SALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND SERVICE CONDITIONS OF PRESIDENT AND

MEMBERS OF DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 30 confers power on the State Government to frame rules, by way of notification,

regarding the salaries, allowances, and other terms and conditions of service of the President and

members of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. While Section 29 centralises

the prescription of qualifications and appointment procedure under the authority of the Central

Government, Section 30 decentralises matters relating to remuneration and service conditions,

placing them within the regulatory competence of State Governments.

Scope and Application

The provision applies to all Presidents and members of the District Commissions established

under Section 28. Its scope is confined to service-related aspects such as pay, allowances, leave,

benefits, and other ancillary conditions that determine the working environment of the

Commission. The underlying objective is to ensure that members of the District Commissions

receive adequate compensation and fair service conditions, thereby enabling them to discharge

their functions efficiently and independently.

Essential Elements

The essential features of Section 30 can be delineated as follows. First, the rule-making power is

vested in the State Government, which enables flexibility to account for variations in local

economic conditions, administrative structures, and budgetary considerations. This

decentralisation recognises the federal nature of India’s governance and the role of States in

administering consumer redressal mechanisms. Secondly, the provision covers not only salaries

and allowances but also “other terms and conditions of service.” This expression has a broad

(2017) 1 SCC 444

sweep and would include matters such as leave entitlements, retirement age, medical benefits,

housing or conveyance facilities, and other conditions affecting tenure and service.

Thirdly, while the State Government has discretion in framing rules, such rules must

conform to the broader objectives of the Act, namely, to provide an effective, independent, and

accessible mechanism for consumer dispute resolution. Remuneration and service conditions must

therefore be sufficient to attract competent persons to serve as Presidents and members while also

ensuring that their independence is not compromised by inadequate or irregular service benefits.

Judicial pronouncements under the earlier Act provide significant context. In State of U.P. v. All

U.P. Consumer Protection Bar Association

, the Supreme Court noted that inadequate

infrastructure and poor service conditions of consumer fora members severely undermined the

effectiveness of the system. The Court stressed the need for parity in service conditions with other

adjudicatory bodies to uphold the dignity and independence of consumer fora. Section 30, by

expressly empowering State Governments to regulate these aspects, seeks to institutionalise fair

service conditions in light of these concerns.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION RELATING TO PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF

DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 31 deals with the transitional arrangement concerning the continuity of service of

Presidents and members of the District Commissions who were appointed under the repealed

Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The section provides that any person holding office as President

or member of the District Forum immediately before the commencement of the 2019 Act shall

continue to hold such office until the completion of the term for which they had been appointed.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 31 is limited to safeguarding the tenure of office-bearers of the District

Forum, which under the 2019 Act is reconstituted and renamed as the District Commission. It

applies only to those Presidents and members who were appointed under the 1986 Act but were

still in office at the time when the 2019 Act came into force. By doing so, the provision ensures

that there is no disruption in the functioning of the district-level consumer redressal mechanism

due to the legislative transition.

Essential Elements

The essential aspect of Section 31 is its continuity clause. It explicitly recognises the appointments

made under the earlier statute and validates them under the new Act until the end of their

respective terms. This legislative device avoids a vacuum in the functioning of consumer redressal

institutions and ensures the stability of adjudicatory processes during the transition from the 1986

Act to the 2019 Act. Another critical element is the protection of tenure. The section safeguards

the independence of the adjudicatory authorities by preventing premature termination of service

merely because of the statutory shift. By ensuring that existing office-holders continue for the

period of their appointment, the legislature reinforces the principle of security of tenure, which is

crucial to maintaining judicial independence and institutional integrity. This approach is consistent

(2017) 1 SCC 444

with the jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court in Madras Bar Association v. Union of

India

, where the Court highlighted that fixed tenure and independence of adjudicatory members

is essential for upholding rule of law. Although that case dealt with tribunals under a different

statute, the underlying principles of protecting appointments during legislative changes are

analogous.

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF MEMBER OF DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 32 provides for a mechanism to deal with vacancies that may arise in the office of the

President or any member of the District Commission. The section authorises the State

Government, through notification, to make interim arrangements to ensure the uninterrupted

functioning of the District Commission. It empowers the State Government either to assign the

jurisdiction of the concerned district to another District Commission or to direct the President or a

member of another District Commission to discharge the functions of the vacant office.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is limited to situations where the post of the President or member in a

District Commission falls vacant due to reasons such as resignation, retirement, death, suspension,

or removal. It ensures that such vacancies do not paralyse the adjudicatory process or delay the

resolution of consumer disputes. The application of Section 32 lies entirely in the discretion of the

State Government, which may issue the necessary notification to transfer jurisdiction or authorise

a temporary arrangement.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the recognition of potential vacancies that may arise in the office of

the President or a member of the District Commission. Without such a safeguard, the functioning

of the Commission would be adversely affected, resulting in delay and denial of justice to

consumers. The second element is the power conferred upon the State Government to issue a

notification to address such contingencies. Clause (a) of Section 32 permits the State Government

to authorise another District Commission to exercise jurisdiction over the affected district. This

creates a structural flexibility in the consumer redressal framework and ensures that the

adjudicatory machinery continues without interruption. Clause (b) of Section 32 allows the State

Government to direct the President or a member of another District Commission to discharge the

functions of the vacant office. This provision is particularly useful in cases where the workload of

the district is not substantial enough to warrant transfer of jurisdiction to an entire Commission,

and a single member can temporarily fill the gap. A further essential aspect is the temporary nature

of such arrangements. Section 32 does not provide for a permanent substitution of authority but

rather ensures continuity until the vacancy is duly filled in accordance with the provisions of the

Act and the rules made thereunder.

The importance of Section 32 lies in its contribution to the constitutional principle of

access to justice under Article 39A of the Constitution of India. By ensuring that vacancies do not

obstruct the functioning of consumer fora, the section upholds the consumer’s right to speedy and

effective redressal. Judicial pronouncements such as State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi

, though

in a different context, have emphasised that procedural or administrative lacunae should not defeat

(2021) 7 SCC 369

(1979) 2 SCC 236

substantive rights. Section 32 embodies this principle within the consumer protection regime by

preventing delay due to institutional vacancies.

OFFICERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES OF DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 33 deals with the staffing and administrative support required for the effective functioning

of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (District Commission). It recognises

that judicial and quasi-judicial bodies cannot function in isolation and require adequate

administrative personnel for day-to-day operations.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 33 extends to the appointment, control, and service conditions of officers and

employees of the District Commission. The provision places the responsibility upon the State

Government to provide necessary staff, thereby ensuring that the District Commission is equipped

to discharge its adjudicatory functions effectively. Its application arises whenever the District

Commission requires administrative assistance such as clerks, stenographers, record-keepers, or

support staff for case management, record maintenance, and coordination of proceedings.

Essential Elements

1. Responsibility of the State Government – Sub-section (1) casts a mandatory duty on the

State Government to provide officers and employees to assist the Commission. This

ensures that staffing decisions remain within the administrative and financial powers of the

State.

2. Control and Superintendence – Sub-section (2) vests the President of the District

Commission with general superintendence over the officers and employees. This provision

is essential to maintain judicial independence and ensure that administrative staff act in

alignment with the functioning of the Commission rather than external authorities.

3. Service Conditions – Sub-section (3) empowers the State Government to prescribe the

salaries, allowances, and terms of service of these officers and employees. By keeping

these conditions within the statutory framework, the Act provides a uniform system and

prevents arbitrary treatment of staff.

Significance

The provision ensures institutional efficiency and reinforces the independence of the quasi-judicial

body by giving the President supervisory control over the staff. Without such support, the

functioning of the Commission would be hindered, and timely redressal of consumer grievances

would be compromised.

This provision aligns with constitutional principles under Article 39A (access to justice),

ensuring that procedural bottlenecks or lack of infrastructure do not obstruct consumers’ rights.

Judicial decisions like All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India

, have highlighted that

adequate infrastructure and staff are indispensable for the effective functioning of adjudicatory

bodies. Section 33 embodies this principle within the consumer protection framework.

(1992) 1 SCC 119

JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COMMISSION

The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 under Section 34 provides for the jurisdiction of the District

Commission. Sub-section (1) lays down the pecuniary jurisdiction by stipulating that the District

Commission shall entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as

consideration does not exceed one crore rupees. The proviso empowers the Central Government to

prescribe a different pecuniary limit whenever necessary. Sub-section (2) determines the territorial

jurisdiction, providing that a complaint may be instituted within the local limits where the opposite

party ordinarily resides, carries on business, has a branch office, or personally works for gain. It

also covers situations where there are multiple opposite parties, allowing institution of a complaint

where any one of them resides or carries on business, provided the District Commission grants

permission. Further, jurisdiction may also be invoked where the cause of action wholly or in part

arises, or where the complainant resides or personally works for gain. Sub-section (3) specifies

that the District Commission shall ordinarily function at the district headquarters, though the State

Government, in consultation with the State Commission, may notify additional places within the

district for its functioning.

Scope and Application

Section 34 plays a crucial role in delineating the contours of the District Commission’s authority.

By fixing a pecuniary threshold, the statute ensures that disputes of lower monetary value are

resolved at the District level, thereby enhancing accessibility for consumers. The territorial

jurisdiction framework is consumer-centric, offering multiple bases for filing a complaint,

including the place of residence or work of the complainant, which was absent under the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986. This marks a significant broadening of access to justice. The

recognition that the Commission may also function at notified places within the district expands

its reach to rural and semi-urban areas, thereby decentralising consumer redressal. In Sonic

Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

, the Supreme Court underscored the necessity of

adhering to statutory territorial limits, warning against forum shopping and ensuring that

jurisdictional rules are not rendered illusory.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 34 are threefold. First, pecuniary jurisdiction is determined

strictly with reference to the consideration paid for the goods or services, and not on the amount of

compensation claimed, marking a departure from the earlier 1986 Act. Second, territorial

jurisdiction is broadened to include not only the place of business or residence of the opposite

party but also the residence or workplace of the complainant, as well as the situs of the cause of

action. This provides consumers greater convenience and flexibility in initiating proceedings.

Third, functional jurisdiction under sub-section (3) establishes the District Commission’s principal

seat at the district headquarters while permitting extension to other notified places. Together, these

elements demonstrate the legislative intent to create a more accessible and consumer-friendly

redressal mechanism.

MANNER IN WHICH COMPLAINT SHALL BE MADE

(2010) 1 SCC 135

Section 35 prescribes the persons and authorities who are entitled to file a complaint before the

District Commission. Sub-section (1) recognises multiple categories of complainants. First, an

individual consumer may institute a complaint in respect of goods sold, delivered, or agreed to be

sold or delivered, or services provided or agreed to be provided. This also extends to a consumer

alleging unfair trade practices. Second, a recognised consumer association, registered under any

law in force, may file a complaint irrespective of whether the affected consumer is a member of

that association. Third, one or more consumers may institute a complaint on behalf of or for the

benefit of numerous consumers sharing the same interest, provided permission of the District

Commission is obtained. This reflects the principle of representative action. Fourth, governmental

bodies such as the Central Government, the Central Authority, or the State Government are also

empowered to file complaints in the larger public interest. The proviso allows for electronic filing

of complaints in the prescribed manner, thereby aligning the procedure with contemporary

technological developments. The Explanation clarifies that a "recognised consumer association"

refers to any voluntary consumer association registered under law. Sub-section (2) requires that

every complaint be accompanied by the prescribed fee, which may also be paid electronically.

Scope and Application

This provision significantly expands the locus standi for filing complaints, thereby widening

access to consumer justice. Unlike the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was more restrictive,

Section 35 acknowledges that consumer rights are not merely individual but also collective and

societal. By including recognised consumer associations, the law facilitates collective redressal

and strengthens the role of civil society in consumer protection. The provision for representative

complaints accommodates situations where numerous consumers are affected by the same

defective goods or deficient services, ensuring efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The inclusion of the Central and State Governments, as well as the Central Authority, underscores

the public law dimension of consumer protection, recognising that systemic violations require

governmental intervention. The allowance for electronic filing is a progressive step that enhances

convenience, accessibility, and efficiency in the redressal mechanism.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 35 are: first, the eligibility of various persons and bodies to file a

complaint, including individual consumers, consumer associations, groups of consumers with

similar interests (with the permission of the District Commission), and governmental authorities;

second, the recognition of voluntary consumer associations registered under any law as legitimate

representatives of consumer interests; third, the requirement that every complaint be accompanied

by a prescribed fee, payable through traditional or electronic means; and fourth, the procedural

innovation permitting electronic filing of complaints. Collectively, these elements indicate a

legislative intent to democratise access to consumer fora, strengthen institutional support for

consumers, and facilitate collective redressal mechanisms.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 36 lays down the procedure to be followed in the conduct of proceedings before the

District Commission. Sub-section (1) provides that every proceeding shall be conducted by the

President and at least one member sitting together. The proviso clarifies that if, for any reason, a

member is unable to continue with a proceeding until its completion, the President along with the

remaining member may proceed with the matter from the stage at which it was last heard. Sub-

section (2) mandates that on receipt of a complaint under Section 35, the District Commission may

either admit the complaint or reject it, but rejection cannot be made without affording the

complainant an opportunity of being heard. The first proviso ensures compliance with principles

of natural justice, while the second proviso directs that the issue of admissibility must ordinarily

be decided within twenty-one days from the date of filing. Sub-section (3) introduces a deeming

provision: if the District Commission fails to decide the admissibility within the stipulated twenty-

one days, the complaint shall be deemed to have been admitted.

Scope and Application

The provision establishes a framework to ensure procedural fairness and efficiency in consumer

disputes. The requirement that the President and at least one member conduct the proceedings

underscores the principle of collective adjudication and prevents unilateral decision-making. The

proviso to sub-section (1) ensures continuity in adjudication, avoiding the need for rehearing in the

event of a member’s inability to continue. The power to admit or reject a complaint under sub-

section (2) is a gatekeeping function, intended to filter out frivolous or non-maintainable

complaints, but this power is balanced by the mandatory opportunity of hearing. The twenty-one-

day limit for deciding admissibility reflects the legislative intent to expedite consumer disputes,

which historically have been delayed. The deeming provision in sub-section (3) reinforces this

object by ensuring that procedural inaction by the Commission does not prejudice the consumer.

Judicial emphasis on speedy and effective redressal, as observed in State of Karnataka v.

Vishwabharathi House Building Co-op. Society

, supports this approach.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 36 are: first, the requirement of collective adjudication by the

President and at least one member of the District Commission; second, the continuity of

proceedings even if one member is unable to continue; third, the discretionary power of the

Commission to admit or reject a complaint, subject to the principle of natural justice; fourth, the

statutory requirement to decide on admissibility ordinarily within twenty-one days; and fifth, the

deeming fiction that a complaint shall stand admitted if no decision on admissibility is made

within the stipulated period. These elements collectively strengthen the procedural framework of

the District Commission by ensuring fairness, continuity, and efficiency, while reinforcing the

consumer-centric objective of the Act.

REFERENCE TO MEDIATION

Section 37 introduces mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism within consumer

adjudication. Sub-section (1) empowers the District Commission, at the first hearing of the

complaint after admission or at any later stage, to consider whether elements of a settlement exist

which may be acceptable to the parties. If so, and except in cases as may be prescribed, the

Commission may direct the parties to furnish written consent within five days for resolution of the

dispute through mediation in accordance with Chapter V of the Act. Sub-section (2) provides that

where parties agree to settle their dispute through mediation and give written consent, the District

Commission must, within five days of receiving such consent, refer the matter for mediation,

which shall then proceed as per the provisions of Chapter V.

(2003) 2 SCC 412

Scope and Application

The provision represents a significant departure from the rigid adjudicatory model of the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, by formally incorporating mediation into the consumer redressal

framework. Its scope lies in promoting amicable settlement of disputes, reducing pendency of

cases, and providing consumers with speedy, cost-effective remedies. By making mediation a

consensual process, Section 37 safeguards party autonomy, ensuring that settlement efforts do not

compromise substantive rights without voluntary agreement. The discretionary power vested in

the District Commission to evaluate the existence of settlement elements ensures that mediation is

not imposed indiscriminately, but is encouraged where prospects of resolution genuinely exist.

The legislative intent aligns with the broader policy shift towards alternative dispute resolution in

India, as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey

Construction Co. (P) Ltd.

, where mediation was emphasised as a mechanism to reduce litigation

backlog and foster mutually acceptable solutions.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 37 are: first, the discretionary authority of the District

Commission to assess the potential for settlement and direct parties to consider mediation; second,

the requirement that parties provide written consent within five days if they agree to mediation;

third, the mandatory referral of the matter to mediation by the District Commission within five

days of receiving such consent; and fourth, the application of the procedural framework of Chapter

V to such mediation proceedings. These elements collectively integrate mediation into the

consumer protection regime as a structured yet flexible mechanism, balancing efficiency with the

voluntary nature of dispute resolution.

PROCEDURE ON ADMISSION OF COMPLAINT

Section 38 lays down the detailed procedure to be followed by the District Commission upon

admission of a complaint, or in cases referred back after failure of settlement by mediation. Sub-

section (1) establishes that once a complaint is admitted, the Commission shall proceed to deal

with it in accordance with the procedure prescribed under this section.

Sub-section (2) applies where the complaint relates to goods. It requires the Commission to

forward a copy of the complaint to the opposite party within twenty-one days of admission,

directing him to submit his version within thirty days, with an extension not exceeding fifteen

days. If the opposite party denies, disputes, or fails to respond, the Commission shall proceed to

settle the dispute. Where the complaint involves allegations of defect in goods that require analysis

or testing, the Commission is empowered to obtain samples, seal and authenticate them, and refer

them to an appropriate laboratory. The expenses for such testing are to be borne by the

complainant, subject to deposit of prescribed fees. After the report is received, copies are to be

furnished to the opposite party, who may dispute its correctness, and both parties are to be given a

reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is passed under Section 39.

