THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA
Regal Mentor-Mob-9995400709
INTRODUCTION
When the entire world observes the world's largest democracy, remnants of colonialism persist in
many aspects of its legislature. The formal codification of laws had to await the 'white man's
burden' to adopt laws in the British model in Indian legislative and executive systems, despite
the ancient compilation of laws such as Upanishads and Dharmasasthra that stood as mighty
mountains in the entire spectrum of laws.
In overcoming these historical hindrances, India has made significant strides with the
enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Samhitha (BNS). This marks a fundamental shift in India’s
approach to criminal justice. Etymologically, Bharatiya Nyaya Samhitha seeks truth rather than
mere punishment. It introduces new offenses, enhanced penalties, gender inclusivity,
incorporates digital records into legal definitions, and removes outdated and unconstitutional
provisions. Notably, the introduction of community service in sentencing deserves special
mention.
In bypassing its colonial history and adopting a justice-centric approach, the Bharatiya
Nyaya Samhitha represents more than old wine in a new bottleit opens new doors for the
world's largest democracy, offering a fresh perspective on criminal adjudication.
DEFINITION OF CRIME
The expression ‘crime’ has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. A crime is an act
or omission in respect of which a punishment may be inflicted on the person responsible for the
act or omission. A crime can be defined as any act or omission of duty that results in harm to the
society at large and which is punishable by the state. A crime, by definition, harms society as a
whole. For this reason crimes are generally prosecuted by the state, i.e. it is not the role of the
victim to prosecute the person(s) committing the crime.
Definition
It is difficult to attach an exact definition to the term crime. There are motoring offences ranging
from simple parking errors, to death by dangerous driving. Offences against the person range
from a slap to murder.
In Halsbury’s Laws of England, the crime is defined as “an unlawful act or default, which
is an offence against the public. Blackstone in his classical work, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, attempted to define crime as a public wrong. According to him crime is an act
committed or omitted in violation of a public duty forbidding or commanding it”. Blackstone
identified the demerits of his first definition, so he modified it and said, “a crime is a violation of
the public rights and duties due to the whole community.
Later when Stephen got an opportunity to edit the work of Blackstone, Blackstone’s
commentaries, he made a modification to the definition. Thus from the definitions given by
Blackstone and Stephen, one can conclude that the crime is a breach of laws which injure the
community in general. But this concept has been criticized by Kenny as erroneous because in his
view all acts that are injurious to the community are not necessarily crime. A Crime is an act or
omission in respect of which legal punishment may be inflicted on the person who is in default
either by acting or omitting to act.
1
There are many different types of crimes, from crimes against persons to victimless
crimes and violent crimes to white collar crimes. With each type of crime also come different
sociological phenomena and demographic profiles.
Crimes against Persons
Crimes against persons, also called personal crimes, include murder, aggravated assault, rape,
and robbery. Personal crimes are unevenly distributed in the United States, with young, urban,
poor, and racial minorities committing these crimes more than others.
Crimes against Property
Property crimes involve theft of property without bodily harm, such as burglary, larceny, auto
theft, and arson. Like personal crimes, young, urban, poor, and racial minorities generally
commit these crimes more than others.
Crimes against Morality
Crimes against morality are also called victimless crimes because there is not complainant, or
victim. Prostitution, illegal gambling, and illegal drug use are all examples of victimless crimes.
White-Collar Crime
White-collar crimes are crimes that committed by people of high social status who commit their
crimes in the context of their occupation. This includes embezzling (stealing money from one’s
employer), insider trading, and tax evasion and other violations of income tax laws.
White-collar crimes generally generate less concern in the public mind than other types of crime,
however in terms of total dollars, white-collar crimes are even more consequential for society.
Nonetheless, these crimes are generally the least investigated and least prosecuted.
Organized Crime
Organized crime is crime committed by structured groups typically involving the distribution of
illegal goods and services to others. Many people think of the Mafia when they think of
organized crime, but the term can refer to any group that exercises control over large illegal
1
James Stephen
enterprises (such as the drug trade, illegal gambling, prostitution, weapons smuggling, or money
laundering).
A key sociological concept in the study or organized crime is that these industries are
organized along the same lines as legitimate businesses and take on a corporate form. There are
typically senior partners who control the business’ profits, workers who manage and work for the
business, and clients who buy the goods and services that the organization provides.
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminal liability is what unlocks the logical structure of the criminal law. Each element of a
crime that the prosecutor needs to prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) involves a principle of
criminal liability. There are some crimes that only involve a subset of the principles of liability,
but these are rare and are called "crimes of criminal conduct." Burglary, for example, is such a
crime because all need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is an actus reus concurring with a
mens rea. On the other hand, there are crimes that involve all the principles of liability, and these
are called "true crimes" that reflect "black letter law." Homicide, for example, is such a crime
because need to prove actus reus, mens rea, concurrence, causation, and harm. The requirement
that the prosecutor must prove each element of criminal liability beyond a reasonable doubt is
called the "corpus delicti rule."
Liability needs to be distinguished from the following concepts:
culpability (purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently) - infers intent
capacity (infancy, intoxication, insanity) - capacity defenses
responsibility (volition, free will, competency) - presumptions
In general, liability is one of the most important concepts in law. From the above list, it
is closest to responsibility, but more strictly refers to the idea of "legal responsibility" as in the
notion from civil law where a person is "legally liable" if they do not meet some "legal
responsibility." Some good synonyms for it are answerability or accountability. Liability is
inherently a social concept, which implies not only some harm is done to society, but there is
some collective accountability involved. Of course, pure collective accountability is called
"vicarious liability" but modern societies (and even Anglo-American common law) have moved
away from collective or community-based systems of responsibility to systems where
governments get to declare what is criminal or quasi-criminal.
There are five principles of liability in criminal law:
Principle of Actus Reus
Principle of Mens Rea
Principle of Concurrence
Principle of Causation
Principle of Resulting Harm
THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTUS REUS
Involuntariness -- sleepwalking, hypnotic behavior, etc. are seen as examples of acting upon
forces beyond individual control, and are therefore not normally included in the principle of
actus reus. However, certain "voluntarily induced involuntary acts" such as drowsy driving might
arguably be included if the prior voluntary act created the risk of a future involuntary act.
manifest criminality -- caught red-handed, clear-cut case of actus reus proven beyond a
reasonable doubt
Possession -- the law recognizes various degrees of this. Actual possession means physically on
your person. Constructive possession means physically under your control. Knowing possession
means you know what you are possessing. Mere possession means you don't know what you are
possessing. Unwitting possession is when something has been planted on you. The only
punishable types of possession are the ones that are conscious and knowable.
procuring -- obtaining things with the intent of using them for criminal purposes; e.g., precursor
chemicals for making narcotics, "pimping" for a prostitute, and procuring another to commit a
crime ("accessory before the fact")
Status or condition -- sometimes a chronic condition qualifies as action, e.g., drug addiction,
alcoholism, on the assumption that first use is voluntary. Sometimes the condition, e.g. chronic
alcoholism, is treated as a disease which exculpates an individual. Equal Protection and other
constitutional issues may be triggered.
Thoughts -- sometimes, not often, the expression of angry thoughts, e.g., "I'll kill you for that" is
taken as expressing the resolution and will to commit a crime, but in general, thoughts are not
part of the principle of actus reus. Daydreaming and fantasy are also not easily included in the
principle of mens rea.
Words -- these are considered "verbal acts"; e.g. sexual harassment, solicitation, terroristic
threats, assault, inciting to riot.
Criminal liability is what unlocks the logical structure of the criminal law. Each element of a
crime that the prosecutor needs to prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) involves a principle of
criminal liability. There are some crimes that only involve a subset of the principles of liability,
but these are rare and are called "crimes of criminal conduct." Burglary, for example, is such a
crime because all you need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is an actus reus concurring with a
mens rea. On the other hand, there are crimes that involve all the principles of liability, and these
are called "true crimes" that reflect "black letter law." Homicide, for example, is such a crime
because you need to prove actus reus, mens rea, concurrence, causation, and harm. The
requirement that the prosecutor must prove each element of criminal liability beyond a
reasonable doubt is called the "corpus delicti rule."
Liability needs to be distinguished from the following concepts:
culpability (purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently) - infers intent
capacity (infancy, intoxication, insanity) - capacity defenses
responsibility (volition, free will, competency) - presumptions
In general, liability is one of the most important concepts in law. From the above list, it
is closest to responsibility, but more strictly refers to the idea of "legal responsibility" as in the
notion from civil law where a person is "legally liable" if they do not meet some "legal
responsibility." Liability is inherently a social concept, which implies not only some harm is
done to society, but there is some collective accountability involved. Of course, pure collective
accountability is called "vicarious liability" but modern societies (and even Anglo-American
common law) have moved away from collective or community-based systems of responsibility
to systems where governments get to declare what is criminal or quasi-criminal.
Elements of Crime
With the exception of strict liability offences, for a criminal offence to have occurred, the
accused must have committed both elements of the crime:
o Actus reus: refers to the actions (or in rare cases the failure to act/the omission) of the accused;
that is that the accused actually did the act {Physical element}.
o Mens rea: refers to the mental state of the accused; i.e. that the accused intended the actions.
{Mental element}
To constitute a crime, two elements are necessary and they are:
A. Or Actus Reus.
B. Mental element or Mens Rea.
The fundamental principle of penal liability is based on the Latin maxim Actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit reaIt means that an act does not become a crime unless done with a guilty
mind. So, the guilty mind and the act must concur to constitute a crime. Both the Actus Reus and
Mens Rea are essential to constitute a crime.
Actus Reus
The term Actusmeans a deed, a physical result or conduct. It is defined as “such result
of human conduct as the law seeks to prevent”. For e.g. in the case of a murder, the conduct of
murderer is brought out by the victim’s death. Here, the conduct is ‘Actus reus’.
The conduct of the offender is experienced in 3 ways:
i. A certain wilful movement or omission.
ii. Certain surrounding circumstances including past acts.
iii. Certain consequents.
Act is a conscious movement. It results from the operation of will. The will may be by
thinking and working out by mind. It may also be expressed by way of working out of a problem
on a paper. The former is called Internal Act and the later is called External Act.
Elements of Act
a. Origin b. Circumstances c. Consequences.
Origin
If a person commits an act, he has to think of it and do some physical bodily activity. For
example if A wants to kill B, A must think of it and then raise his hand, apply his fingers on the
trigger and pull it.
Circumstances
In the above example, circumstances are the following:
1. The rifle must be already loaded.
2. B must be in the line of trigger point.
Consequences
Consequences are the outcome (result) of the origin or circumstances. In the
above example, the fall of the trigger and the explosion of the bullet constitute the consequences
of the act.
It is not the origin that completes the act as illegal, but it is only the circumstances and
consequences which make the act illegal or an offence.
Characteristics of Act
a) An act is an event subject to the control of will power. For e.g., ‘A’ falling from a tower
or building is an event where as ‘A’ jumping from a tower or building is an act.
b) An act may include omission also. For eg, a parent can be held liable for the murder of
his child by starvation.
c) A man is liable only for such acts, the consequences of which are foreseen by him.
d) If there are subsisting and intervening causes, the act is not punishable. For eg. if a man
shoot a girl, but if she dies from fever, then the accused is not guilty of murder, because the death
is not due to the act of shooting.
e) Under certain circumstances, even without physical participation, a man’s act is punishable.
For e.g. a man in Delhi can be held liable for arranging the commission of a crime at Madras.
Thus, acts like Abetment and Conspiracy are punishable even though there is no physical
participation in the commission of crime.
Mens Rea
A prohibited act will become a crime when it is accompanied by a certain state of
mind. There must be a mind at fault before any crime can be committed. An act or omission
alone is not sufficient to constitute a crime. The act or omission should have followed by an evil
intent.
The combination of an act with the intent makes a crime. An act by itself is not a
wrong. An act done with guilty mind makes it a crime if the act is prohibited by law. Mens rea
is an evil intention or knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act. Mens rea may be of different
kinds:
(1) Intention
Intention indicates the state of mind of a man who, not only foresees, but also
desires the possible consequence of his conduct.
Illustration
X throws a stone at Y with a desire to cause injury to Y. As a result of that injury
is caused to Y. The desire of X to cause injury to Y is intention or mens rea and the act of
throwing the stone and the consequential injury is the actus reus.
(2) Recklessness
When a person does an act with foresight of injury but without desire to cause harm to
any person the state of mind can be called "recklessness".
Illustration
X drives a vehicle at high speed through a busy street without any desire to commit injury
to any person. He foresees the possibility of accident but consciously takes the risk that may
result from such a driving. The accident may or may not happen. The state of mind of X at the
time of driving is recklessness. It is a mind at fault with mens rea for constituting a crime.
(3) Negligence
Negligence means want of care. When a person who is bound to take care fails to take
care of an ordinary prudent man his mind is at fault and the faulty state of mind is known as
"negligence”. Recklessness includes negligent conduct.
(4) Knowledge
Knowledge refers to the personal information of a person doing an act. It is a state of
mind of a person. Under law doing of an act with knowledge may constitute a crime.
Illustration
X receives stolen property from Y with knowledge that it is stolen property. The act of X
is an offence punishable under law.
(5) Motive
Motive is an attitude of the mind. It is the emotion prompting the act. Love, compassion,
fear, jealousy, hatred, perverted lust, desire for money etc. are examples of emotion prompting us
the act and they constitute motive.
Motive refers to the ultimate intent. X is a starving man. He decides to commit theft of
bread to satisfy his hunger and he commits theft of bread from B's shop. The immediate intention
of his act is theft of bread and the motive is to satisfy his hunger. Thus, motive is the ulterior
object of an act which prompted him to do an act. Purity of motive or good motive will not
convert an act which otherwise criminal into one which is not punishable.
Exceptions to the element of Mens Rea
Strict liability offences
Strict liability offences are minor in nature, e.g. speeding. For these offences it is not necessary
for the prosecution to prove mens rea; proof of the act alone is sufficient to constitute a crime.
Strict liability offences can only be successfully defended if the accused can prove that the actual
act did not occur as mens rea is irrelevant to this category of offences.
Mens Rea in Statutory Offences
There are certain enactments which defines offences without mentioning the necessity of
mens rea. In those statutes offences are defined in absolute terms. The Opium Act, 1878, The
Foreign Exchange Act, 1947, The Prevention Food Adulteration Act, 1954, The Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985, etc, are examples of such enactments.
In olden days it was a common belief that legislature was not competent to over-ride the
established rules of common law. According to this view, even if the necessity of mens rea is
not expressly mentioned in a particular statute, the judges should read between lines the
necessary mens rea. In other words the necessity of mens rea should be taken as granted. Thus
even if the offences are defined without mentioning the necessity of mens rea, the courts used to
acquit the accused in the absence of guilty mind. But the present view is that when the
legislature defines an offence in absolute terms the courts cannot read in between lines the
necessary mens rea.
In State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George
2
, this case the accused was a passenger in a
Swiss Plane from Zurich to Manila. When the plain landed at the Bombay Airport, 34 Kg of
gold was recovered from him. He pleaded that he brought gold in to India for mere transit to
Manila. Supreme Court convicted him on the ground that violation of law itself is sufficient for
criminal liability even without mens rea.
2
AIR 1965 SC 722.
In Inder Singh v. State of Punjab
3
, the appellant received a parcel containing fruits. While
he was carrying the parcel from the railway station the Police arrested him. The parcel was found
to contain Opium along with fruits. The mere possession of Opium is punishable under the
Opium Act, 1878. The accused was punished for possession of Opium though he had no
knowledge of the existence of Opium in the parcel.
Thus the classical view that ‘no mens rea, no crime' has been avoided by several statutes
enacted by the legislatures in India and by such laws severe punishments have been prescribed
for mere actus reus. Thus the statutory offences constitute an exception to doctrine of mens rea.
CRIMINAL DEFENSES
Defendants of a crime must refute one or more elements of the crime of which they have
been accused by:
Arguing they were falsely accused and that the real culprit has yet to be identified.
May claim that although they engaged in the criminal act of which they are accused, they
lacked the intent needed to be found guilty of the crime.
Excuses - excuse criminal actions by claiming he or she lacked the capacity to form
sufficient intent to be held criminally responsible (insanity, intoxication, and ignorance)
Another type of defense is justification the individual admits committing the criminal
act but maintains that the act was justified and that he or she should therefore not be held
criminally liable. (Justified under the circumstances necessity, duress, self-defense, and
entrapment)
Ignorance or Mistake ignorance of the law is no excuse; ignorance does not excuse evil
intent; can be an excuse when there was no intent to violate the law and unknowingly did so
(buying goods you did not know were stolen) or if the mistake is reasonable (some statutory
rape)
Insanity a defense to criminal prosecution in which the defendant’s state of mind
negates his or her criminal responsibility
Insanity is a legal category in which psychiatric testimony is to prove a defendant legally
sane.
A person found to be legally insane at the time of trial is placed in the custody of state
mental health authorities until diagnosed as sane.
U.S. courts usually use the M’Naghten Rule or the substantial capacity test
3
1972 (2) SCC 372.
M’Naghten Rule is known as the right-wrong test; didn’t know what he was doing or
didn’t know it was wrong.
M’Naghten criticized due to confusion of terms “disease of the mind” and know the
nature and quality of the act” having never been properly clarified; mental health professionals
have pointed out that rule is unrealistic and narrow in that it does not cover situations in which
people know right from wrong but cannot control their actions.
Irresistible impulse test could not control his conduct at the time of the crime; if jury
finds a person acted under an irresistible impulse, the defendant would be placed in a mental
health facility until considered capable of controlling his or her behavior.
Substantial capacity test is essentially a combination of M’Naghten and Irresistible
impulse requiring only a lack of substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the
conduct or to control it, which must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt
Intoxication which in legal terms is defined as the taking of alcohol or drugs, is not
generally considered a defense
Duress defense to a crime when the defendant commits an illegal act because the
defendant, or a third person, has been threatened by another with death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not performed.
Necessity- as a defense is applied in situations in which a person must break the law to
avoid a greater evil caused by natural forces (storms, earthquakes, or illness) this defense is
available only when committing the crime is the lesser of two evils.
Self-Defense involves a claim that the defendant’s actions were a justified response to
the victim’s provocative behavior.
Self-defense can be used to protect one’s person or property.
An individual is justified in using force against another to protect himself or herself.
Defendants must reasonably believe that they are in danger of death or great harm and
that it is necessary for them to use force to protect themselves.
The amount of force used must be no greater than that necessary to prevent personal
harm.
Entrapment another defense that excuses a defendant from criminal liability.
Defendant maintains that law enforcement officers induced him or her to commit a crime
that the defendant would not have committed had it not been for trickery, persuasion, or fraud on
the officers’ part
Law enforcement officers plan a crime, implant the criminal idea in a person’s mind, and
pressure that person into doing the act is different than an officer providing an opportunity for
the crime to be committed and the defendant being willing and ready to do the act
Exotic Defences based on pre-existing conditions or syndromes with which their clients
were afflicted
Vicarious Liability in Crimes
Vicarious liability is a principle by which one person is held liable for another's wrong. In
the case of crime only the person who actually commits the crime is normally responsible. There
are certain exceptions to the general rule that in case of crime only the person who committed the
crime is liable. The following are the exceptions:
(i) Section 154 of IPC provides that if unlawful assembly or riot takes place on the land of
person, the owner or occupier of such land is liable to be punished with fine not exceeding one
thousand rupees if he or his agent or manager fails to give the earliest notice of an unlawful
assembly or riot to the principal officer at the nearest police-station.
In R. v. Prayag Singh
4
, a riot took place on the land of one Prayag Singh during the
course of which one Pir Khan was killed. Prayag Singh was punished with fine of Rs. 1000/-.
(ii) According Section 155 of the I.P.C. whenever a riot is committed for the benefit of the
owner or occupier of any land who claims any interest in such land, if such person has reason to
believe that such riot was likely to be committed, the owner or occupier is liable for fine if he has
not taken all lawful means to prevent such riot.
(iii) Section 34 deals with joint liability or vicarious liability on the basis of "common
intention". By virtue of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, "when a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all each of such persons is liable for
that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone".
In Hari Ram v. State of UP
5
, the Court held that to prove the charge of common intention,
the prosecution must present evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, demonstrating a planned
or concerted effort among all accused individuals to commit the offence.
In State of U.P v. Kishan Chand and Others
6
, it was determined that the common object
of an unlawful assembly can be inferred from the assembly's nature, the weapons employed, and
the conduct exhibited by its members at or before the incident. This inference is drawn based on
the specific facts and circumstances of each case.
(iv) Section 120A and 120B deal with joint liability of a member of a conspiracy to commit
an offence.
4
1890 (12) All 550.
5
2004 (8) SCC 146.
6
2004 (7) SCC 629.
