THE BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM

REGAL MENTOR

Introduction

In this mosaic tapestry of pre-colonial India, there was an exciting play of religious doctrines

with the quest for justice. Steeped in their respective faiths and social structures, Hindu and

Muslim communities had established systems of evidence law. These have not been archaic,

and systems functioned alongside—nay, even influenced—the gradual introduction of a British

legal framework. The following article makes a detailed account of ways in which the Hindu

approach to evidence was surprisingly modern. Based on ideas of "Dharma" like duty, law, and

righteousness, I describe how the presentation and testing of evidence took place in courts

across Indian history.

Shift forward to the present day, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam—Indian

Evidence Act, 2023—heralds some drastic changes in the legal landscape shaped by this

country. Replacing the earlier 1872 version, this Act has spawned a lot of debate over how it

would affect the delicate balance between prosecution and defence strategies in court. To

appreciate the real meaning and essence of this new Act fully, we need to trace its roots – the

reasons that called for a revision of the existing law and the process it underwent in the

legislature. It also becomes incumbent to examine the structure of the Act per se – its provisions

and possible implications.

Legal reforms seldom take place in a vacuum. Criticism has been levied against the

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam too. Exploring these criticisms reveals much. Does the Act

make it more difficult for defendants to make a compelling case? Does it tend to provide an

impetus for the prosecution to resort to dubious evidence? Contrast these legal philosophies—

historical and modern—with a consideration of their bearing upon the appreciation of the

amazing sweep of evidence law in India. Such a journey through time can only help in

understanding how concepts of justice and truth-seeking have been shaped by religion, tradition,

and the ever-evolving needs of society.

This Act is intended to consolidate and to provide for general rules and principles of evidence

for fair trial.

The word evidence is derived from the Latin word ‘evidere’, which means “to show clearly or

to prove”. The rules regarding evidence in the administration of justice are of high importance.

No substantive law can be enforced without the help of the rules of law of evidence. The law

of evidence can be stated to be the foundation on which the entire structure of judiciary is

based.

The term “law of evidence” may be defined as a system of rules for ascertaining

controverted questions of fact in judicial enquiries. It forms part of adjective law, which

prescribes the methods of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion. The

process of litigation is governed by the law which can be sorted out into (1) Procedure, (2)

Pleading and (3) Proof. The last part, proof, deals with the establishment of facts as according

to the case of litigation. And we rely on evidence for the proof of such facts relevant to the

issue. In juristic conception of the term of evidence in case of the oral testimony of witnesses

is that the party against whom it is used has had the right and opportunity of cross examination

to a dignified evidence. Hence evidence is the medium of proof and proof is the effect or result

of evidence. So, evidence is the means for achieving the end, that is, proof.

The law of evidence in India is of ancient origin. It finds its place way back from the

periods of Dharma. This is evident from the sayings of Manu that, the King presiding over the

tribunal shall ascertain the truth and determine the correctness of the testimonies of the witness,

the description, time and place of the transaction or incident giving rise to the case as well as

the usages of the country, and pronounce a true judgment.

The source of information relating to the Law of Evidence that prevailed in Hindu India

originates from the Hindu Dharma Shastras. There are three kinds of evidence recognized

under Vasista. They are: (a) Lekhya (Documents) (b) Sakshi (Witnesses); (c) Bukhthi

(possession).

Under the Muslim Law evidence is classified into Oral and Documentary. Oral

evidence is further sub-classified into direct and hearsay evidence. Although documents

properly executed and books kept in the course of business were accepted as evidence, oral

evidence appears to have been preferred to documentary evidence. Certain classes of persons

Dr. V. Krishnamacheri, Law of Evidence (2003), p. 2.

were considered as vitiated and inadmissible in evidence like women, children, drunkards,

gamblers and criminals. They were considered incompetent to execute documents.

Before ultimately establishing the rights or liabilities in a case, the court has to ascertain

whether the facts, which are the essential features of such right or liability, exist in the case set

up. The enquiry into these facts is regulated by Law of Evidence. In India, the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872, deals with the matter.

India under British Rule

Under British Rule, Presidency Courts were established in Bombay, Madras and

Calcutta by virtue of a Royal Charter. These Courts were following English rules of the Law

of Evidence. During the period of 1835-1953 about eleven enactments were passed which dealt

with the law of evidence. These enactments were found inadequate later on. There were about

600 Princely States in India which were not within the jurisdiction of the British system of

justice. Each of these States had rules of Law of Evidence of its own. Various attempts were

made from 1855 to 1872, to codify a uniform Evidence Act for India, but none of them were

satisfactory.

In Bain v. White Raven and Furness Junction Ry

, the House of Lords while explaining

the place of the law of evidence as early as 1850, observed that “The law of evidence is the lex

fori which governs the courts; whether a witness is competent or not; whether a certain fact

requires to be proved by writing or not; whether a certain evidence proves a fact or not; that is

to be determined by the law of the country where the question arises, where the remedy is

sought to be enforced and where the court sits to enforce it”.

The achievement of accurate outcomes should be the primary aim of the laws of

evidence. In principle, the ideal system would be one that convicts the guilty only and acquits

the innocent only.

English law, which, in modern day as well as in Bentham’s time, contains many rules

restricting the kinds of evidence admissible in court, was target for his criticisms. His preferred

approach was to allow all evidence to be given except the irrelevant or superfluous, although

(1850) 3 H.L.C. 1 at p.19.

Andrew Ashworth Q. C., Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (2002), p. 7.

his secondary concern was the avoidance of undue delay and expense, and he recognized that

compromises would need to be made on this score. In his system, rectitude would be assisted

by providing sanctions against perjury.

In 1870, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was entrusted the task of codifying the

rules of Law of Evidence. The draft was submitted by him and was enacted. The Evidence Act

came into force on 1st September, 1872. The Indian Evidence Act now contains the law relating

to evidence in India. This act is based upon English law of Evidence prior to the passing of this

Act. In the Indian Evidence Act the word evidence is used to mean "the means which tend to

create a belief in the mind of a judge”. The Act applies to all judicial proceedings in or before

any Court, including Courts-martial, other than Courts-martial convened under the Army Act,

the Naval Discipline Act or the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 or the Air Force Act but

not to affidavits presented to any Court or Officer, nor to proceedings before an arbitrator.

In Akbar v. State of Maharashtra

, the Court held that the Indian Evidence Act is a

complete code repealing all rule of evidence and there is no scope for introduction in criminal

cases a rule of evidence unless it is within the four corners of the Act.

In Ram Jas v. Surendra Nath

, Hari Swaroop J. observed that “The law of evidence

does not affect substantive rights of parties but only lays down the law for facilitating the course

of justice. The Evidence Act lays down the rules of evidence for the purposes of guidance of

the courts. It is procedural law which provides, inter alia, how a fact is to be proved”.

The Evidence Act, 1872 is an Act for amending, defining and consolidating the law

relating to evidence in India. The Preamble enlightens the concept of the Act. The law of

evidence is the lex fori where the litigation is going on. Therefore, an Indian court will only

follow the provisions of this Act. It may be stated that this Act is nothing but an attempt to

reduce the English law of Evidence in the form of express propositions, arranged in their natural

order, with some modifications, rendered necessary by the peculiar circumstance of India. It is

divided into three Parts. Part I deals with title, extent, jurisdiction and relevancy of facts and it

Andrew Ashworth Q. C., Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (2002), p. 7.

AIR 1971 SC 44

A.I.R. 1980 All. 385.

Id., p. 388.

consists of Chapters I and II. Part II deals with the mode of proof and includes Chapters III to

VI. Part III deals with the production and effect of evidence and consists of Chapters VII – XI.

The traditional aspect of paper-based records and oral testimony in Law of Evidence

has paved its way to electronic commerce. This eliminates the need for paper-based

transactions. The enactment of Information Technology Act 2000 has brought about drastic

changes in various statutes and laws of the country. The 2nd schedule of the Act contains the

changes brought about in the Indian Evidence Act. Thus, sections 22A, 47A, 65A & B, 67A,

73A, 81A, 85A, B & C, 88A and 90A were inserted and sections 3, 17, 34, 35, 39, 59 and 131

were modified.

PART I

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY

SHORT TITLE, APPLICATION AND COMMENCEMENT.

The new Evidence Act may be called the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court, including Courts-martial, but not to

affidavits presented to any Court or officer, nor to proceedings before an arbitrator.

It came

into force w.e.f from 01-07-2024.

In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh

, it was held that the strict rules of evidence

under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply to domestic inquiries. Materials that are

logically probative for a prudent person are permissible, including hearsay evidence with

reasonable nexus and credibility. However, Departmental Authorities and Administrative

Tribunals must carefully evaluate such evidence and not accept irrelevant material under the

Indian Evidence Act. A judicious approach requires objectivity, exclusion of extraneous

considerations, and adherence to Natural Justice. Fair play is essential, and findings of a

Domestic Tribunal tainted by perversity, arbitrariness, bias, or lack of independent judgment

Section 1(1)

Section 1(2)

AIR 1977 SC 1512

are invalid.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 1 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

DEFINITIONS

Section 2(1) states that in this Adhiniyam, unless the context otherwise requires,

(a) COURT [SECTION 2 (1)(a)]

It includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally

authorised to take evidence;

Etymologically speaking, the word “court‟ means King’s Durbar.

The expression “court‟ as

defined in the Evidence Act means the person or persons who administer justice.

Accordingly “Court” includes of the following:

(a)All Judges;

(b)All Magistrate; and

(c)All persons legally authorized to take evidence, except arbitrators.

The above definition under Sections 3 is inclusive in nature. The expression “court‟ is not

confined only to regular courts, it also includes any person who administers justice and is

authorised to take evidence. Accordingly Magistrate committing a case to the Court of Sessions

falls within the ambit of the term Court, whereas a Magistrate holding preliminary inquiry

under Sections 164 of CrPC

cannot considered as a ‘Court’.

CONCLUSIVE PROOF [SECTION 2 (1)(b)]

Durbar is a Persian term which means the noble court of a king or ruler or a formal

meeting where the king held all discussions regarding the state or the place where

justice is administered.

Section 164 (1) CPC empowers any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate to record any confession or

statement made to him during the course of an investigation

It means when one fact is declared by this Adhiniyam to be conclusive proof of another,

the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence

to be given for the purpose of disproving it;

DISPROVED [SECTION 2 (1)(c)]

It is in relation to a fact, means when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either

believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man

ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does

not exist;

DOCUMENT [SECTION 2 (1)(d)]

It means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance

by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means,

intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes

electronic and digital records.

Illustrations.

(i) A writing is a document.

(ii) Words printed, lithographed or photographed are documents.

(iii)A map or plan is a document.

(iv) An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document.

(v) A caricature is a document.

(vi) An electronic record on emails, server logs, documents on computers, laptop or smartphone,

messages, websites, locational evidence and voice mail messages stored on digital devices are

documents;

EVIDENCE [SECTION 2 (1)(e)]

It means and includes—

(i) all statements including statements given electronically which the Court permits or requires to

be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry and such statements

are called oral evidence;

(ii) all documents including electronic or digital records produced for the inspection of the Court

and such documents are called documentary evidence;

FACT [SECTION 2 (1)(f)]

It means and includes—

(i) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the

senses;

(ii) any mental condition of which any person is conscious.

Illustrations.

(i.) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in a certain place, is a fact.

(ii.) That a person heard or saw something, is a fact.

(iii.) That a person said certain words, is a fact.

(iv.) That a person holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith, or fraudulently,

or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a

particular sensation, is a fact;

FACTS IN ISSUE [SECTION 2 (1)(g)]

It means and includes any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts,

the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or

denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows.

Explanation.

Whenever, under the provisions of the law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure,

any Court records an issue of fact, the fact to be asserted or denied in the answer to such issue

is a fact in issue.

Illustrations.

A is accused of the murder of B. At his trial, the following facts may be in issue:—

i. That A caused B's death.

ii. That A intended to cause B's death.

iii. That A had received grave and sudden provocation from B.

iv. That A, at the time of doing the act which caused B's death, was, by reason of unsoundness of

mind, incapable of knowing its nature;

MAY PRESUME [SECTION 2 (1)(h)]

Whenever it is provided by this Adhiniyam that the Court may presume a fact, it may either

regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it;

NOT PROVED [SECTION 2 (1) (i)]

A fact is said to be not proved when it is neither proved nor disproved;

PROVED [SECTION 2 (1)(j)]

A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either

believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the

circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists;

RELEVANT [SECTION 2 (1)(k)]

"relevant".—A fact is said to be relevant to another when it is connected with the other in any

of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Adhiniyam relating to the relevancy of facts;

According to James Stephen, “relevancy‟ means “Connection of events as to cause and

effect”. Kinds of relevancy:

1. Logical Relevancy; and

2. Legal relevancy.

Logical Relevancy

A fact is said to be logically relevant to another, when by application of our logic, it appears

(to us that one fact has a bearing on another fact. Facts which are logically relevant need not

provable. Therefore, it is aid that “All facts logically relevant are not provable; however,

legally relevant facts are provable.”

For instance, Confessional statement made to wife, by her husband. Husband said his wife

that he had committed a crime i.e. murder or rape or theft. If the wife gives evidence as to the

commission of crime by her husband, it is not admitted in evidence under Section 122 of the

Indian Evidence Act. Similarly confession made to a police officer is not admissible in

evidence under section 25 of Indian Evidence Act.

Legal Relevancy

A fact is said to be legally relevant when it is expressed as relevant under Sections 6 to 55

(Relevancy of Facts).

Illustration: X is tried for administering poison to Y with a motive of inheriting property. Here,

the motive is relevant under Section 8. Similarly the fact revealed by post-mortem expert that

the death is caused by the poison is relevant under sec.45.

It is a general rule in England that any evidence, which are logically relevant are admissible.

That means all logically relevant facts are legally relevant in England.

But in India, only those facts which are declared relevant by the Indian Evidence Act

can be admitted and of no other.

That means evidence may be given to prove fact in issue

(factum probandum) or relevant fact (facta probantia)

and of no other. This is in accordance

with the maxim: frustra probatur quod probatum non relevant. The English version of this

maxim is that “it would be frustrating and disgusting to prove facts which are irrelevant”.

Ss 6 to 55 of the Evidence Act deals with relevancy of facts. Thus the following facts

are relevant:

1.Facts connected with the fact in issue or with relevant facts

2.Facts connected with the fact in issue as Admissions

3.Facts connected with the fact in issue as Confessions

4.Statement made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses

and statements to contradict

or to corroborate

5.Statement made under special circumstances

6.Statement which forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of

letters or papers

7.Judgment

8.Opinion of third persons

9.Character of parties

A fact is said to be logically relevant, when by virtue of the application of our logic it appears to us that one

fact has a bearing on another.

S. 5 of Indian Evidence Act.

One fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways

referred to in the provisions of the Act relating to the relevancy of facts. (S. 3 of the Evidence Act).

Ss. 6 to16.

Ss. 17 to 23.

Ss. 24 to 30.

Ss. 32 to 33.

Ss. 34 to 38.

S. 39.

Ss. 40 to 41.

Ss. 45 to 51.

Ss. 52 to 55.

Comparison between Facts in issue & Relevant Facts

Facts in issue

Relevant Facts

Facts in issue is necessary ingredient to prove a right

or liability

Relevant Facts is not a necessary

ingredient of a right or liability

Facts in issue is also called the Principal fact or

“factum probandium”

Relevant Facts is also called

evidentiary fact or “factum

probandi”

Facts in issue are affirmed by one party (generally

plaintiff) and denied by other (generally defendant)

Relevant facts are foundation of

inference regarding them

(iii) SHALL PRESUME [SECTION 2 (1)(l)]

Whenever it is directed by this Adhiniyam that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard

such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved.

Section 2(2) provides that words and expressions used herein and not defined but

defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 shall have the same meanings as assigned to them

in the said Act and Sanhitas.

In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain

,the Supreme Court has observed that for an

entity to be considered a Court, it must have the power to issue decisions or definitive

judgments that carry finality and authority, in addition to possessing some characteristics of a

Judicial Tribunal. These essential tests of a judicial pronouncement must also be satisfied.

In Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.P.

, it was ruled that the truth of any allegation should be

determined based on the quality of the evidence, not the number of witnesses presented.

AIR 1956 SC 66

AIR 2006 SC 2908

In Galhubhai Sevabhai Koli v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation,

regarding

an accident claim involving the earnings of a deceased person, the court held that for work like

cleaning shops, where documentary evidence is not available, oral evidence is reliable.