Sub-section (3) governs complaints relating to goods where the procedure under sub-

section (2) is not feasible, and complaints relating to services. It prescribes that the opposite party

be given thirty days, extendable by fifteen days, to file a version. If the opposite party disputes or

denies the allegations, the Commission shall proceed on the basis of evidence presented. If he fails

(2010) 8 SCC 24

to respond, the Commission may proceed ex parte on the complainant’s evidence. If the

complainant fails to appear, the Commission shall decide the complaint on merits.

Sub-section (4) enables the Commission to require electronic service providers to furnish

information or documents. Sub-section (5) bars any challenge on grounds of violation of natural

justice where the procedure in sub-sections (2) and (3) has been followed. Sub-section (6)

provides that complaints are ordinarily to be heard on affidavits and documents, though personal

or video-conference hearings may be allowed for sufficient cause.

Sub-section (7) emphasises expeditious disposal, requiring complaints to be decided within

three months where testing is not required, and within five months where it is. Adjournments may

only be granted for sufficient cause, with reasons recorded and costs imposed. Delays beyond the

prescribed period must be explained in writing. Sub-section (8) empowers the Commission to

grant interim orders where necessary.

Sub-section (9) vests the Commission with powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, including summoning witnesses, discovery and production of documents, taking

evidence on affidavits, requisitioning laboratory reports, issuing commissions, and such other

matters as prescribed. Sub-section (10) declares proceedings before the Commission as judicial

proceedings for the purposes of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and the

Commission as a criminal court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Sub-section (11) incorporates the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the CPC, dealing with

representative suits, into consumer complaints, with modifications to apply to complaints and

orders of the District Commission. Sub-section (12) provides that in case of death of a

complainant or opposite party, the provisions of Order XXII CPC relating to survival of actions

and substitution of parties shall apply, again subject to modifications for consumer disputes.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 38 is wide, as it codifies an exhaustive procedural framework that governs

consumer disputes at the District Commission level. It ensures fairness, efficiency, and consumer-

centric access by laying down a stepwise procedure for cases involving both goods and services.

By incorporating provisions for laboratory testing, affidavit-based adjudication, time-bound

disposal, and interim relief, the Act introduces procedural safeguards that balance consumer

interests with fairness to the opposite party. Importantly, the section adopts CPC principles

selectively, modifying them to suit the special character of consumer disputes. The Supreme

Court, in CICSE v. State of Tamil Nadu

, emphasised that consumer forums are intended to

provide inexpensive and speedy redressal, and Section 38 reflects this mandate.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 38 are: first, the distinction between procedure for goods (sub-

section 2) and services (sub-section 3); second, the requirement of timely forwarding of

complaints and responses, with limited extensions; third, the provision for laboratory testing and

associated safeguards where goods are concerned; fourth, reliance on affidavits and documents as

the standard mode of evidence, with limited scope for oral or virtual hearings; fifth, mandatory

timelines for disposal of cases, with written reasons for any delay; sixth, power to issue interim

(2004) 5 SCC 573

orders; seventh, the grant of civil court powers to the Commission for procedural efficacy; eighth,

treatment of proceedings as judicial proceedings to ensure accountability; and ninth, incorporation

of CPC provisions on representative actions and survival of claims, suitably adapted. Together,

these elements reinforce the hybrid nature of consumer fora as quasi-judicial bodies combining

flexibility with procedural safeguards.

FINDINGS OF DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 39 enumerates the reliefs that the District Commission may grant upon satisfaction that

the goods suffer from defects, the services are deficient, unfair trade practices are proved, or

claims under product liability are established. Sub-section (1) empowers the Commission to issue

directions to the opposite party to undertake one or more specified actions. These include removal

of defects in goods, replacement of defective goods with defect-free goods, refund of the price or

charges with interest, and payment of compensation for loss or injury caused by negligence. The

Commission also possesses the power to award punitive damages in appropriate cases.

Compensation may also be directed under a product liability action as provided in Chapter VI.

The Commission may further order removal of defects or deficiencies in goods or services,

discontinuance of unfair or restrictive trade practices, prohibition on offering hazardous goods,

withdrawal of hazardous goods from sale, and cessation of manufacture of such hazardous goods

or services. It may also award compensation where a large number of consumers, who are not

conveniently identifiable, have suffered loss or injury, with the minimum being twenty-five per

cent of the value of the defective goods or deficient services. Additionally, the Commission may

require corrective advertisements to neutralise misleading advertisements, direct adequate costs,

and issue cease and desist orders against misleading advertisements.

Sub-section (2) provides that any amount obtained under sub-section (1) shall be credited

to a fund and utilised in the manner prescribed. Sub-section (3) addresses decision-making where

the President and member differ; the matter is referred to another member whose opinion,

combined with the majority, becomes the order of the Commission. The proviso stipulates that

such opinion must be delivered within one month. Sub-section (4) mandates that every order must

be signed by the President and member(s) conducting the proceeding, including the member

giving the majority opinion where applicable.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 39 is comprehensive as it encapsulates both individual and collective

remedies, thereby recognising the dual character of consumer law as a branch of private as well as

public interest regulation. It equips the Commission with broad remedial powers ranging from

compensatory, restitutive, and preventive relief to punitive sanctions. Unlike the Consumer

Protection Act, 1986, which was narrower in remedial scope, the 2019 Act extends relief to cover

product liability claims, corrective advertising, and collective consumer harm. The provision also

strengthens regulatory functions by prohibiting hazardous goods and unfair practices. The

emphasis on punitive damages demonstrates the legislature’s intent to deter willful misconduct by

suppliers and service providers. Judicial interpretation has consistently affirmed the wide remedial

jurisdiction of consumer fora. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta

, the Supreme

Court underscored that consumer fora are empowered not merely to award compensation for

(1994) 1 SCC 243

individual loss but also to penalise oppressive or arbitrary conduct by service providers. Section

39 reflects this philosophy by expressly incorporating punitive damages and collective

compensation.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 39 are: first, the District Commission’s authority to order

diverse forms of relief including replacement, refund, compensation, punitive damages,

discontinuance of unfair practices, prohibition on hazardous goods, and corrective advertising;

second, recognition of both individual consumer harm and collective injury, with minimum

statutory compensation where large numbers of consumers are affected; third, provision for

crediting amounts recovered to a prescribed fund for broader consumer welfare; fourth, decision-

making by majority opinion in case of difference between the President and members; and fifth,

the requirement of proper authentication of orders through signatures of adjudicating members.

These elements collectively confer upon the District Commission wide-ranging powers not only to

redress individual grievances but also to regulate market practices and safeguard consumer

interests at large.

REVIEW BY DISTRICT COMMISSION IN CERTAIN CASES

Section 40 confers upon the District Commission the power of review over its own orders in

limited circumstances. It provides that the District Commission may review any of its orders if

there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Such review may be undertaken either on its

own motion (suo motu) or upon an application filed by any of the parties to the dispute, provided

such application is made within thirty days of the order sought to be reviewed.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision is deliberately narrow, as the power of review is not equivalent to an

appeal or revision. It is confined only to cases where there exists an error apparent on the face of

the record, meaning an error that is self-evident and does not require elaborate argument or re-

appreciation of evidence. This ensures that the review jurisdiction is not misused as a disguised

form of rehearing. The availability of review strengthens procedural fairness by allowing

rectification of manifest mistakes, thereby saving parties the time and expense of filing appeals for

errors that are obvious and clerical in nature. The Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of

India

clarified that the power of review is distinct from the power of appeal and is available only

for correcting patent errors. Section 40 embodies this principle within the consumer law

framework.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 40 are: first, the District Commission’s power to review is

restricted to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record; second, such review may be

exercised either suo motu or on an application by a party; and third, an application for review must

be filed within thirty days of the order. These elements strike a balance between finality of

adjudication and fairness in rectifying manifest mistakes, ensuring that consumer disputes are

resolved efficiently without compromising justice.

(2000) 6 SCC 224

APPEAL AGAINST ORDER OF DISTRICT COMMISSION

Section 41 provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the State Commission over orders passed by

the District Commission. It enables any person aggrieved by an order of the District Commission

to prefer an appeal before the State Commission, thereby creating a hierarchical structure of

remedies to ensure that errors, whether of fact or law, may be corrected by a superior forum.

Scope and Application

The right of appeal under Section 41 is a substantive statutory right available to any person

aggrieved by an order of the District Commission. The provision explicitly permits appeals on

both factual and legal grounds, thereby allowing the State Commission to re-examine the entirety

of the dispute. The appeal must be filed within forty-five days from the date of the order, though

the State Commission may condone delay if sufficient cause is shown, thus incorporating the

principle of fairness and access to justice. Importantly, the provision imposes a mandatory pre-

deposit requirement: where an order directs payment of any amount, the appellant must deposit

fifty per cent of that amount before the appeal is entertained. This serves as a safeguard against

frivolous appeals and ensures partial compliance with the District Commission’s award. However,

no appeal lies from an order of the District Commission under Section 81(1), which records a

settlement through mediation under Section 80, thereby giving finality to consensual dispute

resolution.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 41 may be identified as follows. First, the right to appeal lies

against any order of the District Commission, whether involving facts, law, or mixed questions

thereof. Second, the statutory period of limitation is forty-five days, subject to the discretion of the

State Commission to condone delay on sufficient cause being shown. Third, an appellant against

whom a monetary award has been passed must deposit fifty per cent of the amount ordered before

the appeal can be entertained, reflecting the principle that one must comply, at least in part, with

the order under challenge. Fourth, appeals are barred in cases where the District Commission’s

order arises from a mediation settlement under Section 81(1), respecting the sanctity and finality

of consensual resolutions.

Judicial recognition of the principles underlying appellate remedies may be traced to

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors

, where it was observed that appellate fora under

consumer law are empowered to consider both facts and law in order to do complete justice.

Section 41 reflects this remedial framework while simultaneously safeguarding efficiency by

imposing conditions that deter dilatory tactics.

ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

Section 42 lays down the statutory framework for the establishment of the State Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission, commonly referred to as the State Commission. This provision is

(2002) 2 CPJ 6 (NC)

integral to the three-tier redressal machinery under the Act, ensuring that consumer grievances are

adjudicated at an intermediate level between the District and National Commissions.

Scope and Application

The mandate under Section 42(1) casts a statutory duty on every State Government to establish, by

notification, a State Commission for its territory. The State Commission serves as the principal

appellate authority against orders of the District Commissions within the State, in addition to

exercising original jurisdiction over consumer disputes of higher pecuniary value. Sub-section (2)

provides that the Commission shall ordinarily function at the State capital, though it may also

discharge its functions at other notified places. The State Government is further empowered to

establish regional benches of the State Commission, thereby decentralising access to consumer

justice and ensuring convenience for litigants across geographically dispersed regions. Sub-section

(3) stipulates the composition of the State Commission, requiring a President and not less than

four members, with the number of members being determined in consultation with the Central

Government. This ensures both uniformity across States and adequate capacity to manage

caseloads.

Essential Elements

The essential features of Section 42 can be summarised in three parts. First, the establishment of

the State Commission is mandatory and must be effectuated through official notification by the

State Government. Second, while the Commission is ordinarily seated at the State capital, the

statute provides flexibility for regional benches to enhance accessibility. This decentralised

approach aligns with the consumer welfare objective underlying the Act. Third, the composition of

the Commission is prescribed to include a President and a minimum of four members, with the

strength being subject to consultation with the Central Government. The requirement of

consultation ensures uniformity and prevents arbitrariness in determining the strength of State

Commissions across India.

Judicial observations, though more frequently directed at earlier provisions under the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, underscore the importance of properly constituted forums. In

State of U.P. v. All U.P. Consumer Protection Bar Association

, the Supreme Court stressed the

need for adequate infrastructure and timely appointments to consumer fora, recognising that the

effectiveness of consumer protection law depends on a well-functioning adjudicatory machinery.

Section 42 of the 2019 Act reflects this legislative intent by laying down clear norms for

establishment and composition.

QUALIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF

STATE COMMISSION

Section 43 empowers the Central Government to frame rules governing the qualifications, method

of recruitment, appointment procedure, tenure, resignation, and removal of the President and

members of the State Commission. This provision ensures uniformity and standardisation in the

constitution of State Commissions across India.

Scope and Application

(2017) 1 SCC 444,

The provision vests the Central Government with rule-making authority by way of notification,

thereby centralising the regulatory framework concerning the appointment and service conditions

of the President and members of State Commissions. This ensures that States do not adopt

inconsistent or arbitrary standards, thereby safeguarding the integrity and efficiency of the quasi-

judicial bodies created under the Act. The scope of Section 43 extends not only to the initial

appointment but also to matters of resignation and removal, ensuring a comprehensive regulatory

scheme.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 43 may be identified in terms of its subject matter:

qualifications, recruitment, appointment, tenure, and removal. First, the qualifications of both the

President and members are to be prescribed by rules, which usually require judicial experience in

the case of the President and technical, administrative, or academic expertise in consumer-related

fields for members. Second, the method of recruitment and appointment procedure must ensure

transparency and merit-based selection, often involving a Selection Committee constituted under

rules. Third, the provision addresses the term of office, resignation, and removal, thereby

providing security of tenure while simultaneously ensuring accountability. This balance between

independence and accountability is crucial for maintaining the quasi-judicial character of the State

Commission.

Judicial interpretation has highlighted the importance of qualifications and independence

in the functioning of consumer fora. In Madras Bar Association v. Union of India

, the Supreme

Court emphasised that tribunals and commissions exercising adjudicatory powers must be manned

by individuals possessing judicial or legal expertise, to preserve the quality of justice and uphold

the rule of law. Though the decision was in the context of tribunals, the principle applies equally

to consumer fora. Section 43 reflects this judicially recognised necessity by mandating that rules

be framed to regulate the composition and qualifications of members. By centralising the power to

prescribe qualifications and related matters, Section 43 creates a harmonised structure across

States, thereby preventing disparities and ensuring that consumer redressal fora function with

credibility, competence, and consistency.

SALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND SERVICE CONDITIONS OF PRESIDENT AND

MEMBERS OF STATE COMMISSION

Section 44 states the State Government may, by notification, make rules to provide for the salaries

and allowances and other terms and conditions of service of the President and members of the

State Commission.

Scope and Application

Section 44 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, governs the service conditions of the President

and members of the State Commission. Its scope is confined to empowering the State Government

to prescribe, by way of subordinate legislation, the salaries, allowances, and other terms and

conditions of service applicable to such office-bearers. This provision reflects the federal scheme

of the Act, wherein the administration of consumer fora at the State level is entrusted to State

Governments, subject to the overarching statutory framework laid down by Parliament. It ensures

that the functioning of the State Commission is supported by clear service conditions, thereby

strengthening its institutional independence and efficiency.

(2021) 7 SCC 369

Essential Elements

The essential aspects of Section 44 may be identified as follows. First, the authority to frame rules

regarding salaries, allowances, and service conditions is expressly vested in the State Government,

which must exercise this power by issuing a notification. This ensures transparency and formality

in the prescription of such conditions. Second, the provision uses the phrase “salaries and

allowances and other terms and conditions of service,” which indicates a comprehensive coverage,

extending not only to monetary remuneration but also to ancillary matters such as leave,

pensionary benefits, tenure-related entitlements, and conditions of conduct. Third, the rule-making

power is not unfettered; it is circumscribed by the general principles of administrative law and is

subject to judicial review if exercised arbitrarily or inconsistently with the parent Act.

Judicial interpretation has underscored the importance of secure and well-defined service

conditions for members of quasi-judicial bodies. In Union of India v. R. Gandhi

, the Supreme

Court stressed that independence of tribunals depends substantially on adequate safeguards

concerning appointment, tenure, and service conditions of their members. Although the case

pertained to company law tribunals, the reasoning applies equally to consumer fora, which

perform adjudicatory functions.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION

Any person appointed as President or member of the State Commission immediately before the

commencement of this Act shall hold office as such President or member, as the case may be, until

the completion of his term.

Scope and Application

Section 45 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, is a transitional clause designed to ensure

continuity in the functioning of State Commissions during the shift from the 1986 Act to the 2019

Act. Its scope is limited to incumbents who were already appointed as President or members prior

to the commencement of the 2019 Act. The legislative intent is to protect the tenure and position

of such individuals so that their appointments are not prematurely terminated or invalidated

merely because of the repeal and re-enactment of the statute.

Essential Elements

The essential features of Section 45 are, first, its retrospective safeguarding of appointments made

under the earlier law. Second, it secures the incumbents’ right to continue until completion of their

original term, thereby preventing disruption in adjudicatory work of the State Commissions. Third,

it harmonises the transition between the old and new legal frameworks, ensuring administrative

and judicial stability. This reflects the general principle of statutory interpretation that repeal and

re-enactment of a law does not disturb vested rights or lawful appointments unless expressly

provided.

(2010) 11 SCC 1

The principle was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh

, where the Supreme Court

held that repeal of an enactment does not affect existing rights and obligations unless a contrary

intention appears. Section 45 embodies this principle in the specific context of consumer fora.

OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF STATE COMMISSION

By virtue of section 46 the State Government shall determine the nature and categories of officers

and employees required to assist the State Commission in discharging its functions and provide

the Commission with such staff as it deems fit. The officers and employees shall discharge their

functions under the general superintendence of the President of the State Commission.