(v) Section 149 deals with joint liability or vicarious liability of members of an unlawful
assembly when an offence is committed by a member in prosecution of the common object of the
unlawful assembly.
(vi) Section 396 deals with joint liability or vicarious liability of dacoits when a dacoit
commits murder for committing dacoity.
(vii) Section 460 deals with joint liability of persons concerned in lurking-house trespass or
house breaking by night when death or grievous hurt is caused by one of them.
In Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of A.P
7
, it was held that an attempt consists in it the
intent to commit a crime, falling short of, its actual commission or consummation/completion. It
may consequently be defined as that which if not prevented would have resulted in the full
consummation of the act attempted.
Parties to a crime
Including principal in the first degree, principal in the second degree, accessory before the
fact, accessory after the fact
Crimes are often complex events with a range of criminal activity, undertaken by a number of
different people associated with the event. All the people involved in a crime are referred to as
parties to the crime. All parties can be convicted and be punished by the court. Their punishment
will depend in part on the extent to which they were involved in the crime. The more involved
the greater the punishment. There are four types of parties to a crime; these are:
1. Principal in the first degree: the person(s) directly responsible for the criminal act, e.g. robbed
the bank.
2. Principal in the second degree: the person, who assists the offender in the first degree to commit
the crime, e.g. drove the getaway car.
3. Accessory before the fact: the person(s) who helped to plan the crime e.g. stole the bank plans.
4. Accessory after the fact: the person(s) who knowingly assists the offender after the crime has
been committed, e.g. helped hide the offender from police.
THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 NO. 45 OF 2023
[25th December, 2023.]
An Act to consolidate and amend the provisions relating to offences and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Seventy-fourth Year of the Republic of India as follows: ––
7
2004 (2) KLT SN 19.
CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY
1. Short Title, commencement and application
(1) This Act may be called the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
(2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this
Sanhita.
(3) Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Sanhita and not otherwise for every act
or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within India
(4) Any person liable, by any law for the time being in force in India, to be tried for an offence
committed beyond India shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Sanhita for any act
committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within India.
(5) The provisions of this Sanhita shall also apply to any offence committed by
(a) Any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India;
(b) Any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be;
(c) Any person in any place without and beyond India committing an offence targeting a
computer resource located in India.
Explanation. —In this section, the word “offence” includes every act committed outside India
which, if committed in India, would be punishable under this Sanhita.
Illustration
A, who is a citizen of India, commits a murder in any place without and beyond India.
He can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in India in which he may be found.
(6) Nothing in this Sanhita shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and
desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the
provisions of any special or local law.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Sec 1 of IPC
Territorial Jurisdiction
According to Sec.1 of the I.P.C. The territorial jurisdiction extends all over India, except
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. So, every person who is within Indian Territory is punishable,
whether he is an Indian or a foreigner. The citizenship or nationality of the person is immaterial.
Exemptions
The following persons are exempted from jurisdiction:
i. The President of India or the Governor of a state.
ii. The Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
iii. Foreign Sovereigns and Ambassadors.
iv. Warships of Foreign States.
v. Alien Enemies.
vi. Former Rulers of the States.
Maritime Territory
For the purpose of jurisdiction, the land, internal waters such as rivers, lakes, and canals
are included. The sea was not under the territorial jurisdiction. But now, by enacting the
“Territorial waters Jurisdiction Act” the jurisdiction of I.P.C. extends to 12 nautical miles into
the sea.
R v. Keyn (Franconia case)
The German ship Franconia, while passing within three miles of the shore of England,
ran into a British ship and caused the death of a passenger, which amounted to the offence of
manslaughter. Mr. Keyn, the captain of the ship was tried for the offence of manslaughter. As a
statutory enactment was absent, the English criminal court had no power to try such an offence.
Hence the English parliament enacted the “Territorial waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878” which
extended the jurisdiction of English Courts to three miles into sea from the shore.
Similarly, the air space excluding outer space above a country is subject to its control and
the country can prohibit the disturbance of the air space by wireless communication from foreign
stations.
Extra Territorial Jurisdiction
Sec.3 and 4 says that if an offence is committed outside India, the offender can be
punished in two ways:
1. If he is a citizen of India, and commits an offence outside India, (but this offence must be
punishable under the I.P.C.)
2. If an offence is committed in any ship or aircraft registered in India, wherever it may be.
The word ‘offence’ means every act, which is punishable under Indian Penal Code,
though committed outside India. Thus Sec.3 and 4 extend the jurisdiction of Indian Courts
beyond the territorial limits of India. This is called Extra Territorial Jurisdiction of the I.P.C.
Illustration
A, who is a citizen of India commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted
for murder in any place in India in which he may be found.
Extra territorial jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian Courts for offences committed
beyond the territories of India either in land or high seas.
The term ‘citizen of India’ means every person who has his domicile in the territory of
India and who is born in the territory of India, or either of whose parents was born in the territory
of India or who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years
immediately preceding the commencement of the Indian constitution. The accused must be a
citizen of India at the time of committing the offence and not an individual who has become a
citizen subsequently.
Admiralty Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction to try offences committed on high seas is known as Admiralty
Jurisdiction. High seas are considered to be no man’s territory. The jurisdiction of a country over
its ships on the high seas is based on the principle that the ship is a floating island belonging to
the nation whose flag she is flying.
The Admiralty jurisdiction extends:
1. over offences committed on Indian ships;
2. Over offences committed on foreign ships in Indian territorial waters; and
3. over pirates.
2. In this Sanhita, unless the context otherwise requires, ––
(1) “Act” denotes as well a series of acts as a single act;
(2) “Animal” means any living creature, other than a human being;
(3) “Child” means any person below the age of eighteen years;
(4) Counterfeit”. ––A person is said to counterfeit” who causes one thing to resemble another
thing, intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception, or knowing it to be likely
that deception will thereby be practised.
Explanation 1. It is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be exact.
Explanation 2. When a person causes one thing to resemble another thing, and the
resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved, that the person so causing the one thing to resemble the other thing intended
by means of that resemblance to practise deception or knew it to be likely that deception would
thereby be practised;
(5) “Court” means a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges
which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is
acting judicially;
(6) “Death” means the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context;
(7) Dishonestly means doing anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one
person or wrongful loss to another person;
(8) Document means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of
letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital
record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.
Explanation 1. It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or
marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in a Court or not.
Illustrations.
(a) A writing expressing the terms of a contract, which may be used as evidence of the contract,
is a document.
(b) A cheque upon a banker is a document.
(c) A power-of-attorney is a document.
(d) A map or plan which is intended to be used or which may be used as evidence, is a document.
(e) A writing containing directions or instructions is a document.
Explanation 2. Whatever is expressed by means of letters, figures or marks as explained by
mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such letters, figures or marks
within the meaning of this section, although the same may not be actually expressed.
Illustration.
A write his name on the back of a bill of exchange payable to his order. The meaning of the
endorsement, as explained by mercantile usage, is that the bill is to be paid to the holder. The
endorsement is a document, and shall be construed in the same manner as if the words “pay to
the holder” or words to that effect had been written over the signature;
(9) “Fraudulently” means doing anything with the intention to defraud but not otherwise;
(10) Gender”. —The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used by anys person, whether male,
female or transgender.
Explanation. –– “transgender” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (k) of section 2 of
the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019;
(11) Good faith”. —Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or
believed without due care and attention;
(12) “Government” means the Central Government or a State Government;
(13) harbor includes supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms,
ammunition or means of conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the
same kind as those enumerated in this clause or not, to evade apprehension;
(14) “Injury” means any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation
or property;
(15) Illegaland “legally bound to do”. —The word “illegal” is applicable to everything which
is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a
person is said to be “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal in him to omit;
(16) “Judge” means a person who is officially designated as a Judge and includes a person, ––
(i) who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive
judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment
which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or
(ii) Who is one of a body or persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a
judgment.
Illustration.
A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power to sentence to
fine or imprisonment, with or without appeal, is a Judge;
(17) “Life” means the life of a human being, unless the contrary appears from the context;
(18) “Local law” means a law applicable only to a particular part of India;
(19) “Man means male human being of any age;
(20) Monthand year”. ––Wherever the word “month” or the word year” is used, it is to be
understood that the month or the year is to be reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar;
(21) Movable property” includes property of every description, except land and things attached
to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth;
(22) Number”. Unless the contrary appears from the context, words importing the singular
number include the plural number, and words importing the plural number include the singular
number;
(23) “oath” includes a solemn affirmation substituted by law for an oath, and any declaration
required or authorised by law to be made before a public servant or to be used for the purpose of
proof, whether in a Court or not;
(24) “offence”. Except in the Chapters and sections mentioned in sub-clauses (a) and (b), the
word “offence” means a thing made punishable by this Sanhita, but––
(a) in Chapter III and in the following sections, namely, sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
section 8, sections 9, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 119,
120, 123, sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 127, 222, 230, 231, 240, 248, 250,
251, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 308 and sub-section (2) of
section 330, the word offence” means a thing punishable under this Sanhita, or under any
special law or local law; and
(b) in sub-section (1) of section 189, sections 211, 212, 238, 239, 249, 253 and sub-section (1) of
section 329, the word “offence” shall have the same meaning when the act punishable under the
special law or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months
or more, whether with or without fine;
(25) “Omission” denotes as well as a series of omissions as a single omission;
(26) Personincludes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or
not;
(27) “Public” includes any class of the public or any community;
(28) “Public servant” means a person falling under any of the descriptions, namely:
(a) Every commissioned officer in the Army, Navy or Air Force;
(b) Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as
a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;
(c) every officer of a Court including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner whose duty it is, as
such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or
keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial
process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court, and every
person specially authorised by a Court to perform any of such duties;
(d) Every assessor or member of a panchayat assisting a Court or public servant;
(e) Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision
or report by any Court, or by any other competent public authority;
(f) Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any
person in confinement;
(g) every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give
information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or
convenience;
(h) every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property
on behalf of the Government, or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of the
Government, or to execute any revenue-process, or to investigate, or to report, on any matter
affecting the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to make, authenticate or keep any
document relating to the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to prevent the infraction of
any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of the Government;
(i) every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property,
to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of
any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining
of the rights of the people of any village, town or district;
(j) Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish,
maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election;
(k) Every person
(i) In the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the
performance of any public duty by the Government;
(ii) In the service or pay of a local authority as defined in clause (31) of section 3 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, a corporation established by or under a Central or State Act or a Government
company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013.
Explanation:
(a) Persons falling under any of the descriptions made in this clause are public servants, whether
appointed by the Government or not;
(b) Every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal
defect there may be in his right to hold that situation is a public servant;
(c) Election means an election for the purpose of selecting members of any legislative,
municipal or other public authority, of whatever character, the method of selection to which is
by, or under any law for the time being in force.
Illustration.
A Municipal Commissioner is a public servant;
(29) Reason to believe”. A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has
sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise;
(30) “Special law” means a law applicable to a particular subject;
(31) “valuable security” means a document which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any
legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or whereby any
person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right.
Illustration.
A write his name on the back of a bill of exchange. As the effect of this endorsement is to
transfer the right to the bill to any person who may become the lawful holder of it, the
endorsement is a “valuable security”;
(32) Vessel means anything made for the conveyance by water of human beings or of
property;
(33) Voluntarily”. —A person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by
means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those
means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.
Illustration.
A set fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large town, for the purpose of facilitating a
robbery and thus causing the death of a person. Here, A may not have intended to cause death;
and may even be sorry that death has been caused by his act; yet, if he knew that he was likely to
cause death, he has caused death voluntarily;
(34) “Will” means any testamentary document;
(35) “Woman” means a female human being of any age;
(36) Wrongful gain” means gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is
not legally entitled;
(37) “Wrongful loss” means the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it
is legally entitled;
(38) “Gaining wrongfully” and “losing wrongfully”. A person is said to gain wrongfully when
such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquires wrongfully. A person is
said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property, as well as when
such person is wrongfully deprived of property; and
(39) Words and expressions used but not defined in this Sanhita but defined in the Information
Technology Act, 2000 and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 shall have the
meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act and Sanhita.
NOTE This section corresponds to Sections 6-52A of IPC
S. 6 provides that throughout this Code every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and
every illustration of every such definition or penal provision shall be understood subject to the
exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled “General Exceptions”, though those exceptions are
not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or illustration
S. 7 states that every expression, which is explained in any part of this Code, is used in every part
of this Code in conformity with the explanation.
Gender
According to S. 8 the pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used for any person, whether male or
female.
Number
S. 9 provides that unless the contrary appears from the context, words importing the singular
number include the plural number, and words importing the plural number include the singular
number.
By virtue of S. 14 the words “servant of Government” denote any officer or servant continued,
appointed or employed in India by or under the authority of Government.
S. 19 states that the word “Judge” denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a
judge, but also every person.
S. 20 provides that the words “Court of Justice” denote a judge who is empowered by law to act
judicially alone, or a body of judges, which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body,
when such a judge or body of judges is acting judicially.
The term public servant is contained in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Actually, the term is
not defined in the Code. It gives a list of 10 categories of persons who are considered as public
servants. First of all, the public servant must be a servant. Public Servants are specially
protected by the Indian Penal Code. At the same time if they deviate from their powers they are
seriously dealt with. The servant who is performing public duty is generally called a public
servant. They are called statutory public servants.
According to S. 21 the words “moveable property” is intended to include corporeal property of
every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to
anything, which is attached to the earth.
Sec. 23 defines the words ‘Wrongful loss’ and ‘Wrongful gain’. It is curious to find that the word
“Wrongful” is not defined anywhere in the Code. But the word is indicative of some act which is
contrary to the dictates of law and which adversely affects some person. Both in wrongful gain
and loss some property should be involved. This is clear from the Section which reads
“Wrongful gain” as gain by “unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not
legally entitled.” Wrongful Loss” is loss by unlawful means of property to which the person
losing is legally entitled. In order to constitute wrongful loss the property should have been kept
out of it, by unlawful methods adopted by the accused.
“Dishonestly”
According to S. 24 whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one
person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”.
“Fraudulently”
By virtue of S. 25 a person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to
defraud but not otherwise.
“Reason to believe”
S. 26 provides that a person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient cause
to believe that thing but not otherwise.
Property in possession of wife, clerk or servant
According to S. 27 when property is in the possession of a person’s wife, clerk or servant, on
account of that person, it is in that person’s possession within the meaning of this Code.
Explanation to S. 27 states that a person employed temporarily or on a particular occasion in the
capacity of a clerk or servant, is a clerk or servant within the meaning of this section.
“Counterfeit”
S. 28 provides that a person is said to counterfeit” who causes one thing to resemble another
thing, intending by means of that resemblance to practice deception, or knowing it to be likely
that deception will thereby be practiced.
Explanation I to S. 27 states that it is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be
exact.
Explanation II to S. 27 states that when a person causes one thing to resemble another thing, and
the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved, that the person so causing the one thing to resemble the other thing intended
by means of that resemblance to practice deception or knew it to be likely that deception would
thereby be practiced.
“Document”
S. 29 provides that the word “document” denotes any matter expressed or described upon any
substance by means of letters, figures, or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to
be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.
Explanation I to S. 29 states that it is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the
letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in, a
Court of Justice, or no.
Illustrations
A writing expressing the terms of a contract, which may be used as evidence of the contract, is a
document.
A cheque upon a banker is a document.
A power of attorney is a document.
A man or plan which is intended to be used or which may be used as evidence, is a document.
Explanation II to S. 29 states that whatever is expressed by means of letters, figures or marks as
explained by mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such letters, figures
or marks within the meaning of this section, although the same may not be actually expressed.
Illustration
A write his name on the back of a bill of exchange payable to his order. The meaning of the
endorsement, as explained by mercantile usage, is that the bill is to be paid to the holder. The
endorsement is a document, and must be construed in the same manner as if the words “pay to
the holder” or words to that effect had been written over the signature.
“Valuable security”
According to S. 30 the words “valuable security” denote a document which is, or purports to be,
a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or
released, or whereby any person acknowledges that the security lies under legal liability, or has
not a certain legal right.
Illustration
A write his name on the back of a bill of exchange. As the effect of this endorsement is to
transfer the right to the bill to any person who may become the lawful holder of it, the
endorsement is a “valuable security”.
“A will”
By virtue of S. 31 the words “a will” denote any testamentary document.
“Words referring to acts include illegal omissions
S. 32 provides that in every part of this Code, except where a contrary intention appears from the
context, words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.
“Act”. “Omission”
S.33 states that the word “act” denotes as well a series of acts as a single act: the word
“omission” denotes as well as a series of omissions as a single omission.
Section 34 provides this principle. The Section says that if an offence is committed by two or
more persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons shall be held liable
as if the act was done by him alone. That means constructive liability will arise in such a case.
Section 34 does not create a specific offence. But it is only a rule of evidence.
The essential Ingredients of Section 34 are:
1) There must be two or more persons;
2) They must have a common intention;
3) The criminal act must be done in furtherance of the common intention; and
4) Participation in action by all the accused.
Ss.34 to 38 is in Chapter II of the IPC dealing with general explanation. These sections state the
conditions in which a man may be held constructively liable for the acts committed by the other
member of a group.
When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention
According to S. 34 whenever an act, which is criminal only be reason of its being done with a
criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in
the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act
were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.
Effect caused partly by act and partly by omission
By virtue of S. 36 wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by
an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly
by an act and partly by an omission is the same offence.
Illustration
An intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by
beating Z. A has committed murder.
Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence
S. 37 provides that when an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever
intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either
singly or jointly with any other person commits that offence.
Illustrations
(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of
poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z
dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B
intentionally co-operates in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which
the death is caused, they are both .guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.
(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternately for six
hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that
effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food
supplied to them for that purpose. Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.
(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death illegally omits
to supply Z with food in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation
is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B,
without collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he
is likely thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not
cooperate with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.
Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences
S. 38 states that where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal
act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act.
Illustration
An attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and intending to kill
him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B
are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable
homicide.
“Voluntarily”
According to S. 39 a person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means
whereby, he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he
knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.
Illustration
A set fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large town, for the purpose of facilitating a
robbery and thus causing the death of a person. Here, A may not have intended to cause death;
and may even be sorry that death has been caused by his act; yet, if he knew that he was likely to
cause death, he has caused death voluntarily.
“Offence”
By virtue of S. 40 except in the [Chapters] and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this
section, the word “offence” denotes a thing made punishable by this code
“Special law”
According to S. 41 a “special law” is a law applicable to a particular subject.
“Local law”
By virtue of S. 42 a “local law” is a law applicable only to a particular part of [India].
“Illegal”, Legally bound to do”
S. 43 provides that the word “illegal” is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is
prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be “legally
bound to do” whatever it is illegal for him to omit.
“Injury”
S. 44 states that the word “injurydenotes any harm whatsoever illegally caused to any person,
in body, mind, reputation or property.
“Life”
According to S. 45 the word “life” denotes the life of a human being, unless the contrary appears
from the context.
“Death”
By virtue of S. 46 the word “death” denotes the death of a human being unless the contrary
appears from the context.
“Animal”
S. 47 provides that the word “animal” denotes any living creature, other than a human being.
“Vessel”
According to S. 48 the word “vessel” denotes anything made for the conveyance by water of
human beings or of property.
“Year”, “Month”
S. 49 states that wherever the word year” or the word “month” is used, it is to be understood
that the year or the month is to be reckoned according to the British calendar.
“Section”
By virtue of S. 50 the word “section” denotes one of those portions of a chapter of this Code
which are distinguished by prefixed numeral figures.
“Oath”
S. 51 provides that the word “oath” includes a solemn affirmation substituted by law for an oath,
and any declaration required or authorized by law to be made before a public servant or to be
used for the purpose of proof, whether in a Court of Justice or not.
“Good faith”
By virtue of S. 52 nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or
believed without due care and attention.
“Harbour”
S. 52 A states that the except in Section 157, and in Section 130 in the case in which the harbour
is given by the wife or husband of the person harboured, the word “harbour” includes the
supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means of
conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the same kind as those
enumerated in this section or not, to evade apprehension.
3. General Explanations (1) Throughout this Sanhita every definition of an offence, every
penal provision, and every Illustration of every such definition or penal provision, shall be
understood subject to the exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled “General Exceptions”,
though those exceptions are not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or Illustration.
Illustrations.
(a) The sections in this Sanhita, which contain definitions of offences, do not express that a child
under seven years of age cannot commit such offences; but the definitions are to be understood
subject to the general exception which provides that nothing shall be an offence which is done by
a child under seven years of age.
(b) A, a police officer, without warrant, apprehends Z, who has committed murder. Here A is not
guilty of the offence of wrongful confinement; for he was bound by law to apprehend Z, and
therefore the case falls within the general exception which provides that “nothing is an offence
which is done by a person who is bound by law to do it”.