In the Supreme Court case Neeraj Dutta v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi (

), This judgment

underscores the need for clear evidence of both demand and acceptance to secure a conviction

under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 3 and 4 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872.

PART II

CHAPTER II RELEVANCY OF FACTS

EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN OF FACTS IN ISSUE AND RELEVANT FACTS.

By virtue of Section 3 evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the

existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter

declared to be relevant, and of no others.

Explanation.

This section shall not enable any person to give evidence of a fact which he is disentitled to

prove by any provision of the law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure.

a. A is tried for the murder of B by beating him with a club with the intention of causing his death.

At A's trial the following facts are in issue:— A's beating B with the club;

A's causing B's death by such beating; A's intention to cause B's death.

b. A suitor does not bring with him, and have in readiness for production at the first hearing of

the case, a bond on which he relies. This section does not enable him to produce the bond or

prove its contents at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, otherwise than in accordance with

the conditions prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

1999 A.C.J. 1364

AIR 2023 SC 330

In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab,

, the Court emphasized that there is

a significant difference between something that ‘may be true’ and something that ‘must be true’.

This gap must be bridged by legal, reliable, and unambiguous evidence.

In Nand Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh

, the Supreme Court held that convicting co-

accused persons solely based on the oral testimony of interested witnesses without sufficient

corroboration is unsustainable. Consequently, these co-accused individuals are entitled to the

benefit of the doubt.

In Suresh v. State of Kerala

, the court noted that the occurrence took place outside

the house and the testimony of the

victim's wife was deemed credible and believed.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Closely connected facts

RELEVANCY OF FACTS FORMING PART OF SAME TRANSACTION

Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue or a relevant fact

as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time

and place or at different times and places.

Illustrations.

(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the

bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a

relevant fact.

AIR 1957 SC 637

AIR 2023 SC 1599

AIR Online SC 110

Section 4

(b) A is accused of waging war against the Government of India by taking part in an armed

insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked and jails are broken open. The

occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction, though A may

not have been present at all of them.

parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the

correspondence in which it is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel

itself.

(d) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods were

delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.

In the Supreme Court case Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra

, the principle

of "res gestae" was discussed and he court noted that statements made by witnesses

immediately after an incident can be admissible as evidence if they form part of the same

transaction. This inclusion helps provide a complete picture of the events surrounding the crime,

ensuring that spontaneous statements reflecting the true nature of the incident are considered

reliable and can be used to determine the guilt of the accused.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS WHICH ARE OCCASION, CAUSE OR EFFECT OF FACTS IN ISSUE OR

RELEVANT FACTS.

According to Section 5 facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or

otherwise, of relevant facts, or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which

they happened, or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or transaction, are

relevant.

Illustrations.

(a) The question is, whether A robbed B. The facts that, shortly before the robbery, B went to a

fair with money in his possession, and that he showed it, or mentioned the fact that he had it,

to third persons, are relevant.

AIR 2023 SC 1736

(b) The question is, whether A murdered B. Marks on the ground, produced by a struggle at or

near the place where the murder was committed, are relevant facts.

to poison, and habits of B, known to A, which afforded an opportunity for the administration

of poison, are relevant facts.

In the case of Ajay v. State of U.P.

, the Court observed that the injured witness fully

supported the prosecution's case as per her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. The

court held that the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was appropriate.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

MOTIVE, PREPARATION AND PREVIOUS OR SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT.

Section 6 (1) states that any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or

preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

Section 6(2) provides that the conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any

suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue

therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person, an offence against whom is the

subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact

in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.

Explanation 1.

The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements, unless those statements

accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the

relevancy of statements under any other section of this Adhiniyam.

AIR 2023 SC 996

Explanation 2.

When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and

hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.

Illustrations.

(a) A is tried for the murder of B. The facts that A murdered C, that B knew that A had murdered

C, and that B had tried to extort money from A by threatening to make his knowledge public,

are relevant.

(b) A sues B upon a bond for the payment of money. B denies the making of the bond. The fact

that, at the time when the bond was alleged to be made, B required money for a particular

purpose, is relevant.

similar to that which was administered to B, is relevant.

(d) The question is, whether a certain document is the will of A. The facts that, not long before,

the date of the alleged will, A made inquiry into matters to which the provisions of the alleged

will relate; that he consulted advocates in reference to making the will, and that he caused drafts

of other wills to be prepared, of which he did not approve, are relevant.

(e) A is accused of a crime. The facts that, either before, or at the time of, or after the alleged crime,

A provided evidence which would tend to give to the facts of the case an appearance favourable

to himself, or that he destroyed or concealed evidence, or prevented the presence or procured

the absence of persons who might have been witnesses, or suborned persons to give false

evidence respecting it, are relevant.

(f) The question is, whether A robbed B. The facts that, after B was robbed, C said in A's

presence—"the police are coming to look for the person who robbed B", and that immediately

afterwards A ran away, are relevant.

(g) The question is, whether A owes B ten thousand rupees. The facts that A asked C to lend him

money, and that D said to C in A's presence and hearing—"I advise you not to trust A, for he

owes B ten thousand rupees", and that A went away without making any answer, are relevant

facts.

(h) The question is, whether A committed a crime. The fact that A absconded, after receiving a

letter, warning A that inquiry was being made for the criminal, and the contents of the letter,

are relevant.

(i) A is accused of a crime. The facts that, after the commission of the alleged crime, A absconded,

or was in possession of property or the proceeds of property acquired by the crime, or attempted

to conceal things which were or might have been used in committing it, are relevant.

(j) The question is, whether A was raped. The fact that, shortly after the alleged rape, A made a

complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the

complaint was made, are relevant. The fact that, without making a complaint, A said that A

had been raped is not relevant as conduct under this section, though it may be relevant as a

dying declaration under clause (a) of section 26, or as corroborative evidence under section

160.

(k) The question is, whether A was robbed. The fact that, soon after the alleged robbery, A made

a complaint relating to the offence, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the

complaint was made, are relevant. The fact that A said he had been robbed, without making

any complaint, is not relevant, as conduct under this section, though it may be relevant as a

dying declaration under clause (a) of section 26, or as corroborative evidence under section

160.

In Prem Singh v. State of NCT Delhi

, the Court noted that while proving motive

provides an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, the absence of motive alone

cannot be a sole ground to dismiss the prosecution's case. However, in cases relying on

circumstantial evidence, the lack of motive is a factor favoring the accused.

In Emperor v. Nanus

, it was observed that the term "conduct" may encompass not

only actions but also statements in certain circumstances. Therefore, its connotation is broad,

extending beyond its literal meaning.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN OR INTRODUCE FACT IN ISSUE OF OR

RELEVANT FACTS.

AIR 2023 SC 193

AIR 1941 All 145

According to Section 7 facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant

fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or a relevant fact, or

which establish the identity of anything, or person whose identity, is relevant, or fix the time

or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of

parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for

that purpose.

Illustrations.

(a) The question is, whether a given document is the will of A. The state of A's property and of his

family at the date of the alleged will may be relevant facts.

(b) A sues B for a libel imputing disgraceful conduct to A; B affirms that the matter alleged to be

libellous is true. The position and relations of the parties at the time when the libel was

published may be relevant facts as introductory to the facts in issue. The particulars of a dispute

between A and B about a matter unconnected with the alleged libel are irrelevant, though the

fact that there was a dispute may be relevant if it affected the relations between A and B.

from his house, is relevant under section 6, as conduct subsequent to and affected by facts in

issue. The fact that, at the time when he left home, A had sudden and urgent business at the

place to which he went, is relevant, as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly.

The details of the business on which he left are not relevant, except in so far as they are

necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent.

(d) A sues B for inducing C to break a contract of service made by him with A. C, on leaving A's

service, says to A—"I am leaving you because B has made me a better offer". This statement

is a relevant fact as explanatory of C's conduct, which is relevant as a fact in issue.

(e) A, accused of theft, is seen to give the stolen property to B, who is seen to give it to A's wife.

B says as he delivers it—"A says you are to hide this". B's statement is relevant as explanatory

of a fact which is part of the transaction.

(f) A is tried for a riot and is proved to have marched at the head of a mob. The cries of the mob

are relevant as explanatory of the nature of the transaction.

In Mulla and Anr. v. State of U.P.

, it was clarified that the absence of a test

identification parade does not render the evidence of identification in court inadmissible; such

evidence remains legally admissible. However, when an accused is identified for the first time

in Court, this identification alone should not be the basis for conviction.

In Kedar Singh v. State of Bihar.

, the Court noted that even in complete darkness,

there are often other means to identify someone, such as their body shape, clothing, gait,

manner of walking, or voice. In the case at hand, the Court found no difficulty for eyewitnesses

to identify the assailants due to the light from a temple located 50 yards away.

In Broj Mohan Das Adhikar

, held that Section 32 Clause (3) of the law does not permit

a statement in a document between third parties to be admissible against a party in a lawsuit.

In Sheo Nandan vs. The State

,it was observed that while human memory can be

fallible and recollection may fade over time, this does not diminish the evidentiary value of a

witness who can accurately identify the culprit.

In George v. State of Kerala

, it was held that the identification of the accused in Court

constitutes substantive evidence by the person making the identification. The absence of earlier

identification evidence in a T.I. parade does not impact the admissibility of identification

evidence presented in Court.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

THINGS SAID OR DONE BY CONSPIRATOR IN REFERENCE TO COMMON

DESIGN.

Section 8 states that where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more

persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said,

done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the

AIR SC 942

AIR 1999 SC 1481

AIR 1926 Cal. 948

AIR 1964 All. 139

AIR 1998 SC 1376

time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against

each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence

of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.

Illustration.

Reasonable ground exists for believing that A has joined in a conspiracy to wage war

against the State.

The facts that B procured arms in Europe for the purpose of the conspiracy, C collected money

in Kolkata for a like object, D persuaded persons to join the conspiracy in Mumbai, E published

writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F transmitted from Delhi to G at Singapore

the money which C had collected at Kolkata, and the contents of a letter written by H giving

an account of the conspiracy, are each relevant, both to prove the existence of the conspiracy,

and to prove A's complicity in it, although he may have been ignorant of all of them, and

although the persons by whom they were done were strangers to him, and although they may

have taken place before he joined the conspiracy or after he left it.

In Vahitha v. State of Tamil Nadu

, the Court ruled that a plea of alibi based on the

testimony of the accused's father claiming the accused was with him and not at the scene of the

incident is to be disregarded. The plea of alibi was rejected.

In Mirza Akbar v. King-Emperor

, the Court was clarified that 'common intention'

refers to an intention shared at the time an act was said, done, or written by a conspirator. It

does not encompass statements made after the offense to describe past events.

In Samunder Singh v. State

, the Court highlighted that statements or actions in

reference to a common intention are broadly interpreted. If the acts and declarations given as

evidence reasonably relate to the objective of the conspiracy, they are admissible not only

against the declarant but also against other alleged conspirators believed to be involved.

AIR 2023 SC 1165: AIR Online 2023 SC 135

AIR 1940 PC 176

AIR1965 Cal.598

Participation in the crime or subsequent conduct in furtherance of it can reveal shared criminal

intent.

In Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. The State of Bombay

, the Court held that while evidence

may occasionally require mentioning and recounting the actions of conspirators beyond the

conspiracy period but within a reasonable timeframe, such evidence cannot be admitted if it

extends beyond the specified conspiracy period as charged.

In State of Gujarat v. Mohammed Atik

, the Court established that once the common

intention ceases to exist, any statement made by a former conspirator afterward regarding the

conspiracy cannot be considered as made in furtherance of the common intention. Statements

made post-arrest to a police officer about conspiracy fall outside the scope of Section 10.

In State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini

,the principle underlying this provision revolves

around agency. It is crucial that the acts mentioned must occur while the common intention of

the conspirators persists. Only then can the act of one conspirator serve as relevant evidence

against every other conspirator. The facts must establish a genuine instance where the

conspirators shared a common intention to commit the offense or act in question.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WHEN FACTS NOT OTHERWISE RELEVANT BECOME RELEVANT.

According to Section 9 facts not otherwise relevant are relevant

If they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact;

AIR 1957 SC 747

AIR 1998 SC 1686

AIR 1999 SC 2640

Section 9(1)

If by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-

existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.

Illustrations.

(a) The question is, whether A committed a crime at Chennai on a certain day. The fact that, on

that day, A was at Ladakh is relevant. The fact that, near the time when the crime was

committed, A was at a distance from the place where it was committed, which would render it

highly improbable, though not impossible, that he committed it, is relevant.

(b) The question is, whether A committed a crime. The circumstances are such that the crime must

have been committed either by A, B, C or D. Every fact which shows that the crime could have

been committed by no one else, and that it was not committed by either B, C or D, is relevant.

In this case Thakur Prasad v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

the Supreme Court held

that the plea of alibi involves a question of fact. Thakur Prasad was accused of committing a

crime, but he claimed he was elsewhere at the time. Both the Trial Court and Appellate Court

found against his alibi. The Supreme Court emphasized that it cannot go behind such

concurrent findings of fact by lower courts.

In Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar,

Justice Thomas explained the doctrine of

alibi in this case. The Latin word "alibi" means "elsewhere," and it is used when an accused

person claims that they were so far from the crime scene at the time of the crime that it is

extremely improbable they participated. The plea requires a high degree of probability to be

accepted in evidence.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS TENDING TO ENABLE COURT TO DETERMINE AMOUNT ARE

RELEVANT IN SUITS FOR DAMAGES

Section 9(2)

, AIR 1954 SC 30

AIR 1997 SC 322

In suits in which damages are claimed, any fact which will enable the Court to

determine the amount of damages which ought to be awarded, is relevant.

In Brij Lal v. Ram Pratap

, according to this case Brij Lal sold one plot of his land to

Mr. X and later sold an adjoining plot to Mr. Y. When a dispute arose regarding the areas of

the two plots, the Court held that the sale deed which is earlier in time should be given

preference over the later one.

In Sadhurajan v. Sreeramulu Naidu

,This case involved the admissibility of recitals as

to boundaries in sale deeds. The Court held that such recitals in documents inter-partes

(between the parties) are not admissible without examining the executants of those deeds.

In V.A. Amiappa Nainar v. N. Annamalai Chettiar

, The Court observed that recitals

in documents which are not inter-partes can only be admitted in evidence through the

examination of the executant of the document noting the boundaries.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 12 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS RELEVANT WHEN RIGHT OR CUSTOM IS IN QUESTION

Section 11 provides that where the question is as to the existence of any right or custom,

the following facts are relevant

(a) any transaction by which the right or custom in question was created, claimed, modified,

recognised, asserted or denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence;

(b) particular instances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognised or exercised, or in

which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from.

Section 10

AIR 1982 Del.149

AIR 1999 Mad. 377

AIR 1972 Mad.154

Illustration.

The question is, whether A has a right to a fishery. A deed conferring the fishery on A's

ancestors, a mortgage of the fishery by A's father, a subsequent grant of the fishery by A's

father, irreconcilable with the mortgage, particular instances in which A's father exercised the

right, or in which the exercise of the right was stopped by A's neighbours, are relevant facts.

In Mohammed Baqar v. Naim-Un-Nisa Bibi

,The burden of proving a custom that

derogates from the general law is heavy on the party asserting it. The court held that clear and

cogent evidence must be provided, and a person's statement about custom must largely depend

on their means of knowledge.

In Ujagar Singh v. Mst. Jeo

The Supreme Court discussed when a court can take judicial

notice of a custom. There was a conflict in judicial decisions about the Punjab custom giving

preference to collaterals over sisters in inheritance to non-ancestral properties. The court

refused to take judicial notice due to this conflict but accepted that the respondent proved the

custom as recognized by the High Court, where a sister was entitled to succeed over collateral

relations of her brother.

In Ramakrushna Mohapatra v. Gangadhar Mohapatra

,The court held that a valid

custom must not be contrary to justice, equity, or good sense and must not contravene any

express provision of the law. It must be ancient, certain, and invariable. It can be proved or

disproved through specific ways outlined by the court.

In Janardhana Pillai v. Kaliammd

,The Court observed that for a custom to receive

legal recognition, there must be satisfactory evidence of long usage and its following. This can

be proved by actual instances or general evidence from community members.

AIR 1956 SC 548

AIR 1959 SC 1041

AIR 1958 Orissa 26

AIR 1968 Mad.105

In S. Govinda Raju Udayar v. Pattu

,Judgments not inter-parties can be admitted under

Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a relevant piece of evidence.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS SHOWING EXISTENCE OF STATE OF MIND, OR OF BODY OR BODILY

FEELING.