The salaries, allowances, and other terms and conditions of service of such officers and

employees shall be prescribed.

Scope and Application

Section 46 lays down the framework for administrative support to the State Commission by

requiring the State Government to provide adequate officers and employees. Its scope covers

recruitment, supervision, and conditions of service of such staff. This provision reflects the

legislative recognition that effective adjudication by the State Commission is contingent upon

sufficient administrative support, and therefore mandates the State Government to make

appropriate arrangements.

Essential Elements

The essential components of Section 46 are as follows. First, the responsibility to determine the

strength and categories of staff lies with the State Government, giving it flexibility to allocate

personnel as per the needs of the Commission. Second, sub-section (2) ensures that the

administrative staff function under the control and superintendence of the President, thereby

maintaining institutional discipline and ensuring accountability within the Commission. Third,

sub-section (3) mandates that salaries, allowances, and service conditions of the staff shall be

prescribed, most likely through rules framed by the State Government, thereby bringing

uniformity and transparency.

Judicial precedent has consistently held that adequate staffing and administrative

independence are vital for quasi-judicial bodies to perform effectively. In All India Judges’

Association v. Union of India

, the Supreme Court emphasised that adjudicatory bodies must be

supported by proper service conditions and administrative infrastructure to discharge their

functions independently. Section 46 embodies this principle in the specific context of consumer

fora at the State level.

Accordingly, Section 46 ensures that the State Commission is supported by a properly

structured administrative framework, with personnel under the authority of the President and with

service conditions prescribed by the State Government. This strengthens institutional capacity and

efficiency in consumer dispute resolution.

AIR 1955 SC 84

(1992) 1 SCC 119

JURISDICTION OF STATE COMMISSION

Sec 47 of the Act states that subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall

have jurisdiction to entertain: (a) complaints where the value of goods or services paid as

consideration exceeds one crore rupees but does not exceed ten crore rupees, subject to revision by

the Central Government; (b) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of consideration

does not exceed ten crore rupees; (c) appeals against the orders of any District Commission within

the State; and (d) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in consumer disputes pending

before or decided by a District Commission within the State where such Commission has

exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or acted illegally or

with material irregularity. The jurisdiction, powers, and authority of the State Commission may be

exercised by Benches thereof, constituted by the President with one or more members, the senior-

most member presiding. Where members of a Bench differ in opinion, the majority shall prevail;

in the absence of a majority, the point of difference shall be referred to the President who shall

hear the matter himself or refer it to other members, and the decision shall be according to the

majority opinion. Such opinion must be rendered within one month of reference. A complaint

shall be instituted in a State Commission within whose jurisdiction the opposite party resides,

carries on business, has a branch office, or personally works for gain; or, with the Commission’s

permission, where one of the several opposite parties resides or works for gain; or where the cause

of action arises wholly or in part; or where the complainant resides or works for gain.

Scope and Application

Section 47 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, demarcates the jurisdiction of the State

Commission both pecuniarily and territorially, while also vesting it with appellate and revisional

powers. Its application ensures that consumer disputes of significant value, but below the

threshold of the National Commission, are adjudicated at the State level. The provision reflects a

hierarchical distribution of jurisdiction among the District, State, and National Commissions to

ensure efficiency and accessibility.

Pecuniary jurisdiction extends to complaints where consideration exceeds one crore but

does not exceed ten crore rupees, including unfair contract disputes of similar value. The section

further authorises the State Commission to entertain appeals from District Commission orders and

to exercise revisional jurisdiction over District Commissions acting beyond or in violation of their

lawful jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction, under sub-section (4), is broadly framed to enhance

consumer convenience by permitting institution of complaints not only where the opposite party

resides or the cause of action arises but also where the complainant resides or works for gain,

thereby widening access to justice.

Essential Elements

The essential components of Section 47 can be identified as follows. First, the pecuniary

jurisdiction is statutorily fixed between one crore and ten crore rupees, subject to modification by

the Central Government, thereby providing flexibility. Second, the State Commission has

jurisdiction over complaints concerning unfair contracts, a category introduced by the 2019 Act,

thereby broadening its substantive jurisdiction. Third, it exercises appellate jurisdiction over

District Commission decisions and revisional jurisdiction in cases of jurisdictional excess or

material irregularity. Fourth, the provision allows the President to constitute Benches, ensuring

decentralisation of workload and expeditious disposal of cases, with mechanisms to resolve

differences of opinion among members. Finally, the territorial jurisdiction is consumer-friendly,

permitting filing in multiple possible locations, including where the complainant resides or works

for gain.

In Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd

100

., the Supreme Court clarified the

principles of territorial jurisdiction under consumer law, underscoring that complaints must

ordinarily be filed where the opposite party resides or where the cause of action arises. The 2019

Act, by adding the residence or place of work of the complainant, marks a deliberate legislative

departure aimed at furthering consumer convenience.

TRANSFER OF CASES

The State Commission is empowered to transfer cases in appropriate circumstances. Section 48

provides that on the application of the complainant, or on its own motion, the State Commission

may, at any stage of the proceedings, transfer any complaint pending before a District

Commission to another District Commission within the State if the interest of justice so requires.

Scope and Application

This provision ensures flexibility in the adjudicatory process and protects the rights of parties by

allowing transfer of cases to a more suitable forum. The power of transfer vests exclusively in the

State Commission and may be exercised either suo motu or upon the request of a complainant.

The underlying rationale is to prevent inconvenience, ensure fair adjudication, and avoid any

apprehension of bias or inefficiency in the District Commission where the complaint is originally

filed. The discretion is to be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice and in

furtherance of consumer interest.

Essential Elements

The essential components of Section 48 may be outlined as follows. First, the power of transfer is

conferred upon the State Commission alone; neither the District Commission nor the parties can

effectuate such transfer independently. Second, the power can be invoked at any stage of the

proceedings, underscoring that the paramount consideration is justice rather than procedural

rigidity. Third, the locus standi to apply for transfer is vested in the complainant, though the

Commission may act suo motu if the circumstances so demand. Fourth, the guiding principle is the

“interest of justice,” which provides a broad, purposive standard for the exercise of discretion.

Judicial interpretation of transfer provisions under earlier consumer legislation indicates

that the power is not to be exercised arbitrarily. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das,

101

, the Supreme Court stressed that interim and procedural powers under consumer law must be

exercised cautiously and only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice so require. While

this case dealt with interim relief, the principle equally applies to transfer jurisdiction. Similarly,

High Courts have emphasised that transfer jurisdiction must be sparingly used and with due regard

to fairness and balance between parties.

PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO STATE COMMISSION

100

(2010) 1 SCC 135

101

(1994) 4 SCC 225

Section 49 lays down that the provisions relating to complaints under Sections 35, 36, 37, 38 and

39 shall, with such modifications as may be necessary, be applicable to the disposal of complaints

by the State Commission. Additionally, sub-section (2) empowers the State Commission to

declare any term of a contract, which is unfair to any consumer, as null and void.

Scope and Application

The section ensures uniformity in procedure between the District and State Commissions while

allowing necessary modifications to accommodate the higher jurisdiction of the State

Commission. The incorporation of Sections 35 to 39 by reference extends to the manner of filing

complaints, the procedure for admission, hearing, settlement through mediation, and adjudication

of disputes. Importantly, the provision under sub-section (2) widens the remedial jurisdiction of

the State Commission by explicitly empowering it to nullify contractual terms found to be unfair

to consumers, thereby ensuring substantive justice beyond mere procedural conformity.

Essential Elements

First, the procedural framework governing complaints before the District Commission is made

applicable to the State Commission. This legislative design ensures procedural consistency across

the consumer redressal fora. Secondly, the scope of authority of the State Commission is expanded

by allowing it to scrutinise and strike down unfair contractual terms, which could include clauses

relating to exclusion of liability, unilateral alteration of terms, or excessive penalty stipulations.

Thirdly, the power to declare terms “null and void” operates as a substantive corrective against

exploitation, thereby preventing the circumvention of consumer rights through adhesion contracts.

Judicial recognition of the doctrine of unfair contracts has developed through cases such as

LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre

102

, where the Supreme Court held that

standard form contracts must not contain unfair or unreasonable clauses that defeat the rights of

consumers. The incorporation of this principle within the statutory text by Section 49(2) marks a

significant advance in consumer protection law.

REVIEW BY STATE COMMISSION IN CERTAIN CASES

Section 50 confers upon the State Commission the power to review any of its orders if there is an

error apparent on the face of the record. Such review may be undertaken either suo motu or upon

an application made by any party within thirty days from the date of the order.

Scope and Application

The power of review under Section 50 is limited in nature and is not equivalent to an appellate

jurisdiction. It is intended to correct manifest errors that are self-evident and do not require

elaborate argument or reasoning to establish. The section balances finality of decisions with the

necessity of correcting glaring mistakes that could undermine the fairness of proceedings.

Essential Elements

102

(1995) 5 SCC 482

First, the review power is confined to errors apparent on the face of the record, which denotes

errors that are obvious, patent, and do not call for detailed examination of evidence or law.

Secondly, review can be exercised either by the Commission suo motu or on application by an

aggrieved party, provided the application is filed within thirty days of the order. Thirdly, this

power does not permit the Commission to re-argue the merits of the case or substitute its earlier

reasoning, but merely to correct apparent mistakes.

Judicial precedent has consistently restricted the scope of review. In Lily Thomas v. Union

of India

103

, the Supreme Court clarified that the review jurisdiction is narrower than appellate

jurisdiction and can only be invoked where there is a patent error. Similarly, in Parison Devi v.

Sumitri Devi

104

, it was emphasised that a review cannot be an appeal in disguise. These principles

guide the exercise of review power under Section 50 as well, ensuring that it functions as a limited

corrective tool without undermining the finality of adjudication.

Thus, Sections 49 and 50 collectively reinforce procedural consistency, substantive

fairness, and judicial accountability at the level of the State Commission. They ensure that

consumer disputes are resolved not only expeditiously and uniformly, but also with the flexibility

to nullify exploitative practices and rectify manifest errors.

APPEAL TO NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 51 lays down the statutory framework governing appeals from the orders of the State

Commission to the National Commission. Sub-section (1) provides that any person aggrieved by

an order made by the State Commission under sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1)

of section 47 may prefer an appeal before the National Commission within thirty days from the

date of such order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed. The National Commission is

empowered to entertain an appeal even after the expiry of thirty days, provided sufficient cause for

delay is demonstrated. The proviso to this sub-section imposes a condition that no appeal by a

person required to pay any amount under the order of the State Commission shall be entertained

unless the appellant deposits fifty per cent of that amount in the prescribed manner.

Sub-section (2) stipulates that, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or under

any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the National Commission from an

order passed in appeal by any State Commission only if the National Commission is satisfied that

the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (3) requires that the memorandum of

appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved. Sub-section (4) further

provides that, upon being satisfied of the existence of a substantial question of law, the National

Commission shall formulate such question and hear the appeal accordingly. The proviso clarifies

that the Commission retains discretion to hear any other substantial question of law, provided

reasons are recorded in writing. Finally, sub-section (5) recognises that an appeal may also lie

from an ex parte order passed by the State Commission.

Scope and Application

The provision confers appellate jurisdiction upon the National Commission to review orders of the

State Commission, thereby ensuring a hierarchical structure of redressal under the Act. Its scope is

103

(2000) 6 SCC 224

104

(1997) 8 SCC 715

twofold: first, it provides a direct appeal against certain original orders of the State Commission

under section 47(1)(a)(i) and (ii); second, it regulates appeals from appellate orders of the State

Commission by restricting them to cases involving substantial questions of law. The requirement

of pre-deposit acts as a procedural safeguard against frivolous litigation and ensures compliance

with orders while appeals are pending. The provision is intended to strike a balance between the

right to appeal and the objective of expeditious consumer dispute resolution.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of section 51 may be distilled as follows. First, the right to appeal arises

only against orders specified in section 47(1)(a)(i) and (ii), thereby limiting indiscriminate

recourse to the National Commission. Second, the limitation period of thirty days is subject to the

equitable principle of condonation of delay, permitting the Commission to extend the period

where sufficient cause is shown. Third, the mandatory deposit of fifty per cent of the awarded

amount functions as a condition precedent for maintainability, underscoring legislative intent to

deter vexatious challenges. Fourth, in respect of second appeals, the jurisdiction of the National

Commission is confined to substantial questions of law, akin to the approach followed by the

Supreme Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This preserves judicial

time by precluding re-litigation of factual controversies. Fifth, the provision for appeals against ex

parte orders serves the principles of natural justice by safeguarding parties who were denied a fair

opportunity of hearing.

In Emerald Realtors Pvt. Ltd. v. A. K. Menon

105

, the National Commission reiterated that

the requirement of pre-deposit under section 51 is mandatory and goes to the root of

maintainability of an appeal. Similarly, in M/s Pyaridevi Chabiraj Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. National

Insurance Co. Ltd.

106

, the Supreme Court emphasised that the limitation period prescribed must be

adhered to strictly, and condonation of delay can only be granted where cogent reasons are

established. These decisions highlight the judicial insistence on balancing consumer interests with

procedural discipline.

HEARING OF APPEAL

Section 52 prescribes the manner in which appeals filed before the State Commission or the

National Commission are to be heard and disposed of. It mandates that an appeal shall be heard as

expeditiously as possible and every endeavour shall be made to dispose of the same within a

period of ninety days from the date of its admission. The first proviso restricts the grant of

adjournments, stating that no adjournment shall ordinarily be allowed unless sufficient cause is

shown, and reasons for the same are recorded in writing. The second proviso empowers the

Commission to make orders as to the costs occasioned by such adjournment, as may be specified

by regulations. The third proviso directs that, if the appeal is disposed of beyond the prescribed

ninety-day period, the Commission must record the reasons for such delay at the time of disposal.

Scope and Application

This section reinforces the legislative intent of consumer protection law, namely the speedy

adjudication of disputes. By prescribing a time-frame for disposal of appeals, the provision seeks

to curb delays that historically plagued consumer fora. Its application extends equally to appeals

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2021 SCC OnLine NCDRC 76

106

2022 SCC OnLine SC 1230

before the State Commission and the National Commission, thereby ensuring procedural

uniformity across the appellate hierarchy. The provision also introduces an accountability

mechanism by requiring the recording of reasons for delay, thereby safeguarding the right of

consumers to timely justice.

Essential Elements

The key features of section 52 are, first, the statutory expectation of expeditious disposal of

appeals within ninety days from admission. Though directory in nature, this provision serves as a

guiding principle for adjudicatory discipline. Second, the restriction on adjournments reflects the

legislative disapproval of dilatory tactics, ensuring that consumer disputes are not frustrated by

procedural abuse. Third, the imposition of costs for adjournments underscores the principle that

parties should bear the consequences of delay attributable to them. Fourth, the requirement of

recording reasons for delay in disposal introduces transparency and enables judicial scrutiny of the

functioning of the appellate bodies.

The judiciary has consistently emphasised the importance of expeditious disposal in

consumer matters. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt.

Ltd.

107

, the Supreme Court underscored that statutory timelines under the Consumer Protection

Act must be adhered to strictly to preserve the object of the legislation. Although that case

pertained to disposal of complaints under the 1986 Act, the principle equally applies to appeals

under the 2019 Act, given the continuity of legislative policy. Similarly, the National Commission

has in several rulings stressed that adjournments should not be granted as a matter of course, but

only upon demonstration of unavoidable necessity, in keeping with section 52.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 53 provides for the establishment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission, commonly referred to as the National Commission. Sub-section (1) empowers the

Central Government to establish the National Commission by way of notification. Sub-section (2)

stipulates that the National Commission shall ordinarily function at the National Capital Region,

though it may also perform its functions at such other places as the Central Government, in

consultation with the Commission, may notify in the Official Gazette. The proviso further

authorises the Central Government to establish regional benches of the National Commission at

such places as it considers appropriate.

Scope and Application

The scope of this provision lies in creating the apex consumer dispute redressal body in India. As

the highest adjudicatory forum under the Act, the National Commission is entrusted with hearing

appeals, complaints, and matters of consumer law that extend beyond the jurisdiction of State

Commissions. The application of this section ensures both centralisation and accessibility: while

the principal seat is at the National Capital Region, regional benches may be established to

decentralise adjudication, thereby addressing concerns of convenience and access to justice for

consumers spread across diverse regions of the country.

Essential Elements

107

(2020) 5 SCC 757

The first essential element of this section is the statutory mandate given to the Central Government

for the formal creation of the National Commission through notification, which underscores its

status as a creature of statute. Second, the ordinary functioning of the Commission at the National

Capital Region reflects the legislative intent to situate the principal bench close to the seat of

central authority. Third, the enabling provision for regional benches carries significant importance

for improving access to consumer justice. By allowing the Central Government to establish

benches in consultation with the National Commission, the Act ensures both administrative

feasibility and judicial input in such decisions. Finally, the requirement of publication in the

Official Gazette ensures transparency and public notice regarding the establishment of any

additional benches or locations.

The Supreme Court has consistently emphasised that access to justice is a fundamental

right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan

108

, the Court

recognised accessibility to adjudicatory forums as an integral component of this right. The proviso

to section 53, enabling the establishment of regional benches, reflects this constitutional principle

by decentralising the forum for consumer redressal.

COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 54 provides for the composition of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission (National Commission). According to this provision, the Commission shall consist of

a President and not less than four members, with the upper limit of members to be prescribed by

rules framed under the Act.