(2) Every expression which is explained in any Part of this Sanhita, is used in every Part of this
Sanhita in conformity with the explanation.
(3) When property is in the possession of a person’s spouse, clerk or servant, on account of that
person, it is in that person’s possession within the meaning of this Sanhita.
Explanation. A person employed temporarily or on a particular occasion in the capacity of a
clerk or servant, is a clerk or servant within the meaning of this subsection.
(4) In every Part of this Sanhita, except where a contrary intention appears from the context,
words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.
(5) When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
(6) Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal
knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act
with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done
by him alone with that knowledge or intention.
(7) Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an
omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and
partly by an omission is the same offence.
Illustration.
A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by
beating Z. A has committed murder.
(8) When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally cooperates in
the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any
other person, commits that offence.
Illustrations.
(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of
poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z
dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B
intentionally cooperate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which
the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.
(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six
hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly cooperate in causing that
effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food
supplied to them for that purpose. Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.
(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to
supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is
not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without
collusion or cooperation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely
thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not cooperate
with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.
(9) Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they
may be guilty of different offences by means of that act.
Illustration.
An attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and intending to kill
him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B
are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable
homicide.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Sections 6, 7, 27, 32,35,36,37 and 38 of IPC
S. 6 provides that throughout this Code every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and
every illustration of every such definition or penal provision shall be understood subject to the
exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled “General Exceptions”, though those exceptions are
not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or illustration
S. 7 states that every expression, which is explained in any part of this Code, is used in every part
of this Code in conformity with the explanation.
Property in possession of wife, clerk or servant
According to S. 27 when property is in the possession of a person’s wife, clerk or servant, on
account of that person, it is in that person’s possession within the meaning of this Code.
Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence
S. 37 provides that when an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever
intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either
singly or jointly with any other person commits that offence.
Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences
S. 38 states that where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal
act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act.
CHAPTER II PUNISHMENTS
Section 4 of the Nyaya Samhita -The punishments to which offenders are liable under the
provisions of this Sanhita are,
(a) Death;
(b) Imprisonment for life;
(c) Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:
(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
(2) Simple;
(d) Forfeiture of property;
(e) Fine;
(f) Community Service.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 53 of IPC
In Nadella Venkatakrishna Rao v. State of A. P
8
The Court held that the whole goal of
punishment is curative. The accent must be more and more on rehabilitation rather than
retributive paucity inside the prison.
In Shiv Kumar v. State of Karnataka
9
The Court emphasized that fixed punishments
cannot be for a period less than 14 years, ensuring that benefits like statutory remission are not
available to the accused before completing this mandated period under Section 433A of the
CrPC.
In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
10
the Court criticized the punitive
approach of the Indian Penal Code for failing to align with modern trends in correctional
treatment and individualized sentencing.
In Shiv Mohan Singh v. State of Delhi
11
the Court emphasized that the severity of the
crime is a crucial factor to be considered during sentencing.
In Paramanand Katara v. Union of India
12
the Supreme Court condemned the practice
of keeping the body of a condemned prisoner after execution, which was deemed a violation of
Article 21 of the Constitution.
In Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra
13
the Court ruled that the
pendency of similar cases against an accused cannot be used as a basis for awarding the death
penalty. Past adverse conduct of the convict should not influence the sentencing decision.
In Sat Pal v. State of Haryana
14
, the Court clarified that a sentence of life imprisonment
entails rigorous imprisonment for life. A convict serving a life term is not eligible for release
before completing fourteen years of actual imprisonment.
8
AIR 1978 SC 480
9
AIR 2023 SC 1774; AIR Online 2023 SC 228
10
AIR 1973 SC 2622
11
AIR 1977 SC 949
12
(1995) 3 SCC 248
13
AIR 2019 SC 1
14
(1992) 4 SCC 172
5. Regarding commutation of sentences, the appropriate Government has the authority, without
requiring the consent of the offender, to replace any punishment under the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, with another punishment as per Section 474.
Explanation. ––For the purposes of this section the expression “appropriate Government” means,
––
(a) In cases where the sentence is a sentence of death or is for an offence against any law relating
to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government; and
(b) In cases where the sentence (whether of death or not) is for an offence against any law
relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends, the Government of the
State within which the offender is sentenced.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Sections 54, 55 of IPC
6. In calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as
equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years unless otherwise provided.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 57 of IPC
7. Sentence may be (in certain cases of imprisonment) wholly or partly rigorous or simple- In
every case in which an offender is punishable with imprisonment which may be of either
description, it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender to direct in the
sentence that such imprisonment shall be wholly rigorous, or that such imprisonment shall be
wholly simple, or that any part of such imprisonment shall be rigorous and the rest simple.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 60 of IPC
8. Amount of fine, liability in default of payment of fine- (1) Where no sum is expressed to
which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall
not be excessive.
(2) In every case of an offence––
(a) Punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine,
whether with or without imprisonment;
(b) Punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to
a fine,
it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender to direct by the sentence that, in
default of payment of the fine, the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a certain term, in which
imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have been
sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence.
(3) The term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned in default of payment of
a fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for
the offence, if the offence be punishable with imprisonment as well as fine.
(4) The imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of a fine or in default of
community service may be of any description to which the offender might have been sentenced
for the offence.
(5) If the offence is punishable with fine or community service, the imprisonment which the
Court imposes in default of payment of the fine or in default of community service shall be
simple, and the term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned, in default of
payment of fine or in default of community service, shall not exceed,
(a) two months when the amount of the fine does not exceed five thousand rupees;
(b) four months when the amount of the fine does not exceed ten thousand rupees; and
(c) one year in any other case.
(6) (a) The imprisonment which is imposed in default of payment of a fine shall terminate
whenever that fine is either paid or levied by process of law;
(b) If, before the expiration of the term of imprisonment fixed in default of payment, such a
proportion of the fine be paid or levied that the term of imprisonment suffered in default of
payment is not less than proportional to the part of the fine still unpaid, the imprisonment shall
terminate.
Illustration.
A is sentenced to a fine of one thousand rupees and to four months’ imprisonment in default of
payment. Here, if seven hundred and fifty rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the
expiration of one month of the imprisonment, A will be discharged as soon as the first month has
expired. If seven hundred and fifty rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of the
first month, or at any later time while A continues in imprisonment, A will be immediately
discharged. If five hundred rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the expiration of two
months of the imprisonment, A will be discharged as soon as the two months are completed. If
five hundred rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of those two months, or at any
later time while A continues in imprisonment, A will be immediately discharged.
(7) The fine, or any part thereof which remains unpaid, may be levied at any time within six
years after the passing of the sentence, and if, under the sentence, the offender be liable to
imprisonment for a longer period than six years, then at any time previous to the expiration of
that period; and the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability any property
which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 63 of IPC
9. Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences
(1) Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an
offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such
offences, unless it be so expressly provided.
(2) Where
(a) anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for
the time being by which offences are defined or punished;
(b) several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an
offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence,
The offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries
him could award for any one of such offences.
Illustrations.
(a) A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence of voluntarily
causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which make up the whole
beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for fifty years,
one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for the whole beating.
(b) But, if, while A is beating Z, Y interferes, and A intentionally strikes Y, here, as the blow
given to Y is no part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to Z, A is liable to one
punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to another for the blow given to Y.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 71 of IPC
10. Punishment of person guilty of several offences, judgement stating that it is doubtful- In all
cases in which judgment is given that a person is guilty of one of several offences specified in
the judgment, but that it is doubtful of which of these offences he is guilty, the offender shall be
punished for the offence for which the lowest punishment is provided if the same punishment is
not provided for all.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 72 of IPC
11. Solitary confinement- Whenever any person is convicted of an offence for which under this
Sanhita the Court has power to sentence him to rigorous imprisonment, the Court may, by its
sentence, order that the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or portions
of the imprisonment to which he is sentenced, not exceeding three months in the whole,
according to the following scale, namely:
(a) a time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall not exceed six months;
(b) a time not exceeding two months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed six months and
shall not exceed one year;
(c) a time not exceeding three months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed one year.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 73 of IPC
12. Limit of solitary confinement - In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such
confinement shall in no case exceed fourteen days at a time, with intervals between the periods
of solitary confinement of not less duration than such periods; and when the imprisonment
awarded shall exceed three months, the solitary confinement shall not exceed seven days in any
one month of the whole imprisonment awarded, with intervals between the periods of solitary
confinement of not less duration than such periods.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 74 of IPC
13. Enhanced punishment for certain offences after previous conviction- Whoever, having been
convicted by a Court in India, of an offence punishable under Chapter X or Chapter XVII of this
Sanhita with imprisonment of either description for a term of three years or upwards, shall be
guilty of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like imprisonment for the
like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to imprisonment for life, or to
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 75 of IPC
CHAPTER III GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
14. Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound by law- Nothing
is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by
reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
Illustrations.
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the
commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry,
believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 76 of IPC
Section 76 deals with cases in which a person acts in the belief that he is bound by law to act.
The Section says that nothing is an offence which is done by a person, who is or who by reason
of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be,
bound by law to do it. To get the benefit of this Section the accused must have acted in good
faith. In other words, if a person has acted without due care and attention, he will be held
responsible for the mistake committed.
15. Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any
power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 77 of IPC
Judicial Acts
Section 77 protects judges from criminal prosecution and Section 78 protects the acts of a person
acting under the judgment or order of a Court. All acts of a judicial nature, even if not performed
in Court are protected by Section 77. The judge must be acting within his jurisdiction and also,
he must be acting judicially. Acting judicially means acting as a judge. Section 77 lays down that
nothing is an offence which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any
power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be given to him by law.
16. Act done by pursuant judgment or order of Court- Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or
which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court; if done whilst such judgment or order
remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass
such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court
had such jurisdiction.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 78 of IPC.
As per Section 78, the officer is not concerned with the jurisdiction of the Court. An officer of
the Court will not be protected if he believes that the judgment or order by which he has to act is
without jurisdiction. Judgment here means the statement given by the judge, as the grounds of a
decree or order. The protection given to an officer under Section 78 is wider than that given to a
judge under Section 77.
17. Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law-
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a
mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be
justified by law, in doing it.
Illustration.
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment
exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers
in the fact, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no
offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self-defence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 79 of IPC
18. Accident in doing lawful act- Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune,
and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner
by lawful means and with proper care and caution.
Illustration.
A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing by. Here, if there
was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an offence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 80 of IPC
In order to invoke Section 80, first, the act must have been done without any criminal
intention or knowledge. Secondly the act alleged against the accused must be lawful. While
doing an unlawful act if an accident happens, that is not excusable as per this Section.
In Sukhdev Singh v. Delhi State (Government of N.C.T of Delhi)
15
The Court held that
section 80 exempts the doer of an innocent or lawful act in an innocent and lawful manner from
any unforeseen result that may result from accident or misfortune. If either of these elements are
wanted, the act will not be excused on the ground of accident.
15
(2003) 7 SCC 441
In Bhupendrasinh A. Chudasama v. State of Gujarat
16
, the Court held that when an act is
done without any care and caution, the accused is not entitled to the benefit of section 80 IPC
19. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent- Nothing is an offence merely by
reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without
any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding
other harm to person or property.
Explanation. It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided
was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the
knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
Illustrations.
(a) A, the captain of a vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence on his part, finds
himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat
B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that,
by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a boat C with only two passengers
on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run
down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the
boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an act which
he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he
intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C.
(b) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading. He
does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or property. Here, if it be found
that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not
guilty of the offence.
NOTE- This act corresponds to Section 81 of IPC
The act must have been done Necessity
Section 81 provides that nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause harm; if it is done without any criminal intention to cause
harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or
property. The explanation to the Section says that it is a question of a fact whether the harm to be
prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of
doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
This provision deals with what is known as ‘compulsion by necessity’, in English law.
The principle is that where a person meets with two evils, one of which is unavoidable, choose
the lesser rather than the greater. The law justifies his action and makes him not responsible for
the consequences of his action. The reason is that mens-rea is lacking in such circumstances. For
e.g. pulling down houses to prevent fire from spreading. In India the maxim “necessity vincit
legem” which means “necessity overcomes law” has been accepted. The essentials of
Section 81 are:
1) under good faith; and
2) There must not be a mens rea.
20. Act of a child under seven years of age- Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under
seven years of age.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 82 of IPC
Infancy
16
AIR 1997 SC 3790
As per Section 82, if a child below the age of seven years commits an offence, he will be fully
exempted from liability. It is presumed that a child below seven years does not realize and does
not intend the consequences of his act. In other words, it is presumed that a child below the age
of 7 years cannot have mens rea. If a child acts as an agent of an adult and commits a crime the
adult who employed the child for such an act will be liable as an abetter.
21. Act of a child above seven and under twelve years of age of immature understanding-
Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve years
of age, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and
consequences of his conduct on that occasion.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 83 of IPC
As per Section 83, a child above seven years and below twelve years is exempted from liability
subject to one restriction. That is, if he does not have the sufficient maturity of understanding, he
will be exempted from the liability. A child above seven years and below 12 years is presumed to
be doli in capax i.e., incapable of committing the offences. But the presumption can be rebutted
by producing sufficient evidence.
In Ulla Mahapatra v. King
17
, a boy over eleven and below twelve years picked up his
knife and advanced towards another. He threatened the other by saying that he would cut him
into bits and did actually what he said. It was held that he was having sufficient maturity of
understanding, because he did what he intended. Therefore, he was held liable.
22. Act of a person of unsound mind- Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at
the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the
act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 84 of IPC
In Bapu @ Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan
18
The Court held that there is no definition
of unsoundness of mind in the Indian Penal Code. So, every person who is mentally diseased is
not ipso facto exempted from criminal responsibility.
In Rupesh Manager (Thapa) v. State of Sikkim
19
, the conviction of the accused for murder
was set aside due to the accused's mental illness.
In T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka
20
The Court held that the exemption is granted
when the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the
act or that what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law.
In Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra
21
The Court held that the burden
of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the purview of section 84 lies
upon the accused under section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act.
In Prem Singh v. State of NCT Delhi
22
The Court arrived at the conclusion that the
burden of proving the existence of circumstances so as to bring the case within the purview of
the section 84 lies on accused, here in this case plea of accused was not proved thus convicted
under s .302.
17
AIR 1950 ORI 261,
18
(2007) 8 SCC 66
19
Air 2023 SC 4431
20
2002 SCC (Cri) 103
21
2003 SCC (Cri) 144
22
AIR 2023 SC 193
In Sheralli Wali Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra
23
The Court held that the burden of
proving insanity is on the accused but the burden is not higher than that which rests upon a party
in a civil proceeding.
23. Act of a person incapable of judgement by reason of intoxication caused against his will-
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of
intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong,
or contrary to law; provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him
without his knowledge or against his will.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 85 of IPC
Section 85 reads as ‘nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
is by reason of intoxication incapable of knowing the nature of the act or he is doing what is
either wrong or contrary to law, provided that the things administered to him without his
knowledge or against his will. This Section gives the same benefit which is given by S. 84 to a
person of unsound mind.
Drunkenness may result from drinks or drugs. It may be voluntary or involuntary. If the
intoxicant is administered by force or by fraud, it is called involuntary drunkenness.
24. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated-In
cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a
person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the
same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which
intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 86 of IPC.
As per Section 86, if a man has voluntarily drunk, even if he, by reason of his intoxication, is
incapable of knowing the nature of his act, is liable to be dealt with as if he had been sober. In
such circumstances incapacity arises by one’s own act and hence is not excusable.
25. Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt , done by
consent- Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known
by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm
which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of
age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any
harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has
consented to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration.
A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of
each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play;
and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 87 of IPC
26.Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit-Nothing,
which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or
be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for
whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied,
to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration.
23
AIR 1972 SC 2443,
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers
under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z’s death, and intending, in good faith,
Z’s benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Z’s consent. A has committed no offence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 88 of IPC
27.Act done in good faith for benefit of child or person of unsound mind , by consent of
guardian-Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of
age, or person of unsound mind, by, or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or
other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it
may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to
that person:
Provided that this exception shall not extend to––
(a) the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any
purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease
or infirmity;
(c) the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it
be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or
infirmity;
(d) The abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration.
A, in good faith, for his child’s benefit without his child’s consent, has his child cut for the stone
by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child’s death, but not
intending to cause the child’s death. A is within the exception, in as much as his object was the
cure of the child.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 89 of IPC
Section 89 protects harm caused to a person below twelve years of age or of unsound mind by
his guardian himself or by another person with the guardian’s consent. The act must be done in
good faith for the benefit of the child or the person of unsound mind. The consent may be
expressed or implied.
28.Consent known to be given under fear or misconception- A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Sanhita, ––
(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and
if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in
consequence of such fear or misconception; or
(b) If the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable
to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
(c) Unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under
twelve years of age.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 90 of IPC
As per Section 90, consent is not consent, if it is given-
1) Under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact and the person doing the act, knows
or has reason to believe that the consent was given under either of these two circumstances; or
2) By a person of unsound mind or by a drunken person, provided he is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of that to which he consents; or
3) By a person under twelve years of age. Consent under this Section should be free. It
should not be vitiated by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation.
29. Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused- The exceptions in
sections 25, 26 and 27 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which
they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving
the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.
Illustration.
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman)
is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the
woman. Therefore, it is not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the consent of the woman
or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 91 of IPC
30. Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent- Nothing is an offence by
reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith,
even without that person’s consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that
person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or
other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the
thing to be done with benefit:
Provided that this exception shall not extend to––
(a) The intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any
purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease
or infirmity;
(c) The voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than
the preventing of death or hurt;
(d) The abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustrations.
(1) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be
trepanned. A, not intending Z’s death, but in good faith, for Z’s benefit, performs the trepan
before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(2) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fire at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill Z,
but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z’s benefit. A’s bullet gives Z a mortal
wound. A has committed no offence.
(3) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation
is immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child’s guardian. A performs the
operation in spite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the child’s benefit. A has
committed no offence.
(4) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drop the
child from the house top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending
to kill the child, and intending, in good faith, the child’s benefit. Here, even if the child is killed
by the fall, A has committed no offence.
Explanation. Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and
this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 92 of IPC
31. Communication made in good faith- No communication made in good faith is an offence by
reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person.
Illustration.
A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The
patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be
likely that the communication might cause the patient’s death.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 93 of IPC
32. Act to which a person is compelled by threats - Except murder, and offences against the State
punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it
by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to
that person will otherwise be the consequence:
Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable
apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he
became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1. A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins
a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the
ground of having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
Explanation 2. A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to
do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to
force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this
exception.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 95 of IPC
Trifles
Section 95 deals with acts causing slight harm. This Section is based on the maxim ‘de minimis
non curat lexwhich means law does not take account of trifles. i.e., the law does not punish an
act which caused only a slight harm. If the harm caused is so slight no man of ordinary sense and
temper would complain of it. Harm means hurt or injury, damage etc., whether an act is trivial or
not depends upon the nature of the injury, the intention or knowledge of the accused etc.
In Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill
24
the Court held that section 95 has no manner of
application to the allegations made in the FIR complaining outrage of modesty.
33. Act causing slight harm-Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended
to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no
person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 94 of IPC.
Compulsion
Section 94 lays down the principle that a person, compelled by force or threat of force to do any
act, should not be punished. A person is excused from the consequences of any act except
murder and offences against the state punishable with death, done under the fear of instant death.
Fear of grievous hurt or hurt is not an excuse. The fear of death must be to the offender himself
and to nobody else.
Of right of private defence
34. Things done in private defence- Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the
right of private defence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 96 of IPC
Section 96 lays down that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of
private defence. This Section does not define the right of private defence but simply declares the
24
(1995)6 SCC 194
right. This right is available against the person or persons from whom imminent danger to life or
property is apprehended.
In Sekar v. State of Rajasthan
25
, the Court held that the plea of right of private defence
cannot be based on surmises and speculation.
In Ananta Deb Singha Mahapatra v. State of West Bengal
26
, the Court held that whether
a person acted in the exercise of right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on
the facts and circumstances of each case
In Sekar v. State of Rajasthan
27
The Court held that if the circumstances show the right of
private defence was reasonably exercised, it is open for the court to consider such a plea. It is not
necessary for the accused to plead in so many words.
In Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat
28
, the Court articulated the following principles:
1. There is no right of private defence against an act that is not inherently an offence
under the Indian Penal Code.
2. The right begins as soon as there is reasonable apprehension of danger to the body.
3. It is a defensive right, allowing only as much harm as necessary to fend off the attack.
4. The right extends to causing the death of the assailant when there is reasonable and
imminent apprehension of offences enumerated in the six clauses of Section 100 of the IPC.
In the State of U.P v. Ram Swarup
29
, the Court ruled that the right of private defence
cannot be claimed if the accused provoked the attack.