Section 12 states that facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention,

knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or goodwill towards any particular person,

or showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant, when the existence

of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant.

Explanation 1.

A fact relevant as showing the existence of a relevant state of mind must show that the

state of mind exists, not generally, but in reference to the particular matter in question.

Explanation 2.

But where, upon the trial of a person accused of an offence, the previous commission

by the accused of an offence is relevant within the meaning of this section, the previous

conviction of such person shall also be a relevant fact.

Illustrations.

(a) A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. It is proved that he was in

possession of a particular stolen article. The fact that, at the same time, he was in possession

of many other stolen articles is relevant, as tending to show that he knew each and all of the

articles of which he was in possession to be stolen.

AIR 1999 Mad 435

(b) A is accused of fraudulently delivering to another person a counterfeit currency which, at the

time when he delivered it, he knew to be counterfeit. The fact that, at the time of its delivery,

A was possessed of a number of other pieces of counterfeit currency is relevant. The fact that

A had been previously convicted of delivering to another person as genuine a counterfeit

currency knowing it to be counterfeit is relevant.

had previously bitten X, Y and Z, and that they had made complaints to B, are relevant.

(d) The question is, whether A, the acceptor of a bill of exchange, knew that the name of the payee

was fictitious. The fact that A had accepted other bills drawn in the same manner before they

could have been transmitted to him by the payee if the payee had been a real person, is relevant,

as showing that A knew that the payee was a fictitious person.

(e) A is accused of defaming B by publishing an imputation intended to harm the reputation of B.

The fact of previous publications by A respecting B, showing ill-will on the part of A towards

B is relevant, as proving A's intention to harm B's reputation by the particular publication in

question. The facts that there was no previous quarrel between A and B, and that A repeated

the matter complained of as he heard it, are relevant, as showing that A did not intend to harm

the reputation of B.

(f) A is sued by B for fraudulently representing to B that C was solvent, whereby B, being induced

to trust C, who was insolvent, suffered loss. The fact that, at the time when A represented C to

be solvent, C was supposed to be solvent by his neighbours and by persons dealing with him,

is relevant, as showing that A made the representation in good faith.

(g) A is sued by B for the price of work done by B, upon a house of which A is owner, by the order

of C, a contractor. A's defence is that B's contract was with C. The fact that A paid C for the

work in question is relevant, as proving that A did, in good faith, make over to C the

management of the work in question, so that C was in a position to contract with B on C's own

account, and not as agent for A.

(h) A is accused of the dishonest misappropriation of property which he had found, and the

question is whether, when he appropriated it, he believed in good faith that the real owner could

not be found. The fact that public notice of the loss of the property had been given in the place

where A was, is relevant, as showing that A did not in good faith believe that the real owner of

the property could not be found. The fact that A knew, or had reason to believe, that the notice

was given fraudulently by C, who had heard of the loss of the property and wished to set up a

false claim to it, is relevant, as showing that the fact that A knew of the notice did not disprove

A's good faith.

(i) A is charged with shooting at B with intent to kill him. In order to show A's intent, the fact of

A's having previously shot at B may be proved.

(j) A is charged with sending threatening letters to B. Threatening letters previously sent by A to

B may be proved, as showing the intention of the letters.

(k) The question is, whether A has been guilty of cruelty towards B, his wife. Expressions of their

feeling towards each other shortly before or after the alleged cruelty are relevant facts.

(l) The question is, whether A's death was caused by poison. Statements made by A during his

illness as to his symptoms are relevant facts.

(m) The question is, what was the state of A's health at the time when an assurance on his life was

effected. Statements made by A as to the state of his health at or near the time in question are

relevant facts.

(n) A sues B for negligence in providing him with a car for hire not reasonably fit for use, whereby

A was injured. The fact that B's attention was drawn on other occasions to the defect of that

particular car is relevant. The fact that B was habitually negligent about the cars which he let

to hire is irrelevant.

(o) A is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him dead. The fact that A on other

occasions shot at B is relevant as showing his intention to shoot B. The fact that A was in the

habit of shooting at people with intent to murder them is irrelevant.

(p) A is tried for a crime. The fact that he said something indicating an intention to commit that

particular crime is relevant. The fact that he said something indicating a general disposition to

commit crimes of that class is irrelevant.

State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram

, The Supreme Court explained that the credit of a

witness can be impeached by proving a former statement inconsistent with their testimony, as

indicated in Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

AIR 1999 SC 1776

FACTS BEARING ON QUESTION WHETHER ACT WAS ACCIDENTAL OR

INTENTIONAL.

Section 13 states that when there is a question whether an act was accidental or

intentional, or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part

of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is

relevant.

Illustrations.

(a) A is accused of burning down his house in order to obtain money for which it is insured. The

facts that A lived in several houses successively each of which he insured, in each of which a

fire occurred, and after each of which fires A received payment from a different insurance

company, are relevant, as tending to show that the fires were not accidental.

(b) A is employed to receive money from the debtors of B. It is A's duty to make entries in a book

showing the amounts received by him. He makes an entry showing that on a particular occasion

he received less than he really did receive. The question is, whether this false entry was

accidental or intentional. The facts that other entries made by A in the same book are false, and

that the false entry is in each case in favour of A, are relevant.

the delivery of the currency was accidental. The facts that, soon before or soon after the delivery

to B, A delivered counterfeit currency to C, D and E are relevant, as showing that the delivery

to B was not accidental.

In, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah

,it was established that a

judgment not inter-partes (i.e., not between the same parties involved in the current litigation)

is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. Such a judgment can serve as

evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. This decision draws from the

precedent set in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango

,which further clarifies

that judgments beyond the scope of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act can still be

admissible as evidence.

AIR 1998 SC 1132

AIR 1954 SC 379

In State of Bihar v. Sri Radhakrishna Singh

,The Court discussed the admissibility of

judgments in rem (judgments that declare the status of a thing as against the world, such as

probate, insolvency, matrimonial, or guardianship judgments) and concluded that such

judgments are admissible in all cases, whether or not they are inter-partes. However, the

judgments presented as exhibits in this case were found to be judgments in personam

(judgments between the specific parties involved) and thus did not satisfy the criteria under

Section 41 of the Evidence Act, making them inadmissible on that basis.

In Ujagar Singh v. Mst. Jeo

, The Court explained the circumstances under which

judicial notice can be taken of a custom. Judicial notice refers to the act by which a court

recognizes certain facts as being universally accepted and undisputed without requiring formal

evidence. In this case, the court refused to take judicial notice of a custom due to conflicting

judicial decisions regarding the Punjab custom that gave preference to collaterals over sisters

in matters of inheritance to non-ancestral properties. However, the court acknowledged that the

respondent successfully proved the custom, allowing a sister to succeed in preference to

collateral relations, which was also affirmed by the High Court.

In Mohammed Baqar v. Naim-Un-Nisa Bif

, The Court emphasized that the burden of

proving a custom that deviates from the general law is significant and rests on the party

asserting it. The evidence presented must be clear and compelling. The weight of a person's

statement about a custom depends largely on their knowledge and credibility.

In Shankar Ganesh v. Kesheol

in this case established that a judgment not falling

under Sections 40, 41, and 42 of the Evidence Act cannot be deemed relevant for deciding the

same point in a subsequent proceeding under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. The judgment

highlighted the limitations on the relevance and admissibility of such judgments.

AIR1983 SC 684

AIR 1959 SC 1041

AIR 1956 SC 548

AIR 1930 Nag 1

In Rama Chandra v. Gadadhar Mohapatra

The Court held that a judgment from a

previous suit, even if not inter-partes, can be admissible to prove a transaction or specific

instance where a relationship was asserted and recognized or denied. Such a judgment is

considered like any other fact, to be weighed in the balance, though it is not conclusive.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 15 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EXISTENCE OF COURSE OF BUSINESS WHEN RELEVANT.

When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course

of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact.

Illustrations.

(a) The question is, whether a particular letter was dispatched. The facts that it was the ordinary

course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular

letter was put in that place are relevant.

(b) The question is, whether a particular letter reached A. The facts that it was posted in due course,

and was not returned through the Return Letter Office, are relevant.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 16 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

In Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad,

it was observed as follows: In

Criminal proceedings, a man's character is often a matter of importance in explaining his

conduct and in judging his innocence or criminality. Many acts of an accused person would be

suspicious or free from all suspicion when we come to know the character of the person by

AIR 1980 Orissa 54

Section 14

AIR 1954 SC 51

whom they are done. Even on the question of punishment an accused is allowed to prove

general good character. When the allegation against the appellant was that he was acting in

pursuance of the policy of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, that his state of mind was to exterminate

the Hindus, he was entitled to lead evidence to show that he did not possess that state of mind;

but that on the other hand, his behaviour towards the Hindus throughout his official career had

been very good and he could not possibly think of exterminating them.

In Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan

it was remarked that the possession of the fruits

of a crime, found soon after its commission affords a strong and reasonable ground for the

presumption that the possessor of the same is a real offender, unless he can account for it in a

manner consistent with his innocence. 15. Facts bearing on question whether act was accidental

or intentional:- When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done

with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar

occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant,

Admissions

ADMISSION DEFINED.

According to Section 15 an admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained

in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and

which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.

In Chandan v. The State of Rajasthan

,it was pointed out that where the evidence of

a witness claiming identification of the culprits and stating to the Magistrate who conducted

the identification parade in only 'hearsay' and when his statement is not subject to any cross-

examination regarding the test identification parade, such an evidence cannot be looked into.

Further, the Court observed that reading through the evidence of the approver, it is clear that

he neither participated in the commission of the offence nor in injuring or attacking the

AIR 2001 SC 51

AIR 1988 SC 599

deceased and thus he claimed only to be spectator at every moment without participating at any

stage. His initial story also appeared to be absolutely unnatural.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 17of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ADMISSION BY PARTY TO PROCEEDING OR HIS AGENT.

Section 16(1) states that statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent

to any such party, whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly

or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions.

Section 16(2) provides that statements made by

i. parties to suits suing or sued in a representative character, are not admissions, unless they were

made while the party making them held that character; or

ii. (a) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the

proceeding, and who make the statement in their character of persons so interested; or

the suit,are admissions, if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons

making the statements.

In Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. The State of Bombay

as follows:

The proof of genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is a

proof of fact like that of any of the fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or

circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being

written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of

the signature, by one of the modes provided in Ss.45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.

AIR 1957 SC 85

In Budha v. Bedariya

, it was held that a presumption of correctness of the postal

endorsement of 'refusal' can be drawn with the aid of Sections 16 and 114 of the Evidence Act.

A postal endorsement 'refused' made on a returned registered article is held to mean that the

addressee refused to sign the receipt, unless there is any evidence to the contrary.

It was held in Vandavasi Karthikeya v. S. Kamalamma

, that the fact that invitation cards had

the post marks of the place of posting and the place of destination, gives rise to an inference

that they were so posted and received by the addressee and such evidence is admissible under

Section 16 of the Act.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ADMISSIONS BY PERSONS WHOSE POSITION MUST BE PROVED AS AGAINST

PARTY TO SUIT.

Section 17 states that statements made by persons whose position or liability, it is

necessary to prove as against any party to the suit, are admissions, if such statements would be

relevant as against such persons in relation to such position or liability in a suit brought by or

against them, and if they are made whilst the person making them occupies such position or is

subject to such liability.

Illustration.

A undertakes to collect rents for B. B sues A for not collecting rent due from C to B. A

denies that rent was due from C to B. A statement by C that he owed B rent is an admission,

and is a relevant fact as against A, if A denies that C did owe rent to B.

AIR 1981 Mad 194

AIR 1959 Bom.81

In Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ram Chandra Nago Patil

,it was held that in examining the

principle that an admission is not conclusive proof it has to be considered with reference to two

views: (a) To attach any weight, it has to be seen whether it is a clear and un-ambiguous and

relevant piece of evidence, (b) After proof of admission also, in order to use it.

In Nagibai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao

that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth

of the matters it refers to. Its weight depends upon the circumstances in which it is made. It is

open to show that it is erroneous or untrue only in case where a person to whom it was

addressed, has acted upon it to his detriment. Of course, there it is conclusive by virtue of the

principle of estoppel.

In Dharamwati Bai v. Shiv Singh

it was held that an admission by a party has to be

read in its entirety and that no statement out of context can constitute admission of any fact. 4.

Partnership entries: As against entries made by a partner in the Partnership books, though they

are made without the other partners' knowledge, it was held that since such books are accessible

to all the partners, they are prima facie evidence against any of them as well as against any

others.

In M.M. Valliammai vs. K.N. PL. U. Ramanathan Chettiar

,What we have to note

here is that ven when there is no actual knowledge of such fact the availability of means of

knowledge and probably the duty to know impute to one such knowledge as others should not

be put to any disadvantage owing to the neglect of such person. that effect, particularly when

the admission about the adoption is from a person who is blind and when her version is found

to be

In Jadho Nagu Bai v. Jadho Gangu Bai

, it was observed that although admissions

constitute good evidence against the party making them and his representatives-in-interest, he

AIR 1977 SC 1712

AIR 1956 SC 593

AIR 1991 M.P 18

AIR 1969 Mad. 257

AIR 1958 AP 19

is not concluded by them unless they operate as estoppels and that he is at liberty to show that

they were mistaken or untrue.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 19 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ADMISSIONS BY PERSONS EXPRESSLY REFERRED TO BY PARTY TO SUIT

Statements made by persons to whom a party to the suit has expressly referred for

information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions.

Illustration.

The question is, whether a horse sold by A to B is sound.

A says to B—"Go and ask C, C knows all about it". C's statement is an admission.

In Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra University

it was held: "It is well settled that any

admission made in ignorance or legal rights or under duress cannot bind the maker of the

admission."

In Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. Susheela Mahendra Nanavati

it was observed that

though a statement of a party in a letter written by the party can be used against that party as

an admission, it cannot always be used in favour of the party accepting it to be a correct

statement. It was also held in this case that an admission in a pleading has to be taken as a

whole and if the Court has to act upon such an admission, then that part of the admission which

attributes of certain conduct to the maker of the admission has to be also given due regard.

Section 18

AIR 1976 SC 376

AIR 1965 SC 364

However, the Court pointed out that, no doubt what applies to an admission in the pleading

would not apply to statements made by a witness in the evidence.

In Hanumanth Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh

, it was held that it is

settled law that an admission made by a person whether amounting to a confession or not cannot

be split up and part of it used against him. It was added that the Court must use the admission

either as a whole or not at all.

In Nathoo Lal v. Durga Prasad,

it is held that what is admitted by a party to be true

must be presumed to be true, unless the contrary is shown.

In Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd

it was observed that an

admission by a party is in the nature of substantive evidence in respect of the fact which is

admitted. Admissions are duly proved irrespective of the fact whether the party making them

appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as a witness was

confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 20 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF ADMISSIONS AGAINST PERSONS MAKING THEM, AND BY OR ON

THEIR BEHALF.

According to Section 19 admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the

person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on

AIR 1952 SC 343

AIR 1954 SC 355

AIR 1977 SC 409

behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the following

cases, namely:—

By virtue of Section 19(1) an admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person

making it, when it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be

relevant as between third persons under section 26;

y virtue of Section 19(2) an admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person

making it, when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant

or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is

accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable;

By virtue of Section 19(3) an admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person

making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.

Illustrations.

(a) The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it

is genuine, B that it is forged. A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine, and B

may prove a statement by A that deed is forged; but A cannot prove a statement by himself that

the deed is genuine, nor can B prove a statement by himself that the deed is forged.

(b) A, the captain of a ship, is tried for casting her away. Evidence is given to show that the ship

was taken out of her proper course. A produces a book kept by him in the ordinary course of

his business showing observations alleged to have been taken by him from day to day, and

indicating that the ship was not taken out of her proper course. A may prove these statements,

because they would be admissible between third parties, if he were dead, under clause (b) of

section 26.

and dated at Chennai on that day, and bearing the Chennai post-mark of that day. The statement

in the date of the letter is admissible, because, if A were dead, it would be admissible under

clause (b) of section 26.

(d) A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. He offers to prove that he

refused to sell them below their value. A may prove these statements, though they are

admissions, because they are explanatory of conduct influenced by facts in issue.

(e) A is accused of fraudulently having in his possession counterfeit currency which he knew to

be counterfeit. He offers to prove that he asked a skilful person to examine the currency as he

doubted whether it was counterfeit or not, and that person did examine it and told him it was

genuine. A may prove these facts.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WHEN ORAL ADMISSIONS TO AS CONTENTS OF DOCUMENTS ARE

RELEVANT.