Scope and Application

This provision establishes the structural foundation of the National Commission. The presence of

a President ensures judicial leadership, while the requirement of a minimum of four members

provides for collective decision-making, thereby enhancing the efficiency and credibility of the

adjudicatory process. The phrase “not more than such number of members as may be prescribed”

confers upon the Central Government the power to determine the strength of the Commission,

enabling flexibility to meet the growing volume and complexity of consumer disputes.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of section 54 are twofold. First, the Commission must mandatorily consist

of a President, who ordinarily is expected to be a person of judicial background, ensuring that the

Commission’s adjudication maintains legal soundness and impartiality. Second, it requires not less

than four members, thereby ensuring a multi-member bench structure that allows for both

diversity of perspectives and workload distribution. The upper ceiling of membership is left open

to prescription by delegated legislation, which ensures that the Commission can be expanded in

accordance with practical needs without legislative amendment.

The significance of this provision lies in balancing institutional stability with

administrative flexibility. The prescribed composition reflects the status of the National

Commission as the apex consumer adjudicatory body in India, vested with powers of original,

appellate, and revisional jurisdiction under subsequent provisions of the Act.

108

(2016) 8 SCC 509

QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF PRESIDENT AND

MEMBERS OF NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 55 lays down the framework governing the qualifications, appointment, tenure,

remuneration, and conditions of service of the President and members of the National Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission).

Scope and Application

The provision entrusts the Central Government with the responsibility of prescribing detailed rules

regarding the qualifications and service conditions of the President and members. This delegated

legislation ensures administrative flexibility while maintaining parliamentary oversight. By setting

maximum limits on tenure and age, the provision balances the need for experienced adjudicators

with the imperative of periodic institutional renewal. It applies exclusively to the apex consumer

adjudicatory body and seeks to preserve both its independence and efficiency.

Essential Elements

The essential features of Section 55 are threefold. First, sub-section (1) empowers the Central

Government to make rules relating to qualifications, appointment procedures, tenure, salaries,

allowances, resignation, and removal. This rule-making authority ensures that the executive can

adapt eligibility and service requirements to evolving institutional needs without requiring

statutory amendments. Secondly, the tenure of the President and members cannot exceed five

years from the date of assumption of office, though re-appointment is permissible. However, this

is subject to an upper age limit—seventy years for the President and sixty-seven years for other

members. These age restrictions are designed to prevent overextension in office while ensuring

that only persons capable of discharging demanding judicial and quasi-judicial functions are

appointed. Thirdly, sub-section (2) contains an express protection against the variation of salary,

allowances, and service conditions to the disadvantage of the President and members after their

appointment. This safeguard is rooted in the principle of judicial independence, ensuring that

adjudicators are insulated from executive interference through alteration of service conditions.

Judicial interpretation has consistently underscored the importance of preserving the

independence of consumer fora. In State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop.

Society

109

, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of consumer fora, emphasizing

their quasi-judicial character and the necessity of ensuring adequate qualifications and

independence of members. The protection under Section 55(2) resonates with this jurisprudence

by preventing executive overreach in matters of service conditions.

Thus, Section 55 serves the dual purpose of empowering the Central Government to

regulate appointments through rules while safeguarding the autonomy and impartiality of the

National Commission through tenure, age limits, and protection of service conditions.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISION FOR PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF NATIONAL

COMMISSION

109

(2003) 2 SCC 412

Section 56 contains a transitional clause that addresses the service conditions of the President and

members of the National Commission who were appointed prior to the commencement of Section

177 of the Finance Act, 2017.

Scope and Application

This provision ensures continuity and stability in the functioning of the National Commission

during the legislative shift from the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to the Consumer Protection

Act, 2019. Transitional provisions of this nature are necessary to prevent any legal or

administrative vacuum that may arise when statutory frameworks are replaced. Section 56

specifically protects the tenure, service conditions, and entitlements of those appointed under the

earlier regime, thereby safeguarding vested rights and preventing retrospective application of new

statutory provisions.

Essential Elements

The key element of Section 56 is the continuation of the governance of the President and members

appointed before the commencement of Section 177 of the Finance Act, 2017 under the provisions

of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the rules framed thereunder. In effect, their

appointments, tenure, salaries, and service conditions remain unaffected by the subsequent

enactment of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

This reflects two important legislative concerns. First, it preserves the legal certainty and

legitimate expectations of incumbents, ensuring that their service conditions are not arbitrarily

altered. Secondly, it maintains institutional stability by preventing disruption in the functioning of

the National Commission during the transition from the old Act to the new Act.

The judicial approach towards transitional provisions has generally been to uphold their

validity, as seen in Union of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty

110

, where the Supreme Court

emphasized that vested rights relating to service conditions cannot be taken away except by clear

statutory mandate. Section 56 embodies this principle by expressly protecting incumbents under

the 1986 regime.

OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 57 deals with the provision of officers and employees to the National Consumer Disputes

Redressal Commission (NCDRC) for the effective discharge of its functions. It lays down the

framework for appointment, control, and service conditions of such staff.

Scope and Application

The provision recognises that the effectiveness of a quasi-judicial body such as the National

Commission depends not only on its President and Members but also on the efficiency and

adequacy of its supporting staff. Section 57 thus empowers the Central Government to provide the

necessary human resources, while at the same time ensuring that the President of the National

Commission has supervisory control over them. This dual mechanism balances executive

involvement in appointments with judicial oversight in day-to-day functioning.

110

(1994) 5 SCC 450

Essential Elements

Sub-section (1) empowers the Central Government, in consultation with the President of the

National Commission, to provide officers and employees as it deems necessary. The requirement

of consultation ensures that the President, being the head of the institution, has a say in the

adequacy and suitability of staff.

Sub-section (2) vests the general superintendence over such officers and employees in the

President of the National Commission. This ensures institutional independence by preventing

undue executive interference in the administrative working of the Commission. Judicial and quasi-

judicial bodies have repeatedly asserted the importance of administrative control being vested in

their presiding authorities to preserve independence, a principle also underscored by the Supreme

Court in Union of India v. R. Gandhi

111

Sub-section (3) provides that salaries, allowances, and service conditions of officers and

employees shall be prescribed by rules. This reflects the legislative intent to maintain uniformity

and clarity in service conditions, while leaving the detailed framework to delegated legislation.

JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 58 delineates the jurisdiction of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission

(NCDRC). The provision not only specifies the pecuniary limits for the Commission’s original

jurisdiction but also confers appellate and revisional powers, thereby making it the apex

adjudicatory forum under the Act.

Scope and Application

The National Commission functions as the highest quasi-judicial consumer redressal forum in

India. Section 58 makes it clear that the Commission has both original and appellate jurisdiction,

along with supervisory revisional powers. Its jurisdiction is subject to other provisions of the Act,

ensuring that its powers are exercised within the legislative framework. The section also lays

down procedural safeguards in the event of differing opinions among Bench members, thereby

ensuring consistency and finality in adjudication.

Essential Elements

Sub-section (1) confers original, appellate, and revisional jurisdiction on the National

Commission. Clause (a)(i) provides that it may entertain complaints where the consideration paid

for goods or services exceeds ten crore rupees. The provision also allows the Central Government

to alter this pecuniary threshold, ensuring flexibility in response to economic realities. Clause

(a)(ii) specifically addresses complaints relating to unfair contracts where the value exceeds ten

crore rupees, recognising the need for scrutiny of high-value contractual relationships. Clauses

(a)(iii) and (a)(iv) grant the Commission appellate jurisdiction over orders of State Commissions

and the Central Authority respectively, thereby placing it at the apex of the consumer dispute

redressal hierarchy. Clause (b) empowers the Commission to exercise revisional jurisdiction over

proceedings of the State Commission where jurisdictional errors, illegality, or material

irregularities are evident. This supervisory function ensures that justice is not compromised at the

State level.

111

(2010) 11 SCC 1.

Sub-section (2) provides that the jurisdiction, powers, and authority of the National

Commission may be exercised by Benches constituted by the President. The senior-most member

of such a Bench presides, thereby maintaining hierarchy and order in functioning.

Sub-section (3) addresses situations of difference of opinion among Bench members. If

there is a majority, the majority view prevails. In cases of equal division, the matter is referred to

the President, who may either decide the issue himself or refer it to other members. The final

decision is then based on the majority opinion of those who have heard the case. Importantly, the

provision mandates that such references be resolved within two months, ensuring expeditious

disposal and avoiding prolonged uncertainty.

Judicial interpretation has consistently reinforced the supervisory and appellate nature of

the National Commission’s jurisdiction. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of

India

112

, the Supreme Court emphasised that the National Commission’s revisional jurisdiction is

to be exercised to correct jurisdictional errors and not to re-appreciate evidence, thus maintaining

its supervisory character.

PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 59 lays down that the provisions relating to complaints under Sections 35, 36, 37, 38, and

39 shall, with necessary modifications, apply to the disposal of complaints by the National

Commission. Furthermore, sub-section (2) provides that the National Commission has the power

to declare any term of a contract that is unfair to consumers as null and void.

Scope and Application

The provision ensures that the procedural mechanism applicable to the District and State

Commissions is extended to the National Commission, thereby promoting uniformity in the

adjudicatory process under the Act. The National Commission, despite being the apex consumer

forum, is not intended to function like a conventional civil court. Instead, it is bound to follow the

summary, consumer-friendly procedure prescribed under Sections 35 to 39, which include

institution of complaints, reference to mediation, hearing procedure, powers to enforce attendance

and documents, and the issuance of orders. This makes consumer redressal at the national level

efficient and accessible. The addition of sub-section (2) reflects a substantive expansion of the

Commission’s powers, authorising it to intervene in contractual arrangements and declare terms

that are oppressive or one-sided against consumers as void, thereby reinforcing the principles of

fairness in consumer transactions.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the adoption of the procedural scheme of Sections 35–39, subject to

modifications, which provides consistency and predictability across consumer fora. Secondly, sub-

section (2) specifically grants the National Commission authority over unfair contractual terms.

This is particularly significant in cases involving standard form contracts, adhesion contracts, or

contracts with large corporations where consumers generally lack bargaining power. Judicial

recognition of the concept of “unfair terms” is evident in cases such as LIC of India v. Consumer

Education & Research Centre

113

, where the Supreme Court emphasised the need to protect

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(2011) 14 SCC 337

113

(1995) 5 SCC 482

consumers from exploitative clauses. Section 59(2) embodies this protective rationale within the

statutory framework by giving explicit powers to the National Commission to strike down such

terms.

REVIEW BY THE NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 60 confers upon the National Commission the power to review its own orders where there

exists an error apparent on the face of the record. Such review may be undertaken either suo motu

or on an application made by any of the parties within thirty days from the date of the order.

Scope and Application

The provision embodies the principle that justice should not be sacrificed at the altar of

technicalities. While the National Commission primarily functions as an appellate and revisional

authority, Section 60 empowers it to correct manifest errors in its own decisions, thus providing an

inbuilt corrective mechanism. The scope of review is narrow and restricted to cases where the

error is evident without detailed examination, as distinguished from a re-appreciation of evidence

or rehearing of the matter. The remedy of review under this section does not substitute the remedy

of appeal; instead, it acts as a limited supervisory power to prevent miscarriage of justice.

Essential Elements

The first essential element of this provision is the requirement of an "error apparent on the face of

the record." This phrase has been judicially interpreted in several cases, including Lily Thomas v.

Union of India

114

, where the Supreme Court clarified that such an error must be self-evident and

not one that requires elaborate arguments or reasoning to establish. Secondly, the review may be

exercised suo motu by the National Commission, signifying its responsibility to uphold justice

even in the absence of an application. Thirdly, where review is sought by a party, the application

must be made within thirty days of the order, thereby maintaining procedural discipline. The

provision balances the need for finality of decisions with the imperative of correcting obvious

errors, thus preserving both certainty and fairness in consumer adjudication.

POWER TO SET ASIDE EX PARTE ORDERS

Section 61 provides that where an order has been passed by the National Commission ex parte, the

aggrieved party may file an application before the Commission seeking to set aside such order.

Scope and Application

This provision ensures that a party who could not be present during the proceedings before the

National Commission is not unjustly prejudiced by an ex parte order. The principle underlying

Section 61 is rooted in natural justice, particularly the maxim audi alteram partem, which

mandates that no one should be condemned unheard. The section grants the National Commission

the power to restore matters to their original position where it is satisfied that sufficient cause

existed for the party’s absence.

Essential Elements

114

(2000) 6 SCC 224

The first element is the existence of an ex parte order, i.e., an order passed in the absence of one of

the parties. The second element is the right of the aggrieved party to move an application to set

aside such order, thereby reopening the matter. The third element is the discretion vested in the

National Commission, which is required to assess whether the absence was due to justifiable

reasons. The provision does not automatically nullify ex parte orders but subjects them to judicial

scrutiny.

Judicial Perspective

The courts in India have recognised the need to balance finality of litigation with fairness in

procedure. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah

115

, the Supreme Court held that

procedural rules are handmaids of justice and should not be applied in a manner that defeats

substantive rights. Applying this principle, Section 61 empowers the National Commission to

undo the effects of technical defaults and ensure that disputes are adjudicated on merits rather than

procedural lapses.

TRANSFER OF CASES

Section 62 empowers the National Commission to transfer consumer disputes between forums. It

provides that on the application of the complainant or on its own motion, the National

Commission may, at any stage of the proceeding and in the interest of justice, transfer a complaint

pending before a District Commission of one State to a District Commission of another State, or

from one State Commission to another State Commission.

Scope and Application

The provision serves as an instrument to ensure convenience, fairness, and efficiency in the

administration of consumer justice. It recognises that circumstances may arise where a matter

pending before a particular District or State Commission cannot be adjudicated fairly or

effectively, either due to issues of impartiality, practical difficulties, or convenience of parties.

Section 62 thus operates as a safeguard to protect the consumer’s right to a fair hearing and

effective adjudication.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is that the power of transfer lies exclusively with the National

Commission, which acts as the supervisory body over the State and District Commissions.

Secondly, such transfer may occur either upon the application of the complainant or suo motu by

the National Commission. Thirdly, the transfer must be justified in the “interest of justice,” which

acts as the guiding principle and limits arbitrary exercise of power. Lastly, the transfer can only

take place between forums of equivalent status, i.e., from one District Commission to another or

from one State Commission to another.

Judicial Perspective

The principle underlying Section 62 is consistent with the broader judicial policy that cases should

be heard in a manner that secures fairness and avoids any likelihood of bias or inconvenience. In

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

116

, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of “procedure

established by law” under Article 21 to include fairness and reasonableness. Applying this spirit,

115

(AIR 1955 SC 425)

116

(AIR 1978 SC 597)

the power under Section 62 must be exercised to safeguard consumer rights and ensure that justice

is not only done but also appears to be done.

VACANCY IN OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 63 provides for the functioning of the National Commission in the event of a vacancy in

the office of its President or when the President is unable to discharge his duties due to absence or

any other reason. In such situations, the duties of the President shall be performed by the senior-

most member of the Commission. The proviso further clarifies that where a retired Judge of a

High Court or a Judicial Member is part of the Commission, such member, or if more than one,

the senior-most among them, shall preside over the Commission during the absence of the

President.

Scope and Application

The provision ensures continuity in the functioning of the National Commission and avoids

administrative or judicial paralysis due to the temporary or permanent vacancy in the office of the

President. Consumer disputes are time-sensitive, and delays in adjudication would frustrate the

very purpose of consumer justice. Section 63, therefore, provides a mechanism for maintaining

uninterrupted adjudicatory and administrative work at the highest forum of consumer redressal.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the occurrence of a vacancy or inability of the President to perform

his duties, either temporarily or permanently. The second element is the automatic transfer of

duties to the senior-most member of the National Commission. Thirdly, in cases where a Judicial

Member or retired High Court Judge is present, such member shall preside, ensuring that the

judicial character of the forum is maintained. Lastly, the proviso prioritises judicial expertise over

administrative seniority, thereby reinforcing the quasi-judicial nature of the Commission.

Judicial Perspective

Though there is no direct precedent specifically on Section 63, the principle underlying it is

consistent with the judicial policy of maintaining the functional integrity of adjudicatory bodies. In

Union of India v. R. Gandhi

117

, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of judicial

independence and competence in tribunals. By mandating that, in the absence of the President, a

retired High Court Judge or Judicial Member shall preside, Section 63 aligns with this

constitutional requirement of judicial standards in quasi-judicial bodies.

VACANCIES OR DEFECTS IN APPOINTMENT NOT TO INVALIDATE ORDERS

Section 64 provides that no act or proceeding of the District Commission, State Commission, or

National Commission shall be rendered invalid merely on the ground of any vacancy among its

members or any defect in its constitution.

Scope and Application

117

(2010) 11 SCC 1

This provision embodies the principle of institutional continuity in quasi-judicial bodies. It seeks

to prevent technical objections regarding vacancies or irregularities in the appointment process

from obstructing the administration of consumer justice. The scope of this section extends across

all three levels of the consumer redressal hierarchy—District, State, and National Commissions—

ensuring that the adjudicatory process remains effective despite administrative shortcomings.

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the existence of a vacancy among members of the consumer fora.

Such vacancy, whether temporary or permanent, shall not invalidate proceedings already

conducted or decisions rendered. The second essential element is the possibility of a defect in

constitution, which may arise from errors or irregularities in the appointment of members. Section

64 declares that such defects do not vitiate the legality of the acts or proceedings. The third

element is the protective nature of the provision: it shields consumer fora decisions from being set

aside on mere technicalities, thereby safeguarding the integrity and efficiency of the adjudicatory

process.