In Rajesh Kumar v. Dharamvir
30
the Court emphasized that the right of private defence
is solely for defensive purposes and not for retaliation.
In Sekar v. State of Rajasthan
31
, the Court clarified that an accused invoking the right of
private defence is not obligated to present evidence. It suffices for the accused to demonstrate,
akin to a civil case, that the preponderance of probabilities supports their plea.
35. Right of private defence of body and of property- Every person has a right, subject to the
restrictions contained in section 37, to defend
(a) His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human
body;
(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any
act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal
trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 97 of IPC
Section 97 provides that the right of private defence is available to defend person as well as
property. The right consists of defending the body or property of the person exercised in the case
25
2003 SCC (Cri) 16
26
AIR 2007 SC 2524
27
2003 SCC (Cri) 16
28
AIR 1980 SC 660
29
AIR 1997 SC 3769
30
AIR 1997 SC 3769
31
2003 SCC (Cri) 16
of any offences in relation to property. Property includes movable as well as immovable property
of himself or of any other person.
In Parichhat vs the State of M.P
32
, the Court concluded that the accused had
exceeded their right to private defence. This determination was based on the fact that the accused
struck the deceased in the chest with a Ballam, despite the deceased initially hitting their father
on the head with a lathi.
In Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab
33
the Court affirmed that every person has the right,
subject to the restrictions in Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code, to defend their properties
against offenses such as theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal trespass.
In Ramaotar v. State of M.P
34
the Court ruled that when an unarmed woman intervenes
to protect her sons during a conflict, an attack against her would not qualify for the right of self-
defence for the accused.
In Ram Rattan v. State of U. P
35
the Court held that while a true owner ordinarily has the
right to remove a trespasser, this right is forfeited if the trespasser has successfully taken
possession and the true owner is aware of this fact..
In Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab
36
, the Court held that when the right of private
defence is pleaded, the limitations contained in section 99 and 100 of IPC have to be kept in
view
36. Right of private defence against act of a person of unsound mind , etc- When an act, which
would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of
maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that
act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right
of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
Illustrations.
(a) Z, a person of unsound mind, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A has the same
right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good faith, taking A for a
house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence.
But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting
under that misconception.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 98 of IPC
As per Section 98 the right of private defence is not affected by the fact that the threatened act
does not constitute an offence technically because of the agent’s youth, want of maturity of
understanding.Unsoundness of mind, or misconception. For e.g., if a drunken person attacks
either the person or property of another, any person is entitled to exercise the right of private
defence. The only limitation is that more than what is necessary should not be inflicted.
37. Acts against which there is no right of private defence-
(1) There is no right of private defence, ––
32
AIR 1972 SC 535
33
1994 SCC (Cri) 1473
34
1993 SC 302
35
AIR 1977 SC 619
36
1994 SCC (Cri) 273
(a) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt,
if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his
office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law;
(b) against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt,
if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under
colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law;
(c) in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
(2) The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is
necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1. A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or
attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe that
the person doing the act is such a public servant.
Explanation 2. A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or
attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to
believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the
authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such
authority, if demanded.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 99 of IPC
Section 99 states the circumstances in which there is no right of private defence. In other words,
the limits of the right of private defence are stated in Section 99. The first two clauses of this
Section state that there is no right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done,
by or by the direction of a public servant. The public servant must have done the act in good faith
under the colour of his office, even though that act may not be justifiable by law.
38. When right of private defence of body extends to causing death- The right of private defence
of the body extends, under the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing of
death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the
right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:
(a) Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the
consequence of such assault;
(b) Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise
be the consequence of such assault;
(c) An assault with the intention of committing rape;
(d) An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
(e) An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which
may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public
authorities for his release;
(g) an act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may
reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such
act.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 100 of IPC
Section 100 provides the circumstances in which the right of private defence may go to the
extent of causing death. This right arises only if an offence against the human body is committed,
attempted or threatened. The right can be exercised subject to the restrictions provided under
Section 99.
In Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab
37
The Court came to the conclusion that the way a
person reacts to the situation varies from person to person, it cannot be said that a person alarmed
by an attack of 30/35 people armed with lathis would not use firearms as self-defence.
In Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab
38
, it was ruled that the reasonable apprehension of the
accused that grievous hurt will be caused to him must be judged from the subjective viewpoint of
the accused and cannot be subjected to microscopic and pedantic scrutiny.
39. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death- If the offence be not of any of
the descriptions specified in section 38, the right of private defence of the body does not extend
to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions specified
in section 37, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 101 of IPC
40. Commencement and continuance of right of private defence of body - The right of private
defense of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body
arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been
committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 102 of IPC
In Bihari Rai v. State of Bihar
39
, it was ruled that right of private defence commences as
soon as reasonable apprehension of danger to body arises and lasts so long as reasonable
apprehension continues
41. When right of private defense of property extends to causing death- The right of private
defense of property extends, under the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary
causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of which,
or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of
the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:
(a) Robbery;
(b) house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise;
(c) Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on any building, tent or vessel, which
building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property;
(d) Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause
apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence
is not exercised.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 103 of IPC
S. 103 provides that the circumstances in which death can be caused while defending the
property. Here also the right can be exercised subject to the restrictions provided under Section
99. The offences states in Section 103 are:
1) Robbery;(S.390)
2) House breaking by night ;( S.446)
3) Mischief by fire on any building, tent or vessel used as a place for the custody of property;
(S.436)
4) Theft, mischief or house-trespass reasonably causing apprehension by death or grievous hurt.
(Ss. 378,425,442)
37
AIR 2023 SC 672 ; AIR Online 2023 SC 48
38
(1996) 1 SCC 146
39
AIR 2009 SC 18
In James Martin v. State of Kerala
40
, the Court ruled that the right of private defense
commences as soon as reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises and lasts so long as
the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues.
In Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu
41
The Court held that the right of private defence of
property can be extended to voluntarily causing death of the aggressor when reasonably
apprehended that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence if the right of private defence
was not exercised.
In State of Orissa vs Rabindranath Dalai and Anr
42
, it was decided that the right of
private defence of property against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts
to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or as long as the fear of instant death, hurt, or personal
restraint continues.
In Jassa Singh v. State of Haryana
43
the Court determined that reasonable apprehension
of death or grievous hurt could arise only from a house trespass, not from the exercise of the
right of private defence of property, thereby applying Section 103 accordingly.
In G.V.S Subbrayanam v. State of A. P
44
, the Court clarified that the right of self-defence
is governed by specific restrictions, emphasizing that any harm inflicted must not exceed what is
reasonably necessary for defensive purposes.
.
42. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death- If the offence, the
committing of which, or the attempting to commit which occasions the exercise of the right of
private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions specified
in section 41, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend,
subject to the restrictions specified in section 37, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of
any harm other than death.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 104 of IPC
43. Commencement and continuance of right of private defense of property- The right of private
defense of property, ––
(a) commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences;
(b) Against theft continues till the offender has affected his retreat with the property or either the
assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered;
(c) against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person
death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of
instant personal restraint continues;
(d) Against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long as the offender continues in the
commission of criminal trespass or mischief;
(e) Against house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise continues as long as the house-
trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 105 of IPC
44. Right to private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person
- If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the
40
(2004) 2 SCC 203
41
AIR 2000 SC 2980
42
(1973) Cri LJ 1686 (Ori).
43
AIR 2002 SC 520
44
AIR 1970 SC 1079
apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right
without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of
that risk.
Illustration.
A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder him. He cannot effectively exercise his right of
private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of harming young
children who are mingled with the mob. A commit no offence if by firing he harms any of the
children.
CHAPTER IV
ABETMENT, CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPT
Of abetment
45. Abetment of a thing- A person abets the doing of a thing, who
(a) Instigates any person to do that thing; or
(b) engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that
thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or
(c) Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1. A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause
or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration.
A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact
and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A
to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigating the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2. Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does
anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 107 of IPC
In State of Rajasthan v. Kesa
45
, the Court held that in order to constitute abetment it must
be shown that the abettor intentionally aided the commission of crime.
46. Abettor- A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the
commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
Explanation 1. The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence
although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act.
Explanation 2. To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted
should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused
Illustrations.
(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the
wound. A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
Explanation 3. It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of
committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of
the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge.
45
2002 Cr LJ 432
Illustrations.
(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a person of unsound mind to commit an act which
would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence, and
having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the act be committed or not, is guilty of
abetting an offence.
(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do an
act which causes Z’s death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act in the absence of A
and thereby causes Z’s death. Here, though B was not capable by law of committing an offence,
A is liable to be punished in the same manner as if B had been capable by law of committing an
offence, and had committed murder, and he is therefore subject to the punishment of death.
(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B, in consequence of his unsoundness of mind,
being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to
law, sets fire to the house in consequence of A’s instigation. B has committed no offence, but A
is guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a dwelling-house, and is liable to the
punishment provided for that offence.
(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates B to take property belonging to Z out
of Z’s possession. A induces B to believe that the property belongs to A. B takes the property out
of Z’s possession, in good faith, believing it to be A’s property. B, acting under this
misconception, does not take dishonestly, and therefore does not commit theft. But A is guilty of
abetting theft, and is liable to the same punishment as if B had committed theft.
Explanation 4. The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an
abatement is also an offence.
Illustration.
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C commits
that offence in consequence of B’s instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence with the
punishment for murder; and, as A instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable to the same
punishment.
Explanation 5. It is not necessary for the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy
that the abettor should concur with the person who commits it. It is sufficient if he engages in the
conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed.
Illustration.
A concert with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A shall administer the poison then
explains the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to administer the poison, but without
mentioning A’s name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures and delivers it to B for the
purpose of its being used in the manner explained. A administers the poison; Z dies in
consequence. Here, though A and C have not conspired together, yet C has been engaged in the
conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered. C has therefore committed the offence
defined in this section and is liable to the punishment for murder.
A person abets an offence within the meaning of this Sanhita who, in India, abets the
commission of any act without and beyond India which would constitute an offence if committed
in India.
Illustration.
A, in India, instigates B, a foreigner in country X, to commit a murder in that country, A is guilty
of abetting murder.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 108 of IPC
47. Abetment in India of offences outside India-A person abets an offence within the meaning of
this Sanhita who, in India abets the commission of any act without and beyond India which
would constitute an offence if committed in India
Illustration.
A, in country X, instigates B; to commit a murder in India, A is guilty of abetting murder.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 108A of IPC
48. Abetment outside India for offence in India- A person abets an offence within the meaning of
this Sanhita who, without and beyond India, abets the commission of any act in India which
would constitute an offence if committed in India.
Illustration
A, in country X, instigates B; to commit a murder in India, A is guilty of abetting murder
NEW SECTION
49. Punishment of abetment if act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express
provision is made for its punishment- Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is
committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Sanhita for
the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation. An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is
committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid
which constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations.
(a)A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation, commits that
offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.
(b)A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the poison and
delivers it to B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the conspiracy,
administers the poison to Z in A’s absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of
murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for
murder.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 109 of IPC
In Saju v. State of Kerala
46
, the Court held that to prove the charge of abetment, the
prosecution is required to prove that the abettor has instigated doing the particular thing or
engaged with one or more of the people or persons in any conspiracy for doing that thing or
intentionally aided by an act of illegal omission, doing that thing.
50. Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with different intention from that of
abettor- Whoever abets the commission of an offence shall, if the person abetted does the act
with a different intention or knowledge from that of the abettor, be punished with the punishment
provided for the offence which would have been committed if the act had been done with the
intention or knowledge of the abettor and with no other.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 110 of IPC
51.Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done- When an act is abetted and a
different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same
extent as if he had directly abetted it:
Provided that the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed
under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which
constituted the abetment.
46
AIR 2001 SC 175
Illustrations.
(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose.
The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the food of Y, which
is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence of A’s instigation, and
the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable in
the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison into the
food of Y.
(b) A instigates B to burn Z’s house, B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft
of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting
the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning.
(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery,
and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and being resisted
by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the
abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 111 of IPC
52. Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act done- If the act for
which the abettor is liable under section 51 is committed in addition to the act abetted, and
constitute a distinct offence, the abettor is liable to punishment for each of the offence
Illustration.
A instigates B to resist by force a distress made by a public servant. B, in consequence, resists
that distress. In offering the resistance, B voluntarily causing grievous hurt to the officer
executing the distress. As B has committed both the offence of resisting the distress, and the
offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment for both these offences;
and, if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous hurt in resisting the distress, A
will also be liable to punishment for each of the offences.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 112 of IPC
53. .Liability of abettor for an effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by
abettor-When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor of causing a particular
effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a
different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the
same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the intention of causing that
effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was likely to cause that effect.
Illustration.
A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B, in consequence of the instigation, causes grievous
hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to
cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 113 of IPC
54. Abettor present when offence is committed- Whenever any person, who is absent would be
liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be
punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed
such act or offence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 114 of IPC
55.Abetment of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life- Whoever abets the
commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, shall, if that offence be
not committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made under this
Sanhita for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if
any act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, and which causes hurt to
any person, is done, the abettor shall be liable to imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration.
A instigates B to murder Z. The offence is not committed. If B had murdered Z, he would have
been subject to the punishment of death or imprisonment for life. Therefore, A is liable to
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also to a fine; and if any hurt be
done to Z in consequence of the abetment, he will be liable to imprisonment for a term which
may extend to fourteen years, and to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 115 of IPC
56.Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment- Whoever abets an offence punishable
with imprisonment shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment, and
no express provision is made under this Sanhita for the punishment of such abetment, be
punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence for a term which may
extend to one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence; or with such fine as is
provided for that offence, or with both; and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public
servant, whose duty it is to prevent the commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished
with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence, for a term which may extend to
one-half of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the
offence, or with both.
Illustrations.
(a) A instigates B to give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence, A has
nevertheless committed the offence defined in this section, and is punishable accordingly.
(b) A, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent robbery, abets the commission of robbery.
Here, though the robbery is not committed, A is liable to one-half of the longest term of
imprisonment provided for that offence, and also to fine.
(c) B abets the commission of a robbery by A, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent that
offence. Here, though the robbery is not committed, B is liable to one-half of the longest term of
imprisonment provided for the offence of robbery, and also to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 116 of IPC
57. Abetting commission of offence by public or by more than 10 persons-Whoever abets the
commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons
exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years and with fine.
Illustration.
An affix in a public place a placard instigating a sect consisting of more than ten members to
meet at a certain time and place, for the purpose of attacking the members of an adverse sect,
while engaged in a procession. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 117 of IPC
58. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life-
Whoever intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the
commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, voluntarily conceals
by any act or omission, or by the use of encryption or any other information hiding tool, the
existence of a design to commit such offence or makes any representation which he knows to be
false respecting such design shall,––
(a) if that offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years; or
(b) if the offence is not committed, with imprisonment of either description, for a term which
may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration.
A, knowing that dacoity is about to be committed at B, falsely informs the Magistrate that a
dacoity is about to be committed at C, a place in an opposite direction, and thereby misleads the
Magistrate with intent to facilitate the commission of the offence. The dacoity is committed at B
in pursuance of the design. A is punishable under this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 118 of IPC
59.Public servant concealing design to commit offence which it is his duty to prevent-Whoever,
being a public servant, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
facilitate the commission of an offence which it is his duty as such public servant to prevent,
voluntarily conceals, by any act or omission or by the use of encryption or any other information
hiding tool, the existence of a design to commit such offence, or makes any representation which
he knows to be false respecting such design shall,––
(a) if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for
the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term of such imprisonment,
or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with both; or
(b) If the offence be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years; or
(c) if the offence be not committed, shall be punished with imprisonment of any description
provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of
such imprisonment or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustration.
A, an officer of police, being legally bound to give information of all designs to commit robbery
which may come to his knowledge, and knowing that B designs to commit robbery, omits to give
such information, with intent to so facilitate the commission of that offence.
Here A has by an illegal omission concealed the existence of B’s design, and is liable to
punishment according to the provision of this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 119 of IPC
60.Concealing design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment- Whoever, intending to
facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence
punishable with imprisonment, voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence
of a design to commit such offence, or makes any representation which he knows to be false
respecting such design shall, ––
(a) if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for
the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth; and
(b) if the offence be not committed, to one-eighth,
of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 120 of IPC
61.Criminal conspiracy- (1) When two or more persons agree with the common object to do, or
cause to be done––
(a) an illegal act; or
(b) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such
agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation. It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement,
or is merely incidental to that object.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy, ––
(a) to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment
for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Sanhita for
the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such
offence;
(b) other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with
fine or with both
In Balla v. State of M.P
47
The Court emphasized the ingredients of criminal conspiracy. It
was observed that there can't be a conspiracy by only one accused so the conviction of the sole
accused was set aside.
In Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P
48
, the Court set aside the conviction of offence
imposed upon the accused on the basis that one person alone can't be held guilty of criminal
conspiracy
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 120A and 120B of IPC
S. 120 A defines the offence of criminal conspiracy. It is defined as an agreement by two or more
persons to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. In the proviso it is stated that no
agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy
unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement. The
explanation to the Section states that it is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object
of such agreement or is merely incidental to that object.
The essential ingredients are:
1. There must be two or more persons;
2. They must make an agreement;
3. The agreement must be to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means;
4. In cases, other than an agreement to commit an offence, the agreement must be followed
by an overt act.
Section 120A
In K Hasim v. State of Tamil Nadu
49
the Court held that criminal conspiracy involves not
merely the intention of two or more individuals but the agreement between them to perform an
unlawful act by unlawful means.
Punishment (S. 120B):
47
AIR 2023 SC 4566 : AIR ONLINE 2023 SC 715
48
AIR 2023 SC 3857AIR ONLINE 2023 SC 636
49
AIR 2005 SC 128
- If a person is involved in a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with
death, life imprisonment, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or more, they shall be
punished as if they had abetted the offence.
- If the conspiracy is to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for less than
two years, or with a fine, or both, the punishment shall not exceed six months of imprisonment or
a fine, or both.
In Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi
50
, the Court outlined the elements of
criminal conspiracy:
1. An object to be accomplished.
2. A plan or scheme to achieve the object.
3. An agreement or understanding between two or more accused persons to cooperate in
accomplishing the object by the means specified in the agreement or by any effective means.
4. An overt act, if required by statute, within the jurisdiction.
In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI
51
the Court held that to establish the charge of
conspiracy under Section 120B, it is essential to prove that there was an agreement between the
parties to commit an unlawful act.
62.Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other
imprisonment- Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Sanhita with
imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such
attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is
made by this Sanhita for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any
description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the
imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment
provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustrations.
(a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a box, and finds after opening the
box, that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards the commission of theft, and
therefore is guilty under this section.
(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z’s pocket. A failure in
the attempt in consequence of Z’s having nothing in his pocket. A is guilty under this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to Section 511 of IPC
In Koppula Venkata Rao v. State of A.P.
52
The Supreme Court has said that ‘Attempt’
should be taken as ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of ‘Attempt’ to commit an offence
is an act or series of acts which leads inevitably to the commission of the offence unless
something which the doer of the act neither foresaw nor intended happens to prevent this.
In Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana
53
, the facts of the case is that , victim went to a field
where she was forcibly dragged and raped by two accused individuals. They threatened to kill
her if she reported the incident. She returned home crying and informed her mother. The accused
claimed they were falsely implicated due to a dispute involving the victim's brother. The
Supreme Court held that the word ‘Attempt’ is to be used in its ordinary meaning. There is a
50
2002 SCC (Cri) 978
51
2003 SCC (Cri) 1121
52
AIR 2004 SC 1874
53
AIR 2004 SC 1497
difference between intention to commit offence and preparation. Where attempt begins and
preparation ends. It means when any step is taken towards committing that offence is considered
as the end of preparation and beginning of attempt.
CHAPTER V
OF OFFENCES AGAINST WOMAN AND CHILD
Of sexual offences
63. Rape- A man is said to commit “rape” if he—
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or
makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the
urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina,
urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other
person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or
any other person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:
(I) against her will;
(ii) without her consent;
(iii) with her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom
she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt;
(iv) with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is
given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be
lawfully married;
(v) with her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind
or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or
unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to
which she gives consent;
(vi) with or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age;
(vii) when she is unable to communicate consent.
Explanation 1. —For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2. Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by
words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness
to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist the act of penetration shall not by the
reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception 1. ––A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2. ––Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being
under eighteen years of age, is not rape.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 375 of IPC
In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Prakash Kenia
54
,The Supreme Court of India held
that implied threat or coercion can constitute consent, moving away from the strict "express and
voluntary" requirement of the Tukaram case,
55
54
2010, AIR 1992 SC 1275
The key points of the Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra v. Prakash Kenia
56
● Consent can be implied from the circumstances, including the presence of threat or coercion.