Section 20 states that oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant,

unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary

evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the

genuineness of a document produced is in question.

In Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan

,It was observed by the Court that ,"the word

'information' occurring in S.20 is not to be understood in the sense that the parties desired to

know something which none of them had any knowledge of. Where there is a dispute as regards

a certain question and the Court is in need of information regarding the truth on that point, any

statement which the referee may make is nevertheless information within the purview of S.20.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 22 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

AIR 1985 SC 998

ADMISSIONS IN CIVIL CASES WHEN RELEVANT.

Section 21 provides that in civil cases no admission is relevant, if it is made either upon

an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which

the Court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given.

Explanation.

Nothing in this section shall be taken to exempt any advocate from giving evidence of

any matter of which he may be compelled to give evidence under sub-sections (1) and (2) of

section 132.

In Kanda Padayachi v. State of Tamil Nadu,

it was held that the accused's statement

before the doctor could be relied upon as an admission Under S.21, as nothing was found on

the facts of the case against the doctor from accepting his evidence about the accused's

statement. It is not barred U/s.26.The party making an admission has a right to rebut it and

prove that the same is not true. However, the burden will be on him.

In State of Kerala v. Ammini

the admissibility is questioned on the ground that the

statements are hit by Section 26 of the Evidence Act which prohibits confession made by a

person 'whilst he is in the custody of a police officer'. What is prohibited is only 'confession',

and the embargo is not extended to the statements which do not amount to confession.

Admissions can be proved as against the person who makes it, and Section 21 of the Evidence

Act permits such admissions being proved. The contours of Section 21 are not bounded by

limitations of the person being in the custody of a police officer. There is no doubt that if the

admission amounts to 'confession' it transgresses into the forbidden field designed in Section

26. What is a 'confession'? Neither the Evidence Act nor other statutes on criminal law defines

confession.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 23 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

AIR 1972 SC 66

AIR 1988 Kerala 1

CONFESSION CAUSED BY INDUMENT, THREAT, COERCION OR PROMISE,

WHEN IRRELEVANT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.

According to section 22 a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant

in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been

caused by any inducement, threat, coercion or promise having reference to the charge against

the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the

Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing

that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in

reference to the proceedings against him:

Provided that if the confession is made after the impression caused by any such inducement,

threat, coercion or promise has, in the opinion of the Court, been fully removed, it is relevant:

Provided further that if such a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant

merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception

practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or

because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may

have been the form of those questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to

make such confession, and that evidence of it might be given against him.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CONFESSION TO POLICE OFFICER.

By virtue of Section 23 (1) no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as

against a person accused of any offence.

Section 23 (2) states that no confession made by any person while he is in the custody

of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved

against him

Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information

received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of

such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact

discovered, may be proved.

In State of Gujarat v. Anirudh Singh

the Court observed that a Senior Reserve Police

Officer appointed under the State Reserve Police Force Act, appointed in-charge of a Police

Station for the only purpose of maintaining law and order and tranquillity in the society, is not

a police officer, when the powers of investigation envisaged in Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. are not

conferred on him.

In Balkishan A. Devidayat v. State of Maharashtra

it was held that an Officer of the

Railway Protection Force under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 making

an enquiry under Section 8(1) of that Act does not possess several important attributes of an

Officer-in-charge of a Police Station conducting an investigation under Chapter-XIV of the

Cr.P.C. The Court held that an enquiry under the Act is different from an investigation under

the Cr.P.C. The powers of the Officers functioning under the two Acts are held to differ in

material aspects. It is also laid down in this case that to consider a person as a Police Officer

within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, it is not enough to show that he is

conferred many of the powers of a Police Officer conducting an investigation under the Cr.P.C.

In Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal

, the Court found that proceedings

taken by a Customs Officer are for the purpose of holding an enquiry into suspected cases of

smuggling and his orders are subject to revision by the Central Board of Revenue and they are

also appealable. Certain powers, like, granting bail, collecting evidence, search of the premises

etc., are conferred upon him primarily for collecting the Duty payable under the Act and for

the prevention of the offences of smuggling. For all purposes, he is an Officer of the Revenue.

AIR 1997 SC 2780

AIR 1981 SC 379

AIR 1970 SC 940

In the case of The State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram it was held that the powers which a

Police Officer enjoys under the Police Act, 1861 are powers for the effective prevention and

detection of crime with a view to maintain law and order, whereas the powers of Customs

Officer are not for such a purpose

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CONSIDERATION OF PROVED CONFESSION AFFECTING PERSON MAKING

IT AND OTHERS JOINTLY UNDER TRIAL FOR SAME OFFENCE.

Section 24 provides that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for

the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some

other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as

against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.

Explanation I

"Offence", as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the

offence.

Explanation II.

A trial of more persons than one held in the absence of the accused who has absconded

or who fails to comply with a proclamation issued under section 84 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 shall be deemed to be a joint trial for the purpose of this section.

Illustrations.

a. A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said—"B and I murdered C".

The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B.

b. A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and

B, and that B said—"A and I murdered C". This statement may not be taken into consideration

by the Court against A, as B is not being jointly tried.

In Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

it was held that a co-accused

making a confession is naturally an accomplice and there is a danger of using the testimony of

one accomplice to corroborate another. It shall not be used for corroboration save in exceptional

circumstances and for reasons disclosed.

In Achhay Lal Singh v. Emperor

it was held that it would be unsafe to consider a

retracted confession of a co-accused against other accused persons, except when there is

corroboration of material particulars which is reliable evidence.

In R v. Frederick Grant

, after considering the admissibility of evidence by one

prisoner against another prisoner who are jointly charged with the same offence, etc., it was

held that it is not competent for a prosecution to examine as witnesses’ persons who are

themselves concerned with the same charge. It was also held further that it is not in accordance

with the fair administration of the law that persons who are charged with an offence and not

yet tried for the same, should be permitted to be called as against another person to give

evidence of such offence.

In Pancho v. State of Haryana,

it was cautioned that though confession may be regarded

as evidence in generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the

fact remains that it is not evidence as defined in Section 30 of the Act. Therefore, in dealing

with a case against an accused, the Court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused: it

must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it forms its opinion with

regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the

confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is

about to reach on the said other evidence beyond doubt that the maker thereby binds himself

by what is admitted.

AIR 1952 SC 159

AIR 1947 Patna 90

1944 AILER 311

AIR 2012 SC 523

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ADMISSIONS NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOF, BUT MAY ESTOP.

Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate as

estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Statements by persons who cannot be called as witnesses

CASES IN WHICH STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACT BY PERSON WHO IS

DEAD OR CANNOT BE FOUND , ETC.., IS RELEVANT.

Section 26 states that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person

who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or

whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the

circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in

the following cases, namely:—

a. when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the

circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that

person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made

them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and

whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into

question;

b. when the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in

particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the

ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgement

written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or

Section 25

of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other

document usually dated, written or signed by him;

c. when the statement gives the opinion of any such person, as to the existence of any public right

or custom or matter of public or general interest, of the existence of which, if it existed, he

would have been likely to be aware, and when such statement was made before any controversy

as to such right, custom or matter had arisen;

d. when the statement relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption

between persons as to whose relationship by blood, marriage or adoption the person making

the statement had special means of knowledge, and when the statement was made before the

question in dispute was raised;

e. when the statement relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption

between persons deceased, and is made in any will or deed relating to the affairs of the family

to which any such deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone,

family portrait or other thing on which such statements are usually made, and when such

statement was made before the question in dispute was raised;

f. when the statement is contained in any deed, will or other document which relates to any such

transaction as is specified in clause (a) of section 11;

g. when the statement was made by a number of persons, and expressed feelings or impressions

on their part relevant to the matter in question.

Illustrations.

(a) The question is, whether A was murdered by B; or A dies of injuries received in a transaction

in the course of which she was raped. The question is whether she was raped by B; or the

question is, whether A was killed by B under such circumstances that a suit would lie against

B by A's widow. Statements made by A as to the cause of his or her death, referring respectively

to the murder, the rape and the actionable wrong under consideration, are relevant facts.

(b) The question is as to the date of A's birth. An entry in the diary of a deceased surgeon regularly

kept in the course of business, stating that, on a given day he attended A's mother and delivered

her of a son, is a relevant fact.

solicitor, regularly kept in the course of business, that on a given day the solicitor attended A

at a place mentioned, in Nagpur, for the purpose of conferring with him upon specified business,

is a relevant fact.

(d) The question is, whether a ship sailed from Mumbai harbour on a given day. A letter written

by a deceased member of a merchant's firm by which she was chartered to their correspondents

in Chennai, to whom the cargo was consigned, stating that the ship sailed on a given day from

Mumbai port, is a relevant fact.

(e) The question is, whether rent was paid to A for certain land. A letter from A's deceased agent

to A, saying that he had received the rent on A's account and held it at A's orders is a relevant

fact.

(f) The question is, whether A and B were legally married. The statement of a deceased clergyman

that he married them under such circumstances that the celebration would be a crime is relevant.

(g) The question is, whether A, a person who cannot be found, wrote a letter on a certain day. The

fact that a letter written by him is dated on that day is relevant.

(h) The question is, what was the cause of the wreck of a ship. A protest made by the captain,

whose attendance cannot be procured, is a relevant fact.

(i) The question is, whether a given road is a public way. A statement by A, a deceased headman

of the village, that the road was public, is a relevant fact.

(j) The question is, what was the price of grain on a certain day in a particular market. A statement

of the price, made by a deceased business person in the ordinary course of his business, is a

relevant fact.

(k) The question is, whether A, who is dead, was the father of B. A statement by A that B was his

son, is a relevant fact.

(l) The question is, what was the date of the birth of A. A letter from A's deceased father to a

friend, announcing the birth of A on a given day, is a relevant fact.

(m) The question is, whether, and when, A and B were married. An entry in a memorandum book

by C, the deceased father of B, of his daughter's marriage with A on a given date, is a relevant

fact.

(n) A sues B for a libel expressed in a painted caricature exposed in a shop window. The question

is as to the similarity of the caricature and its libellous character. The remarks of a crowd of

spectators on these points may be proved.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RELEVANCY OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE FOR PROVING, IN SUBSEQUENT

PROCEEDCING, TRUTH OF FACTS THEREIN STATED.

According to Section 27 evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before

any person authorised by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent

judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts

which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence,

or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an

amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers

unreasonable:

Provided that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest;

that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine

and the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding.

Explanation.

A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor

and the accused within the meaning of this section.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Statements made under special circumstances

ENTRIES IN BOOKS OF ACCOUNT WHEN RELEVANT.

Section 28 provides that entries in the books of account, including those maintained in

an electronic form, regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to

a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient

evidence to charge any person with liability.

Illustration.

A sues B for one thousand rupees, and shows entries in his account books showing

B to be indebted to him to this amount. The entries are relevant, but are not sufficient, without

other evidence, to prove the debt.

In Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Roy v. Narendra Nath Sen

it was held that where the

entries in the Almanac are in the form of loose sheets on paper with blanks left at different

places and where the writer of them is not available, no weight can be attached to such papers.

The reason given was that in such cases it is possible to substitute sheets and entries or make

interpolations.

In Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla

, it was held that it follows from the

various decisions of the Courts that even correct and authentic entries in books of account

cannot, without the aid of independent evidence about their trustworthiness, fix any liability on

a person. The Court also observed, before reaching this conclusion, that the rationale behind

this principle is the regularity of habit, difficulty of falsification and the fair degree of certainty

of ultimate deduction giving them a probability of trustworthiness.

In Kurapati Venkata Mallaiah v. Thondepu Ramaswami & Co.

100

the Court disbelieved

the entry regarding the sale of certain goods at a particular place on finding that the description

of the goods was written in a cramped style.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RELEVANCY OF ENTRY IN PUBLIC RECORD OR AN ELECTRONIC RECORD

MADE IN PERFORMANCE OF DUTY.

Section 29 states that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record or

an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the

AIR 1953 SC 431

AIR1998 SC 1406

100

AIR 1964 SC 818

discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially

enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record or an electronic record,

is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

In Ram Prasad Sharma v. The State of Bihar,

101

that it is necessary to prove an entry in

the official record that it is made by the concerned person and that it is in the discharge of

official duties. Otherwise, such entries are not admissible.As regards the evidentiary value of

the entries in the Record of Rights,

In Digambar Adhar Patil v. Dev Ram Girdhar Patil,

102

that a factum of partition as

evidenced by such entries which are maintained in the official course of business can be

considered as correct, where the same was corroborated by the oral evidence and where the

correctness of such entries is not challenged.

In Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh,

103

that an entry made by the concerned

official in the Birth Register is admissible and it is not necessary for the prosecution of the case

to examine the author of such entries.

In Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar,

104

it was held that the admission register or a transfer

certificate issued by a Primary School do not satisfy the requirements of Section 35. It was

observed on the facts of the case that there is no reliable evidence on record to show that the

date of birth was recorded in the school register on the basis of the statement of any reasonable

person. Incidentally, referring to the case of

In T.P. Manicka Mudaliar vs. Ammakannu

105

it was held that an entry in the Birth

mother's name by an informant, has a bearing on the issue of child's legitimacy. If the informant

is not examined, the entry will not have any evidentiary value. He has to explain about the

omission in his information.

101

AIR 1970 SC 326

102

AIR 1995 SC 1728

103

AIR 1981 SC 361

104

AIR 2004 SC 230

105

AIR 1942 Mad 129

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RELEVANCY OF STATEMENTS IN MAPS, CHARTS AND PLANS.

Section 30 provides that statements of facts in issue or relevant facts, made in published

maps or charts generally offered for public sale, or in maps or plans made under the authority

of the Central Government or any State Government, as to matters usually represented or stated

in such maps, charts or plans, are themselves relevant facts.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 36 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RELEVANCY OF STATEMENT AS TO FACT OF PUBLIC NATURE CONTAINED

IN CERTAIN ACTS OR NOTIFICATIONS.

According to Section 31 when the Court has to form an opinion as to the existence of

any fact of a public nature, any statement of it, made in a recital contained in any Central Act

or State Act or in a Central Government or State Government notification appearing in the

respective Official Gazette or in any printed paper or in electronic or digital form purporting to

be such Gazette, is a relevant fact.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 37 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RELEVANCY OF STATEMENTS AS TO ANY LAW CONTAINED IN LAW BOOKS

INCLUDING ELECTRONIC OR DIGITAL FORM.

Section 32 state that when the Court has to form an opinion as to a law of any country,

any statement of such law contained in a book purporting to be printed or published including

in electronic or digital form under the authority of the Government of such country and to

contain any such law, and any report of a ruling of the Courts of such country contained in a

book including in electronic or digital form purporting to be a report of such rulings, is relevant.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 38 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

How much of a statement is to be proved

WHEN EVIDENCE TO BE GIVEN WHEN STATEMENT FORMS PART OF A

CONVERSATION, DOCUMENT, ELECTRONIC RECORD, BOOK OR SERIES OF

LETTERS OR PAPERS.

Section 33 provides that when any statement of which evidence is given forms part of

a longer statement, or of a conversation or part of an isolated document, or is contained in a

document which forms part of a book, or is contained in part of electronic record or of a

connected series of letters or papers, evidence shall be given of so much and no more of the

statement, conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers as the

Court considers necessary in that particular case to the full understanding of the nature and

effect of the statement, and of the circumstances under which it was made.

In Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v. State of Bombay

106

it was held that since the word

'Statement' is not defined in the Act, one may take recourse to the dictionary meaning, and also

take assistance from the use of the word 'Statement in other parts of the Act.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 39 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Judgments of Courts when relevant

PREVIOUS JUDGEMENTS RELEVANT TO BAR A SECOND SUIT OR TRIAL.

106

AIR 1959 SC 356

The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from

taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether

such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.

107

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RELEVANCY OF CERTAIN JUDGEMENTS IN PROBATE, ETC., JURISDICTION.

According to Section 35 (1) A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court or

Tribunal, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which

confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person

to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any

specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or

the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Section 35(2) states that such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof that

i. any legal character, which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree

came into operation;

ii. any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person

at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person;

iii. any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which

such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and

iv. anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the

time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his

property.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 41of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

107

Section 34

RELEVANCY AND EFFECT OF JUDGEMENTS, ORDERS OR DECREES, OTHER

THAN THOSE MENTIONED IN SECTION 35.

Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 35 are relevant if

they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or

decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.

108

Illustration.