Judicial Perspective

Indian courts have consistently upheld the principle that procedural defects or vacancies should

not defeat substantive justice. In Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh

118

, the Supreme

Court held that judgments delivered by de facto judges are valid despite defects in their

appointment, provided they are rendered in exercise of judicial functions. Section 64 embodies

this de facto doctrine by affirming that minor irregularities in constitution do not impair the

validity of decisions, so long as the forum is competent in substance.

SERVICE OF NOTICE, ETC.

Section 65 lays down the procedure for the service of notices in proceedings before the District

Commission, State Commission, and National Commission. It provides that notices may be served

through traditional postal methods, approved courier services, or electronic means. Sub-section (2)

further introduces the concept of service on electronic service providers, requiring them to appoint

a nodal officer to receive such notices. Sub-sections (3) and (4) establish the evidentiary value of

postal endorsements and stipulate the sufficiency of service based on the proper addressing of

notices.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 65 is procedural in nature but crucial for ensuring compliance with the

principles of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem. The provision applies to both

complainants and opposite parties in consumer disputes. It extends to physical, postal, courier-

based, and electronic modes of communication, reflecting the legislative intent to modernise

service procedures in line with technological advancements. The section also governs situations

where a party refuses to accept notice, deeming such refusal as valid service to prevent delay or

abuse of process.

118

(1981) 3 SCC 132

Essential Elements

The first essential element is the recognition of multiple modes of service under sub-section (1),

including registered post with acknowledgment due, speed post, approved courier service, and

electronic means. The second element, under sub-section (2), is the obligation of electronic service

providers to designate a nodal officer for receipt and processing of notices, ensuring accountability

in digital transactions. The third element is the presumption of due service under sub-section (3),

which arises either when acknowledgment is signed or when the notice is returned with a refusal

endorsement. The fourth element under sub-section (4) clarifies that notices are deemed

sufficiently served when addressed to the place of business or profession of the opposite party, or

to the residence of the complainant.

Judicial Perspective

Indian courts have consistently emphasised that procedural service of notice is not an empty

formality but an essential safeguard of fair trial rights. In State of M.P. v. Hiralal

119

, the Supreme

Court held that service of notice, when properly addressed and dispatched, raises a presumption of

due service, even if acknowledgment is not received. Similarly, in V. Raja Kumari v. P.

Subbarama Naidu

120

, the Court clarified that refusal to accept notice amounts to deemed service.

Section 65 embodies these judicial principles, codifying both presumptive and constructive service

to balance fairness with procedural efficiency.

EXPERTS TO ASSIST NATIONAL COMMISSION OR STATE COMMISSION

Section 66 empowers the National Commission or the State Commission, either suo motu or on

the application of a complainant, to seek assistance from individuals, organisations, or experts

whenever it forms the opinion that the matter before it involves the larger interest of consumers.

This provision introduces an institutional mechanism to bring specialized knowledge and technical

expertise into consumer adjudication.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 66 is not confined to disputes between individual consumers and traders or

service providers. It extends to cases where the adjudicatory fora perceive wider consumer

implications—such as systemic unfair trade practices, public safety issues, or matters involving

emerging technologies that directly affect large segments of consumers. The application of this

section ensures that consumer fora are not limited by their own technical understanding but are

supplemented by expert input for effective and informed adjudication.

Essential Elements

The first essential element of Section 66 is the discretionary power vested in the National

Commission or the State Commission to decide whether expert assistance is required. The second

element is the triggering factor: the opinion of the Commission that the matter involves the "larger

interest of consumers." The third element is the wide ambit of eligible expertise, as the provision

allows the Commission to draw assistance from individuals, organisations, or experts, thus

accommodating professional, technical, and organisational knowledge.

Judicial Perspective

119

(1996) 7 SCC 523

120

(2004) 8 SCC 774

Although direct judicial interpretation of Section 66 is limited due to its relatively recent

introduction, the principle underlying it aligns with the judicial recognition of expert assistance in

complex matters. In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai

121

, the Supreme Court observed

that courts may take assistance of technical experts in specialised matters. Similarly, consumer

fora have, in practice, sought expert opinions in cases involving medical negligence, defective

goods, or complex contractual terms. Section 66 thus formalises and broadens this practice,

providing a statutory foundation for expert participation to safeguard collective consumer

interests.

APPEAL AGAINST ORDER OF NATIONAL COMMISSION

Section 67 provides the appellate mechanism against orders passed by the National Commission.

It stipulates that any person aggrieved by an order made by the National Commission in exercise

of its powers under sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 58, may prefer

an appeal to the Supreme Court. Such appeal must ordinarily be filed within a period of thirty days

from the date of the order. The section further authorises the Supreme Court to condone delays in

filing appeals if sufficient cause is shown. Additionally, it mandates that appellants who are

required to pay any amount under the impugned order must deposit fifty per cent of that amount

before their appeal is entertained.

Scope and Application

The appellate jurisdiction under Section 67 is limited to specific orders of the National

Commission, namely those passed under its original jurisdiction in respect of complaints where

the value of goods or services paid as consideration exceeds the statutory limit, and orders made in

the exercise of appellate powers under section 58(1)(a)(ii). The provision thus ensures that only

substantive determinations of the National Commission are subjected to appeal before the

Supreme Court. Its application also reflects a balance between the right to appeal and the necessity

to protect consumer interests by deterring frivolous or dilatory challenges through the requirement

of pre-deposit.

Essential Elements

The first essential element of Section 67 is the identification of appealable orders, confined to

those specified under section 58(1)(a)(i) and (ii). The second element is the limitation period of

thirty days, subject to the discretionary power of the Supreme Court to condone delay upon

sufficient cause. The third element is the statutory pre-condition of deposit, requiring the appellant

to deposit fifty per cent of the amount ordered by the National Commission before the appeal can

be entertained. This safeguard ensures that the appellate process is not misused to obstruct

enforcement of consumer reliefs.

Judicial Perspective

Judicial interpretation of appellate provisions under the earlier Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has

guided the construction of Section 67. In Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani

122

, the

Supreme Court reiterated that the right of appeal is a statutory creation and must be exercised

strictly within the parameters prescribed by the Act. Similarly, in Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle

121

(2003) 4 SCC 601

122

(2019) 6 SCC 424

Factory

123

, the Court emphasised that statutory requirements of deposit before entertaining

appeals are mandatory in nature and cannot be waived. Section 67 continues this legislative intent,

reinforcing procedural discipline while safeguarding consumer remedies.

FINALITY OF ORDERS

Section 68 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 provides that every order passed by a District

Commission, State Commission, or the National Commission shall attain finality if no appeal has

been preferred against such order under the provisions of the Act. This provision reinforces the

principle of certainty in adjudication by ensuring that orders of consumer fora are not left

indefinitely open to challenge.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 68 extends to all orders passed by the three-tier consumer adjudicatory

system under the Act. The provision becomes operative once the period for filing an appeal has

lapsed without the aggrieved party exercising the right to appeal. Its application ensures that

consumer disputes are resolved conclusively, thereby upholding the legislative intent of providing

speedy and effective redressal to consumers. Finality here is subject to the appellate remedies

provided under the Act, and once those remedies are either exhausted or not availed within the

prescribed limitation, the order becomes binding and enforceable.

Essential Elements

The first essential element of Section 68 is the universality of its application to all consumer

fora—District, State, and National Commissions. The second is the condition precedent that no

appeal should have been filed within the prescribed time frame or in accordance with the

procedure provided under the Act. The third element is the effect of finality, which renders the

order conclusive between the parties, thereby preventing further challenges before consumer

authorities. The provision thus ensures stability of adjudication and prevents perpetual uncertainty.

Judicial Perspective

Courts have consistently held that the finality of orders in consumer proceedings is essential for

maintaining the efficiency of the redressal mechanism. In Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory

124

the Supreme Court stressed that once the prescribed limitation for appeal expires and no sufficient

cause for condonation is shown, the finality of the order cannot be unsettled. Similarly, in Rajeev

Hitendra Pathak v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar

125

, it was clarified that consumer fora are creatures

of statute and their powers and orders must be read strictly within the statutory scheme, including

finality clauses. Section 68 thus enshrines a crucial principle that expedites consumer justice and

prevents abuse of process.

LIMITATION PERIOD

123

(2012) 8 SCC 524

124

(2012) 8 SCC 524

125

(2011) 9 SCC 541

Section 69 prescribes the limitation period for filing a consumer complaint before the District

Commission, State Commission, or the National Commission. Sub-section (1) mandates that a

complaint shall be filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arises. Sub-

section (2) provides a discretionary power to condone delay, subject to sufficient cause being

shown by the complainant, and reasons for such condonation must be recorded in writing by the

adjudicatory body.

Scope and Application

The provision applies uniformly across all levels of consumer fora. The cause of action generally

refers to the date of deficiency in service, defect in goods, or any other consumer right violation

that triggers the right to seek redressal. However, the Act also accommodates genuine cases where

a complaint could not be filed within the stipulated time, thereby balancing the need for timeliness

with the principle of justice.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 69 are:

1. Limitation Period – A strict two-year limitation period is prescribed from the date of cause

of action.

2. Discretionary Condonation – Fora may allow complaints beyond two years if the

complainant establishes “sufficient cause” for delay.

3. Reasoned Order – Any order condoning delay must be supported by recorded reasons,

ensuring transparency and preventing arbitrary exercise of discretion.

Judicial Perspective

Judicial interpretation has reinforced the balance between finality and fairness under this section.

In State Bank of India v. B.S. Agricultural Industries

126

, the Supreme Court held that consumer

fora must strictly adhere to limitation provisions, and delay can be condoned only upon

satisfactory explanation. Similarly, in V.N. Shrikhande v. Anita Sena Fernandes

127

, it was held that

the cause of action in cases involving latent defects may arise later when the defect is discovered,

thereby extending limitation in specific factual contexts. Courts have consistently emphasized that

condonation is an exception and not the rule, and the complainant bears the burden of proving

sufficient cause.

ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS

Section 71 provides that every order made by a District Commission, State Commission or the

National Commission shall be enforced by it in the same manner as if it were a decree made by a

court in a suit before it. For this purpose, the provisions of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are made applicable, subject to the modification that every

reference therein to a decree shall be construed as a reference to an order made under this Act.

126

(2009) 5 SCC 121

127

(2011) 1 SCC 53

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 71 lies in strengthening the enforceability of consumer remedies. The orders

of the District, State and National Commissions are not mere recommendations but carry the

binding force of judicial decrees. By equating the status of such orders to that of decrees under the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the legislature has ensured that consumer fora are not dependent

on civil courts for enforcement. This provision thus guarantees that consumer justice is both

effective and executable within the framework of the Act itself. The application of Order XXI

CPC provides a comprehensive procedure for execution, including attachment of property, arrest

and detention of judgment-debtors, and sale of attached property, thereby aligning consumer

remedies with civil adjudication standards.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 71 may be delineated as follows. First, the orders passed by the

District Commission, State Commission, and National Commission are deemed to have the same

force and effect as a decree of a civil court. Secondly, these bodies themselves are vested with the

power of enforcement, eliminating the need for parties to seek recourse before civil courts for

execution. Thirdly, the application of Order XXI CPC, with necessary modifications, provides the

procedural framework through which execution is carried out. Fourthly, the deeming fiction that

substitutes “decree” with “order” under the Consumer Protection Act ensures that the machinery

of execution under the CPC becomes available to consumer fora without ambiguity.

The Supreme Court in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. N.K. Modi

128

held that consumer

fora have the authority to enforce their orders as decrees, affirming the legislative intention to

create a self-sufficient mechanism of justice delivery. Similarly, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

v. R. Srinivasan

129

, it was reiterated that consumer fora are not subordinate to civil courts and their

orders are to be executed in the same manner as decrees. These judicial pronouncements

underscore the enforceable character of consumer redressal orders and the autonomy of the fora.

PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OF ORDERS

Section 72 provides the penal consequences for failure to comply with the orders of the District

Commission, State Commission or the National Commission. Sub-section (1) prescribes

punishment with imprisonment for a term not less than one month but which may extend to three

years, or with a fine not less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh

rupees, or with both. Sub-section (2) confers upon the District, State and National Commissions

the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class for the purpose of trying such offences. Sub-

section (3) stipulates that such offences shall be tried summarily unless otherwise provided.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 72 is to ensure that consumer redressal fora are not rendered toothless by

non-compliance of their orders. While Section 71 provides for the execution of orders as decrees,

Section 72 creates a penal liability for willful disobedience, thereby strengthening the deterrent

force of the Act. The provision applies to any person, whether natural or juristic, who fails to

128

(1996) 6 SCC 385

129

(2000) 3 SCC 242

comply with the directions of consumer fora. Its application is independent of the civil

enforcement mechanism and serves to vindicate the authority of consumer adjudicatory bodies.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 72 are threefold. Firstly, failure to comply with an order of the

District, State or National Commission attracts penal consequences, which may include

imprisonment, fine, or both. The statutory minimum of one month imprisonment and a fine of

twenty-five thousand rupees indicates the seriousness with which such disobedience is treated.

Secondly, the conferral of the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class upon the consumer

fora for the purposes of trial ensures that the same body which passed the order has competence to

enforce penal sanctions. This strengthens institutional autonomy and obviates the need for

recourse to regular criminal courts. Thirdly, the provision mandates that offences be tried

summarily, thereby ensuring swift adjudication consistent with the overall objective of speedy

consumer justice.

Judicial authority has emphasised the importance of compliance with consumer redressal

orders. In T. Nagarathna v. State of Karnataka

130

, the Karnataka High Court underscored that

non-compliance with consumer forum orders undermines the very efficacy of the mechanism and

therefore warrants strict penal action. Similarly, the National Commission in M/s Emaar MGF

Land Ltd. v. Amit Puri

131

stressed that compliance with its orders is not optional and penal

provisions under the Act must be invoked in cases of deliberate default.

APPEAL AGAINST ORDERS UNDER PENALTY PROVISIONS

Section 73 provides the appellate mechanism in respect of orders passed under Section 72, which

deals with penalties for non-compliance of consumer forum orders. Sub-section (1) specifies that

an appeal shall lie both on facts and on law from the District Commission to the State

Commission, from the State Commission to the National Commission, and from the National

Commission to the Supreme Court. Sub-section (2) clarifies that, except as provided in sub-section

(1), no appeal shall lie before any other court against such orders. Sub-section (3) mandates that

every appeal under this section must be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order,

with a proviso allowing extension of this period if the appellate authority is satisfied that there was

sufficient cause for delay.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 73 is confined to appeals arising from penal orders under Section 72. By

creating a hierarchical appellate structure, the legislature ensures that parties have a right to

challenge penal sanctions without undermining the efficiency and finality of enforcement

proceedings. The provision applies exclusively to appeals from orders of consumer fora acting as

judicial magistrates under Section 72 and precludes recourse to ordinary criminal courts, thereby

maintaining the autonomy of the consumer dispute redressal system. The thirty-day limitation

period and the discretion for condonation of delay ensure both expediency and fairness in the

appellate process.

Essential Elements

130

(ILR 2002 KAR 2753)

131

(Revision Petition No. 2741 of 2015, decided on 30.09.2015)

The essential elements of Section 73 can be summarized as follows. First, the appeal lies on both

facts and law, distinguishing it from statutory provisions where appeals may be restricted to

questions of law. Second, the hierarchical structure is clearly delineated: District Commission to

State Commission, State Commission to National Commission, and National Commission to the

Supreme Court. Third, the provision bars any appeal to other courts except as provided,

reinforcing the exclusive appellate channel within the consumer protection framework. Fourth, the

limitation period of thirty days ensures promptness, with judicial discretion to condone delay

where sufficient cause exists.

Judicial interpretation underscores the necessity of a streamlined appellate mechanism

in penal proceedings. In R.K. Sharma v. State of Punjab

132

, the National Commission emphasised

that appeals under Section 73 are to be treated as a special statutory remedy, separate from

ordinary criminal appeals, and should be decided expeditiously to uphold the deterrent purpose of

Section 72.

CHAPTER V

MEDIATION

ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSUMER MEDIATION CELL

Section 74 deals with the establishment of consumer mediation cells to strengthen the alternative

dispute resolution (ADR) framework under the Act. Sub-section (1) obliges the State Government

to establish, by notification, a consumer mediation cell attached to each District Commission and

State Commission. Sub-section (2) vests a corresponding duty in the Central Government to

establish such mediation cells attached to the National Commission and its regional benches. Sub-

section (3) stipulates that a consumer mediation cell shall consist of such persons as may be

prescribed under rules. Sub-section (4) mandates that every consumer mediation cell shall

maintain a list of empanelled mediators, a list of cases handled, record of proceedings, and any

other information as may be specified by regulations. Sub-section (5) requires the mediation cell

to submit quarterly reports to the respective consumer fora to which it is attached.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 74 lies in institutionalising mediation as a preferred mechanism of consumer

dispute resolution. While the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 primarily emphasised adjudication,

the 2019 Act has introduced structured mediation as an alternative route to reduce pendency and

provide expeditious settlement. The provision applies across all levels of consumer fora—District,

State and National—ensuring that mediation cells are integral to the dispute resolution system and

not parallel bodies. The application of this section is prospective and is subject to rules and

regulations framed under the Act regarding the composition, functioning and reporting

mechanisms of such mediation cells.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 74 can be discerned in four aspects. Firstly, the responsibility of

establishing mediation cells is divided between the State and Central Governments, ensuring a

uniform mechanism across the hierarchy of consumer fora. Secondly, the composition of

132

[(2019) 3 CPJ 45 (NC)]

mediation cells is left to prescription by subordinate legislation, providing flexibility in terms of

qualifications and expertise of members. Thirdly, the requirement of maintaining lists of

empanelled mediators and detailed records of mediation proceedings ensures transparency,

accountability and continuity in the mediation process. Fourthly, the obligation to submit quarterly

reports to the respective commissions promotes oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the

effectiveness of mediation in consumer disputes.