● The absence of physical resistance does not necessarily mean that consent was given.
The decision expanded the definition of consent to include implied consent, which can be
inferred from the circumstances of the case.
The decision was praised by women's rights advocates, but it was also criticized by some for
being too broad.
In the landmark case of Sakshi v. Union of India
57
,The Supreme Court of India made
several significant rulings that expanded the understanding of rape and victim rights:
1. Marital Rape: Although debated, the court recognized marital rape as a form of sexual assault.
While not explicitly criminalized at the time, the court acknowledged the potential for coercion
and harm within marriage, paving the way for future legal changes.
2. Non-Penile Penetration: The court broadened the definition of rape to include non- penile
penetration, recognizing other forms of sexual assault as equally harmful and qualifying for
prosecution under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. Consent and Burden of Proof: The court emphasized the importance of victim's consent as a
pivotal element in determining rape. It shifted the burden of proof onto the accused to
demonstrate voluntary consent beyond "mere submission," highlighting the need for affirmative
consent.
4. Victim Blaming: The court strongly condemned victim blaming and cautioned against using
victim's past sexual relationships or conduct as evidence of consent. This ruling aimed to protect
victims from further trauma and societal stigma.
5. Procedural Guidelines: The court laid out guidelines for medical examination, investigation,
and trial procedures to ensure sensitivity and respect towards victims during the legal process.
64. Punishment for rape- (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2),
commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall
also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever,
(a) being a police officer, commits rape,
(i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is appointed; or
(ii) in the premises of any station house; or
(iii) on a woman in such police officer’s custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate
to such police officer; or
(b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public servant’s custody or in the
custody of a public servant subordinate to such public servant; or
(c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central Government or a
State Government commits rape in such area; or
55
1979 AIR 185
56
2010, AIR 1992 SC 1275
57
2004, 5, SC 518
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody
established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women’s or children’s
institution, commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or
(e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a woman in that
hospital; or
(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards
the woman, commits rape on such woman; or
(g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or
(h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
(i) commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or
(j) being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits rape on such woman; or
(k) commits rape on a woman suffering from mental or physical disability; or
(l) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the
life of a woman; or
(m) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years,
but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. For the purposes of this subsection,
(a) “armed forces” means the naval, army and air forces and includes any member of the Armed
Forces constituted under any law for the time being in force, including the paramilitary forces
and any auxiliary forces that are under the control of the Central Government or the State
Government;
(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for
the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical
attention or rehabilitation;
(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as assigned to the expression “police” under the
Police Act, 1861;
(d) “women’s or children’s institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a
home for neglected women or children or a widow’s home or an institution called by any other
name, which is established and maintained for the reception and care of women or children.
N0TE- This section corresponds to Section 376 of IPC
Section 376
In Mukesh & Anr v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors
58
, The Nirbhaya case highlighted
deficiencies in Section 376 regarding the definition of rape and its penalties.
- Previously, the definition was limited, excluding some forms of sexual assault and lacking
minimum sentencing guidelines for rape convictions.
- The public outcry led to the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2013, which introduced
significant changes to Section 376, including:
- Expanded definition of rape: Incorporating non-penile penetration, insertion of objects, and
sexual assault causing serious bodily harm.
58
(2017) 6 SCC 1
- Increased penalties: Introducing the death penalty for "rarest of rare" cases, raising minimum
sentences for various forms of rape, and criminalizing stalking, voyeurism, and acid attacks.
- Improved investigative procedures: Mandating sensitivity training for police and medical
personnel, creating fast-track courts for sexual assault cases, and establishing witness protection
programs.
- The 2013 amendment to Section 376 increased the minimum punishment to 7 years, extendable
to life imprisonment with a fine. It also introduced 14 circumstances where the penalty for rape
must be at least 10 years in jail, potentially including life imprisonment or death. These scenarios
include rape by:
- Police officers
- Public servants
- Armed forces personnel
- Jail or remand home staff
- Hospital staff
- Relatives, guardians, or teachers
- During communal or sectarian violence
- Of pregnant women
- Of women under 16
- Of women incapable of giving consent
- In positions of control and dominance over a woman
- Of women with mental or physical disabilities
- Causing grievous harm, maiming, disfiguring, or endangering the life of a woman
- Repeatedly raping the same woman
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2018 and the changes it brought to Section 376 IPC
After the horrifying incident of the Mohd Akhtari v. State of J&K
59
, in the year 2018, where an
8-year-old girl was kidnapped and gang-raped, laws were further tightened.
- The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2018 introduced the following changes to Section 376:
- Rape of a girl under 12 years is punishable by a minimum of 20 years in jail, with the
possibility of life imprisonment, a fine, or death.
- Gang rape of a girl under 12 years carries a punishment of life imprisonment, a fine, or death.
- Rape of a girl under 16 years is punishable by a minimum of 20 years in prison or life
imprisonment. A life sentence means imprisonment for the rest of the offender's natural life.
- For rape of a woman over 16, the minimum sentence is 10 years in jail.
65.Punishment for rape in certain cases- (1) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen
years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for
the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this subsection shall be paid to the victim.
59
Criminal. Appeal No.1928 of 2022
(2) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years of age shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that
person’s natural life, and with fine or with death:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this subsection shall be paid to the victim.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 376 AB of IPC
66. Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of victim- Whoever,
commits an offence punishable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 64 and in the
course of such commission inflicts an injury which causes the death of the woman or causes the
woman to be in a persistent vegetative state, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, or with death.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 376 A of IPC
67. Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation- Whoever has sexual
intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether under a decree of separation or
otherwise, without her consent, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation. —In this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean any of the acts mentioned in
clauses (a) to (d) of section 63.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 376 B of IPC
In the 2019 case of Ritu v. State of Haryana
60
, the Court addressed Section 376B of the
Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes non-consensual sexual intercourse by a husband on his
wife during separation. While not overturning Section 376B, the Court made several important
points:
1. Consent and Autonomy within Marriage:
- The Court emphasized the necessity of obtaining a wife's free and informed consent for
sexual intercourse within marriage, underscoring the wife's right to autonomy and bodily
integrity.
- It acknowledged the complexities of marital relationships and the challenges in clearly
defining and proving consent in such situations.
2. Judicial Discretion in Applying Section 376B:
- Judges should exercise caution and discretion when applying Section 376B, carefully
considering the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the
separation, relationship dynamics, and any evidence of coercion or manipulation.
- The Court cautioned against using Section 376B as a tool for revenge or to settle marital
disputes
60
2023 LiveLaw (PH) 71
In Tulshidas Kanolkar v. The State of Goa
61
the Court held that a mentally challenged girl is
unable to offer consent, and thus, the question of consent does not arise in such cases.
Additionally, submission is not equivalent to consent.
In Dileep Singh v. State of Bihar
62
The victim and the accused were neighbours and fell in
love with each other. They had sexual relations based on the accused's promise to marry her.
When she became pregnant the accused evaded from marrying her thus, this case. The
prosecution proved that she was under 16, making her consent irrelevant. The Court held that
consent given by deception of the victim is not a valid consent.
In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh
63
The Court held that the consent under intoxication
and threat is not to be considered. The Supreme Court also established a set of guidelines for the
trial of rape cases, ensuring protection and a sense of confidence to the rape victim.
68.Sexual intercourse by a person in authority- Whoever, being
(a) in a position of authority or in a fiduciary relationship; or
(b) a public servant; or
(c) superintendent or manager of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or
under any law for the time being in force, or a women’s or children’s institution; or
(d) on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a hospital,
abuses such position or fiduciary relationship to induce or seduce any woman either in his
custody or under his charge or present in the premises to have sexual intercourse with him, such
sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with rigorous
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years, but which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1.In this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean any of the acts mentioned in
clauses (a) to (d) of section 63.
Explanation 2.For the purposes of this section, Explanation 1 to section 63 shall also be
applicable.
Explanation 3. “Superintendent”, in relation to a jail, remand home or other place of custody
or a women’s or children’s institution, includes a person holding any other office in such jail,
remand home, place or institution by virtue of which such person can exercise any authority or
control over its inmates
Explanation 4.—The expressions “hospital” and “women’s or children’s institution” shall
respectively have the same meanings as in clauses (b) and (d) of the Explanation to sub-section
(2) of section 64.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 376 C of IPC
69. Sexual offences by employing deceitful means, etc- Whoever, by deceitful means or by
making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual
intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. “deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment
or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.
61
AIR 2004 SC 978
62
(2004) Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 753
63
1996 AIR 1393
70.Gang Rape- (1) Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or
acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have
committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life which
shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this subsection shall be paid to the victim.
(2) Where a woman under eighteen years of age is raped by one or more persons constituting a
group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to
have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine, or with death:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.
In Avatar Singh v. State of Punjab
64
, the prosecution alleged that the prosecutrix was
raped by the accused and co-accused in an under-construction haveli where labourers were
working. However, the prosecutrix did not raise an alarm. Consequently, the conviction of the
accused persons was set aside.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 376 D of IPC
71.Punishment for repeat offenders-Whoever has been previously convicted of an offence
punishable under section 64 or section 65 or section 66 or section 70 and is subsequently
convicted of an offence punishable under any of the said sections shall be punished with
imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural
life, or with death.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 376 E of IPC
72.Disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences, etc- (1) Whoever prints or publishes the
name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an offence
under section 64 or section 65 or section 66 or section 67 or section 68 or section 69 or section
70 or section 71 is alleged or found to have been committed (hereafter in this section referred to
as the victim) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publication of the name or any matter
which may make known the identity of the victim if such printing or publication is
(a) by or under the order in writing of the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police
officer making the investigation into such offence acting in good faith for the purposes of such
investigation; or
(b) by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the victim; or
(c) where the victim is dead or a child or of unsound mind, by, or with the authorisation in
writing of, the next of kin of the victim:
Provided that no such authorisation shall be given by the next of kin to anybody other than the
chairman or the secretary, by whatever name called, of any recognised welfare institution or
organisation.
64
AIR 2023, SC 3718; AIR Online 2023 SC 604
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, “recognised welfare institution or
organisation” means a social welfare institution or organisation recognised in this behalf by the
Central Government or the State Government.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 288 A (1) and (2) of IPC
73.Printing or publishing any matter relating to Court proceedings without permission- Whoever
prints or publishes any matter in relation to any proceeding before a Court with respect to an
offence referred to in section 72 without the previous permission of such Court shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation. The printing or publication of the judgment of any High Court or the Supreme
Court does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section.
Of criminal force and assault against woman
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 228 A (3) of IPC
74. Assault or use of criminal force to women with intent to outrage her modesty - Whoever
assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that
he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall
also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 354 of IPC
In Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana
65
The Court held that pulling a woman, removing her
dress, and requesting sexual intercourse is enough to constitute the offence of outraging a
woman's modesty, even without deliberate intention.
75.Sexual Harassment - (1) A man committing any of the following acts:
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
(2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-
section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 354 A of IPC
76.Assault or use of criminal force to women with intent to disrobe- Whoever assaults or uses
criminal force to any woman or abets such act with the intention of disrobing or compelling her
to be naked, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not
be less than three years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 354 B of IPC
77.Voyeurism- Whoever watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a private act in
circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the
perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or disseminates such image
shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which
shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to
65
AIR 2004 SC 1497
fine, and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1. —For the purposes of this section, “private act” includes an act of watching
carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide
privacy and where the victim’s genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in
underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a
kind ordinarily done in public
Explanation 2. Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or any act, but not to
their dissemination to third persons and where such image or act is disseminated, such
dissemination shall be considered an offence under this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 354 C of IPC
78.Stalking- (1) Any man who
(i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal
interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or
(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic
communication,
commits the offence of stalking:
Provided that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that
(i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the man accused of
stalking had been entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and detection of crime by the
State; or
(ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by
any person under any law; or
(iii) in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and justified.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on first conviction with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be
liable to fine; and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 354 D of IPC
79. Word ,gesture or act intended to insult modesty of a women- Whoever, intending to insult the
modesty of any woman, utters any words, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object in
any form, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be
seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 509 of IPC
In Ramkripal S/O Shyamlal Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh
66
the Supreme Court
held that "the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex... the culpable intention of the accused is
the crux of the matter." Essentially, ‘modesty’ is understood as a woman’s sexual dignity and
autonomy acquired by birth.
In the case of Dy. Inspector Gen.Of Police & Anr v. S.Samuthiram
67
, a police officer was
caught eve-teasing a married woman, resulting in criminal and disciplinary proceedings that led
to his dismissal from service. The matter was appealed regarding the legality of the dismissal.
66
2007 Cri LJ 2302
67
SLP (C) No. 31592 of 2008)
The Court, while allowing the appeal, stated that the prosecution must prove that the accused
uttered the words, made the sound, or gesture, and intended them to be heard or seen by some
woman.
In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal & Anr
68
, the petitioner, an actress, was charged with
various offences, including Section 509. Khushboo had given an interview in a magazine that
was deemed defamatory towards women. However, the Supreme Court concluded that no
offence was made out against her. Specifically, regarding Section 509, the Court stated that to
establish this offence, it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily
identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture, or physical act. In this
case, since the actress's words were published in a magazine, no offence could be made out, even
if the words were capable of insulting the modesty of the said women.
In Another example of a convicted offence under this Section was seen in the case of
Emperor v. Tarak Das Gupta (1925),
69
wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that the
sending by post of a letter containing indecent overtures to a woman can amount to an offence
punishable under Section 509 of the Penal Code, 1860.
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013
(the POSH Act) has been enacted for these issues, this Act only invites civil damages and
remedies while the criminal provision has jail term provisions. The POSH Act also is limited to
the workplace while Section 509 is universal, thus making the latter still relevant. Section 509 is
also important as it criminalises seemingly trivial acts like a stranger inviting a woman for a bike
ride
In the crucial case of Mrs Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr
(1995), the act of the accused of slapping the posterior of a female I.A.S. officer in a gathering
consisting of the elite of the society, when considered in the light of the sequence of events
involving overtures, words used and gestures made, prima facie amounted to commission of the
offence under Section 509.
In the case of Abhijeet J.K. v. State of Kerala (2020)
70
, it was held that an “act of affront to the
decency and dignity of a woman cannot be considered as trivial in nature”.
Of offences relating to marriage
80. Dowry death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is
shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be
called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in
section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 304 B of IPC
In Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka
71
, the Court established two crucial
factual positions to presume that the accused has committed dowry death:
68
AIR 2010 SC 3196
69
1926 (28) BomLR 99
70
2020 SCC OnLine Ker 703
1. The death of a wife should have occurred under abnormal circumstances within seven
years of marriage.
2. The wife should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in
connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death.
To escape this presumption, the burden is on the accused to disprove it. If the accused
fails to rebut the presumption, the Court is bound to act on it.
In Phulel Singh v. State of Haryana
72
The Court acquitted the accused on the ground that
there was no evidence to prove that the deceased was harassed for non-fulfilment of demand of
dowry. In Munshi v. State of U. P
73
, conviction set aside due to the absence of eye witness law of
the deceased. The case was registered based on a complaint from the deceased's brother, stating
that she was married four years prior and was subjected to dowry demands and abuse by her
husband's family. One of the in-laws threatened the deceased's family regarding unmet dowry
demands. Upon learning of her death, a complaint was made alleging by his brother that she was
killed due to unmet dowry demands. The trial resulted in convictions for all three accused under
Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
In Biswajit Haider @ Babu Halder v. State of West Bengal
74
, the Court held that in order
to seek conviction under section 304-B, I.P.C against a person for the offence of dowry death,
the prosecution is obliged to prove that:
(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstances
(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage
(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her
husband
(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry and
(e) to such cruelty or harassment, the deceased should have been subjected soon before her
death. In Phulel Singh v. State of Hariyana 1980
75
, the accused was acquitted due to the
inadequacy of evidence to prove that the deceased was harassed for the non-fulfilment of
demand of dowry. The Court held that Section 304-B is not retrospective. So, offence committed
prior to coming into force of section 304-B does not attract the section.
In Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab
76
The Court observed that some customary payments in
connection with the birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such
payments are not enveloped within the ambit of “dowry”. Hence, the dowry mentioned in section
71
AIR 2001 SC 921
72
AIR 2023 SC 4653 : AIR Online 2023 SC 773
73
, AIR 2023 SC 2158
74
(2008) 1 SCC 202.
75
AIR 249 1980
76
AIR 2001 SC 2828
304-B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with
the marriage.
In Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab
77
A young woman was married to an appellant and
within four years of the marriage, the woman consumed Aluminium Phosphide, a pesticide,
resulting in her death. An FIR was lodged against the husband. The Court convicted appellant
under Section 304B on the basis of the facts that fifteen days before her death, the woman visited
her parents' house due to maltreatment. The woman subsequently died from poisoning. So, the
primary ingredient to attract the offence under S. 304- B is the death of a woman must be a
“dowry death. This provision, meant to combat a social evil of alarming proportions.
81.Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage- Every man who
by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully
married to him and to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 493 of IPC
In Ram Chandra Bhagat v. State of Jharkhand
78
, a man had promised a woman to marry
her, leading to their cohabitation for nine years. The Court considered whether this promise
constituted an inducement to believe in marriage. It was held that the promise did not amount to
an inducement to the belief of marriage, and thus, the man was not held liable.
In Amruta Gadtia v. Trilochan Pradhan,
79
the Court noted that the woman was aware
she was not lawfully married to the man she was cohabiting with, yet she allowed him to have
sexual intercourse with her. The Court held the man not liable under Section 493. It was clarified
that cohabitation or sexual intercourse by a man with a woman who is not lawfully married to
him does not alone constitute an offense under this Section. All elements, including the false
belief induced by the man, must be present to punish him under this Section.
In Raghunath Padhy v. State
80
A 22-year-old man, already married, persuaded the victim
to marry him. She was hesitant because of his existing marriage but he insisted on registering
their marriage. Accused went to the temple and assured her that the exchange of the garlands is
sufficient proof of valid marriage. When she became pregnant, he eventually deserted her and
returned to his first wife. It was observed by the Court that inducement to cohabitate or have
sexual intercourse is necessarily done by a man to be liable for the offence under section 493.
In the case of Moideen Kutty Haji v. Kunhikoya
81
,the Court held that under this Section,
a man is not liable merely for cohabiting or having sexual intercourse with a woman not lawfully
married to him. To be liable under this Section, it must be proven that the man induced the
woman to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him under the belief that she was lawfully
married to him.
In Subhransu Sekhar Samantray v. The State
82
, the Orissa High Court ruled that if the
prosecutrix initially resisted sexual relations but submitted after the accused put vermillion on
77
A1R 2015 SC 1359
78
(2010) Criminal Appeal No. 439/2006
79
(1993) Cr LJ 1022 (Ori)
80
AIR 1957 Ori 198
81
AIR 1987 Ker 184
82
2002 criLj 4463,
her head, declared her as his wife, and promised to publicly accept her once he secured a job, it
constituted an offence under Section 493 of the IPC.
82. Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife- (1) Whoever, having a husband or wife
living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of it taking place during the
life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception.This sub-section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband
or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who
contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the
time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the
space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that
time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes
place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as
the same are within his or her knowledge.
(2) Whoever commits the offence under sub-section (1) having concealed from the person with
whom the subsequent marriage is contracted, the fact of the former marriage, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 494 and 495 of IPC
In Shiekh Altmuddin v. Emperor
83
, the Court held that if the marriage ceremony is invalid
due to the existence of a prior marriage, Section 496 does not apply. Instead, such a case
constitutes the offence of bigamy, which is addressed under Section 494 of the IPC
In Ajay Chandrakar v. Ushabai (1990)
84
,when a husband entered into a second marriage
while the first marriage was subsisting, the petition to declare the second marriage null and void
by the first wife was rejected, and the court held that the remedy under Section 11 is available to
the second wife, who is a party to the subsequent marriage.
In Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh (1971)
85
, the Court held that the offence
of bigamy can be established only if the spouse from the prior marriage was alive at the time of
the subsequent marriage, and the previous marriage was legal and valid. Both marriages must be
solemnised according to essential religious ceremonies and legal requirements for a person to be
punished for the offence.
In Smt. Yamuna Bai Anant Rao Adhav v. Anant Rao Shiv Ram Adhav
86
, The appellant
Smt. Yamunabai was factually married to an accused by observance of rites under Hindu Law in
June, 1974. Accused had earlier married one Smt. Lilabai who was alive and the marriage was
subsisting in 1974. The accused stayed for a week and thereafter left the house alleging ill-
treatment. The Supreme Court held that if the first condition of valid Hindu marriage as
mentioned in Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is violated, the marriage so
solemnized would be rendered null and void according to Section 11 of the Act and the wife will
not be able to claim any maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
83
4 Cri. LJ 152
84
1999 Lawsuit (MP) 471
85
1971 AIR 1153
86
1988 AIR 644
The Supreme Court held that if the first condition of valid Hindu marriage as mentioned in
Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is violated, the marriage so solemnised would be
rendered null and void according to Section 11 of the Act and the wife will not be able to claim
any maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
In the case of Nilesh Narain Rajesh Lal v. Kashmira Bhupendra Bai, a Banker, a
Christian man who was already married entered into a marriage with a Hindu girl according to
Hindu rituals and practices. After some time, when a baby girl was born from this marriage, he
abandoned his wife and filed a lawsuit seeking to annul the marriage. The Court subsequently
declared the marriage null and void.