A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land,

which A denies. The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by

A against C for a trespass on the same land, in which C alleged the existence of the same right

of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.

In Emperor v. Bhgavan Das Thulsidas

109

, it was held that Coroner’s inquisition is not

a matter of public nature and it’s not a judgement.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

JUDGEMENTS, ETC., OTHER THAN THOSE MENTIONED IN SECTIONS 34, 35

AND 36 WHEN RELEVANT.

Section 37 states that judgments or orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in

sections 34, 35 and 36, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is

a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Adhiniyam.

108

Section 36

109

AIR 1946 Bombay 184

Illustrations.

a. A and B separately sue C for a libel which reflects upon each of them. C in each case says that

the matter alleged to be libellous is true, and the circumstances are such that it is probably true

in each case, or in neither. A obtains a decree against C for damages on the ground that C failed

to make out his justification. The fact is irrelevant as between B and C.

b. A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him. B is convicted. A afterwards sues C for the cow,

which B had sold to him before his conviction. As between A and C, the judgment against B

is irrelevant.

c. A has obtained a decree for the possession of land against B. C, B's son, murders A in

consequence. The existence of the judgment is relevant, as showing motive for a crime.

d. A is charged with theft and with having been previously convicted of theft. The previous

conviction is relevant as a fact in issue.

e. A is tried for the murder of B. The fact that B prosecuted A for libel and that A was convicted

and sentenced is relevant under section 6 as showing the motive for the fact in issue.

In Shyam Chand Smt. v. Janaki ,

110

it was held by the Court that orders in relation to

the maintenance proceedings are not relevant under section 40,41, of the evidence Act but that

doesn’t mean it is irrelevant to this Act.

In A.Munuswamy v. R. Sethuraman

111

it was observed that unless the existence of a

judgment is a fact in issue in a case such judgement will not be admissible as relevant.

110

AIR 1966 SC 375

111

AIR 1995 Mad.375

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FRAUD OR COLLUSION IN OBSTAINING JUDGEMENT, OR INCOMPETENCY

OF COURT, MAY BE PROVED.

By virtue of Section 38 any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any

judgment, order or decree which is relevant under section 34, 35 or 36, and which has been

proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was

obtained by fraud or collusion.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Opinions of third persons when relevant

OPINIONS OF EXPERTS.

Section 39 (1) states that when the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign

law or of science or art, or any other field, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions,

the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or

any other field, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant

facts and such persons are called experts.

Illustrations.

a. The question is, whether the death of A was caused by poison. The opinions of experts as to

the symptoms produced by the poison by which A is supposed to have died, are relevant.

b. The question is, whether A, at the time of doing a certain act, was, by reason of unsoundness

of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he was doing what was either wrong

or contrary to law. The opinions of experts upon the question whether the symptoms exhibited

by A commonly show unsoundness of mind, and whether such unsoundness of mind usually

renders persons incapable of knowing the nature of the acts which they do, or of knowing that

what they do is either wrong or contrary to law, are relevant.

c. The question is, whether a certain document was written by A. Another document is produced

which is proved or admitted to have been written by A. The opinions of experts on the question

whether the two documents were written by the same person or by different persons, are

relevant.

Section 39(2) provides that when in a proceeding, the court has to form an opinion on

any matter relating to any information transmitted or stored in any computer resource or any

other electronic or digital form, the opinion of the Examiner of Electronic Evidence referred to

in section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, is a relevant fact.

Explanation.

For the purposes of this sub-section, an Examiner of Electronic Evidence shall be an expert.

In Auup Kumar Maity v. State of West Bengal

112

the Court decided on what situation a

DNA test can be properly done. As per the court’s direction, no person should be compelled to

provide the samples of DNA and it should not be directed in the terms of a matter of routine.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS BEARING UPON OPINIONS OF EXPERTS.

112

AIR 2023 Cal 230

Facts, not otherwise relevant, are relevant if they support or are inconsistent with the

opinions of experts, when such opinions are relevant.

113

Illustrations.

a. a.The question is, whether A was poisoned by a certain poison. The fact that other persons,

who were poisoned by that poison, exhibited certain symptoms which experts affirm or deny

to be the symptoms of that poison, is relevant.

b. The question is, whether an obstruction to a harbour is caused by a certain sea-wall. The fact

that other harbours similarly situated in other respects, but where there were no such sea-walls,

began to be obstructed at about the same time, is relevant.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 46 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

OPINION AS TO HANDWRITING AND SIGNATURE, WHEN RELEVANT.

Section 41(1) states that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by

whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the

handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not

written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact.

Explanation.

A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he has seen that

person write, or when he has received documents purporting to be written by that person in

answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person, or

when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person

have been habitually submitted to him.

Illustration.

The question is, whether a given letter is in the handwriting of A, a merchant in Itanagar. B is

a merchant in Bengaluru, who has written letters addressed to A and received letters purporting

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Section 40

to be written by him. C, is B's clerk whose duty it was to examine and file B's correspondence.

D is B's broker, to whom B habitually submitted the letters purporting to be written by A for

the purpose of advising him thereon. The opinions of B, C and D on the question whether the

letter is in the handwriting of A are relevant, though neither B, C nor D ever saw A write.

Section 41 (2) provides that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the electronic

signature of any person, the opinion of the Certifying Authority which has issued the Electronic

Signature Certificate is a relevant fact.

In Mobarik Ali Ahammed v. The State of Bombay

114

, it was observed by the court that

proof of handwriting and may be proof of contents of signature.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

OPINION AS TO EXISTENCE OF GENERAL CUSTOM OR RIGHT, WHEN

RELEVANT.

According to Section 42 when the Court has to form an opinion as to the existence of

any general custom or right, the opinions, as to the existence of such custom or right, of persons

who would be likely to know of its existence if it existed, are relevant.

Explanation.

The expression "general custom or right" includes customs or rights common to any

considerable class of persons.

Illustration.

The right of the villagers of a particular village to use the water of a particular well is a general

right within the meaning of this section.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 48 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

114

AIR 1957 SC 857

OPINIONS AS TO USAGES, TENETS ETC., WHEN RELEVANT.

According to Section 43 when the Court has to form an opinion as to

(i.) the usages and tenets of any body of men or family;

(ii.) the constitution and governance of any religious or charitable foundation; or

(iii.) the meaning of words or terms used in particular districts or by particular classes of people,

the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge thereon, are relevant facts.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 49 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

OPINION ON RELATIONSHIP, WHEN RELEVANT.

Section 44 states that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of

one person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such

relationship, of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of

knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact:

Provided that such opinion shall not be sufficient to prove a marriage in proceedings under the

Divorce Act, 1869, or in prosecution under sections 82 and 84 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,

2023.

Illustrations.

(a) The question is, whether A and B were married. The fact that they were usually received and

treated by their friends as husband and wife, is relevant.

(b) The question is, whether A was the legitimate son of B. The fact that A was always treated as

such by members of the family, is relevant.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

GROUNDS OF OPINION, WHEN RELEVANT.

Whenever the opinion of any living person is relevant, the grounds on which such

opinion is based are also relevant.

115

Illustration.

An expert may give an account of experiments performed by him for the purpose of forming

his opinion.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 51 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Character when relevant

IN CIVIL CASES CHARACTER TO PROVE CONDUCT IMPUTED, IRREVELANT.

Section 46 provides that in civil cases the fact that the character of any person concerned

is such as to render probable or improbable any conduct imputed to him, is irrelevant, except

in so far as such character appears from facts otherwise relevant.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 52 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

IN CRIMINAL CASES PREVIOUS GOOD CHARACTER RELEVANT.

In criminal proceedings the fact that the person accused is of a good character, is

relevant.

116

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 53 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

115

Section 45

116

Section 47

EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OR PREVIOUS SEXUAL EXPERIENCE NOT

RELEVANT IN CERTAIN CASES.

According to Section 48 in a prosecution for an offence under section 64, section 65,

section 66, section 67, section 68, section 69, section 70, section 71, section 74, section 75,

section 76, section 77 or section 78 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 or for attempt to

commit any such offence, where the question of consent is in issue, evidence of the character

of the victim or of such person's previous sexual experience with any person shall not be

relevant on the issue of such consent or the quality of consent.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 53-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PREVIOUS BAD CHARACTER NOT RELEVANT, EXCEPT IN REPLY.

Section 49 states that in criminal proceedings, the fact that the accused has a bad

character, is irrelevant, unless evidence has been given that he has a good character, in which

case it becomes relevant.

Explanation 1.

This section does not apply to cases in which the bad character of any person is itself a fact in

issue.

Explanation 2.

A previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHARACTER AS AFFECTING DAMAGES.

In civil cases, the fact that the character of any person is such as to affect the amount of

damages which he ought to receive, is relevant.

117

Explanation.

In this section and sections 46, 47 and 49, the word "character" includes both reputation and

disposition; but, except as provided in section 49, evidence may be given only of general

reputation and general disposition, and not of particular acts by which reputation or disposition

has been shown.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 55 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PART III

ON PROOF

CHAPTER III

FACTS WHICH NEED NOT BE PROVED

FACT JUDICIALLY NOTICEABLE NEED NOT BE PROVED.

No fact of which the Court will take judicial notice need be proved.

118

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 56 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS OF WHICH COURT SHALL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTE.

By virtue of Section 52 (1) The Court shall take judicial notice of the following facts,

namely:

a. all laws in force in the territory of India including laws having extra-territorial operation;

117

Section 50

118

Section 51

b. international treaty, agreement or convention with country or countries by India, or decisions

made by India at international associations or other bodies;

c. the course of proceeding of the Constituent Assembly of India, of Parliament of India and of

the State Legislatures;

d. the seals of all Courts and Tribunals;

e. the seals of Courts of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, Notaries Public, and all seals which

any person is authorised to use by the Constitution, or by an Act of Parliament or State

Legislatures, or Regulations having the force of law in India;

f. the accession to office, names, titles, functions, and signatures of the persons filling for the

time being any public office in any State, if the fact of their appointment to such office is

notified in any Official Gazette;

g. the existence, title and national flag of every country or sovereign recognised by the

Government of India;

h. the divisions of time, the geographical divisions of the world, and public festivals, fasts and

holidays notified in the Official Gazette;

i. the territory of India;

j. the commencement, continuance and termination of hostilities between the Government of

India and any other country or body of persons;

k. the names of the members and officers of the Court and of their deputies and subordinate

officers and assistants, and also of all officers acting in execution of its process, and of

advocates and other persons authorised by law to appear or act before it;

l. the rule of the road on land or at sea.

Section 52(2) states that in the cases referred to in sub-section (1) and also on all matters of

public history, literature, science or art, the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or

documents of reference and if the Court is called upon by any person to take judicial notice of

any fact, it may refuse to do so unless and until such person produces any such book or

document as it may consider necessary to enable it to do so.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FACTS ADMITTED NEED NOT BE PROVED.

According to Section 53 no fact needs to be proved in any proceeding which the parties

thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to

admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time

they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:

Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise

than by such admissions.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER IV

OF ORAL EVIDENCE

PROOF OF FACTS BY ORAL EVIDENCE.

All facts, except the contents of documents may be proved by oral evidence.

119

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 59 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ORAL EVIDENCE TO BE DIRECT.

By virtue of Section 55 oral evidence shall, in all cases whatever, be direct; if it refers

to,

(i.) a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it;

(ii.) a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it;

(iii.) a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the

evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner;

(iv.) an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person

who holds that opinion on those grounds:

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Section 54

Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and

the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises

if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot

be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as

unreasonable:

Provided further that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing

other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material

thing for its inspection.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER V

OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

PROOF OF CONTENTS OF DOCUMENTS

The contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary

evidence.

120

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRIMARY EVIDENCE

Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court.

121

Explanation 1.

Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document.

120

Section 56

121

Section 57

Explanation 2.

Where a document is executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some

of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it.

Explanation 3.

Where a number of documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing,

lithography or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but, where

they are all copies of a common original, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the

original.

Explanation 4.

Where an electronic or digital record is created or stored, and such storage occurs

simultaneously or sequentially in multiple files, each such file is primary evidence.

Explanation 5.

Where an electronic or digital record is produced from proper custody, such electronic and

digital record is primary evidence unless it is disputed.

Explanation 6.

Where a video recording is simultaneously stored in electronic form and transmitted or

broadcast or transferred to another, each of the stored recordings is primary evidence.

Explanation 7.

Where an electronic or digital record is stored in multiple storage spaces in a computer resource,

each such automated storage, including temporary files, is primary evidence.

Illustration.

A person is shown to have been in possession of a number of placards, all printed at one time

from one original. Any one of the placards is primary evidence of the contents of any other,

but no one of them is primary evidence of the contents of the original.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

SECONDARY EVIDENCE

According to Section 58 Secondary evidence includes

(i.) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;

(ii.) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the

accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;

(iii.) copies made from or compared with the original;

(iv.) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;

(v.) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it;

(vi.) oral admissions;

(vii.) written admissions;

(viii.) evidence of a person who has examined a document, the original of which consists of numerous

accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and who is

skilled in the examination of such documents.

Illustrations.

(a) A photograph of an original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been

compared, if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original.

(b) A copy compared with a copy of a letter made by a copying machine is secondary evidence of

the contents of the letter, if it is shown that the copy made by the copying machine was made

from the original.

evidence; but the copy not so compared is not secondary evidence of the original, although the

copy from which it was transcribed was compared with the original.

(d) Neither an oral account of a copy compared with the original, nor an oral account of a

photograph or machine-copy of the original, is secondary evidence of the original.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF DOCUMENTS BY PRIMARY EVIDENCE

By virtue of Section 59 documents shall be proved by primary evidence except in the

cases hereinafter mentioned.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CASES IN WHICH SECONDARY EVIDENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS MAY

BE GIVEN

Section 60 states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or

contents of a document in the following cases, namely:

(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power—

(i.) of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved; or

(ii.) of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court; or

(iii.) of any person legally bound to produce it,

and when, after the notice mentioned in section 64 such person does not produce it;

(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in

writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;

cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable

time;

(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;

(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;

(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Adhiniyam, or

by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence;

(g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot

conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole

collection.

Explanation.

For the purposes of

(i.) clauses (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible;

(ii.) clause (b), the written admission is admissible;

(iii.) clause (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is

admissible;

(iv.) clause (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who

has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such document.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ELECTRONIC OR DIGITAL RECORD.

By virtue of Section 61 nothing in this Adhiniyam shall apply to deny the admissibility

of an electronic or digital record in the evidence on the ground that it is an electronic or digital

record and such record shall, subject to section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and

enforceability as other document.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS TO EVIDENCE RELATING TO ELECTRONIC

RECORD.

The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of

section 63.

122

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 65-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC RECORDS.

Section 63(1) states that notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any

information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or

copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a

computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any

electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a

document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information

and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or

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Section 62

production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated

therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

By virtue of a Section 63(2) the conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a

computer output shall be the following, namely:—

(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or

communication device during the period over which the computer or communication device

was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity

regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the

computer or communication device;

(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic

record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into

the computer or communication device in the ordinary course of the said activities;

operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly

or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic

record or the accuracy of its contents; and

(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such

information fed into the computer or communication device in the ordinary course of the said

activities.

Section 63(3) provides that where over any period, the function of creating, storing or

processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as

mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more

computers or communication device, whether;

(a) in standalone mode; or

(b) on a computer system; or

(d) on a computer resource enabling information creation or providing information processing and

storage; or

(e) through an intermediary,

all the computers or communication devices used for that purpose during that period shall be

treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer or communication

device; and references in this section to a computer or communication device shall be construed

accordingly.

According to Section 63(4) in any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in

evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be

submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for

admission, namely:

(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which

it was produced;

(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as

may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a

computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);

and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or

the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall be

evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall

be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person

stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.

According to Section 63(5) for the purposes of this section,

(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is

supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or

without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;

(b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication

device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means

of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of

sub-section (3).

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RULES AS TO NOTICE TO PRODUCE.

Section 64 states that secondary evidence of the contents of the documents referred to

in clause (a) of section 60, shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary

evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is, or

to his advocate or representative, such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law; and if no

notice is prescribed by law, then such notice as the Court considers reasonable under the

circumstances of the case:

Provided that such notice shall not be required in order to render secondary evidence admissible

in any of the following cases, or in any other case in which the Court thinks fit to dispense with

it:—

(a) when the document to be proved is itself a notice;

(b) when, from the nature of the case, the adverse party must know that he will be required to

produce it;

fraud or force;

(d) when the adverse party or his agent has the original in Court;

(e) when the adverse party or his agent has admitted the loss of the document;

(f) when the person in possession of the document is out of reach of, or not subject to, the process

of the Court.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING OF PERSON ALLEGED TO HAVE

SIGNED OR WRITTEN DOCUMENT PRODUCED.