Judicial discourse has consistently encouraged mediation in consumer disputes. The

Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd.

133

recognised mediation as a viable mode of alternative dispute resolution in civil disputes,

including consumer matters. Further, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has

in several instances referred disputes to mediation cells under the 2019 Act to facilitate amicable

resolution.

EMPANELMENT OF MEDIATORS

Section 75 provides the framework for the empanelment of mediators to facilitate consumer

dispute resolution through mediation. Sub-section (1) mandates that the National Commission,

State Commission, or District Commission, as the case may be, shall prepare a panel of mediators

maintained by the consumer mediation cell attached to it, based on the recommendation of a

selection committee consisting of the President and a member of that Commission. Sub-section (2)

empowers the authorities to specify, through regulations, the qualifications and experience

required for empanelment, the procedure for empanelment, training requirements, fees, terms and

conditions, code of conduct, and the grounds and manner for removal or cancellation of

empanelment. Sub-section (3) provides that the panel shall remain valid for five years, and

empanelled mediators may be eligible for re-empanelment for another term subject to conditions

prescribed by regulations.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 75 is to institutionalise a structured and regulated mechanism for mediation

within the consumer protection framework. By requiring the preparation of a panel of mediators,

the provision ensures that qualified and trained professionals are available to facilitate settlement

of disputes. The application of this section is across all levels of consumer fora—District, State,

and National Commissions—and is crucial to operationalising the consumer mediation cells

established under Section 74. It also ensures consistency in the selection, conduct, and functioning

of mediators throughout the country.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 75 are threefold. First, the selection process is structured

through a selection committee, comprising the President and a member of the respective

Commission, ensuring accountability and transparency. Second, the regulatory framework governs

all aspects of empanelment, including qualifications, training, remuneration, code of conduct, and

grounds for removal, thereby maintaining high professional standards and integrity in mediation.

Third, the validity period of five years, with eligibility for re-empanelment, provides stability

while allowing periodic evaluation and renewal of mediator credentials.

133

[(2010) 8 SCC 24]

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v.

Amit Puri

134

has emphasised the importance of having trained and competent mediators for

effective resolution of consumer disputes, highlighting the role of empanelment in ensuring the

quality and credibility of the mediation process.

NOMINATION OF MEDIATORS FROM PANEL

Section 76 prescribes the criteria for nominating mediators from the empanelled panel maintained

under Section 75. It mandates that the District Commission, State Commission, or National

Commission, as the case may be, must consider the suitability of a mediator for resolving the

specific consumer dispute when making a nomination.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 76 is to ensure that mediation is conducted by a mediator whose skills,

experience, and expertise align with the nature of the dispute. This provision applies across all

consumer fora and directs the commissions to exercise discretion while selecting a mediator,

thereby enhancing the effectiveness and credibility of the mediation process. The emphasis on

suitability allows the forum to match the mediator’s specialization—be it technical, financial, or

legal—to the requirements of the case, which increases the probability of an amicable settlement.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 76 include: first, the existence of an empanelled panel of

mediators under Section 75; second, the exercise of evaluative discretion by the Commission in

determining the suitability of a mediator for the dispute at hand; and third, the linkage between the

mediator’s skills or experience and the nature of the consumer dispute, ensuring that the

nomination process is not arbitrary.

DUTY OF MEDIATOR TO DISCLOSE CERTAIN FACTS

Section 77 outlines the obligations of a mediator to maintain transparency and impartiality in the

mediation process. It imposes a duty on mediators to disclose any personal, professional, or

financial interest in the outcome of a consumer dispute, any circumstances that may give rise to a

justifiable doubt regarding their independence or impartiality, and any other facts as may be

prescribed by regulations.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 77 is to uphold the integrity and fairness of the mediation process within

consumer dispute resolution. It applies to all mediators empanelled under Section 75 and

nominated under Section 76, across District, State, and National Commissions. By requiring

disclosure of potential conflicts of interest or circumstances affecting neutrality, this section

ensures that parties can have confidence in the mediator’s objectivity and the legitimacy of the

process. The application of this section is critical in preventing bias or undue influence, thereby

promoting just and equitable settlements.

134

(Revision Petition No. 2741 of 2015)

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 77 include: first, the duty to disclose any personal, professional,

or financial interest in the dispute’s outcome; second, the duty to reveal circumstances that may

create reasonable doubt about the mediator’s independence or impartiality; and third, the duty to

disclose additional facts as may be prescribed by regulations. Together, these elements codify the

principle of transparency, ensuring that mediators act in good faith and that the mediation process

remains credible.

This provision aligns with the broader objective of Sections 75 and 76 by establishing

ethical standards for mediators, which, when coupled with careful nomination and the possibility

of replacement under Section 78, creates a robust framework for effective and impartial consumer

dispute mediation.

REPLACEMENT OF MEDIATOR IN CERTAIN CASES

Section 78 provides for the replacement of a mediator in specific circumstances. It states that

where the District Commission, State Commission, or National Commission, as the case may be,

is satisfied—either on the basis of information furnished by the mediator himself, or upon

information received from any other person including the parties to the complaint—and after

giving the mediator an opportunity of being heard, it shall replace such mediator with another

mediator.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 78 is to ensure impartiality, fairness, and confidence in the mediation

process. Mediation, being a voluntary and neutral mechanism, requires that the mediator be free

from bias, conflict of interest, or incapacity that may affect the process. This provision applies at

all levels of consumer fora and ensures that disputes are mediated by individuals who inspire trust

and neutrality in the parties. It safeguards against situations where the mediator may be unable to

continue due to personal reasons, disqualification, conflict of interest, or lack of competence in

handling the matter.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 78 are: first, the information prompting replacement may

originate either from the mediator himself, from any party to the dispute, or from another person,

ensuring a wide ambit for accountability. Second, the concerned Commission is required to hear

the mediator before making a decision, thereby upholding principles of natural justice. Third, the

replacement is mandatory once the Commission is satisfied about the necessity, ensuring

continuity of the mediation process without prejudice to the parties.

This provision reflects the legislative intent to preserve the integrity of mediation. In line

with judicial observations in cases such as Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey

Construction Co. (P) Ltd.

135

, the neutrality and credibility of the mediator are central to the

success of mediation. Section 78, therefore, provides an inbuilt corrective mechanism to address

potential concerns regarding a mediator’s role, ensuring that consumer disputes are mediated

effectively and fairly.

135

(2010) 8 SCC 24

PROCEDURE FOR MEDIATION

Section 79 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 lays down the procedural framework for

conducting mediation in consumer disputes. Sub-section (1) specifies that mediation shall take

place in the consumer mediation cell attached to the relevant District Commission, State

Commission, or National Commission. Sub-section (2) mandates that the nominated mediator,

when conducting mediation, must consider the rights and obligations of the parties, trade usages

(if any), the circumstances giving rise to the dispute, and any other relevant factors, while

adhering to the principles of natural justice. Sub-section (3) provides that the mediation shall be

conducted within the time and in the manner prescribed by regulations.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 79 is to institutionalize a structured and fair procedure for mediation in

consumer disputes. It applies to all consumer fora—District, State, and National Commissions—

whenever disputes are referred for mediation. By specifying the locus of mediation within

established consumer mediation cells, the provision ensures administrative support and

standardized conduct. The requirement to consider rights, obligations, and relevant circumstances

emphasizes a balanced approach, while adherence to natural justice guarantees procedural fairness

and impartiality. The application of this section ensures that mediation is not merely formalistic

but guided by substantive fairness and efficiency.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 79 include: first, the conduct of mediation within the consumer

mediation cell of the relevant Commission; second, the mediator’s duty to consider the parties’

rights, obligations, trade usages, and circumstances of the dispute; third, the requirement to follow

principles of natural justice; and fourth, adherence to time and manner as prescribed by

regulations. Together, these elements provide a framework that ensures mediation is effective,

impartial, and aligned with the objectives of consumer dispute resolution, complementing the

provisions on empanelment, nomination, and disclosure of mediators under Sections 75 to 78.

SETTLEMENT THROUGH MEDIATION

Section 80 provides for the formalization and reporting of settlements achieved through mediation.

Sub-section (1) requires that if an agreement is reached—either on all issues or some issues of the

consumer dispute—the terms of the agreement must be reduced to writing and signed by the

parties or their authorised representatives. Sub-section (2) mandates that the mediator prepare a

settlement report and submit it along with the signed agreement to the concerned Commission.

Sub-section (3) addresses situations where no agreement is reached or the mediator deems

settlement impossible, requiring the mediator to prepare and submit a report reflecting that

outcome to the Commission.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 80 is to ensure that mediation results are documented and communicated to

the relevant Commission, thereby providing legal recognition and enforceability to mediated

settlements. This section applies to all consumer disputes referred for mediation under Sections 75

to 79, across District, State, and National Commissions. It institutionalizes a mechanism for

recording both successful and unsuccessful mediation attempts, ensuring that the Commission is

apprised of the outcome for further action, if necessary.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 80 include: first, the requirement to reduce a mediated

agreement to writing and obtain signatures from the parties or their authorised representatives;

second, the preparation and submission of a settlement report by the mediator to the concerned

Commission; and third, the obligation to report cases where settlement is not possible. These

elements collectively ensure accountability, transparency, and formal recognition of the mediation

process, thereby integrating mediation as an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism

within the consumer dispute redressal framework.

RECORDING SETTLEMENT AND PASSING OF ORDER

Section 81 prescribes the procedure for formalizing the outcome of mediation and subsequent

judicial action by the consumer commissions. Sub-section (1) mandates that the District

Commission, State Commission, or National Commission, upon receipt of the settlement report,

shall pass an appropriate order recording the settlement within seven days and dispose of the

matter accordingly. Sub-section (2) addresses partial settlements, requiring the Commission to

record the settlement of issues resolved through mediation while continuing to hear the remaining

unresolved issues. Sub-section (3) deals with situations where mediation fails, directing the

Commission to continue the hearing of all issues in the consumer dispute.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 81 is to ensure that mediated settlements are promptly recorded and given

formal recognition by the appropriate Commission. This section applies across all levels of

consumer fora—District, State, and National Commissions—whenever a dispute has been referred

for mediation under Sections 75 to 80. By providing a structured timeline and procedural clarity,

the provision ensures efficiency, prevents unnecessary delays, and integrates the mediation

outcome into the formal adjudicatory process.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of Section 81 include: first, the requirement for the Commission to pass an

order recording the settlement within seven days of receiving the settlement report; second, the

treatment of partially settled disputes, with unresolved issues continuing to be adjudicated; and

third, the continuation of proceedings in cases where mediation fails. These elements reinforce the

finality and enforceability of mediated settlements while preserving the Commission’s authority to

adjudicate unresolved or disputed matters, thereby balancing alternative dispute resolution with

judicial oversight.

CHAPTER VI

PRODUCT LIABILITY

APPLICATION OF CHAPTER ON PRODUCT LIABILITY

Section 82 provides that the Chapter dealing with product liability shall apply to every claim for

compensation arising from harm caused by a defective product. The provision explicitly covers

defective products that are manufactured, serviced, or sold, thereby including product

manufacturers, product service providers, and product sellers within its ambit. This ensures that

liability is not narrowly restricted to the manufacturer alone but extends to all participants in the

product chain who may contribute to the harm caused by the defective product.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 82 is comprehensive, encompassing all claims for compensation under a

product liability action. It applies to any consumer who suffers harm due to a defective product,

thereby enabling redressal irrespective of whether the harm arises from manufacturing defects,

defects in services associated with the product, or defects in the sale or distribution of the product.

The provision establishes a statutory right for consumers to claim compensation and underscores

the principle of strict liability in product-related claims. It also delineates the roles of different

stakeholders in the product chain, ensuring accountability of manufacturers, service providers, and

sellers. Courts have interpreted this provision to emphasize the protection of consumer interests

and to reinforce the liability of all parties involved in making a product available to the market.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 82 are threefold: firstly, the existence of a defective product;

secondly, the causation of harm to the consumer as a result of such defect; and thirdly, the liability

of either the manufacturer, service provider, or seller. The defect may be in design, manufacturing,

packaging, labeling, or in the provision of associated services. The complainant must establish the

connection between the defect and the harm suffered. The provision implies strict liability,

meaning that the aggrieved consumer is not required to prove negligence on the part of the

manufacturer, service provider, or seller, only that the product was defective and caused harm.

This principle was recognized in V.K. Verma v. Reliance Industries Ltd.

136

, where the Supreme

Court highlighted the duty of manufacturers to ensure the safety of their products and the

consequent liability arising from defective products.

PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTION

Section 83 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, provides the legal basis for initiating a product

liability action. It empowers a complainant to bring a claim against a product manufacturer,

product service provider, or product seller for harm caused by a defective product. The provision

establishes that liability is not confined solely to the manufacturer but extends to all parties

involved in producing, servicing, or distributing the product, thereby ensuring comprehensive

accountability within the product chain.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 83 is to enable aggrieved consumers to seek compensation for harm suffered

due to defective products. The provision applies to claims arising from physical injury, property

damage, or any other loss directly attributable to the defect. It allows the complainant to target any

or all of the liable parties—manufacturer, service provider, or seller—depending on the

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(2010) 2 SCC 123

circumstances of the case. Courts have interpreted this section to reinforce the principle that

liability in product-related harms is strict and extends beyond contractual relationships, thereby

protecting consumer interests. The provision underlines the broader objective of the Act to provide

accessible, expeditious, and effective remedies to consumers against unsafe or defective products.

Essential Elements

The essential elements of a product liability action under Section 83 include the presence of a

defective product, the occurrence of harm to the complainant, and the causal link between the

defect and the harm. The defect may be in design, manufacturing, packaging, labeling,

instructions, or associated services. The complainant must identify the responsible party or parties,

which may include the manufacturer, service provider, or seller. Liability under this section is

primarily strict, meaning that the complainant need not prove negligence; it is sufficient to

demonstrate that the product was defective and caused harm. Judicial pronouncements, such as in

V.K. Verma v. Reliance Industries Ltd.

137

, reinforce that manufacturers and other participants in

the product chain have a non-delegable duty to ensure that products are safe for consumer use.

LIABILITY OF PRODUCT MANUFACTURER

Section delineates the liability of a product manufacturer in a product liability action. Sub-section

(1) identifies specific circumstances under which a manufacturer is liable: when the product

contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, deviates from manufacturing

specifications, fails to conform to an express warranty, or lacks adequate instructions or warnings

to prevent harm. Sub-section (2) establishes that liability is strict, emphasizing that the

manufacturer remains liable even if they were neither negligent nor fraudulent in issuing an

express warranty. This statutory provision underscores the principle that consumer protection and

safety take precedence over fault-based defenses in product liability cases.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 84 extends to all situations where a product, by reason of its defect, poses a

risk of harm to consumers. Liability is not confined to negligence but encompasses a broad

spectrum of defects, including design flaws, manufacturing inconsistencies, and inadequate

instructions or warnings. The section is applicable to all manufacturers whose products enter the

consumer market, and it ensures that consumers have an effective legal remedy for harm caused

by defective products. Courts have interpreted this provision to impose a non-delegable duty on

manufacturers to ensure the safety and fitness of their products. In V.K. Verma v. Reliance

Industries Ltd.

138

, the Supreme Court highlighted that a manufacturer’s liability arises from the

defect itself rather than proof of negligence, reflecting the protective intent of the Act.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 84 include the existence of a product manufactured by the

defendant, the presence of a defect (whether in manufacturing, design, specifications, or

warranty), and a causal connection between the defect and the harm suffered by the complainant.

The provision also requires that the manufacturer provide adequate instructions and warnings;

failure to do so establishes liability irrespective of fault. Sub-section (2) emphasizes strict liability,

confirming that proof of absence of negligence or fraudulent intent does not absolve the

137

(2010) 2 SCC 123

138

(2010) 2 SCC 123

manufacturer. This element ensures that the primary focus remains on consumer safety and

effective redressal rather than on defending the conduct of the manufacturer.