In the case of Gul Mohammed v. Emperor (1947), the accused fraudulently took a Hindu
wife and forcibly converted her to Islam before marrying her. The Court ruled that conversion
alone does not automatically dissolve a marriage.
In the case of Dr. Suraj Mani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah
87
the Supreme
Court held that a person will not be punished under Section 494 if the second marriage is
allowed by the custom or law governing parties to marriage. Thus, where the parties belonged to
a tribe, a person cannot be charged for bigamy unless shown by the custom that second marriage
is void during subsistence of first marriage.
In the case of Sankaran Sukumaran v. Krishnan Saraswath
88
, the Kerala High Court
ruled that if spouses have executed a divorce deed and resumed living separately, believing their
marital bond to be terminated, neither party can be charged with bigamy if they enter into a
second marriage. This is because the first marriage has been legally dissolved
In Sri Anand C v. Smt. Chandramma (2022)
89
, the Karnataka High Court held that legal
proceedings against the petitioner could not be dismissed. It affirmed that marrying another
person while one's spouse is alive constitutes the offence of bigamy under Section 494 of the
Indian Penal Code, regardless of the consent of the first spouse. The court emphasized that delay
in filing a complaint is inconsequential as bigamy is considered a continuous offence.
In the case of Harpreet Kaur and Another v. State of Punjab
90
the Punjab and Haryana
High Court observed that a married woman living in an adulterous relationship with another man
without seeking divorce from her husband may be charged under Sections 494 and 495 of the
Indian Penal Code. The court clarified that such relationships do not qualify as 'live-in
relationships' and are not entitled to legal protection.
83.Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage- Whoever,
dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention, goes through the ceremony of being married, knowing
that he is not thereby lawfully married, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 496 of IPC
In Kailash Singh v. State of Rajasthan
91
, accused had a second marriage during the
pendency of appeal against the decree of divorce. However, he did not conceal the fact from the
girl.
The Court held the accused not liable under Section 496 because his act was not dishonest.
87
AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 938
88
Criminal R.P. No. 221 of 1980 (1984),
89
O.S.No.172/2016
90
CRM-M-49574-2019
91
1982 Cri. LJ 1005
84.Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married women - Whoever takes
or entices away any woman who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of
any other man, with intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person, or conceals or
detains with that intent any such woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 498 of IPC
In Alamgir v. State of Bihar
92
, the court established that knowingly taking away another
man’s wife with the intention of engaging in illicit intercourse and thereby depriving the husband
of control over her constitutes an offence under Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code.
85. Husband or relative of the husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. - Whoever, being
the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable
to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 498 A of IPC
In Sushil Kumar Sharma v.Union of India (2005)
93
, the victim committed suicide by
hanging in her husband's home, within a year of their marriage. She was allegedly subjected to
physical and mental torture by her husband, and mother-in-law, who called her unlucky and
demanded more dowry. The court found her husband and his mother guilty under abetment of
suicide and cruelty.
The Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar declared that no arrest should be made
immediately in cases where the accused had allegedly committed an offence under Section
498A. The court laid down guidelines for police officers to follow during arrests made under this
section, as there had been an increase in false complaints.
In the case of Abhishek v. State of M. P
94
The complaint was dismissed upon petition
under Section 482 of the CrPC.
86.Cruelty defined -For the purposes of section 85, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of
the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account
of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 498 A of IPC
87. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc- Whoever kidnaps or
abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she
will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or
seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to
illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal
intimidation as defined in this Sanhita or of abuse of authority or any other method of
compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing
92
1959 AIR 436 1959 SCR Supl
93
AIR 2005 SC 3100
94
(AIR 2023 SC 4209 : AIR Online 2023 SC 674
that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall
also be punishable as aforesaid.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 366 of IPC
In Jinish Lal Sah v. State of Bihar
95
The court held that for the purpose of section 366 and
section 376, IPC, there should be material to establish that either the alleged marriage or the
intercourse has taken place without the consent of the girl if she is above the age of 18 years or
16 years, as the case may be.
Of causing miscarriage, etc.
88. Causing miscarriage Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if
such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or
with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanation.A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 312 of IPC
89.Causing miscarriage without woman’s consent-Whoever commits the offence under section
88 without the consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick with child or not, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 313 of IPC
90. Death caused by act done with intent to cause miscarriage- (1) Whoever, with intent to cause
the miscarriage of a woman with child, does any act which causes the death of such woman,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Where the act referred to in sub-section (1) is done without the consent of the woman, shall
be punishable either with imprisonment for life, or with the punishment specified in said sub-
section.
Explanation.It is not essential to this offence that the offender should know that the act is
likely to cause death.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 314 of IPC
In Jacob George v. State of Kerala
96
,A woman with a lawful marriage and a son sought
an abortion during her second pregnancy. The appellant agreed to perform the procedure for Rs
600. Despite initially regaining consciousness, the woman later died. The appellant was charged
under various sections, including Section 314 IPC. The Court ruled that Section 314, which
addresses causing a woman's death during miscarriage, does not override Section 3 of the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. This Act permits abortion by a registered medical
practitioner under specific conditions, and if these conditions are met, Section 314 IPC is not
applicable, even if the woman dies.
91. Act done with intent to prevent child being born alive or to cause to die after birth-
Whoever before the birth of any child does any act with the intention of thereby
preventing that child from being born alive or causing it to die after its birth, and does by such
act prevent that child from being born alive, or causes it to die after its birth, shall, if such act be
95
(2003) 1 SCC 605
96
(1994) 3 SCC 430
not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 315 of IPC
92. Causing death of quick unborn child by act amounting to culpable homicide- Whoever does
any act under such circumstances, that if he thereby caused death, he would be guilty of culpable
homicide, and does by such act cause the death of a quick unborn child, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
Illustration.
A, knowing that he is likely to cause the death of a pregnant woman, does an act which, if it
caused the death of the woman, would amount to culpable homicide. The woman is injured, but
does not die; but the death of an unborn quick child with which she is pregnant is thereby caused.
A is guilty of the offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 316 of IPC
Of offences against child
93. Exposure and abandonment of child under twelve years of age, by parent or person having
taken care of it- Whoever being the father or mother of a child under the age of twelve years, or
having the care of such child, shall expose or leave such child in any place with the intention of
wholly abandoning such child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation. This section is not intended to prevent the trial of the offender for murder or
culpable homicide, as the case may be, if the child die in consequence of the exposure.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 317 of IPC
94. Concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body - Whoever, by secretly burying or
otherwise disposing of the dead body of a child whether such child die before or after or during
its birth, intentionally conceals or endeavours to conceal the birth of such child, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 318 of IPC
95. Hiring, employing or engaging a child to commit an offence-Whoever hires, employs or
engages any child to commit an offence shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to ten years, and with
fine; and if the offence be committed shall also be punished with the punishment provided for
that offence as if the offence has been committed by such person himself.
Explanation. Hiring, employing, engaging or using a child for sexual exploitation or
pornography is covered within the meaning of this section.
96. Procuration of child- Whoever, by any means whatsoever, induces any child to go from any
place or to do any act with intent that such child may be, or knowing that it is likely that such
child will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 366 A of IPC
97. Kidnapping or abducting child under ten years of age with intent to steal from its person-
Whoever kidnaps or abducts any child under the age of ten years with the intention of taking
dishonestly any movable property from the person of such child, shall be punished with years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 369 of IPC
98. Selling child for purposes of prostitution, etc-Whoever sells, lets to hire, or otherwise
disposes of any child with intent that such child shall at any age be employed or used for the
purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral
purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such child will at any age be employed or used for any
such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1. When a female under the age of eighteen years is sold, let for hire, or otherwise
disposed of to a prostitute or to any person who keeps or manages a brothel, the person so
disposing of such female shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have disposed of her
with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution.
Explanation 2. —For the purposes of this section “illicit intercourse” means sexual intercourse
between persons not united by marriage or by any union or tie which, though not amounting to a
marriage, is recognised by the personal law or custom of the community to which they belong or,
where they belong to different communities, of both such communities, as constituting between
them a quasi-marital relation.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 372 of IPC
99. Buying child for purposes of prostitution, etc- Whoever buys, hires or otherwise obtains
possession of any child with intent that such child shall at any age be employed or used for the
purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral
purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such child will at any age be employed or used for any
such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall
not be less than seven years but which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation 1. Any prostitute or any person keeping or managing a brothel, who buys, hires or
otherwise obtains possession of a female under the age of eighteen years shall, until the contrary
is proved, be presumed to have obtained possession of such female with the intent that she shall
be used for the purpose of prostitution.
Explanation 2. “Illicit intercourse” has the same meaning as in section 98.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 373 of IPC
CHAPTER VI
OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY
Of offences affecting life
100. Culpable homicide- Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing
death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide
Illustrations.
(a) A lay sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the
knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z, believing the ground to be firm, treads on
it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A, intending to cause, or knowing it to
be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B may be
guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a bush; A not
knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of
culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing an act that he knew
was likely to cause death.
Explanation 1. A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a
disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be
deemed to have caused his death.
Murder.
Explanation 2. Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily
injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and
skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3. —The cause of the death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it
may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has
been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 299 of IPC
Section 299
In Jayaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu
97
, during the heated State Assembly election period,
DMK Party members, including the deceased, were attacked by other party members. Deceased
person was fatally injured by the attack and the Court held that whoever causes death by doing
an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide.
In Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P.
98
, before framing a charge under Section 304, Part
II of the Indian Penal Code, the court requires the material on record to prima facie demonstrate
that the accused is guilty of culpable homicide. The act attributed to the accused must amount to
culpable homicide under Section 299 of the IPC. According to Section 299, the prosecution's
evidence must prima facie indicate that the accused performed an act that caused death, knowing
that such an act was likely to cause death. This prerequisite must be satisfied before charging the
accused under Section 304, Part II.
101. Murder -Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, ––
(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or
(b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury
as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused;
or
(c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to
any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death; or
(d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently
dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
injury as aforesaid.
Illustrations.
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
have (b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his
death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow.
A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of
97
AIR 1976 SC 1519
98
(1996) 6 SCC 129
nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is
labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature
kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is
not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary
course of nature would cause death.
(c) An intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in
the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he
may not have intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A
is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular
individual.
Exception 1. Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of
self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the
provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident:
Provided that the provocation is not, ––
(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any
person;
(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise
of the powers of such public servant;
(c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation. Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence
from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations.
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y,
Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death
of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither
intended nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z.
Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited by sudden and violent passion by the arrest,
and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public
servant in the exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s
deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and
kills Z. This is murder.
(e) An attempt to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A
to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and
kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise
of the right of private defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take
advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B
kills Z with the knife. Here B may commit only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2. Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of
the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and
causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without
premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of
such defence.
Illustration.
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draw out a
pistol. Z persists in the assault. Believing in good faith that he can be no other means to prevent
himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only
culpable homicide.
Exception 3. Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding
a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by
law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and
necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the
person whose death is caused.
Exception 4. Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a
sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken
undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation. It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the
first assault.
Exception 5. Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being
above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Illustration.
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth,
he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 300 of IPC
In Nirmala Devi v. State of H. P
99
the possibility that the accused acted under
provocation, stemming from the deceased's refusal to provide money, was considered.
Consequently, the accused's conviction was modified from Section 302 to Section 304 of the
IPC. In State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya
100
the Court approached the determination of whether an
offence constitutes "murder" or "culpable homicide not amounting to murder" through a
structured analysis in three stages. Initially, the Court considers whether the accused caused the
death of another person through their act, establishing a causal connection. If this causal link is
established, the second stage involves determining whether the act constitutes "culpable
homicide" as defined in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Subsequently, the Court
proceeds to the third stage, where it evaluates whether the act falls within the ambit of any of the
four clauses defining "murder" under Section 300 of the IPC.
If the act does not meet the criteria for murder under Section 300 but still qualifies as
culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 299, it would be punishable under the
first or second part of Section 304 of the IPC, depending on whether the act corresponds to the
second or third clause of Section 299. However, if the act falls within any of the Exceptions
listed in Section 300, the offence would still be considered culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, punishable under the first part of Section 304.
99
(AIR 2023 SC 3683 : AIR Online SC 596),
100
AIR 1977 SC 45
In some cases, the facts may be so intertwined that the second and third stages blend
together, making it impractical to separately analyze the issues involved in each stage.
In Tularam v.The State Of Madhya Pradesh
101
The appellant was accused and convicted
of murdering another person. The incident began with a quarrel. between two individuals at a
flour mill. Later, as one of them was returning home, the quarrel resumed and escalated into a
violent altercation. Several people joined the fight, including the appellant, who was armed with
a spear-tipped stick. During the fight, the appellant pierced the victim in the chest, causing a fatal
injury. The victim was taken home and later declared dead. The Court held that the accused
attracted the ingredients under murder.
In Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala
102
, the distinction between murder and culpable
homicide not amounting to murder hinges on the presence of a specific mens rea defined in the
four clauses of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The presence of any one of these mental
states differentiates murder from culpable homicide.
In Ankeri v. State of Rajasthan
103
, the Court ruled that when the appellant, armed with an
axe, inflicts only simple incised injuries, some of which are superficial and do not affect the
internal organs of the deceased, it cannot be inferred that the accused intended to cause the death
of the deceased.
In the State of U.P. v. Virendra Prasad
104
The case began with police receiving
information about a gambling den operated by the accused and his family. A raid was conducted
involving several officers. During the raid, the police found people gambling. While searching,
the accused and others attempted to escape. One of them fired a rifle but missed. The police
caught him, but the main accused grabbed the rifle and fired, injuring three officers. The injured
officers were taken to the hospital, where one later died. The main accused was found guilty of
murder, attempted murder, and a firearm offense.
In State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh
105
, the Court determined that the number of injuries
alone is not decisive in establishing intention. Instead, the nature of the injury, the body part
affected, and the weapon used are crucial indicators to ascertain whether the accused intended to
cause death or not.
In Mahesh v. State of M.P.
106
The deceased, along with two witnesses, were working as
agricultural labourers on a field. On the day of occurrence, while they were ploughing the field,
the accused came with his cattle. The cattle entered the field, damaging the crop. The deceased
and a witness asked the accused to remove his cattle, but he refused, leading to an altercation.
The accused then struck the deceased on the head with a sharp tool, causing an injury that led to
the deceased's immediate death. The Court held that the assault took place without any pre-
meditation, so Exception 4 to section 300 is attracted and the accused is convicted under section
304, Part 1, IPC.
101
1 M.Cr.C. No. 9819
102
AIR 1966 SC 1874
103
AIR 1994 SC 842
104
AIR 2004 SC 1517
105
AIR 2004 SC 1264
106
(1996) 10 SCC 668
In Rajendra Singh v. State of Bihar
107
the Court specified that for an assault to be
considered as arising from a sudden fight, it must occur without pre-meditation, without undue
advantage or cruelty, and not be used as a disguise for pre-existing malice.
102. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended-
If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits
culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows
himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the
description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he
intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 301 of IPC
In Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab
108
, the Court determined that if an accused intends to
harm one individual but unintentionally causes the death of another, they would be held
accountable for murder under the doctrine of transferred malice outlined in Section 301 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC).
In Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab
109
the Supreme Court held that if an accused fires a
shot in self-defense intending to harm their assailant, but the shot misses and unintentionally kills
an innocent person, the accused is still protected under Section 100 of the IPC. This provision
safeguards actions taken in self-defense even if unintended consequences result, such as the
death of an innocent bystander.
103. Punishment for Murder- (1) Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) When a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of
race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar
ground each member of such group shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life,
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 302 of IPC
In the case of Rajesh v. State of MP
110
,the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the
accused. The court emphasized that a substantial degree of evidence beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary to find the accused guilty.
In R. Sreenivasa v. State of Karnataka
111
The deceased had been missing for over two
days. However, there was no conclusive evidence establishing the last seen of the deceased, and
a significant time gap existed between the alleged last sighting and the discovery of the body. As
a result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC was overturned.
In Allauddin Main v. State of Bihar
112
the Court established that life imprisonment should
generally be the norm, with the death penalty considered an exception that requires specific,
articulated reasons. Therefore, when imposing the death penalty, special justifications must be
provided.
107
AIR 2000 SC 1779,
108
AIR 1991 SC 982
109
(1996) 1 SCC 458
110
(AIR 2023 SC 4759 : AIR Online 2023 SC 764
111
(AIR 2023 SC 4301; AIR Online 2023 SC 697)
112
AIR 1989 SC 1456
In Sushil Murmu v. State of Jharkhand
113
,the fact of the case is as follows, a tragic event
occurred when a man discovered that his son was missing from their home. He searched for him
and learned from various sources that his son had been sacrificed to Goddess Kali by an
individual, with the help of his wife and mother. The severed head of the victim was later
recovered from a bag in the pond. The three accused were tried for murder (Section 302 IPC) and
destroying evidence (Section 201 IPC). The main accused was found guilty and sentenced to
death for the murder and seven years of rigorous imprisonment for destroying evidence. The
other two accused were acquitted due to lack of evidence.
In Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P.
114
, the Court emphasized that the nature of the
offence must be assessed based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.
The court observed that the following guidelines will have to be applied to facts of each
individual case where the question of imposition of death sentence arises:
(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme
culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty, the circumstances of the “offender” also need to be taken
into consideration along with the circumstances of the “crime”.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentences are an exception. Death sentence must be
imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having
regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to
impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to
the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in
doing so the mitigating circumstances has to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to
be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is
exercised. In rarest of rare cases when the collective conscience of the community is so shocked,
that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of
their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty, death
sentence can be awarded. The community may entertain such sentiment in the following
circumstances:
(1) When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or
dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community.
(2) When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness,
e.g., murder by hired assassin for money or reward, or cold- blooded murder for gains of a
person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in a position of trust, or
murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the motherland.
(3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community, etc., is committed
not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath, or in cases of “bride
burning” or “dowry deaths” or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of
extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of infatuation.
113
AIR 2004 SC 394
114
AIR 1999 SC 3338
(4) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance, when multiple murders, say of all or
almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular caste,
community, or locality, are committed.
(5) When the victim of murder is an innocent child, or a helpless woman or old or infirm person
or a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position, or a public figure generally
loved and respected by the community.
In Purushottam Dashrath Borate v. State of Maharashtra
115
, the Court determined that a
case qualifies as the "rarest of the rare" when the accused poses a significant threat or menace to
societal harmony and is incompatible with it.
In the case of Rav Mandal v. State of Uttarakhand
116
, the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of the accused for murder. The incident occurred under cover of darkness,
complicating the case with two contradictory FIRs and inconsistent witness statements.
In M.A. Antony v. State of Kerala
117
the Court emphasized that merely basing a case on
circumstantial evidence is insufficient grounds to convert a death sentence into life
imprisonment. Socio-economic factors, especially concerning access to justice and remedies that
are not readily available to the poor and needy, must also be taken into account when
determining sentences.
In Sardar Khan v. State of Karnataka
118
, the Court held that while the brutality of the
crime is a crucial factor, it alone is not sufficient to classify a case as one of the rarest of rare,
warranting the imposition of the death penalty. Various factors must be considered in totality to
reach such a conclusion.
104. Punishment for murder by life-convict- Whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for
life, commits murder, shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall
mean the remainder of that person’s natural life.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 303 of IPC
In Harendra v. State of Bihar
119
, the Court held that if death occurs and the
circumstances fall under any of the 5 Exceptions of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
the offence is not classified as murder but as culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Section 304 further distinguishes penalties based on whether there was an intention to kill or
only knowledge that death could likely occur. However, for conviction under Part I of Section
304, the accused must have caused death under one of the circumstances outlined in the 5
Exceptions of Section 300. If death itself was not caused, the accused cannot be convicted under
Section 304.
In Bonda Devesu v. State of A.P.
120
the Court held that if the accused intended to inflict
bodily injury likely to cause death, the offence falls under Section 304, Part I of the IPC. If the
accused acted under grave and sudden provocation intending to cause the death of the deceased,
the offence is also punishable under Section 304, Part I of the IPC.