Section 65 provides that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written

wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document

as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF AS TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE.

According to Section 66 except in the case of a secure electronic signature, if the

electronic signature of any subscriber is alleged to have been affixed to an electronic record,

the fact that such electronic signature is the electronic signature of the subscriber must be

proved.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 67-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF EXECUTION OF DOCUMENT REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE ATTESTED.

Section 67 states that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used

as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its

execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and

capable of giving evidence:

Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of

any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions

of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to

have been executed is specifically denied.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF WHERE NO ATTESTING WITNESS FOUND.

According to Section 68 if no such attesting witness can be found, it must be proved

that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting, and that the signature

of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ADMISSION OF EXECUTION BY PARTY TO ATTESTED DOCUMENT.

The admission of a party to an attested document of its execution by himself shall be

sufficient proof of its execution as against him, though it be a document required by law to be

attested.

123

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 70 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF WHEN ATTESTING WITNESS DENIES EXECUTION.

If the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its

execution may be proved by other evidence.

124

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF DOCUMENT NOT REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE ATTESTED.

123

Section 69

124

Section 70

An attested document not required by law to be attested may be proved as if it was

unattested.

125

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 72 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

COMPARISON OF SIGNATURE, WRITING OR SEAL WITH OTHERS ADMITTED

OR PROVED.

Section 72(1) states that in order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that

of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal

admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person

may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal

has not been produced or proved for any other purpose.

By virtue of Section 72(2) the Court may direct any person present in Court to write

any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so

written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.

Section 72(3) provides thata this section applies also, with any necessary modifications,

to finger impressions.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF AS TO VERIFICATION OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE.

According to Section 73 in order to ascertain whether a digital signature is that of the person

by whom it purports to have been affixed, the Court may direct—

(a) that person or the Controller or the Certifying Authority to produce the Digital Signature

Certificate;

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Section 71

(b) any other person to apply the public key listed in the Digital Signature Certificate and verify

the digital signature purported to have been affixed by that person.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section73-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Public documents

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.

According to Section 74(1) the following documents are public documents:

(a) documents forming the acts, or records of the acts—

(i.) of the sovereign authority;

(ii.) of official bodies and tribunals; and

(iii.) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive of India or of a foreign country;

(b) public records kept in any State or Union territory of private documents.

Section 74(2) states that all other documents except the documents referred to in sub-

section (1) are private.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 74,75 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Section 75 provides that every public officer having the custody of a public document,

which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on

payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy

that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate

shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be

sealed, whenever such officer is authorised by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so

certified shall be called certified copies.

Explanation.

Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorised to deliver such

copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this

section.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF DOCUMENTS BY PRODUCTION OF CERTIFIED COPIES.

Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents

or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.

126

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 77 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

According to Section 77 the following public documents may be proved as follows:

(a) Acts, orders or notifications of the Central Government in any of its Ministries and

Departments or of any State Government or any Department of any State Government or Union

territory Administration—

(i.) by the records of the Departments, certified by the head of those Departments respectively; or

(ii.) by any document purporting to be printed by order of any such Government;

(b) the proceedings of Parliament or a State Legislature, by the journals of those bodies

respectively, or by published Acts or abstracts, or by copies purporting to be printed by order

of the Government concerned;

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Section 76

or the Administrator or Lieutenant Governor of a Union territory, by copies or extracts

contained in the Official Gazette;

(d) the Acts of the Executive or the proceedings of the Legislature of a foreign country, by journals

published by their authority, or commonly received in that country as such, or by a copy

certified under the seal of the country or sovereign, or by a recognition thereof in any Central

Act;

(e) the proceedings of a municipal or local body in a State, by a copy of such proceedings, certified

by the legal keeper thereof, or by a printed book purporting to be published by the authority of

such body;

(f) public documents of any other class in a foreign country, by the original or by a copy certified

by the legal keeper thereof, with a certificate under the seal of a Notary Public, or of an Indian

Consul or diplomatic agent, that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the legal

custody of the original, and upon proof of the character of the document according to the law

of the foreign country.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 78 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

Presumptions as to documents

PRESUMPTION AS TO GENUINENESS OF CERTIFIED COPIES.

By virtue of Section 78 (1) the Court shall presume to be genuine every document

purporting to be a certificate, certified copy or other document, which is by law declared to be

admissible as evidence of any particular fact and which purports to be duly certified by any

officer of the Central Government or of a State Government:

Provided that such document is substantially in the form and purports to be executed in the

manner directed by law in that behalf.

By virtue of Section 78(2) the Court shall also presume that any officer by whom any

such document purports to be signed or certified, held, when he signed it, the official character

which he claims in such paper.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AS RECORD OF EVIDENCE,

ETC.

According to Section 79 whenever any document is produced before any Court,

purporting to be a record or memorandum of the evidence, or of any part of the evidence, given

by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any officer authorised by law to take such

evidence or to be a statement or confession by any prisoner or accused person, taken in

accordance with law,

and purporting to be signed by any Judge or Magistrate, or by any such officer as aforesaid,

the Court shall presume that—

(i.) (i)the document is genuine;

(ii.) any statements as to the circumstances under which it was taken, purporting to be made by the

person signing it, are true; and

(iii.) such evidence, statement or confession was duly taken.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO GAZETTES, NEWSPAPERS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.

By virtue of Section 80 the Court shall presume the genuineness of every document

purporting to be the Official Gazette, or to be a newspaper or journal, and of every document

purporting to be a document directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such document is

kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.

Explanation.

For the purposes of this section and section 92, document is said to be in proper custody

if it is in the place in which, and looked after by the person with whom such document is

required to be kept; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin,

or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render that origin probable.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 81 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO GAZETTES IN ELECTRONIC OR DIGITAL RECORD.

By virtue of Section 81 the Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic or

digital record purporting to be the Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic or digital

record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic or digital record is kept

substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.

Explanation.

For the purposes of this section and section 93 electronic records are said to be in proper

custody if they are in the place in which, and looked after by the person with whom such

document is required to be kept; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a

legitimate origin, or the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render that origin

probable.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 81-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO MAPS OR PLANS MADE BY AUTHORITY OF

GOVERNMENT.

By virtue of Section 82 the Court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be

made by the authority of the Central Government or any State Government were so made, and

are accurate; but maps or plans made for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be

accurate.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 83 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO COLLECTIONS OF LAWS AND REPORTS OF DECISIONS.

By virtue of Section 83 the Court shall presume the genuineness of, every book

purporting to be printed or published under the authority of the Government of any country,

and to contain any of the laws of that country, and of every book purporting to contain reports

of decisions of the Courts of such country.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 84 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO POWERS- OF-ATTORNEY.

By virtue of Section 84 the Court shall presume that every document purporting to be

a power-of-attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a Notary Public,

or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central

Government, was so executed and authenticated.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ELECTRONIC AGREEMENTS.

By virtue of Section 85 the Court shall presume that every electronic record purporting

to be an agreement containing the electronic or digital signature of the parties was so concluded

by affixing the electronic or digital signature of the parties.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 85-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND ELECTRONIC

SIGNATURES.

By virtue of Section 86(1) in any proceeding involving a secure electronic record, the

Court shall presume unless contrary is proved, that the secure electronic record has not been

altered since the specific point of time to which the secure status relates.

According to Section 86(2) in any proceeding, involving secure electronic signature, the

Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved that;

(a) (a)the secure electronic signature is affixed by subscriber with the intention of signing or

approving the electronic record;

(b) except in the case of a secure electronic record or a secure electronic signature, nothing in this

section shall create any presumption, relating to authenticity and integrity of the electronic

record or any electronic signature.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 85-B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE CERTIFICATES.

By virtue of Section 87 the Court shall presume, unless contrary is proved, that the

information listed in an Electronic Signature Certificate is correct, except for information

specified as subscriber information which has not been verified, if the certificate was accepted

by the subscriber.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 85-C of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO CERTIFIED COPIES OF FOREIGN JUDICIAL RECORDS.

Section 88(1) states that the Court may presume that any document purporting to be a

certified copy of any judicial record of any country beyond India is genuine and accurate, if

the document purports to be certified in any manner which is certified by any representative of

the Central Government in or for such country to be the manner commonly in use in that

country for the certification of copies of judicial records.

Section 88(2) provides that an officer who, with respect to any territory or place outside

India is a Political Agent therefor, as defined in clause (43) of section 3 of the General Clauses

Act, 1897, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a representative of the Central

Government in and for the country comprising that territory or place.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 86 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO BOOKS, MAPS AND CHARTS.

According to Section 89 the Court may presume that any book to which it may refer

for information on matters of public or general interest, and that any published map or chart,

the statements of which are relevant facts, and which is produced for its inspection, was written

and published by the person, and at the time and place, by whom or at which it purports to have

been written or published.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 87 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ELECTRONIC MESSAGES.

By virtue of Section 90 the Court may presume that an electronic message, forwarded

by the originator through an electronic mail server to the addressee to whom the message

purports to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed into his computer for

transmission; but the Court shall not make any presumption as to the person by whom such

message was sent.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 88-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO DUE EXECUTION, ETC., OF DOCUMENTS NOT

PRODUCED.

The Court shall presume that every document, called for and not produced after notice

to produce, was attested, stamped and executed in the manner required by law.

127

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 89 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO DOCUMENTS THIRTY YEARS OLD.

According to Section 92 where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years

old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the

Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports

to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the

case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons

by whom it purports to be executed and attested.

Explanation.

The Explanation to section 80 shall also apply to this section.

Illustrations.

(a) A has been in possession of landed property for a long time. He produces from his custody

deeds relating to the land showing his titles to it. The custody shall be proper.

(b) A produces deeds relating to landed property of which he is the mortgagee. The mortgagor is

in possession. The custody shall be proper.

with him by B for safe custody. The custody shall be proper.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ELECTRONIC RECORDS FIVE YEARS OLD.

Section 93 states that where any electronic record, purporting or proved to be five years

old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the

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Section 91

Court may presume that the electronic signature which purports to be the electronic signature

of any particular person was so affixed by him or any person authorised by him in this behalf.

Explanation.

The Explanation to section 81 shall also apply to this section.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 90-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER VI

OF THE EXCLUSION OF ORAL EVIDENCE BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE OF TERMS OF CONTRACTS, GRANTS AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS

OF PROPERTY REDUCED TO FORM OF DOCUMENT.

Section 94 provides that when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other

disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which

any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be

given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such

matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which

secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.

Exception 1.

When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is

shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed

need not be proved.

Exception 2.

Wills admitted to probate in India may be proved by the probate.

Explanation 1.

This section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of

property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained

in more documents than one.

Explanation 2.

Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved.

Explanation 3.

The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in

this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact.

Illustrations.

(a) If a contract be contained in several letters, all the letters in which it is contained must be proved.

(b) If a contract is contained in a bill of exchange, the bill of exchange must be proved.

(d) A contracts, in writing, with B, for the delivery of indigo upon certain terms. The contract

mentions the fact that B had paid A the price of other indigo contracted for verbally on another

occasion. Oral evidence is offered that no payment was made for the other indigo. The evidence

is admissible.

(e) A gives B a receipt for money paid by B. Oral evidence is offered of the payment. The evidence

is admissible.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF ORAL AGREEMENT.

According to Section 95 when the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition

of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been

proved according to section 94, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be

admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for

the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:

Provided that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would

entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality,

want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of

consideration, or mistake in fact or law:

Provided further that the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a

document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering

whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of

the document:

Provided also that the existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition

precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of

property, may be proved:

Provided also that the existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify

any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which

such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been

registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents:

Provided also that any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any

contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved:

Provided also that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent

with, the express terms of the contract:

Provided also that any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a

document is related to existing facts.

Illustrations.

(a) A policy of insurance is effected on goods "in ships from Kolkata to Visakhapatnam". The

goods are shipped in a particular ship which is lost. The fact that particular ship was orally

excepted from the policy, cannot be proved.

(b) A agrees absolutely in writing to pay B one thousand rupees on the 1st March, 2023. The fact

that, at the same time, an oral agreement was made that the money should not be paid till the

31st March, 2023, cannot be proved.

sold. The fact that land not included in the map had always been regarded as part of the estate

and was meant to pass by the deed cannot be proved.

(d) A enters into a written contract with B to work certain mines, the property of B, upon certain

terms. A was induced to do so by a misrepresentation of B's as to their value. This fact may be

proved.

(e) A institutes a suit against B for the specific performance of a contract, and also prays that the

contract may be reformed as to one of its provisions, as that provision was inserted in it by

mistake. A may prove that such a mistake was made as would by law entitle him to have the

contract reformed.

(f) A orders goods of B by a letter in which nothing is said as to the time of payment, and accepts

the goods on delivery. B sues A for the price. A may show that the goods were supplied on

credit for a term still unexpired.

(g) A sells B a horse and verbally warrants him sound. A gives B a paper in these words—"Bought

of A a horse for thirty thousand rupees". B may prove the verbal warranty.

(h) A hires lodgings of B, and gives B a card on which is written—"Rooms, ten thousand rupees a

month". A may prove a verbal agreement that these terms were to include partial board. A hires

lodging of B for a year, and a regularly stamped agreement, drawn up by an advocate, is made

between them. It is silent on the subject of board. A may not prove that board was included in

the term verbally.

(i) A applies to B for a debt due to A by sending a receipt for the money. B keeps the receipt and

does not send the money. In a suit for the amount, A may prove this.

(j) A and B make a contract in writing to take effect upon the happening of a certain contingency.

The writing is left with B who sues A upon it. A may show the circumstances under which it

was delivered.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN OR AMEND AMBIGUOUS DOCUMENT.

When the language used in a document is, on its face, ambiguous or defective, evidence

may not be given of facts which would show its meaning or supply its defects.

128

Illustrations.

(a) A agrees, in writing, to sell a horse to B for "one lakh rupees or one lakh fifty thousand rupees".

Evidence cannot be given to show which price was to be given.

(b) A deed contains blanks. Evidence cannot be given of facts which would show how they were

meant to be filled.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 93 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE AGAINST APPLICATION OF DOCUMENT TO

EXISTING FACTS.

According to Section 97 when language used in a document is plain in itself, and when

it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant

to apply to such facts.

Illustration.

A sells to B, by deed, "my estate at Rampur containing one hundred bighas". A has an estate

at Rampur containing one hundred bighas. Evidence may not be given of the fact that the estate

meant to be sold was one situated at a different place and of a different size.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 94 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

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Section 96

EVIDENCE AS TO DOCUMENT UNMEANING IN REFERENCE TO EXISTING

FACTS.

Section 98 states that when language used in a document is plain in itself, but is

unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a

peculiar sense.

Illustration.

A sells to B, by deed, "my house in Kolkata". A had no house in Kolkata, but it appears that he

had a house at Howrah, of which B had been in possession since the execution of the deed.

These facts may be proved to show that the deed related to the house at Howrah.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 95 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EVIDENCE AS TO APPLICATION OF LANGUAGE WHICH CAN APPLY TO ONE

ONLY OF SEVERAL PERSONS.

Section 99 provides that when the facts are such that the language used might have been

meant to apply to any one, and could not have been meant to apply to more than one, of several

persons or things, evidence may be given of facts which show which of those persons or things

it was intended to apply to.

Illustrations.

(a) A agrees to sell to B, for one thousand rupees, "my white horse". A has two white horses.

Evidence may be given of facts which show which of them was meant.

(b) A agrees to accompany B to Ramgarh. Evidence may be given of facts showing whether

Ramgarh in Rajasthan or Ramgarh in Uttarakhand was meant.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 96 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EVIDENCE AS TO APPLICATION OF LANGUAGE TO ONE OF TWO SETS OF

FACTS, TO NEITHER OF WHICH THE WHOLE CORRECTLY APPLIES.

According to Section 100 when the language used applies partly to one set of existing

facts, and partly to another set of existing facts, but the whole of it does not apply correctly to

either, evidence may be given to show to which of the two it was meant to apply.

Illustration.

A agrees to sell to B "my land at X in the occupation of Y". A has land at X, but not in the

occupation of Y, and he has land in the occupation of Y but it is not at X. Evidence may be

given of facts showing which he meant to sell.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 97 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EVIDENCE AS TO MEANING OF ILLEGIBLE CHARACTERS, ETC.