LIABILITY OF PRODUCT SERVICE PROVIDER

Section 85 articulates the circumstances under which a product service provider becomes liable in

a product liability action. The provision specifies that liability arises when the service rendered is

faulty, imperfect, deficient, or inadequate in quality, nature, or performance as required by law,

contract, or prevailing standards. Further, liability extends to acts of omission, commission,

negligence, or deliberate withholding of information that result in harm. The section also includes

failure to provide adequate instructions or warnings and non-conformity with express warranties

or contractual terms as grounds for liability. This provision ensures that consumers are protected

not only against defective products but also against deficiencies in related services that may cause

harm.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 85 encompasses all product-related services that accompany, facilitate, or

enhance the use of a product. A product service provider may include entities responsible for

installation, maintenance, repair, or any other service connected to the product. The section applies

when the harm suffered by the consumer arises from defective service rather than the product

itself, thereby broadening the reach of the product liability framework. Courts have interpreted this

provision to reinforce the principle of accountability for service-related defects, recognizing that

defective services can be as harmful as defective products. The provision ensures that consumers

have a legal remedy against service providers for lapses that cause injury, damage, or loss,

emphasizing the Act’s consumer-protective objectives.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 85 include the existence of a service provided by the

defendant, the defective or deficient nature of the service, and a causal link between the defective

service and the harm suffered. Liability may arise from deficient quality, non-performance,

omission, commission, negligence, withholding of critical information, failure to provide

instructions or warnings, or breach of warranty or contractual terms. Unlike traditional fault-based

claims, the provision aligns with the principles of strict liability, focusing on the occurrence of

harm due to service deficiency rather than the intent or negligence of the provider. Establishing

these elements allows a complainant to hold the service provider accountable, reinforcing the

comprehensive protection afforded to consumers under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

LIABILITY OF PRODUCT SELLERS

Section 86 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, outlines the circumstances under which a

product seller, who is not the manufacturer, may be held liable in a product liability action. The

provision establishes that a seller can incur liability if they exercise substantial control over the

design, testing, manufacturing, packaging, or labeling of the product, or if they alter or modify the

product in a manner that substantially contributes to the harm. Liability also arises when the seller

provides an independent express warranty that is breached, when the manufacturer cannot be

identified or held accountable, or when the seller fails to exercise reasonable care in assembling,

inspecting, maintaining, or conveying warnings and instructions, resulting in harm. This statutory

framework ensures that sellers, as active participants in the product chain, cannot evade

responsibility for defects or mismanagement that pose risks to consumers.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 86 extends the product liability regime to sellers who may not manufacture

the product but whose actions materially affect its safety or compliance. The provision is

applicable in situations where the seller’s intervention, whether through modification, warranty, or

omission of necessary information, directly contributes to consumer harm. It also addresses

circumstances where the manufacturer is unidentifiable, unavailable, or beyond the reach of Indian

law, thereby protecting consumers from being left without a remedy. Courts have interpreted this

section to reinforce the principle that liability in product-related harms is not confined to the

manufacturer alone and that sellers who exercise significant control or fail in their duty of care can

be held accountable.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 86 include the existence of a product sold by the defendant,

the seller’s involvement in design, modification, warranty, or transmission of instructions, and a

causal connection between such involvement or omission and the harm suffered. Liability may

arise from substantial control over the product, alteration or modification, breach of an

independent express warranty, inability to hold the manufacturer accountable, or failure to

exercise reasonable care in handling or communicating necessary safety instructions. The

provision embodies principles of strict liability, focusing on the effect of the seller’s actions on

consumer safety rather than on fault or negligence. Establishing these elements allows a

complainant to seek redress directly from the seller, ensuring comprehensive consumer protection

under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

CHAPTER VII

OFFENCES AND PENALTIES

PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH DIRECTIONS OF CENTRAL

AUTHORITY

Section 88 prescribes penal consequences for failure to comply with directions issued by the

Central Authority under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. The provision stipulates that any person

who contravenes such directions shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of up to six

months, a fine not exceeding twenty lakh rupees, or both. This section reinforces the binding

nature of the Central Authority’s directions and ensures that regulatory mechanisms under the Act

are effectively enforceable.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 88 is to provide a deterrent against non-compliance with directives issued by

the Central Authority, which may include measures related to product safety, recall,

standardization, or other regulatory interventions under Sections 20 and 21. The provision applies

to all persons subject to the authority of the Central Authority, including manufacturers, service

providers, and sellers. Courts have consistently interpreted this section as an enforcement tool,

emphasizing that the Central Authority’s directions carry statutory weight, and non-compliance

attracts both criminal and financial liability. The provision underscores the Act’s objective of

ensuring compliance with consumer protection standards and safeguarding public interest.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 88 include the issuance of a direction by the Central

Authority under Sections 20 or 21 and the failure of the person concerned to comply with such

direction. Liability is strict in the sense that the penal consequences attach to non-compliance

regardless of intent or negligence. The provision allows for both imprisonment and monetary fine,

reflecting the dual objective of deterrence and punitive sanction. The availability of both penalties

underscores the seriousness of adherence to regulatory directives issued under the Act. Section 88

thus serves as a crucial enforcement mechanism within the Consumer Protection Act, 2019,

ensuring that the Central Authority’s directions are complied with and that non-compliance is met

with proportionate penal consequences.

PUNISHMENT FOR FALSE OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT

Section 89 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, prescribes penalties for manufacturers or

service providers who cause false or misleading advertisements that are prejudicial to consumer

interests. The provision specifies that for a first offence, the offender may be punished with

imprisonment of up to two years and a fine not exceeding ten lakh rupees. For every subsequent

offence, the punishment is enhanced to imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of up to fifty

lakh rupees. This provision underscores the statutory commitment to safeguarding consumers

against deceptive practices and maintaining market integrity.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 89 extends to all manufacturers and service providers responsible for

advertising their products or services. It applies to advertisements that are false, misleading, or

likely to mislead consumers in a manner that prejudices their interests. Courts have interpreted this

provision to encompass both express and implied misrepresentations, including claims about

quality, quantity, standard, price, or efficacy of a product or service. The enhanced penalties for

repeat offences demonstrate the legislative intent to deter habitual or intentional misrepresentation

in the marketplace. This section is particularly relevant in the contemporary context of aggressive

marketing and digital advertising, ensuring that consumer protection is effectively enforced.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 89 include the existence of an advertisement, the false or

misleading nature of the advertisement, the prejudice caused to consumers, and the role of the

manufacturer or service provider in causing the advertisement. For repeat offences, prior

conviction under this section must be established. The provision imposes strict liability on the

offender, emphasizing that the harmful effect on consumer interests is sufficient to attract

punishment, regardless of intent to deceive. The dual penal structure—imprisonment and fine—

serves both as a deterrent and as a mechanism to compensate for the severity of the violation.

Section 89 therefore functions as a key deterrent against deceptive advertising practices,

reinforcing the consumer-centric ethos of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, and promoting

transparency, honesty, and accountability in commercial communications.

PUNISHMENT FOR MANUFACTURING, SELLING OR DISTRIBUTING PRODUCTS

CONTAINING ADULTERANTS

Section 90 prescribes penal consequences for manufacturing, storing, selling, distributing, or

importing products containing adulterants. Sub-section (1) categorizes the punishment based on

the severity of harm caused to the consumer. If no injury occurs, the offender may face

imprisonment up to six months and a fine up to one lakh rupees. If injury not amounting to

grievous hurt occurs, imprisonment may extend to one year with a fine up to three lakh rupees. If

grievous hurt results, imprisonment may extend up to seven years with a fine up to five lakh

rupees. If the act causes the death of a consumer, imprisonment ranges from a minimum of seven

years to life, with a fine of not less than ten lakh rupees. Sub-section (2) declares offences under

clauses (c) and (d) as cognizable and non-bailable. Sub-section (3) empowers courts to suspend or

cancel licences issued under any law in case of first or subsequent convictions. The Explanation

defines “adulterant” as any material, including extraneous matter, making a product unsafe, and

refers to Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code for the meaning of “grievous hurt.”

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 90 is extensive, covering all activities involving adulterated products,

whether manufacturing, storage, distribution, sale, or import. The provision applies irrespective of

whether the act is deliberate or negligent, thereby enforcing strict liability to protect consumers

from unsafe products. The graded punishment reflects the principle of proportionality, linking the

severity of the penalty to the harm caused. Courts have consistently treated offences under this

section as serious, particularly those causing grievous hurt or death, emphasizing the need for

strict compliance with safety and quality standards. The provision also ensures regulatory

oversight by enabling suspension or cancellation of licences in addition to criminal liability.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 90 include the existence of a product containing an

adulterant, involvement of the accused in manufacturing, storage, sale, distribution, or import, and

the resultant harm to the consumer. The degree of punishment depends on whether the harm

caused is none, minor, grievous, or fatal. Sub-section (2) emphasizes the gravity of offences

causing grievous hurt or death by making them cognizable and non-bailable. Sub-section (3) adds

a regulatory dimension, allowing suspension or cancellation of licences in cases of conviction.

Establishing these elements enables courts to hold offenders accountable under both criminal and

regulatory frameworks, ensuring robust consumer protection. Section 90 therefore serves as a

critical provision in safeguarding public health and safety, imposing stringent penalties for

adulteration, and reinforcing the consumer-centric ethos of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

PUNISHMENT FOR MANUFACTURING, SELLING OR DISTRIBUTING SPURIOUS

GOODS

Section 91 prescribes penal consequences for manufacturing, storing, selling, distributing, or

importing spurious goods. Sub-section (1) provides graded punishments depending on the harm

caused to consumers. If the act causes injury not amounting to grievous hurt, imprisonment may

extend up to one year with a fine up to three lakh rupees. If injury results in grievous hurt,

imprisonment may extend up to seven years with a fine up to five lakh rupees. If the act results in

the death of a consumer, imprisonment shall not be less than seven years but may extend to life,

with a fine of not less than ten lakh rupees. Sub-section (2) declares offences causing grievous hurt

or death as cognizable and non-bailable. Sub-section (3) empowers courts to suspend licences for

a first conviction for up to two years and to cancel licences for second or subsequent convictions,

thereby integrating regulatory sanctions with criminal penalties.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 91 extends to all persons involved in bringing spurious goods into the

market, whether through manufacturing, storage, sale, distribution, or import. The provision

applies irrespective of the intent of the offender, reflecting strict liability principles to safeguard

consumers from harmful or counterfeit products. Courts have interpreted this section as addressing

both public health and market integrity concerns, ensuring that offenders face commensurate

criminal and regulatory consequences. The graded punishment system aligns the severity of

penalties with the harm caused, while the cognizability and non-bailability of serious offences

emphasize the gravity of endangering consumer safety.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 91 include the presence of spurious goods, the involvement

of the accused in manufacturing, storage, sale, distribution, or import, and the resultant harm to the

consumer. Liability is determined based on the severity of the injury: minor injury, grievous hurt,

or death. The provision further integrates regulatory oversight by allowing suspension or

cancellation of licences in addition to imprisonment and fines. Establishing these elements enables

courts to hold offenders accountable, ensuring both deterrence and remedial measures under the

Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Section 91 thus provides a comprehensive framework to penalize

the production and circulation of spurious goods, reinforcing consumer protection and public

safety while maintaining accountability for all actors in the supply chain.

COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCE BY COURT

Section 92 specifies the procedural requirement for initiating prosecution under Sections 88 and

89 of the Act. It provides that a competent court cannot take cognizance of offences under these

sections except upon a complaint filed by the Central Authority or by an officer authorized by the

Central Authority. This provision ensures that only the designated regulatory authority can initiate

legal proceedings for non-compliance with its directions or for false or misleading advertisements,

centralizing enforcement and preventing frivolous or unauthorized litigation.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 92 is to regulate the procedural entry point for prosecution under Sections 88

and 89. It applies to all offences relating to non-compliance with directions of the Central

Authority and false or misleading advertisements by manufacturers or service providers. The

provision is intended to streamline enforcement, maintain consistency in regulatory action, and

ensure that complaints are filed only by competent authorities with the requisite knowledge and

jurisdiction. Courts have consistently interpreted this section to restrict private parties from

independently initiating proceedings under these sections, emphasizing the exclusive role of the

Central Authority in enforcement.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 92 include the existence of an offence under Section 88 or

89 and the filing of a complaint by the Central Authority or an officer authorized by it. Without

such a complaint, the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. This procedural

requirement underscores the centralized enforcement mechanism envisaged by the Act, ensuring

that regulatory oversight is exercised in a systematic and accountable manner. Section 92 thus

functions as a procedural safeguard, centralizing the initiation of prosecution for specific offences

under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, and ensuring that legal action is taken only through

competent authorities with proper authorization.

VEXATIOUS SEARCH

Section 93 prescribes penal consequences for misuse of powers by the Director General or any

other officer exercising powers under Section 22. It provides that if an officer, knowing that there

are no reasonable grounds, nevertheless conducts a search of any premises or seizes any record,

year, a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees, or both. This provision safeguards against abuse of

authority and ensures that enforcement powers under the Act are exercised responsibly and within

the limits of law.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 93 is to deter arbitrary or unjustified searches and seizures by officers

empowered under the Act. It applies to all officers acting under Section 22, which deals with

inspection, search, and seizure to ensure compliance with consumer protection regulations. Courts

have recognized that this section protects individuals and entities from harassment or misuse of

statutory powers and emphasizes accountability of officers performing regulatory duties. The

provision ensures that enforcement actions are based on reasonable grounds and prevents

vexatious or malicious exercise of authority.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 93 include the exercise of powers under Section 22 by the

Director General or authorized officer, the knowledge that there are no reasonable grounds for

search or seizure, and the actual conduct of a search or seizure. The provision imposes strict

penalties for misuse of authority, underscoring both criminal liability and deterrence. Establishing

these elements allows the courts to hold officers accountable for vexatious enforcement actions,

maintaining the balance between regulatory oversight and protection of individual rights. Section

93 thus serves as a critical check against abuse of power, ensuring that searches and seizures under

the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, are conducted fairly, reasonably, and lawfully.

CHAPTER VIII

MISCELLANEOUS

MEASURES TO PREVENT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN E-COMMERCE AND

DIRECT SELLING

Section 94 empowers the Central Government to take measures to prevent unfair trade practices in

e-commerce, direct selling, and related commercial activities. The provision explicitly links such

measures to the protection of consumer interests and rights and authorizes the government to

prescribe the manner in which these measures are to be implemented. This statutory provision

recognizes the evolving nature of commerce and the need for regulatory intervention in emerging

market practices to safeguard consumers.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 94 is broad and anticipatory, enabling the Central Government to address

unfair trade practices that may arise in e-commerce platforms, online marketplaces, direct selling,

and other contemporary commercial models. It applies to all persons engaged in such trade,

including online sellers, intermediaries, and service providers. Courts have interpreted this

provision as providing a legislative framework for proactive regulation, allowing the government

to prescribe guidelines, codes of conduct, or enforcement mechanisms to curb deceptive,

fraudulent, or exploitative practices in digital and direct-selling markets. The provision ensures

that consumer protection evolves alongside technological and commercial innovations.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 94 include the existence of unfair trade practices in e-

commerce or direct selling and the exercise of regulatory measures by the Central Government in

a prescribed manner to prevent such practices. The provision is enabling in nature, granting

discretionary power to the government to formulate and implement rules, notifications, or

standards to address consumer risks. Its application reflects the preventive and protective purpose

of the Act, emphasizing systemic safeguards rather than merely post-harm remedies. Section 94

thus provides the Central Government with the statutory authority to proactively regulate modern

trade practices, ensuring that consumer interests are protected in dynamic commercial

environments such as e-commerce and direct selling, consistent with the consumer-centric

objectives of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

PUBLIC SERVANTS UNDER THE ACT

Section 95 declares that certain office holders and personnel under the Act are deemed to be

public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This includes

the Presidents and members of the District, State, and National Commissions, officers and

employees of these Commissions, the Chief Commissioner and Commissioner of the Central

Authority, the Director General, Additional Director General, Director, Joint Director, Deputy

Director, Assistant Director, and all other officers and employees of the Central Authority, as well

as any person performing duties under the Act. The deeming provision applies when these

officials are acting or purporting to act in pursuance of the provisions of the Act, thereby

subjecting them to the legal obligations and protections applicable to public servants.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 95 is to confer the status of “public servant” on key functionaries operating

under the Consumer Protection Act, ensuring accountability and the applicability of penal

provisions under the Indian Penal Code related to public servants, including offences of

corruption, abuse of office, and misconduct. The provision applies to all persons performing duties

under the Act in any capacity, formal or functional, so long as the acts are in pursuance of

statutory powers. Courts have recognized that this deeming provision ensures that officials

exercising quasi-judicial, regulatory, or enforcement functions under the Act are held to the

standards of integrity and accountability expected of public servants under Indian law.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 95 include (i) the official must be holding a designated

position under the Act or performing duties thereunder, and (ii) the act or purported act must be in

pursuance of any provision of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Once these elements are

satisfied, the official is treated as a public servant under Section 21 of the IPC, making them

subject to provisions relating to misconduct, criminal liability, and protection while performing

official duties. This classification ensures transparency, accountability, and the rule of law in the

functioning of consumer protection mechanisms. Section 95 therefore institutionalizes the status

of public servant for officers and officials under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, reinforcing

accountability and legal responsibility in the discharge of statutory duties.

COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES

Section 96 provides for the compounding of offences punishable under Sections 88 and 89. Sub-

section (1) allows such offences to be compounded, either before or after the institution of

prosecution, upon payment of a prescribed amount, subject to the leave of the court before which a

complaint has been filed under Section 92. The amount payable for compounding cannot exceed

the maximum fine prescribed for the offence. Sub-section (2) empowers the Central Authority or

an officer specially authorized by it to compound such offences. Sub-section (3) restricts

compounding for repeat offences committed within three years of the previous compounded

offence, while allowing offences committed after three years to be treated as first offences. Sub-

section (4) clarifies that no further proceedings shall be initiated once an offence is compounded.

Sub-section (5) provides that acceptance of the compounding sum by the Central Authority or its

authorized officer shall be deemed an acquittal within the meaning of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 96 is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for certain

offences under the Act, reducing the burden on courts and promoting settlement in cases involving

non-compliance with directions or false and misleading advertisements. This provision applies to

offences under Sections 88 and 89 and allows the offender to avoid prosecution by paying a

prescribed sum, subject to judicial approval. Courts have noted that compounding is intended to

balance the punitive and rehabilitative objectives of the Act, allowing regulators to enforce

compliance while giving offenders an opportunity to make amends. The restriction on repeat

offences within three years ensures that habitual offenders cannot evade liability through repeated

compounding.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 96 include: (i) the offence must be punishable under

Sections 88 or 89; (ii) payment of the prescribed sum as authorized by the Central Authority or an

authorized officer; (iii) leave of the court in cases where a complaint has already been filed; and

(iv) compliance with the restrictions on repeat offences within three years. Once these elements

are satisfied, the offence is deemed compounded, no further proceedings can be initiated, and the

acceptance of the sum is treated as an acquittal under the CrPC. This mechanism integrates

procedural flexibility with regulatory oversight, ensuring that compounding does not compromise

the integrity of consumer protection laws. Section 96 therefore provides a structured and legally

recognized mechanism for settling offences under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, offering

both regulatory efficiency and procedural fairness while maintaining accountability for non-

compliance and deceptive practices.