115
AIR 2015 SC 2170
116
(AIR 1023 SC 2554 : AIR Online SC 434)
117
AIR 2019 SC 194
118
AIR 2004 SC 1695
119
AIR 1993 SC1977
120
(1996) 7 SCC 115
In Gyarsibai v. State
121
,the Court did not need to determine if the woman was justifiably
found guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Allahabad High Court had
suggested that fear of her husband and resultant panic could excuse her actions. However, in this
case, the appellant was not influenced by panic or fright. The Court noted that assessing an
excuse requires considering the accused's state of mind.
105. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder- Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and
with fine, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any
intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
In Anbazhagan v State,
122
According to the facts of the case, the accused used a weed axe
and made a blow to the head of the deceased causing death. Though there was no clear intention
to kill the person the accused was charged under culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
In Nk.Gursewak Singh v Union of India
123
, the fact of the case is as follows, the accused
killed the deceased by firing a bullet. But soon after the incident the accused did not escape from
the event , instead helping in lifting the deceased and also accompanied to the hospital. Even
though there were 20 rounds in rifles, only one round was fired. So, the conviction of offence
under section 302 altered to section 304.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 304 of IPC
106. Causing death by negligence- (1) Whoever causes death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if such
act is done by a registered medical practitioner while performing medical procedure, he shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, “registered medical practitioner” means a
medical practitioner who possesses any medical qualification recognised under the National
Medical Commission Act, 2019 and whose name has been entered in the National Medical
Register or a State Medical Register under that Act.
(2) Whoever causes death of any person by rash and negligent driving of vehicle not amounting
to culpable homicide, and escapes without reporting it to a police officer or a Magistrate soon
after the incident, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description of a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 304 A of IPC
In State of Punjab v. Dil Bahadur
124
The Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the
high court reducing sentences from two years rigorous imprisonment to eight months simple
imprisonment on the offence of causing death by rash and negligent driving.
121
AIR 1953 M.B. 61
122
AIR 2023 SC 3660; AIR Online 2023 SC 588
123
AIR 2023 SC 3659 ; AIR Online 2023 SC 574
124
, AIR 2023 SC 1767 : AIR ONLINE 2023 SC 227
In State of Gujarat v. Haidarali
125
, the Court held that an offence under Section 304-A is
committed through either a rash or negligent act. This section distinctly does not encompass the
elements of Section 299 or Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, if a speeding truck,
while turning in an open field, collides with a cot resulting in the death of a person resting on it,
this death is categorized under Section 304-A. It is evident that the driver did not intentionally
drive the truck onto the cot; rather, the act was either rash or negligent.
107. Abetment of suicide of child or person of unsound mind- If any child, any person of
unsound mind, any delirious person or any person in a state of intoxication, commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for
life, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 305 of IPC
108. Abetment of suicide-If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such
suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 306 of IPC
In Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana
126
, the Court ruled that to convict a person for
instigating someone to commit suicide, it must be proven that the victim actually committed
suicide.
In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
127
, the Court noted that merely because an
accused has been found guilty under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code does not
automatically imply guilt for abetting the suicide of the woman involved based on the same
evidence.
In Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh
128
,the Court held that if the facts and circumstances
establish suicide and there is dowry demand, section 306 is attracted.
In M. Arjunan v. State
129
,the Court held that mere use of abusive words by accused held
not sufficient to constitute offence of abetment of suicide.
109. Attempt to murder- (1) Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under
such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be
liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
(2) When any person offending under sub-section (1) is under sentence of imprisonment for life,
he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean
the remainder of that person’s natural life.
125
AIR 1976 SC 1012
126
AIR 1989 SC 378
127
(2001) 9 SCC 618
128
AIR 1990 SC 209
AIR 1990 SC 209
129
AIR 2019 SC 43
Illustrations.
(a) A shot at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued, A
would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert
place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does
not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fire
the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and, if by such firing he
wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of sub-section (1).
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which
remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. Place the
food on Z’s table or deliver it to Z’s servants to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the
offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 307 of IPC
In Sagayam v. State of Karnataka
130
the Court ruled that to convict under Section 307 of
the Indian Penal Code, it is not necessary that bodily injury capable of causing death be inflicted.
The law considers an attempt criminal if there is intent along with an overt act that is proximate
to the intended crime, even if external factors prevent its completion. The legal framework
distinguishes between intent, preparation, and attempt in the commission of a crime. If an
attempt fails at the stage of execution, the law still penalizes the attempt itself, distinct from mere
intent or preparation.
In Ajmer Singh v State of Haryana
131
, conviction was set aside by the Court on the fact
that considering both parties suffered injuries in free fight, therefore conviction will not be
sustainable.
In Emperor v. Mt. Dhirajia
132
This appeal involves a 20-year-old woman convicted of
murder under Section 302 IPC by the Sessions Judge of Benares. Simultaneously, she was tried
for attempted suicide by a jury, which found her not guilty. The Judge, disagreeing with the
jury's verdict on attempted suicide, referred the case under Section 307 CrPC, recommending
that the jury's verdict be set aside and the appellant be convicted under Section 309 IPC as well
as Section 302 IPC. Consequently, the appeal before us addresses both her conviction and
sentence for murder and the Judge's recommendation to convict her for attempted suicide..
In R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka
133
, the Court observed that a conviction under
Section 307 can be justified if there is intent accompanied by some overt act towards its
execution. It is not necessary that the act causes bodily injury capable of causing death.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha
134
despite lacking forensic evidence to prove
grievous injury, the Court held that eleven punctured and bleeding wounds on the injured,
allegedly caused by a firearm, clearly indicated an intent to commit murder. Thus, Section 307
130
AIR 2000 SC 2161
131
AIR 2023 SC 1969 : AIR ONLINE 2023 SC 271
132
AIR 1940 All.486
133
AIR 2004 SC 1812
134
AIR 2019 SC 713
applies based on the circumstances indicating intent, regardless of the severity of the forensic
evidence.
110. Attempt to commit culpable homicide-Whoever does any act with such intention or
knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is
caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration.
A, on grave and sudden provocation, fires a pistol at Z, under such circumstances that if he
thereby caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A has
committed the offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 308 of IPC
In Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra
135
, the Supreme Court held that if during a scuffle
between the accused and the victim none of the victim's vital organs were injured, and it can be
established that the accused knew the injuries were likely to cause death, the accused cannot be
convicted of attempted murder. Instead, the appropriate charge would be attempting to commit
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
111. Organised crime- (1) Any continuing unlawful activity including kidnapping, robbery,
vehicle theft, extortion, land grabbing, contract killing, economic offence, cyber-crimes,
trafficking of persons, drugs, weapons or illicit goods or services, human trafficking for
prostitution or ransom, by any person or a group of persons acting in concert, singly or jointly,
either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of
violence, threat of violence, intimidation, coercion, or by any other unlawful means to obtain
direct or indirect material benefit including a financial benefit, shall constitute organised crime.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, ––
(i) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of two or more persons who, acting either singly
or jointly, as a syndicate or gang indulge in any continuing unlawful activity;
(ii) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity prohibited by law which is a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken by any person, either
singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in
respect of which more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court within
the preceding period of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such offence, and
includes economic offence;
(iii) “economic offence” includes criminal breach of trust, forgery, counterfeiting of currency-
notes, bank-notes and Government stamps, hawala transaction, mass-marketing fraud or running
any scheme to defraud several persons or doing any act in any manner with a view to defraud
any bank or financial institution or any other institution or organisation for obtaining monetary
benefits in any form.
(2) Whoever commits organised crime shall,
(a) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be punished with death or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than ten lakh rupees;
135
(1994) 1 SCC 465
(b) in any other case, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall
not be less than five lakh rupees.
(3) Whoever abets, attempts, conspires or knowingly facilitates the commission of an organised
crime, or otherwise engages in any act preparatory to an organised crime, shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than five lakh
rupees.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime syndicate shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than five lakh
rupees.
(5) Whoever, intentionally, harbours or conceals any person who has committed the offence of
an organised crime shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine which
shall not be less than five lakh rupees:
Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any case in which the harbour or concealment is
by the spouse of the offender.
(6) Whoever possesses any property derived or obtained from the commission of an organised
crime or proceeds of any organised crime or which has been acquired through the organised
crime, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be
less than two lakh rupees.
(7) If any person on behalf of a member of an organised crime syndicate is, or at any time has
been in possession of movable or immovable property which he cannot satisfactorily account for,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but
which may extend to imprisonment for ten years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not
be less than one lakh rupees.
112. Petty Organised crime- (1) Whoever, being a member of a group or gang, either singly or
jointly, commits any act of theft, snatching, cheating, unauthorised selling of tickets,
unauthorised betting or gambling, selling of public examination question papers or any other
similar criminal act, is said to commit petty organised crime.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section "theft" includes trick theft, theft from
vehicle, dwelling house or business premises, cargo theft, pick pocketing, theft through card
skimming, shoplifting and theft of Automated Teller Machine.
(2) Whoever commits any petty organised crime shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
113. Terrorist act-(1) Whoever does any act with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the
unity, integrity, sovereignty, security, or economic security of India or with the intent to strike
terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign
country, ––
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substance or inflammable substance or firearms
or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other
substance (whether biological, radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any
other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause,
(i) death of, or injury to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any
foreign country; or
(iv) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or circulation
of counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or
(v) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be
used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of
India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or
causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatening to kill or injure such person or does
any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the
Government of a foreign country or an international or inter-governmental organisation or any
other person to do or abstain from doing any act,
commit a terrorist act.
Explanation. For the purpose of this sub-section,
(a) “public functionarymeans the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in
the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary;
(b) “counterfeit Indian currency” means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after
examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency imitates or
compromises with the key security features of Indian currency.
(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act shall,
(a) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be punished with death or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine;
(b) in any other case, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or
knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission
of a terrorist act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine
(4) Whoever organises or causes to be organised any camp or camps for imparting training in
terrorist act, or recruits or causes to be recruited any person or persons for commission of a
terrorist act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(5) Any person who is a member of an organisation which is involved in terrorist act, shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also
be liable to fine.
(6) Whoever voluntarily harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal any person
knowing that such person has committed a terrorist act shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
and shall also be liable to fine:
Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any case in which the harbour or concealment is
by the spouse of the offender.
(7) Whoever knowingly possesses any property derived or obtained from commission of any
terrorist act or acquired through the commission of any terrorist act shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the officer not below the
rank of Superintendent of Police shall decide whether to register the case under this section or
under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Of hurt
114. Hurt- Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause
hurt.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 319 of IPC
115. Voluntarily causing hurt- (1) Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby
causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any
person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”.
(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122 voluntarily causes
hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 321 and 323 of IPC
In Radhey v. State
136
, the Court noted that Section 321 applies when an accused intends
to harm one person but ends up causing harm to another. For instance, if during a fight between
the accused and another person, a bystander intervenes and gets injured by a stick, the accused
would be liable under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code for causing hurt.
116. Grievous hurt- The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “grievous”, namely: ––
(a) Emasculation;
(b) Permanent privation of the sight of either eye;
(c) Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear;
(d) Privation of any member or joint;
(e) Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint;
(f) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face;
(g) Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth;
(h) Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen
days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 320 of IPC
117. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt- (1) Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which
he intends to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which
he causes is grievous hurt, is said “voluntarily to cause grievous hurt”.
Explanation. A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both
causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. But he is
said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause
grievous hurt of one kind, he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind.
In Emperor v. Mushnooru Surynarayana Murthy
137
,under this case it was held that Section 321
requires that hurt to a person must be intended or foreseen. Legally, an individual is presumed to
foresee consequences that an ordinary person would. One cannot claim ignorance of likely
136
1970 Cr LJ 1544 (All)
137
1912 22 MLR 333
outcomes. A person may be held responsible for effects not directly caused by their actions if
those effects are likely to arise in the ordinary course of events.
Illustration.
A, intending of knowing himself to be likely permanently to disfigure Z’s face, gives Z a blow
which does not permanently disfigure Z’s face, but which causes Z to suffer severe bodily pain
for the space of fifteen days. A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt.
(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section (2) of section 122, voluntarily
causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever commits an offence under sub-section (1) and in the course of such commission
causes any hurt to a person which causes that person to be in permanent disability or in persistent
vegetative state, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that person’s natural life.
(4) When a group of five or more persons acting in concert, causes grievous hurt to a person on
the ground of his race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any
other similar ground, each member of such group shall be guilty of the offence of causing
grievous hurt, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 322 and 325 of IPC
118. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons- (1) Whoever, except in
the case provided for by sub-section (1) of section 122, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any
instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of
offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any
poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any
substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the
blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand
rupees, or with both.
(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section (2) of section 122, voluntarily
causes grievous hurt by any means referred to in subsection (1), shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
less than one year but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 324 and 326 of IPC
In Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P.
138
, the Court held that for Section 324 of the Indian
Penal Code to apply, the prosecution must substantiate that the accused committed the alleged
acts knowing that they were likely to cause harm to the victim.
In Mahadeo v. State of west Bengal
139
The appellant was convicted under Section 420 of
the Indian Penal Code for taking delivery of 25 ingots of tin without intending to pay, instead
promising cash against delivery to induce the complainant to part with the goods. Evidence,
including the appellant's overdraft account and hypothecation of tin, supports this conclusion.
138
(1996) 6 SCC 129
139
1954 SC 724
Both lower Courts correctly found him guilty and sentenced him to one year's rigorous
imprisonment. The appeal is dismissed as without merit.
119. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal act-
(1) Whoever voluntarily causes hurt for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer, or from any
person interested in the sufferer, any property or valuable security, or of constraining the sufferer
or any person interested in such sufferer to do anything which is illegal or which may facilitate
the commission of an offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1), shall
be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 327 and 329 of IPC
120. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession, or to compel restoration of
property- (1) Whoever voluntarily causes hurt for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer or
from any person interested in the sufferer, any confession or any information which may lead to
the detection of an offence or misconduct, or for the purpose of constraining the sufferer or any
person interested in the sufferer to restore or to cause the restoration of any property or valuable
security or to satisfy any claim or demand, or to give information which may lead to the
restoration of any property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustrations.
(a) A, a police officer, tortures Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. A is
guilty of an offence under this section.
(b) A, a police officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen property is
deposited. A is guilty of an offence under this section.
(c) A, a revenue officer, tortures Z in order to compel him to pay certain arrears of revenue due
from Z. A is guilty of an offence under this section.
(2) Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt for any purpose referred to in sub-section (1), shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 330 and 331 of IPC
121. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to deter public servant from his duty- (1) Whoever
voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty as such
public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from
discharging his duty as such public servant or in consequence of anything done or attempted to
be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or
with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt to any person being a public servant in the
discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any
other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant or in consequence of
anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such
public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall
not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 332 and 333 of IPC
In D. Chattaiah v. State of A.P.
140
the Court held that to invoke Section 332 of the Indian
Penal Code, there must be clear evidence of intent to obstruct or deter a public servant from
performing their duties. Therefore, if a public servant is assaulted in their office due to a personal
grudge unrelated to the discharge of their duties, the accused cannot be convicted under either
Section 332 or Section 333 of the IPC.
122. Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt on provocation- (1) Whoever voluntarily causes
hurt on grave and sudden provocation, if he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to
cause hurt to any person other than the person who gave the provocation, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) Whoever voluntarily causing grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation, if he neither
intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt to any person other than the person
who gave the provocation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to five years, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with
both.
Explanation.This section is subject to the same proviso as Exception 1 of section 101.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 334 and 335 of IPC
123. Causing hurt by means of poison, etc, with intent to commit an offence-Whoever
administers to or causes to be taken by any person any poison or any stupefying, intoxicating or
unwholesome drug, or other thing with intent to cause hurt to such person, or with intent to
commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence or knowing it to be likely that he will
thereby cause hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 328 of IPC
124. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc- (1) Whoever causes permanent or
partial damage or deformity to, or burns or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of the body of
a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or by administering acid to that person, or
by using any other means with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to
cause such injury or hurt or causes a person to be in a permanent vegetative state shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine:
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses of the
treatment of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.
(2) Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or attempts to administer acid to
any person, or attempts to use any other means, with the intention of causing permanent or
partial damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or disability or grievous hurt
to that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall
not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1. —For the purposes of this section, “acid” includes any substance which has an
acidic or corrosive character or burning nature, that is capable of causing bodily injury leading to
scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanent disability.
140
AIR 1978 SC 1441
Explanation 2. For the purposes of this section, permanent or partial damage or deformity or
permanent vegetative state shall not be required to be irreversible.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 326 A and 326 B of IPC
125.Act endangering life or personal safety of others-Whoever does any act so rashly or
negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months or with fine
which may extend to two thousand five hundred rupees, or with both, but
(a) where hurt is caused, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with
both;
(b) where grievous hurt is caused, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 336 and 338 of IPC
Of wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement
126. Wrongful restraint. (1) Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that
person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said
wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception. The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith
believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this
section.
Illustration.
A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to pass, A not believing in good faith that he has a
right to stop the path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A wrongfully restrained Z.
(2) Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 339 and 341 of IPC
127. Wrongful confinement - (1) Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as
to prevent that person from proceedings beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said
“wrongfully to confine” that person.
Illustrations.
(a) A causes Z to go within a walled space, and locks Z in. Z is thus prevented from proceeding
in any direction beyond the circumscribing line of the wall. A wrongfully confines Z.
(b) A man places firearms at the outlets of a building, and tells Z that they will fire at Z if Z
attempts to leave the building. A wrongfully confines Z.
(2) Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both.
(3) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for three days, or more, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
(4) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for ten days or more, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be
liable to fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees.
(5) Whoever keeps any person in wrongful confinement, knowing that a writ for the liberation of
that person has been duly issued, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years in addition to any term of imprisonment to which he may be
liable under any other section of this Chapter and shall also be liable to fine
(6) Whoever wrongfully confines any person in such manner as to indicate an intention that the
confinement of such person may not be known to any person interested in the person so
confined, or to any public servant, or that the place of such confinement may not be known to or
discovered by any such person or public servant as hereinbefore mentioned, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years in addition to
any other punishment to which he may be liable for such wrongful confinement and shall also be
liable to fine.
(7) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for the purpose of extorting from the person
confined, or from any person interested in the person confined, any property or valuable security
or of constraining the person confined or any person interested in such person to do anything
illegal or to give any information which may facilitate the commission of an offence, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
(8) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for the purpose of extorting from the person
confined or any person interested in the person confined any confession or any information
which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or for the purpose of constraining
the person confined or any person interested in the person confined to restore or to cause the
restoration of any property or valuable security or to satisfy any claim or demand, or to give
information which may lead to the restoration of any property or valuable security, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 340 and 342- 348 of IPC
Of criminal force and assault
128. Force-A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or
cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of
motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other’s
body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that
such contact affects that other’s sense of feeling:
Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes
that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the following three ways,
namely: ––
(a) by his own bodily power;
(b) by disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or cessation of
motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of any other person;
(c) by inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 349 of IPC
129. Criminal Force-Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person’s
consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause,
or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to
the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.
Illustrations.
(a) Z is sitting in a moored boat on a river. A unfastens the moorings, and thus intentionally
causes the boat to drift down the stream. Here A intentionally causes motion to Z, and he does
this by disposing of substances in such a manner that the motion is produced without any other
action on any person’s part. A has therefore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done so
without Z’s consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending or knowing it to be
likely that this use of force will cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, A has used criminal force to
Z.
(b) Z is riding in a chariot. A lashes Z’s horses, and thereby causes them to quicken their pace.
Here A has caused change of motion to Z by inducing the animals to change their motion. A has
therefore used force to Z; and if A has done this without Z’s consent, intending or knowing it to
be likely that he may thereby injure, frighten or annoy Z, A has used criminal force to Z.
(c) Z is riding in a palanquin. A, intending to rob Z, seizes the pole and stops the palanquin. Here
A has caused cessation of motion to Z, and he has done this by his own bodily power. A has
therefore used force to Z; and as A has acted thus intentionally, without Z’s consent, in order to
the commission of an offence. A has used criminal force to Z.
(d) A intentionally pushes against Z in the street. Here A has by his own bodily power moved his
own person so as to bring it into contact with Z. He has therefore intentionally used force to Z;
and if he has done so without Z’s consent, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may
thereby injure, frighten or annoy Z, he has used criminal force to Z.
(e) A throw a stone, intending or knowing it to be likely that the stone will be thus brought into
contact with Z, or with Z’s clothes, or with something carried by Z, or that it will strike water
and dash up the water against Z’s clothes or something carried by Z. Here, if the throwing of the
stone produces the effect of causing any substance to come into contact with Z, or Z’s clothes, A
has used force to Z, and if he did so without Z’s consent, intending thereby to injure, frighten or
annoy Z, he has used criminal force to Z.
(f) A intentionally pulls up a woman’s veil. Here A intentionally uses force to her, and if he does
so without her consent intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby injure, frighten or
annoy her, he has used criminal force to her.