Section 101 states that evidence may be given to show the meaning of illegible or not

commonly intelligible characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical, local and regional expressions,

of abbreviations and of words used in a peculiar sense.

Illustration.

A, sculptor, agrees to sell to B, "all my mods". A has both models and modelling tools.

Evidence may be given to show which he meant to sell.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 98 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WHO MAY GIVE EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT VARYING TERMS OF

DOCUMENT.

Persons who are not parties to a document, or their representatives in interest, may give

evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the

document.

129

Illustration.

A and B make a contract in writing that B shall sell A certain cotton, to be paid for on delivery.

At the same time, they make an oral agreement that three months’ credit shall be given to A.

This could not be shown as between A and B, but it might be shown by C, if it affected his

interests.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 99 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

SAVING OF PROVISIONS OF INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT RELATING TO WILLS.

By virtue of Section 103 nothing in this Chapter shall be taken to affect any of the

provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 as to the construction of wills.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 100 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PART IV

PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE

CHAPTER VII

OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

BURDEN OF PROOF.

129

Section 102

According to Section 104 whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal

right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those

facts exist, and when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the

burden of proof lies on that person.

Illustrations.

(a) A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall be punished for a crime which A says B has

committed. A must prove that B has committed the crime.

(b) A desires a Court to give judgment that he is entitled to certain land in the possession of B, by

reason of facts which he asserts, and which B denies, to be true. A must prove the existence of

those facts.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ON WHOM BURDEN OF PROOF LIES.

Section 105 states that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person

who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

Illustrations.

(a) A sues B for land of which B is in possession, and which, as A asserts, was left to A by the will

of C, B's father. If no evidence were given on either side, B would be entitled to retain his

possession. Therefore, the burden of proof is on A.

(b) A sues B for money due on a bond. The execution of the bond is admitted, but B says that it

was obtained by fraud, which A denies. If no evidence were given on either side, A would

succeed, as the bond is not disputed and the fraud is not proved. Therefore, the burden of proof

is on B.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO PARTICULAR FACT.

Section 106 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person

who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof

of that fact shall lie on any particular person.

Illustration.

A prosecutes B for theft, and wishes the Court to believe that B admitted the theft to C. A must

prove the admission. B wishes the Court to believe that, at the time in question, he was

elsewhere. He must prove it.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROVING FACT TO BE PROVED TO MAKE EVIDENCE

ADMISSIBLE.

According to Section 107 the burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order

to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the person who wishes to give

such evidence.

Illustrations.

(a) A wishes to prove a dying declaration by B. A must prove B's death.

(b) A wishes to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of a lost document. A must prove that

the document has been lost.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 104 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROVING THAT CASE OF ACCUSED COMES WITHIN

EXCEPTIONS.

According to Section 108 when a person is accused of any offence, the burden of

proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions

in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 or within any special exception or proviso contained in

any other part of the said Sanhita, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court

shall presume the absence of such circumstances.

Illustrations.

(a) A, accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the

nature of the act. The burden of proof is on A.

(b) A, accused of murder, alleges that, by grave and sudden provocation, he was deprived of the

power of self-control. The burden of proof is on A.

provided for by sub-section (2) of section 122, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be subject

to certain punishments. A is charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt under section 117.

The burden of proving the circumstances bringing the case under sub-section (2) of section 122

lies on A.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROVING FACT ESPECIALLY WITHIN KNOWLEDGE.

When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving

that fact is upon him.

130

Illustrations.

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and

circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a

ticket is on him.

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Section 109

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROVING DEATH OF PERSON KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN ALIVE

WITHIN THIRTY YEARS.

When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is shown that he was alive

within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it.

131

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 107 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PERSON IS ALIVE WHO HAS NOT BEEN HEARD

OF FOR SEVEN YEARS.

According to Section 111 when the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is

proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard

of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to the person who

affirms it.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO RELATIONSHIP IN THE CASES OF PARTNERS,

LANDLORD AND TENANT, PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Section 112 states that when the question is whether persons are partners, landlord and

tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the

burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other in those

relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 109 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

131

Section 110

BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO OWNERSHIP.

When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to

be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms

that he is not the owner.

132

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROOF OF GOOD FAITH IN TRANSACTIONS WHERE ONE PARTY IS IN

RELATION OF ACTIVE CONFIDENCE.

According to Section 114 where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction

between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden

of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party who is in a position of active

confidence.

Illustrations.

(a) The good faith of a sale by a client to an advocate is in question in a suit brought by the client.

The burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the advocate.

(b) The good faith of a sale by a son just come of age to a father is in question in a suit brought by

the son. The burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the father.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO CERTAIN OFFENCES.

Section 115(1) states that where a person is accused of having committed any offence

specified in sub-section (2), in—

(a) any area declared to be a disturbed area under any enactment for the time being in force, making

provision for the suppression of disorder and restoration and maintenance of public order; or

132

Section 113

(b) any area in which there has been, over a period of more than one month, extensive disturbance

of the public peace,

and it is shown that such person had been at a place in such area at a time when firearms or

explosives were used at or from that place to attack or resist the members of any armed forces

or the forces charged with the maintenance of public order acting in the discharge of their duties,

it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that such person had committed such offence.

Section 115(2) provides that the offences referred to in sub-section (1) are the following,

namely:

(a) an offence under section 147, section 148, section 149 or section 150 of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023;

(b) criminal conspiracy or attempt to commit, or abetment of, an offence under section 149 or

section 150 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 111-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

BIRTH DURING MARRIAGE, CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF LEGITIMACY.

According to Section 116 the fact that any person was born during the continuance of

a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after

its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the

legitimate child of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no

access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ABETMENT OF SUICIDE BY A MARRIED WOMAN.

Section 117 states that when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a

woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she

had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that

her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may

presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been

abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.

For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 86 of the

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 113-Aof the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO DOWRY DEATH.

Section 118 provides that when the question is whether a person has committed the

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death, such woman had been

subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for

dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.

For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 80

of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

COURT MAY PRESUME EXISTENCE OF CERTAIN FACTS.

According to Section 119(1) the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it

thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events,

human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular

case.

Illustrations.

The Court may presume that—

(a) a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon, after the theft is either the thief or has received

the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession;

(b) an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars;

(d) a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than

that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence;

(e) judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;

(f) the common course of business has been followed in particular cases;

(g) evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person

who withholds it;

(h) if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law, the answer,

if given, would be unfavourable to him;

(i) when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been

discharged.

By virtue of Section 119(2) the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following,

in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it:

(i.) as to Illustration (a)—a shop-keeper has in his bill a marked rupee soon after it was stolen, and

cannot account for its possession specifically, but is continually receiving rupees in the course

of his business;

(ii.) as to Illustration (b)—A, a person of the highest character, is tried for causing a man's death by

an act of negligence in arranging certain machinery. B, a person of equally good character, who

also took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and admits and explains

the common carelessness of A and himself;

(iii.) as to Illustration (b)—a crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C, three of the

criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of

the crime implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to render

previous concert highly improbable;

(iv.) as to Illustration (c)—A, the drawer of a bill of exchange, was a man of business. B, the

acceptor, was a young and ignorant person, completely under A's influence;

(v.) as to Illustration (d)—it is proved that a river ran in a certain course five years ago, but it is

known that there have been floods since that time which might change its course;

(vi.) as to Illustration (e)—a judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed under

exceptional circumstances;

(vii.) as to Illustration (f)—the question is, whether a letter was received. It is shown to have been

posted, but the usual course of the post was interrupted by disturbances;

(viii.) as to Illustration (g)—a man refuses to produce a document which would bear on a contract of

small importance on which he is sued, but which might also injure the feelings and reputation

of his family;

(ix.) as to Illustration (h)—a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled by law to

answer, but the answer to it might cause loss to him in matters unconnected with the matter in

relation to which it is asked;

(x.) as to Illustration (i)—a bond is in possession of the obligor, but the circumstances of the case

are such that he may have stolen it.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRESUMPTION AS TO ABSENCE OF CONSENT IN CERTAIN PROSECUTION

FOR RAPE.

Section 120 states that in a prosecution for rape under sub-section (2) of section 64 of

the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the

question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and

such woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court shall

presume that she did not consent.

Explanation.

In this section, "sexual intercourse" shall mean any of the acts mentioned in section 63

of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER VIII

ESTOPPEL

ESTOPPEL.

According to Section 121 when one person has, by his declaration, act or omission,

intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon

such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between

himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.

Illustration.

A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and thereby induces

B to buy and pay for it. The land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A seeks to set

aside the sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had no title. He must not be allowed

to prove his want of title.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ESTOPPEL OF TENANT AND OF LICENSEE OF PERSON IN POSSESSION.

Section 122 states that no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through

such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy or any time thereafter, be permitted to

deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such

immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of

the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such

possession at the time when such licence was given.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ESTOPPEL OF ACCEPTOR OF BILL OF EXCHANGE, BAILEE OR LICENSEE.

Section 123 provides that no acceptor of a bill of exchange shall be permitted to deny

that the drawer had authority to draw such bill or to endorse it; nor shall any bailee or licensee

be permitted to deny that his bailor or licensor had, at the time when the bailment or licence

commenced, authority to make such bailment or grant such licence.

Explanation 1.

The acceptor of a bill of exchange may deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by

whom it purports to have been drawn.

Explanation 2.

If a bailee delivers the goods bailed to a person other than the bailor, he may prove that such

person had a right to them as against the bailor.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 117 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER IX

OF WITNESSES

WHO MAY TESTIFY.

By virtue of Section 124 all persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court

considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving

rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body

or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.

Explanation.

A person of unsound mind is not incompetent to testify, unless he is prevented by his

unsoundness of mind from understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers

to them.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WITNESS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE VERBALLY.

According to Section 125 a witness who is unable to speak may give his evidence in

any other manner in which he can make it intelligible, as by writing or by signs; but such

writing must be written and the signs made in open Court and evidence so given shall be

deemed to be oral evidence:

Provided that if the witness is unable to communicate verbally, the Court shall take the

assistance of an interpreter or a special educator in recording the statement, and such statement

shall be videographed.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 119 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

COMPETENCY OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AS WITNESSES IN CERTAIN CASES.

Section 126(1) states that in all civil proceedings the parties to the suit, and the husband

or wife of any party to the suit, shall be competent witnesses.

By virtue of Section 126(2) in criminal proceedings against any person, the husband or

wife of such person, respectively, shall be a competent witness.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES.

By virtue of Section 127 no Judge or Magistrate shall, except upon the special order of

some Court to which he is subordinate, be compelled to answer any question as to his own

conduct in Court as such Judge or Magistrate, or as to anything which came to his knowledge

in Court as such Judge or Magistrate; but he may be examined as to other matters which

occurred in his presence whilst he was so acting.

Illustrations.

(a) A, on his trial before the Court of Session, says that a deposition was improperly taken by B,

the Magistrate. B cannot be compelled to answer questions as to this, except upon the special

order of a superior Court.

(b) A is accused before the Court of Session of having given false evidence before B, a Magistrate.

B cannot be asked what A said, except upon the special order of the superior Court.

trial before B, a Sessions Judge. B may be examined as to what occurred.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 121 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

COMMUNICATIONS DURING MARRIAGE.

By virtue of Section 128 no person who is or has been married, shall be compelled to

disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has

been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person

who made it, or his representative in interest, consents, except in suits between married persons,

or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the

other.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EVIDENCE AS TO AFFAIRS OF STATE.

By virtue of Section 129 no one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived from

unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the permission of the

officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as

he thinks fit.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

By virtue of Section 130 no public officer shall be compelled to disclose

communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests

would suffer by the disclosure.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

INFORMATION AS TO COMMISSION OF OFFENCES.

By virtue of Section 131 no Magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to say when

he got any information as to the commission of any offence, and no revenue officer shall be

compelled to say when he got any information as to the commission of any offence against the

public revenue.

Explanation.

"revenue officer" means any officer employed in or about the business of any branch of the

public revenue.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 125 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS.

By virtue of Section 132(1) no advocate, shall at any time be permitted, unless with his

client's express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the

purpose of his service as such advocate, by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or

condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the

purpose of his professional service, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the

course and for the purpose of such service:

Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure of—

(a) any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose;

(b) any fact observed by any advocate, in the course of his service as such, showing that any crime

or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his service.

According to Section 132(2) it is immaterial whether the attention of such advocate

referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1), was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf

of his client.

Explanation.

The obligation stated in this section continues after the professional service has ceased.

Illustrations.

(a) A, a client, says to B, an advocate—"I have committed forgery, and I wish you to defend me".

As the defence of a man known to be guilty is not a criminal purpose, this communication is

protected from disclosure.

(b) A, a client, says to B, an advocate—"I wish to obtain possession of property by the use of a

forged deed on which I request you to sue". This communication, being made in furtherance of

a criminal purpose, is not protected from disclosure.

the proceedings, B observes that an entry has been made in A's account book, charging A with

the sum said to have been embezzled, which entry was not in the book at the commencement

of his professional service. This being a fact observed by B in the course of his service, showing

that a fraud has been committed since the commencement of the proceedings, it is not protected

from disclosure.

By virtue of Section 132(3) the provisions of this section shall apply to interpreters, and

the clerks or employees of advocates.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRIVILEGE NOT WAIVED BY VOLUNTEERING EVIDENCE.

According to Section 133 if any party to a suit gives evidence therein at his own instance

or otherwise, he shall not be deemed to have consented thereby to such disclosure as is

mentioned in section 132; and, if any party to a suit or proceeding calls any such advocate, as

a witness, he shall be deemed to have consented to such disclosure only if he questions such

advocate, on matters which, but for such question, he would not be at liberty to disclose.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 128 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION WITH LEGAL ADVISERS.

By virtue of Section 134 no one shall be compelled to disclose to the Court any confidential

communication which has taken place between him and his legal adviser, unless he offers

himself as a witness, in which case he may be compelled to disclose any such communications

as may appear to the C NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 129 of the Indian

Evidence Act 1872

ourt necessary to be known in order to explain any evidence which he has given, but no

others.

PRODUCTION OF TITLE-DEEDS OF WITNESS NOT A PARTY.

By virtue of Section 135 no witness who is not a party to a suit shall be compelled to

produce his title-deeds to any property, or any document in virtue of which he holds any

property as pledgee or mortgagee or any document the production of which might tend to

criminate him, unless he has agreed in writing to produce them with the person seeking the

production of such deeds or some person through whom he claims.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 130 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OR ELECTRONIC RECORDS WHICH

ANOTHER PERSON, HAVING POSSESSION, COULD REFUSE TO PRODUCE.

By virtue of Section 136 no one shall be compelled to produce documents in his

possession or electronic records under his control, which any other person would be entitled to

refuse to produce if they were in his possession or control, unless such last-mentioned person

consents to their production.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 131 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WITNESS NOT EXCUSED FROM ANSWERING ON GROUND THAT ANSWER

WILL CRIMINATE.

By virtue of Section 137 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question

as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding,

upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend directly or

indirectly to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to

expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind:

Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to

any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding, except a

prosecution forgiving false evidence by such answer.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ACCOMPLICE.

An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a

conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice.

133

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

133

Section 138

NUMBER OF WITNESSES.

No particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any

fact.

134

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER X

OF EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

ORDER OF PRODUCTION AND EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

By virtue of Section 140 the order in which witnesses are produced and examined shall

be regulated by the law and practice for the time being relating to civil and criminal procedure

respectively, and, in the absence of any such law, by the discretion of the Court.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 135 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

JUDGE TO DECIDE AS TO ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.

According to Section 141(1) when either party proposes to give evidence of any fact,

the Judge may ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if

proved, would be relevant; and the Judge shall admit the evidence if he thinks that the fact, if

proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise.

Section 141(2) states that if the fact proposed to be proved is one of which evidence is

admissible only upon proof of some other fact, such last mentioned fact must be proved before

evidence is given of the fact first mentioned, unless the party undertakes to give proof of such

fact, and the Court is satisfied with such undertaking.

134

Section 139

Section 141(3) provides that if the relevancy of one alleged fact depends upon another

alleged fact being first proved, the Judge may, in his discretion, either permit evidence of the

first fact to be given before the second fact is proved, or require evidence to be given of the

second fact before evidence is given of the first fact.

Illustrations.

(a) It is proposed to prove a statement about a relevant fact by a person alleged to be dead, which

statement is relevant under section 26. The fact that the person is dead must be proved by the

person proposing to prove the statement, before evidence is given of the statement.