MANNER OF CREDITING PENALTY

Section 97 prescribes the manner in which penalties and compounding amounts collected under

the Act are to be handled. Specifically, it provides that any penalty imposed under Section 21, as

well as any sum received under Section 96 for compounding offences, shall be credited to a fund

as may be prescribed. This provision ensures that amounts recovered under the Act are

systematically accounted for and utilized in a manner prescribed by law, rather than being retained

arbitrarily by the authority or the court.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 97 is administrative and financial, focusing on the proper accounting and

allocation of sums recovered from offenders. The provision applies to all penalties imposed for

non-compliance under Section 21 and amounts received for compounding offences under Section

96. It ensures transparency in the handling of funds and allows the Central Government to

prescribe the specific fund or mechanism for crediting such amounts. Courts and regulatory

authorities have recognized this section as facilitating accountability and proper utilization of

resources recovered through enforcement of consumer protection laws.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 97 include (i) the imposition of a penalty under Section 21 or

collection of a sum under Section 96, and (ii) the crediting of such amounts to a prescribed fund.

The provision does not itself determine the use of the fund but mandates compliance with

prescribed procedures to ensure that all amounts collected under the Act are properly accounted

for. This element of financial propriety underscores the administrative integrity of the Consumer

Protection Act, 2019, and ensures that enforcement actions yield structured and traceable

outcomes. Section 97 thus provides a clear statutory mechanism for the financial management of

penalties and compounding amounts, ensuring transparency, accountability, and proper utilization

in line with the objectives of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

PROTECTION OF ACTION TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

Section 98 provides legal protection to officials and officers acting under the Act. It stipulates that

no suit, prosecution, or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Presidents and members of the

District, State, and National Commissions, the Chief Commissioner, the Commissioner, any

officer or employee of the Central Authority, or any other person performing duties under the Act,

for any act done in good faith or intended to be done in pursuance of the provisions of the Act, or

under any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder. This provision ensures that officials are not

deterred from performing their statutory duties by fear of personal liability, provided their actions

are bona fide and within the scope of the Act.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 98 is to protect all officers and functionaries under the Act from civil or

criminal liability for actions performed in the course of their official duties, provided such actions

are in good faith. The provision applies to quasi-judicial, administrative, or regulatory acts carried

out under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Courts have interpreted this section as conferring

immunity from personal liability, emphasizing that protection is available only when the act is

bona fide, without malice, and within the statutory mandate. It serves to encourage decisive and

responsible action by authorities while preventing frivolous litigation against them.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 98 include: (i) the individual must be acting in an official

capacity under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019; (ii) the act must be done in good faith or

intended to be done in good faith; and (iii) the act must be in pursuance of the provisions of the

Act, rules, or orders made thereunder. The protection extends to all forms of legal proceedings,

including civil suits, prosecutions, or other actions, ensuring that officials can discharge their

functions without undue interference or harassment. Section 98 therefore establishes a safeguard

for officials and functionaries under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, balancing accountability

with the need for effective administration and enforcement of consumer rights.

POWER TO GIVE DIRECTIONS BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Section 99 vests the Central Government with the authority to issue written directions to the

Central Authority on questions of policy. The provision mandates that the Central Authority, in

the exercise of its powers or performance of its functions under the Act, is bound by such

directions. A proviso requires that the Central Authority, as far as practicable, be provided an

opportunity to express its views before a direction is issued. The section further clarifies that the

decision of the Central Government on whether a question constitutes a policy matter is final,

thereby establishing the supremacy of the executive in policy determination.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 99 is to regulate the exercise of discretionary powers by the Central

Authority, ensuring that its functions are aligned with the broader policy objectives determined by

the Central Government. This provision applies to all functions and powers conferred on the

Central Authority under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, including regulatory, administrative,

and enforcement activities. Courts have recognized that while the Central Authority enjoys

operational autonomy, it must act within the framework of policy directions issued by the

government, reflecting a balance between statutory independence and executive oversight.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 99 include: (i) the issuance of a written direction by the

Central Government on a question of policy, (ii) the binding nature of such direction on the

Central Authority in exercising its powers or performing its functions, (iii) the opportunity for the

Central Authority to express its views before the direction, as far as practicable, and (iv) the

finality of the Central Government’s determination regarding what constitutes a policy question.

These elements ensure that while the Central Authority retains functional autonomy, its actions are

harmonized with national policy objectives and government priorities. Section 99 therefore

formalizes the relationship between the Central Government and the Central Authority, ensuring

that consumer protection measures and regulatory actions are consistent with overarching policy

directions, while maintaining procedural fairness and operational effectiveness under the

Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

ACT NOT IN DEROGATION OF ANY OTHER LAW

Section 100 provides that the provisions of this Act are in addition to, and not in derogation of,

any other law in force in India. This means that the rights, remedies, and obligations under the

Consumer Protection Act operate alongside existing statutes and do not diminish, limit, or

override the provisions of other laws that may govern similar or related matters. The section

affirms the complementary nature of the Act within the broader legal framework.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 100 is to clarify the relationship between the Consumer Protection Act and

other statutes, ensuring that its application does not conflict with or reduce the efficacy of other

laws. It applies universally, covering all areas where consumer protection intersects with other

regulatory or civil provisions, such as the Food Safety and Standards Act, the Drugs and

Cosmetics Act, the Indian Contract Act, or the Companies Act. Courts have consistently

interpreted this section to mean that consumers retain rights under multiple laws simultaneously,

and remedies under the Consumer Protection Act can be invoked in addition to those available

under other statutes.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 100 include (i) the existence of other laws in force, (ii) the

concurrent applicability of the Consumer Protection Act, and (iii) the principle that the Act

supplements, rather than diminishes, rights or obligations under other legislation. This ensures that

statutory protections for consumers are cumulative, allowing for comprehensive legal remedies.

Section 100 thus affirms the non-derogatory and supplementary character of the Consumer

Protection Act, 2019, ensuring that it enhances, rather than restricts, the scope of consumer rights

and legal remedies under existing Indian law.

POWER OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO MAKE RULES

Section 101 empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification for carrying out any

of the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) enumerates specific areas in which rules may be

prescribed, including the qualifications, appointment, terms of service, salaries, and allowances of

office-bearers; the procedures for filing complaints, appeals, and maintaining records; the

functioning of the Central, State, and National Commissions; the manner of handling funds and

penalties; and measures to prevent unfair trade practices in e-commerce and direct selling, among

other matters. This provision grants comprehensive rule-making authority to ensure effective

implementation of the Act, providing flexibility to address administrative, procedural, and

operational requirements.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 101 is extensive, covering all aspects necessary for the implementation,

administration, and enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. It applies to every

authority, officer, and functionary under the Act, enabling the Central Government to prescribe

detailed procedures, forms, and standards to operationalize statutory provisions. Courts have

emphasized that rules made under this section must be consistent with the Act and can fill

procedural gaps, regulate administrative mechanisms, and ensure uniformity in functioning across

jurisdictions. The section also allows the Central Government to update rules as required,

reflecting evolving consumer protection needs and administrative practices.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 101 include: (i) the power of the Central Government to

issue rules by notification; (ii) the rules must relate to the implementation of provisions of the

Consumer Protection Act; (iii) the ability to prescribe detailed procedures, standards, and

operational guidelines for commissions, authorities, officers, and other stakeholders; and (iv) the

capacity to include any matter necessary for the effective discharge of functions under the Act.

The wide-ranging rule-making power ensures that the statutory framework is adaptable,

comprehensive, and capable of addressing complex issues in consumer protection. Section 101

therefore provides the Central Government with enabling authority to formulate rules essential for

the practical enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, covering administrative,

procedural, and regulatory dimensions, thereby ensuring the Act’s objectives are effectively

realized.

POWER OF STATE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE RULES

Section 102 empowers State Governments to make rules, by notification, for carrying out the

provisions of the Act within their respective jurisdictions. A proviso provides that the Central

Government may frame model rules on any matter within the scope of state rule-making. Until the

State Government frames its rules, the model rules issued by the Central Government shall apply,

and any rules made by the State Government should, as far as practicable, conform to such model

rules. Sub-section (2) specifies particular areas for rule-making, including administrative,

procedural, and operational matters related to State and District Commissions, State and District

Councils, salaries and allowances of officers and employees, authentication of goods, appeals,

consumer mediation cells, and other related matters.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 102 is to enable States to tailor the implementation of the Consumer

Protection Act according to local conditions while ensuring uniformity and compliance with

central standards. This provision applies to the functioning of State and District Commissions,

Councils, and other mechanisms established under the Act. Courts have emphasized that the rule-

making power under this section must be exercised consistently with the objectives of the Act, and

any rules framed must align with model rules provided by the Central Government unless there is

a reasonable local justification for deviation. This ensures both flexibility and coherence in the

administration of consumer protection across India.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 102 include: (i) the authority of State Governments to issue

rules by notification for implementing the Act; (ii) the applicability of Central Government model

rules until state-specific rules are framed; (iii) the requirement that state rules conform to model

rules as far as practicable; and (iv) the specification of matters on which state rules may be made,

covering administrative structures, procedures, remuneration, authentication of goods, appeal

processes, and other operational aspects. This rule-making framework ensures that States can

operationalize consumer protection provisions effectively while maintaining alignment with

national standards. Section 102 thus provides the statutory basis for decentralized and context-

specific rule-making by State Governments, ensuring the effective implementation of the

Consumer Protection Act, 2019, while preserving consistency with central policies and model

rules.

POWER OF NATIONAL COMMISSION TO MAKE REGULATIONS

Section 103 empowers the National Commission, with the prior approval of the Central

Government, to make regulations by notification. These regulations must not be inconsistent with

the provisions of the Act and are intended to provide for all matters necessary or expedient for

giving effect to the Act. Sub-section (2) specifies areas for regulation, including costs for

adjournments by District, State, or National Commissions, maintenance and submission of

information by consumer mediation cells, qualifications and empanelment procedures for

mediators, training, fees, terms and conditions of service, code of conduct, re-empanelment

conditions, disclosure requirements, and the time and manner of conducting mediation.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 103 is to enable the National Commission to establish detailed procedural

and administrative frameworks through regulations, complementing the rule-making powers of the

Central and State Governments. The provision applies primarily to matters concerning mediation

and other procedural aspects under the jurisdiction of the National Commission, ensuring

uniformity, efficiency, and accountability in consumer dispute resolution processes. Courts have

recognized that regulations made under this section are subordinate to the Act but are essential for

operational clarity, standardization of processes, and effective functioning of consumer mediation

mechanisms.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 103 include: (i) the power to make regulations is vested in

the National Commission and requires prior approval of the Central Government; (ii) regulations

must not conflict with the provisions of the Act; (iii) the regulations may address procedural,

administrative, and operational matters, particularly in relation to mediation and dispute

resolution; and (iv) the regulations may specify qualifications, empanelment, conduct,

remuneration, and reporting requirements for mediators, as well as procedural costs and timelines.

These elements ensure that the regulatory framework under the National Commission is

comprehensive, standardized, and legally consistent with the Act.

Section 103 therefore provides the National Commission with a structured mechanism to

make detailed regulations necessary for the effective administration of consumer protection,

particularly in mediation and dispute resolution, ensuring that procedural and operational

standards are maintained across the country in accordance with the Consumer Protection Act,

2019.

POWER OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE REGULATIONS

Section 104 empowers the Central Authority, with the prior approval of the Central Government,

to make regulations by notification for giving effect to the provisions of the Act. The regulations

must not be inconsistent with the Act and may address all matters necessary to ensure its effective

implementation. Sub-section (2) identifies specific areas for regulation, including the procedure

for engaging experts and professionals, the number of such personnel, procedures for the

transaction and allocation of business by the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners, the form,

manner, and time for submission of inquiries or investigations by the Director-General, and any

other matter for which regulations are necessary.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 104 is to provide the Central Authority with the regulatory mechanism to

manage its internal administration, investigative functions, and engagement of expertise required

for effective consumer protection enforcement. This provision applies to all functions and powers

of the Central Authority under the Act, including investigations, inquiries, and administrative

organization. Courts have recognized that such regulatory powers enable the Central Authority to

function efficiently, standardize procedures, and ensure accountability, without conflicting with

the statutory framework.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 104 include: (i) the power to make regulations is vested in

the Central Authority with prior Central Government approval; (ii) regulations must not be

inconsistent with the Act; (iii) regulations may cover procedures for engaging experts, transaction

of business, submission of investigative reports, and other necessary matters; and (iv) the

regulations ensure proper operational and procedural functioning of the Central Authority. Section

104 therefore establishes a statutory framework for the Central Authority to issue regulations

necessary for the practical implementation of its powers and functions under the Consumer

Protection Act, 2019, facilitating procedural clarity, administrative efficiency, and effective

enforcement of consumer rights.

RULES AND REGULATIONS TO BE LAID BEFORE EACH HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT

Section 105 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, mandates that every rule and regulation made

under the Act must be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as possible after it is made.

The rule or regulation must remain before Parliament for a total period of thirty days, which may

be spread over one or more sessions. If, before the expiry of the session immediately following the

period of laying, both Houses agree to modify the rule or regulation, or agree that it shall cease to

have effect, such modification or annulment shall be valid. Importantly, any modification or

annulment does not affect the validity of actions previously taken under the rule or regulation.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 105 is to ensure parliamentary oversight over the rules and regulations

framed under the Consumer Protection Act. It applies to all rules made by the Central or State

Governments under Sections 101 and 102, and regulations made by the National Commission or

Central Authority under Sections 103 and 104. This provision ensures democratic accountability,

allowing Parliament to review, amend, or annul rules and regulations to ensure compliance with

legislative intent. Judicial interpretation affirms that the laying procedure is primarily supervisory

and does not invalidate rules or regulations made in good faith prior to parliamentary review.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 105 include: (i) the requirement to lay every rule and

regulation before both Houses of Parliament; (ii) the period of thirty days for consideration, which

may extend across one or more sessions; (iii) the power of both Houses to modify or annul the rule

or regulation; and (iv) the preservation of the validity of actions previously taken under the rule or

regulation, despite subsequent modification or annulment. Section 105 therefore establishes a

mechanism of legislative supervision over subordinate legislation under the Consumer Protection

Act, 2019, ensuring that rules and regulations are consistent with parliamentary intent while

safeguarding the continuity of actions taken under them.

POWER TO REMOVE DIFFICULTIES

Section 106 empowers the Central Government to make provisions by order in the Official

Gazette for removing any difficulty that may arise in giving effect to the Act. Such provisions

must not be inconsistent with the Act and are limited to what is necessary or expedient to resolve

the difficulty. The proviso restricts the exercise of this power to a period of two years from the

commencement of the Act, thereby ensuring that this enabling provision is temporary and

transitional in nature.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 106 is to provide a mechanism for the Central Government to address

unforeseen or practical difficulties that may arise during the initial implementation of the Act. This

provision applies to any impediment, ambiguity, or administrative challenge encountered while

operationalizing the statutory framework, including procedural, regulatory, or enforcement issues.

Judicial practice recognizes such “removal of difficulty” powers as a necessary tool for ensuring

smooth implementation of legislation, particularly when dealing with a complex regulatory

framework like consumer protection.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 106 include: (i) the identification of difficulties in giving

effect to the provisions of the Act; (ii) the power of the Central Government to issue orders in the

Official Gazette to remove such difficulties; (iii) the requirement that such orders be consistent

with the Act; and (iv) the temporal limitation of two years from the commencement of the Act.

These elements ensure that the provision serves as a temporary corrective mechanism without

undermining the substantive law. Section 106 thus provides a statutory mechanism for the Central

Government to address practical and transitional issues in implementing the Consumer Protection

Act, 2019, ensuring continuity, consistency, and effective enforcement during the initial period

following the commencement of the Act.

REPEAL AND SAVINGS

Section 107 repeals the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986). Sub-section (2) provides a

savings clause, stating that anything done or any action taken under the repealed Act shall, to the

extent it is not inconsistent with the 2019 Act, be deemed to have been done under the

corresponding provisions of the new Act. Sub-section (3) clarifies that the mention of specific

matters in sub-section (2) does not limit the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897, which governs the effect of repeal of statutes.

Scope and Application

The scope of Section 107 is to ensure continuity and legal certainty during the transition from the

1986 Act to the 2019 Act. It applies to all actions, proceedings, and legal effects undertaken under

the repealed Act, including complaints, investigations, orders, and settlements. Courts have

recognized that the savings clause prevents legal vacuums and protects rights and obligations

already accrued under the 1986 Act, ensuring that ongoing matters are seamlessly transitioned to

the 2019 framework.

Essential Elements

The essential elements under Section 107 include: (i) the formal repeal of the Consumer

Protection Act, 1986; (ii) the saving of actions, proceedings, or rights executed under the repealed

Act, provided they are not inconsistent with the new Act; and (iii) the preservation of the general

applicability of the General Clauses Act, 1897, in relation to the effect of repeal. These elements

ensure that the legislative transition preserves legal continuity, protects accrued rights, and avoids

disruption in the enforcement of consumer protection laws. Section 107 thus provides a statutory

mechanism for the orderly repeal of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, while safeguarding

ongoing legal processes and rights, ensuring that the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, is

implemented without adversely affecting pre-existing actions or legal obligations.