(b) It is proposed to prove, by a copy, the contents of a document said to be lost. The fact that the

original is lost must be proved by the person proposing to produce the copy, before the copy is

produced.

that he denied the possession of the property. The relevancy of the denial depends on the

identity of the property. The Court may, in its discretion, either require the property to be

identified before the denial of the possession is proved, or permit the denial of the possession

to be proved before the property is identified.

(d) It is proposed to prove a fact A which is said to have been the cause or effect of a fact in issue.

There are several intermediate facts B, C and D which must be shown to exist before the fact

A can be regarded as the cause or effect of the fact in issue. The Court may either permit A to

be proved before B, C or D is proved, or may require proof of B, C and D before permitting

proof of A.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 136 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

According to Section 142(1) the examination of a witness by the party who calls him

shall be called his examination-in-chief.

The examination of a witness by the adverse party shall be called his cross-

examination.

135

Section 142(3) states that the examination of a witness, subsequent to the cross-

examination, by the party who called him, shall be called his re-examination.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

ORDER OF EXAMINATIONS.

According Section 143(1) witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the

adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.

The examination-in-chief and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but the

cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his

examination-in-chief.

136

By virtue of Section 143(3) the re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of

matters referred to in cross-examination; and, if new matter is, by permission of the Court,

introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CROSS- EXAMINATION OF PERSON CALLED TO PRODUCE A DOCUMENT.

A person summoned to produce a document does not become a witness by the mere

fact that he produces it, and cannot be cross-examined unless a

137

nd until he is called as a

witness.

135

Section 142(2)

136

Section 143(2)

137

Section 144

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 139 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WITNESSES TO CHARACTER.

Witnesses to character may be cross-examined and re-examined.

138

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 140 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

LEADING QUESTIONS.

According to Section 146(1) any question suggesting the answer which the person

putting it wishes or expects to receive, is called a leading question.

Section 146(2) states that leading questions must not, if objected to by the adverse party,

be asked in an examination-in-chief, or in a re-examination, except with the permission of the

Court.

By virtue of Section 146(3) the Court shall permit leading questions as to matters which

are introductory or undisputed, or which have, in its opinion, been already sufficiently proved.

Leading questions may be asked in cross-examination.

139

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 141 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EVIDENCE AS TO MATTERS IN WRITING.

According to Section 147 any witness may be asked, while under examination, whether

any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not

138

Section 145

139

Section 146(4)

contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as

to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the

adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or

until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary

evidence of it.

Explanation.

A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the

contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.

Illustration.

The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—"B wrote a letter

accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him". This statement is relevant, as showing

A's motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given

about the letter.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 144 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CROSS- EXAMINATION AS TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS IN WRITING.

Section 148 states that a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made

by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such

writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the

writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which

are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

QUESTIONS LAWFUL IN CROSS- EXAMINATION.

Section 149 provides that when a witness is cross-examined, he may, in addition to the

questions hereinbefore referred to, be asked any questions which tend—

(a) to test his veracity; or

(b) to discover who he is and what is his position in life; or

directly or indirectly to criminate him, or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose

him to a penalty or forfeiture:

Provided that in a prosecution for an offence under section 64, section 65, section 66, section

67, section 68, section 69, section 70 or section 71 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 or for

attempt to commit any such offence, where the question of consent is an issue, it shall not be

permissible to adduce evidence or to put questions in the cross-examination of the victim as to

the general immoral character, or previous sexual experience, of such victim with any person

for proving such consent or the quality of consent.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WHEN WITNESS TO BE COMPELLED TO ANSWER.

If any such question relates to a matter relevant to the suit or proceeding, the provisions

of section 137 shall apply thereto.

140

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 147 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

COURT TO DECIDE WHEN QUESTION SHALL BE ASKED AND WHEN WITNESS

COMPELLED TO ANSWER.

Section 151(1) states that if any such question relates to a matter not relevant to the

suit or proceeding, except in so far as it affects the credit of the witness by injuring his character,

140

Section 150

the Court shall decide whether or not the witness shall be compelled to answer it, and may, if

it thinks fit, warn the witness that he is not obliged to answer it.

By virtue of Section 151(2) in exercising its discretion, the Court shall have regard to

the following considerations, namely:

(a) such questions are proper if they are of such a nature that the truth of the imputation conveyed

by them would seriously affect the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on

the matter to which he testifies;

(b) such questions are improper if the imputation which they convey relates to matters so remote

in time, or of such a character, that the truth of the imputation would not affect, or would affect

in a slight degree, the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to

which he testifies;

imputation made against the witness's character and the importance of his evidence;

(d) the Court may, if it sees fit, draw, from the witness's refusal to answer, the inference that the

answer if given would be unfavourable.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 148 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

QUESTION NOT TO BE ASKED WITHOUT REASONABLE GROUNDS.

According to Section 152 no such question as is referred to in section 151 ought to be

asked, unless the person asking it has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation which

it conveys is well-founded.

Illustrations.

(a) An advocate is instructed by another advocate that an important witness is a dacoit. This is a

reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dacoit.

(b) An advocate is informed by a person in Court that an important witness is a dacoit. The

informant, on being questioned by the advocate, gives satisfactory reasons for his statement.

This is a reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dacoit.

There are here no reasonable grounds for the question.

(d) A witness, of whom nothing whatever is known, being questioned as to his mode of life and

means of living, gives unsatisfactory answers. This may be a reasonable ground for asking him

if he is a dacoit.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 149 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

PROCEDURE OF COURT IN CASE OF QUESTION BEING ASKED WITHOUT

REASONABLE GROUNDS.

If the Court is of opinion that any such question was asked without reasonable grounds,

it may, if it was asked by any advocate, report the circumstances of the case to the High Court

or other authority to which such advocate is subject in the exercise of his profession.

141

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 150 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

INDECENT AND SCANDALOUS QUESTIONS.

By virtue of Section 154 the Court may forbid any questions or inquiries which it

regards as indecent or scandalous, although such questions or inquiries may have some bearing

on the questions before the Court, unless they relate to facts in issue, or to matters necessary to

be known in order to determine whether or not the facts in issue existed.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 151 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

QUESTIONS INTENDED TO INSULT OR ANNOY.

141

Section 153

By virtue of section 155 the Court shall forbid any question which appears to it to be

intended to insult or annoy, or which, though proper in itself, appears to the Court needlessly

offensive in form.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 152 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

TESTING VERACITY.

According to Section 156 when a witness has been asked and has answered any

question which is relevant to the inquiry only in so far as it tends to shake his credit by injuring

his character, no evidence shall be given to contradict him; but, if he answers falsely, he may

afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.

Exception 1.

If a witness is asked whether he has been previously convicted of any crime and denies it,

evidence may be given of his previous conviction.

Exception 2.

If a witness is asked any question tending to impeach his impartiality, and answers it by denying

the facts suggested, he may be contradicted.

Illustrations.

(a) A claim against an underwriter is resisted on the ground of fraud. The claimant is asked whether,

in a former transaction, he had not made a fraudulent claim. He denies it. Evidence is offered

to show that he did make such a claim. The evidence is inadmissible.

(b) A witness is asked whether he was not dismissed from a situation for dishonesty. He denies it.

Evidence is offered to show that he was dismissed for dishonesty. The evidence is not

admissible.

day at Varanasi. He denies it. Evidence is offered to show that A was on that day at Varanasi.

The evidence is admissible, not as contradicting A on a fact which affects his credit, but as

contradicting the alleged fact that B was seen on the day in question in Goa. In each of these

cases, the witness might, if his denial was false, be charged with giving false evidence.

(d) A is asked whether his family has not had a blood feud with the family of B against whom he

gives evidence. He denies it. He may be contradicted on the ground that the question tends to

impeach his impartiality.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 153 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

QUESTION BY PARTY TO HIS OWN WITNESS.

By virtue of Section 157(1) the Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls

a witness to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse

party.

By virtue of Section 157(2) nothing in this section shall disentitle the person so

permitted under sub-section (1), to rely on any part of the evidence of such witness.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

IMPEACHING CREDIT OF WITNESS.

According to Section 158 the credit of a witness may be impeached in the following

ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him—

(a) by the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe

him to be unworthy of credit;

(b) by proof that the witness has been bribed, or has accepted the offer of a bribe, or has received

any other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;

contradicted.

Explanation.

A witness declaring another witness to be unworthy of credit may not, upon his examination-

in-chief, give reasons for his belief, but he may be asked his reasons in cross-examination, and

the answers which he gives cannot be contradicted, though, if they are false, he may afterwards

be charged with giving false evidence.

Illustrations.

(a) A sues B for the price of goods sold and delivered to B. C says that he delivered the goods to

B. Evidence is offered to show that, on a previous occasion, he said that he had not delivered

goods to B. The evidence is admissible.

(b) A is accused of the murder of B. C says that B, when dying, declared that A had given B the

wound of which he died. Evidence is offered to show that, on a previous occasion, C said that

B, when dying, did not declare that A had given B the wound of which he died. The evidence

is admissible.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

QUESTIONS TENDING TO CORROBORATE EVIDENCE OF RELEVANT FACT,

ADMISSIBLE.

Section 159 states that when a witness whom it is intended to corroborate gives

evidence of any relevant fact, he may be questioned as to any other circumstances which he

observed at or near to the time or place at which such relevant fact occurred, if the Court is of

opinion that such circumstances, if proved, would corroborate the testimony of the witness as

to the relevant fact which he testifies.

Illustration.

A, an accomplice, gives an account of a robbery in which he took part. He describes various

incidents unconnected with the robbery which occurred on his way to and from the place where

it was committed. Independent evidence of these facts may be given in order to corroborate his

evidence as to the robbery itself.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 156 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

FORMER STATEMENTS OF WITNESS MAY BE PROVED TO CORROBORATE

LATER TESTIMONY AS TO SAME FACT.

In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such

witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any

authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.

142

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

WHAT MATTERS MAY BE PROVED IN CONNECTION WITH PROVED

STATEMENT RELEVANT UNDER SECTION 26 OR 27.

Section 161 provides that whenever any statement, relevant under section 26 or 27, is

proved, all matters may be proved either in order to contradict or to corroborate it, or in order

to impeach or confirm the credit of the person by whom it was made, which might have been

proved if that person had been called as a witness and had denied upon cross-examination the

truth of the matter suggested.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 158 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

REFRESHING MEMORY.

Section 162(1) states that a witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory

by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he

is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was

at that time fresh in his memory:

142

Section 160

Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and

read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.

Section 162(2) provides that whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference

to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:

Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the

original:

Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 159 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

TESTIMONY TO FACTS STATED IN DOCUMENT MENTIONED IN SECTION 162.

By virtue of Section 163 a witness may also testify to facts mentioned in any such

document as is mentioned in section 162, although he has no specific recollection of the facts

themselves, if he is sure that the facts were correctly recorded in the document.

Illustration.

A book-keeper may testify to facts recorded by him in books regularly kept in the course of

business, if he knows that the books were correctly kept, although he has forgotten the

particular transactions entered.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 160 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RIGHT OF ADVERSE PARTY AS TO WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMORY.

Any writing referred to under the provisions of the two last preceding sections shall be

produced and shown to the adverse party if he requires it; such party may, if he pleases, cross-

examine the witness thereupon.

143

Section 164

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 161 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

RIGHT OF ADVERSE PARTY AS TO WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMORY.

By virtue of Section 165(1) a witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in

his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be

to its production or to its admissibility:

Provided that the validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court.

Section 165(2) states that the Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it

refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.

According to Section 165(3) if for such a purpose it is necessary to cause any document

to be translated, the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret,

unless the document is to be given in evidence and, if the interpreter disobeys such direction,

he shall be held to have committed an offence under section 198 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,

2023:

Provided that no Court shall require any communication between the Ministers and the

President of India to be produced before it.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

GIVING, AS EVIDENCE, OF DOCUMENT CALLED FOR AND PRODUCED ON

NOTICE.

According to Section 166 when a party calls for a document which he has given the

other party notice to produce, and such document is produced and inspected by the party calling

for its production, he is bound to give it as evidence if the party producing it requires him to

do so.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 163 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

USING, AS EVIDENCE, OF DOCUMENT PRODUCTION OF WHICH WAS

REFUSED ON NOTICE.

Section 167 states that when a party refuses to produce a document which he has had

notice to produce, he cannot afterwards use the document as evidence without the consent of

the other party or the order of the Court.

Illustration.

A sues B on an agreement and gives B notice to produce it. At the trial, A calls for the

document and B refuses to produce it. A gives secondary evidence of its contents. B seeks to

produce the document itself to contradict the secondary evidence given by A, or in order to

show that the agreement is not stamped. He cannot do so.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 164 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

JUDGE'S POWER TO PUT QUESTIONS OR ORDER PRODUCTION.

By virtue of Section 168 the Judge may, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant

facts, ask any question he considers necessary, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of

the parties about any fact; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither

the parties nor their representatives shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question

or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer

given in reply to any such question:

Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Adhiniyam to be relevant,

and duly proved:

Provided further that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel any witness to answer

any question, or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to

answer or produce under sections 127 to 136, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the

document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it

would be improper for any other person to ask under section 151 or 152; nor shall he dispense

with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER XI

OF IMPROPER ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EVIDENCE

NO NEW TRIAL FOR IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE.

According to Section 169 the improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be

ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the

Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and

admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence

had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision.

NOTE: This provision is analogous to Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

CHAPTER XII

REPEAL AND SAVINGS

REPEAL AND SAVINGS.

According to 170(1) the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is hereby repealed.

Section 170(2) states that notwithstanding such repeal, if, immediately before the date

on which this Adhiniyam comes into force, there is any application, trial, inquiry, investigation,

proceeding or appeal pending, then, such application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding

or appeal shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as in force

immediately before such commencement, as if this Adhiniyam had not come into force.

THE SCHEDULE

[See section 63(4)(c)]

CERTIFICATE

PART A

(To be filled by the Party)

I, (Name), Son/daughter/spouse of residing/employed at do hereby

solemnly affirm and sincerely state and submit as follows:—

I have produced electronic record/output of the digital record taken from the following

device/digital record source (tick mark):—

Computer / Storage Media DVR Mobile Flash Drive CD/DVD Server

Cloud Other

Other:

Make & Model: Color:

Serial Number:

IMEI/UIN/UID/MAC/Cloud ID (as applicable)

and any other relevant information, if any, about the device/digital record (specify).

The digital device or the digital record source was under the lawful control for regularly

creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of carrying out regular activities

and during this period, the computer or the communication device was working properly and

the relevant information was regularly fed into the computer during the ordinary course of

business. If the computer/digital device at any point of time was not working properly or out

of operation, then it has not affected the electronic/digital record or its accuracy. The digital

device or the source of the digital record is:—

Owned Maintained Managed Operated by me (select as applicable).

I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is , obtained through the

following algorithm:—

SHA1:

SHA256:

MD5:

Other (Legally acceptable standard) (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)

(Name and signature)

Date (DD/MM/YYYY):

Time (IST): hours (In 24 hours format) Place:

PART B

(To be filled by the Expert)

I, (Name), Son/daughter/spouse of residing/employed at do hereby

solemnly affirm and sincerely state and submit as follows:—

The produced electronic record/output of the digital record are obtained from the following

device/digital record source (tick mark):—

Computer / Storage Media DVR Mobile Flash Drive CD/DVD Server

Cloud Other

Other:

Make & Model: Color: Serial Number:

IMEI/UIN/UID/MAC/Cloud ID (as applicable)

and any other relevant information, if any, about the device/digital record (specify).

I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is , obtained through the

following algorithm:—

SHA1:

SHA256:

MD5:

Other (Legally acceptable standard) (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)

(Name, designation and signature)

Date (DD/MM/YYYY):

Time (IST): hours (In 24 hours format) Place:

—————

DIWAKAR SINGH,

Joint Secretary & Legislative Counsel to the Govt. of India.

UPLOADED BY THE MANAGER, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PRESS, MINTO ROAD,

NEW DELHI–110002 AND PUBLISHED BY THE CONTROLLER OF PUBLICATIONS,

DELHI–110054.

MGIPMRND—533GI(S3)—25-12-2023.

Kshitiz

2.5.4.20=e8b886a9336825f4d863142c634f2f25e2e76d2f0b5f069af

Delhi, pseudonym=5c90ab0ba7a48905de2428b65504151c,

d23eb18886abaeea31b247, ou=Deputy Manager, o=Government

of India Press, cn=Kshitiz Mohan