(g) Z is bathing. A pour into the bath water which he knows to be boiling. Here A intentionally
by his own bodily power causes such motion in the boiling water as brings that water into
contact with Z, or with other water so situated that such contact must affect Z’s sense of feeling;
A has therefore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done this without Z’s consent
intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, A
has used criminal force.
(h) A incites a dog to spring upon Z, without Z’s consent. Here, if A intends to cause injury,
fear or annoyance to Z, he uses criminal force to Z.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 351 of IPC
130. Assault-Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely
that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes
that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an
assault.
Explanation. Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the words which a person uses may
give to his gestures or preparation such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations
amount to an assault.
Illustrations.
(a) A shakes his fist at Z, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause Z to
believe that A is about to strike Z. A has committed an assault.
(b) A begins to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog, intending or knowing it to be likely that
he may thereby cause Z to believe that he is about to cause the dog to attack Z. A has committed
an assault upon Z.
(c) A takes up a stick, saying to Z, “I will give you a beating”. Here, though the words used by A
could in no case amount to an assault, and though the mere gesture, unaccompanied by any other
circumstances, might not amount to an assault, the gesture explained by the words may amount
to an assault.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 351 of IPC
131.Punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation- Whoever
assaults or uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation
given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Explanation 1. Grave and sudden provocation will not mitigate the punishment for an offence
under this section,
(a) if the provocation is sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for the
offence; or
(b) if the provocation is given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant,
in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant; or
(c) if the provocation is given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private
defence.
Explanation 2. Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to mitigate the offence,
is a question of fact.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 352 of IPC
132. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty-Whoever
assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as
such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as
such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person
in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 353 of IPC
133. Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour person, otherwise than on grave
provocation- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending thereby to
dishonour that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 355 of IPC
134. Assault or criminal force in attempt to commit theft of property carried by a person-
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, in attempting to commit theft on any
property which that person is then wearing or carrying, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 356 of IPC
135. Assault or criminal force in attempt to wrongfully confine a person- Whoever assaults or
uses criminal force to any person, in attempting wrongfully to confine that person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 357 of IPC
136. Assault or criminal force on grave provocation- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to
any person on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.
Explanation. This section is subject to the same Explanation as section 131.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 358 of IPC
Of kidnapping, abduction, slavery and forced labour
137. Kidnapping-(1) Kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from India, and kidnapping from
lawful guardianship––
(a) whoever conveys any person beyond the limits of India without the consent of that person, or
of some person legally authorised to consent on behalf of that person, is said to kidnap that
person from India;
(b) whoever takes or entices any child or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the
lawful guardian of such child or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian,
is said to kidnap such child or person from lawful guardianship.
Explanation. ––The words “lawful guardian” in this clause include any person lawfully entrusted
with the care or custody of such a child or other person.
Exception. This clause does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes
himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be
entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or
unlawful purpose.
(2) Whoever kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 359 to 361 and 363 of IPC
In Chandrakala v. Vipin Menon
141
,the Court ruled that the father, being the natural
guardian of the child, cannot be accused of kidnapping, even if he is alleged to have taken the
minor girl from the custody of her maternal grandfather, with whom she was residing due to
strained relations between the girl's parents.
138. Abduction- Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go
from any place, is said to abduct that person.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 362 of IPC
139. Kidnapping or maiming a child for purposes of begging- (1) Whoever kidnaps any
child or, not being the lawful guardian of such child, obtains the custody of the child, in order
that such child may be employed or used for the purposes of begging shall be punishable with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever maims any child in order that such child may be employed or used for the purposes
of begging shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall not be less than twenty years, but
141
(1993) 2 SCC 6
which may extend to life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s
natural life, and with fine.
(3) Where any person, not being the lawful guardian of a child employs or uses such child for the
purposes of begging, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he kidnapped or
otherwise obtained the custody of such child in order that such child might be employed or used
for the purposes of begging.
(4) In this section “begging” means—
(i) soliciting or receiving alms in a public place, whether under the pretence of singing, dancing,
fortune telling, performing tricks or selling articles or otherwise;
(ii) entering on any private premises for the purpose of soliciting or receiving
(iii) exposing or exhibiting, with the object of obtaining or extorting alms, any sore, wound,
injury, deformity or disease, whether of himself or of any other person or of an animal;
(iv) using such a child as an exhibit for the purpose of soliciting or receiving alms.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 363 A of IPC
140. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc(1) Whoever kidnaps or
abducts any person in order that such person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be
put in danger of being murdered, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustrations.
(a) A kidnaps Z from India, intending or knowing it to be likely that Z may be sacrificed to an
idol. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
(b) A forcibly carries or entices B away from his home in order that B may be murdered. A has
committed the offence defined in this section.
(2) Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping
or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a
reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to
such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international inter-
governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to cause that person to be secretly and
wrongfully confined, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(4) Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected, or may
be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the
unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such person will be so subjected or
disposed of, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 364 and 365 of IPC
141.Importation of girl or boy from foreign country- Whoever imports into India from any
country outside India any girl under the age of twenty-one years or any boy under the age of
eighteen years with intent that girl or boy may be, or knowing it to be likely that girl or boy will
be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person, shall be punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 366 B of IPC
142. Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement, kidnapped or abducted person -
Whoever, knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has been abducted, wrongfully
conceals or confines such person, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had kidnapped or
abducted such person with the same intention or knowledge, or for the same purpose as that with
or for which he conceals or detains such person in confinement.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 368 of IPC
In Saroj Kumari v. State of U.P.
142
the Court held that anyone who wrongfully conceals
or confines a kidnapped or abducted person is liable under Section 368 of the Indian Penal Code.
The key elements of this offence include: (1) the person must have been kidnapped or abducted,
(2) the accused must have known about the kidnapping or abduction, and (3) knowing this, the
accused wrongfully conceals or confines the abducted person.
143. Trafficking of person- (1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation recruits, transports,
harbours, transfers, or receives a person or persons, by
(a) using threats; or
(b) using force, or any other form of coercion; or
(c) by abduction; or
(d) by practising fraud, or deception; or
(e) by abuse of power; or
(f) by inducement, including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve
the consent of any person having control over the person recruited, transported, harboured,
transferred or received, commits the offence of trafficking.
Explanation 1. —The expression “exploitation” shall include any act of physical exploitation or
any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, beggary or
forced removal of organs.
Explanation 2. The consent of the victim is immaterial in determination of the offence of
trafficking.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine.
(3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one person, it shall be punishable
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a child, it shall be punishable with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one child, it shall be punishable with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than fourteen years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(6) If a person is convicted of the offence of trafficking of a child on more than one occasion,
then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
142
AIR 1973 SC 201
(7) When a public servant or a police officer is involved in the trafficking of any person then,
such public servant or police officer shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 370 of IPC
144. Exploitation of a trafficked person- (1) Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe
that a child has been trafficked, engages such child for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, but
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked, engages
such person for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 370 A of IPC
145. Habitual dealing in slaves- Whoever habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells,
traffics or deals in slaves, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of
either description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 371 of IPC
146.Unlawful compulsory labour-Whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against the
will of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 374 of IPC
CHAPTER VII
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
147. Waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against Government of
India-Whoever wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war, or
abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall
also be liable to fine.
Illustration.
Join an insurrection against the Government of India. A has committed the offence defined in
this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 121 of IPC
148.Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 147- Whoever within or without and
beyond India conspires to commit any of the offences punishable by section 147, or conspires to
overawe, by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, the Central Government or
any State Government, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of
either description which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. To constitute a conspiracy under this section, it is not necessary that any act or
illegal omission shall take place in pursuance thereof.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 121 A of IPC
149.Collecting arms, etc with intention of waging war against Government of India- Whoever
collects men, arms or ammunition or otherwise prepares to wage war with the intention of either
waging or being prepared to wage war against the Government of India, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 122 of IPC
150.Concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war- Whoever by any act, or by any
illegal omission, conceals the existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India,
intending by such concealment to facilitate, or knowing it to be likely that such concealment will
facilitate, the waging of such war, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 123 of IPC
151. Assaulting President, Governor, etc with intent to compel or restrain exercise of any lawful
power- Whoever, with the intention of inducing or compelling the President of India, or
Governor of any State, to exercise or refrain from exercising in any manner any of the lawful
powers of such President or Governor, assaults or wrongfully restrains, or attempts wrongfully to
restrain, or overawes, by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, or attempts so to
overawe, such President or Governor, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 124 of IPC
152 Act endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India- Whoever, purposely or
knowingly, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or by
electronic communication or by use of financial mean, or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite,
secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist
activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India; or indulges in or commits any
such act shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. ––Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures, or administrative or other
action of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means without exciting
or attempting to excite the activities referred to in this section do not constitute an offence under
this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 124 A of IPC
In Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar
143
, the Court held that Section should be
interpreted to restrict its application to acts intending to cause disorder, disturbance of law and
order, or incitement to violence.
In Raghuvir Singh v. State
144
, the court held that merely authoring seditious material is
not the essence of the offence of sedition. Distributing and circulating seditious material may
also suffice to constitute the offence.
153. Waging war against Government of any foreign state at peace with Government of India-
Whoever wages war against the Government of any foreign State at peace with the
Government of India or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, to which fine may be added, or with
fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 125 of IPC
154. Committing depredation on territories of foreign state at peace with Government of India-
Whoever commits depredation, or makes preparations to commit depredation, on the territories
of any foreign State at peace with the Government of India, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine
143
1962 SC 955
144
AIR 1987 SC 149
and to forfeiture of any property used or intended to be used in committing such depredation, or
acquired by such depredation.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 126 of IPC
155. Receiving property taken by war or depredation mentioned in sections 153 and 154-
Whoever receives any property knowing the same to have been taken in the commission of any
of the offences mentioned in sections 153 and 154, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine and to
forfeiture of the property so received.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 127 of IPC
156. Public servant voluntarily allowing prisoner of state or war to escape-Whoever, being a
public servant and having the custody of any State prisoner or prisoner of war, voluntarily allows
such prisoner to escape from any place in which such prisoner is confined, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 128 of IPC
157. Public servant negligently suffering such prisoner to escape-Whoever, being a public
servant and having the custody of any State prisoner or prisoner of war, negligently suffers such
prisoner to escape from any place of confinement in which such prisoner is confined, shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 129 of IPC
158. Aiding escape of, rescuing or harbouring such prisoner- Whoever knowingly aids or assists
any State prisoner or prisoner of war in escaping from lawful custody, or rescues or attempts to
rescue any such prisoner, or harbours or conceals any such prisoner who has escaped from lawful
custody, or offers or attempts to offer any resistance to the recapture of such prisoner, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.A State prisoner or prisoner of war, who is permitted to be at large on his parole
within certain limits in India, is said to escape from lawful custody if he goes beyond the limits
within which he is allowed to be at large.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 130 of IPC
CHAPTER VIII
OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE
159. Abetting mutiny, or attempting to seduce a soldier , sailor or airman from his duty-Whoever
abets the committing of mutiny by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air
Force of the Government of India or attempts to seduce any such officer, soldier, sailor or airman
from his allegiance or his duty, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 131 of IPC
160. Abetment of mutiny, if mutiny is committed in consequence thereof-Whoever abets the
committing of mutiny by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force of
the Government of India, shall, if mutiny be committed in consequence of that abetment, be
punished with death or with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 132 of IPC
161. Abetment of assault by soldier, sailor or airman on his superior officer, when in execution
of his office- Whoever abets an assault by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy
or Air Force of the Government of India, on any superior officer being in the execution of his
office, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 133 of IPC
162. Abetment of such assault, if assault committed- Whoever abets an assault by an officer,
soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force of the Government of India, on any
superior officer being in the execution of his office, shall, if such assault be committed in
consequence of that abetment be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 124 of IPC
163. Abetment of desertion of soldier, sailor or airman-Whoever abets the desertion of any
officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force of the Government of India,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 135 of IPC
164. Harbouring deserter- Whoever, except as hereinafter excepted, knowing or having reason to
believe that an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy or Air Force of the
Government of India, has deserted, harbours such officer, soldier, sailor or airman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine or with both.
Exception. This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is given by the
spouse of the deserter.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 136 of IPC
165. Deserter concealed on board merchant vessel through negligence of master- The master or
person in charge of a merchant vessel, on board of which any deserter from the Army, Navy or
Air Force of the Government of India is concealed, shall, though ignorant of such concealment,
be liable to a penalty not exceeding three thousand rupees, if he might have known of such
concealment but for some neglect of his duty as such master or person in charge, or but for some
want of discipline on board of the vessel.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 137 of IPC
166. Abetment of act of insubordination by soldier, sailor or airman- Whoever abets what he
knows to be an act of insubordination by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, in the Army, Navy
or Air Force, of the Government of India, shall, if such act of insubordination be committed in
consequence of that abetment, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 138 of IPC
167. Persons subject to certain acts-No person subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, the Army Act,
1950 and the Navy Act, 1957, or shall be subject to punishment under this Sanhita for any of the
offences defined in this Chapter.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 139 of IPC
168. Wearing grab or carrying token used by soldier, sailor or airman-Whoever, not being a
soldier, sailor or airman in the Army, Naval or Air service of the Government of India, wears any
garb or carries any token resembling any garb or token used by such a soldier, sailor or airman
with the intention that it may be believed that he is such a soldier, sailor or airman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months,
or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 140 of IPC
CHAPTER IX
OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
169. Candidate, electoral right defined- For the purposes of this Chapter
(a) “candidate” means a person who has been nominated as a candidate at any election;
(b) “electoral right” means the right of a person to stand, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from
being, a candidate or to vote or refrain from voting at an election.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 A of IPC
170. Bribery- (1) Whoever
(i) gives a gratification to any person with the object of inducing him or any other person to
exercise any electoral right or of rewarding any person for having exercised any such right; or
(ii) accepts either for himself or for any other person any gratification as a reward for exercising
any such right or for inducing or attempting to induce any other person to exercise any such
right, commits the offence of bribery:
Provided that a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action shall not be an offence
under this section.
(2) A person who offers, or agrees to give, or offers or attempts to procure, a gratification shall
be deemed to give a gratification.
(3) A person who obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain a gratification shall be deemed
to accept a gratification, and a person who accepts a gratification as a motive for doing what he
does not intend to do, or as a reward for doing what he has not done, shall be deemed to have
accepted the gratification as a reward.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 B of IPC
171. Undue influence at elections- (1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere
with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an
election.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), whoever
(a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person in whom a candidate or voter is interested,
with injury of any kind; or
(b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or any person in whom
he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual
censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such
candidate or voter, within the meaning of sub-section (1).
(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of public action or the mere exercise or a legal
right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference
within the meaning of this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 C of IPC
172. Personation at elections - Whoever at an election applies for a voting paper on votes
in the name of any other person, whether living or dead, or in a fictitious name, or who having
voted once at such election applies at the same election for a voting paper in his own name, and
whoever abets, procures or attempts to procure the voting by any person in any such way,
commits the offence of personation at an election:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who has been authorised to vote as
proxy for an elector under any law for the time being in force in so far as he votes as a proxy for
such elector.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 D of IPC
173. Punishment for bribery- Whoever commits the offence of bribery shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
both:
Provided that bribery by treating shall be punished with fine only.
Explanation. “Treating” means that form of bribery where the gratification consists in food,
drink, entertainment, or provision.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 E of IPC
174. Punishment for undue influence or personation at an election- Whoever commits the
offence of undue influence or personation at an election shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 F of IPC
175. False statement in connection with an election- Whoever with intent to affect the result of
an election makes or publishes any statement purporting to be a statement of fact which is false
and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the
personal character or conduct of any candidate shall be punished with fine
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 G of IPC
176. Illegal payments in connection with an election- Whoever without the general or special
authority in writing of a candidate incurs or authorises expenses on account of the holding of any
public meeting, or upon any advertisement, circular or publication, or in any other way
whatsoever for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of such candidate, shall be
punished with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that if any person having incurred any such expenses not exceeding the amount of ten
rupees without authority obtains within ten days from the date on which such expenses were
incurred the approval in writing of the candidate, he shall be deemed to have incurred such
expenses with the authority of the candidate.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 H of IPC
177. Illegal payments in connection with an election- Whoever being required by any law for the
time being in force or any rule having the force of law to keep accounts of expenses incurred at
or in connection with an election fails to keep such accounts shall be punished with fine which
may extend to five thousand rupees.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 G of IPC
CHAPTER X
OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN, CURRENCY-NOTES, BANK-NOTES, AND
GOVERNMENT STAMPS
178.Counterfeiting coin, Government stamps, currency-notes or bank notes-Whoever
counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting, any coin, stamp
issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, currency-note or bank-note, shall be punished
with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. For the purposes of this Chapter,
(1) the expression “bank-note” means a promissory note or engagement for the payment of
money to bearer on demand issued by any person carrying on the business of banking in any part
of the world, or issued by or under the authority of any State or Sovereign Power, and intended
to be used as equivalent to, or as a substitute for money;
(2) “coin” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in section 2 of the Coinage Act, 2011
and includes metal used for the time being as money and is stamped and issued by or under the
authority of any State or Sovereign Power intended to be so used;
(3) a person commits the offence of “counterfeiting Government stamp” who counterfeits by
causing a genuine stamp of one denomination to appear like a genuine stamp of a different
denomination;
(4) a person commits the offence of counterfeiting coin who intending to practise deception, or
knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised, causes a genuine coin to appear
like a different coin; and
(5) the offence of “counterfeiting coin” includes diminishing the weight or alteration of the
composition, or alteration of the appearance of the coin.
In the case of State v. Naresh Jain & Others
145
The issue revolves around the possession
and use of forged currency notes. The Court addresses two sections of the Penal Code: Section
489-C, which penalizes the possession of forged notes with the intention to use them as genuine,
and Section 489-B, which targets the circulation of such notes by penalizing those who
knowingly deal in them. Additionally, Section 489-covers the possession of machinery for
forging notes. This comprehensive approach aims to curb the spread of counterfeit currency by
addressing both possession and circulation.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 230-232, 246-249,255-489 A of IPC
179.Using as genuine, forged ,or counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency- notes or
bank notes- Whoever imports or exports, or sells or delivers to, or buys or receives from, any
other person, or otherwise traffics or uses as genuine, any forged or counterfeit coin, stamp,
currency-note or bank-note, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be forged or
counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 239-241, 250, 251,254 of IPC
180.Possession of forged or counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency- notes or bank
notes- Whoever has in his possession any forged or counterfeit coin, stamp, currency-note or
bank-note, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be forged or counterfeit and
intending to use the same as genuine or that it may be used as genuine, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or
with both.
Explanation. If a person establishes the possession of the forged or counterfeit coin, stamp,
currency-note or bank-note to be from a lawful source, it shall not constitute an offence under
this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 242, 243, 252 to 254, 259 of IPC
181. Making or possessing instruments or materials for forging or counterfeiting coin,
Government stamp, Government stamp, currency notes or bank notes-Whoever makes or
mends, or performs any part of the process of making or mending, or buys or sells or disposes of,
or has in his possession, any machinery, die, or instrument or material for the purpose of being
used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for forging or
counterfeiting any coin, stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, currency-note
145
W.P 5244 /2006
or bank-note, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 233, 256, 257 and 489 D of IPC
182.Making or using documents resembling currency notes or bank notes-
(1) Whoever makes, or causes to be made, or uses for any purpose whatsoever, or delivers to any
person, any document purporting to be, or in any way resembling, or so nearly resembling as to
be calculated to deceive, any currency-note or bank-note shall be punished with fine which may
extend to three hundred rupees.
(2) If any person, whose name appears on a document the making of which is an offence under
sub-section (1), refuses, without lawful excuse, to disclose to a police officer on being so
required the name and address of the person by whom it was printed or otherwise made, he shall
be punished with fine which may extend to six hundred rupees.
(3) Where the name of any person appears on any document in respect of which any person is
charged with an offence under sub-section (1) or on any other document used or distributed in
connection with that document it may, until the contrary is proved, be presumed that the person
caused the document to be made.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 489 E of IPC
183. Effacing writing from substance bearing Government stamp, or removing from
document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government- Whoever,
fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the Government, removes or effaces from any
substance, bearing any stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, any writing or
document for which such stamp has been used, or removes from any writing or document a
stamp which has been used for such writing or document, in order that such stamp may be used
for a different writing or document, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 261 of IPC
184. Using Government stamp known to have been before used- Whoever, fraudulently or
with intent to cause loss to the Government, uses for any purpose a stamp issued by Government
for the purpose of revenue, which he knows to have been before used, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 262 of IPC
185. Erasure of mark denoting that stamp has been used- Whoever, fraudulently or with
intent to cause loss to Government, erases or removes from a stamp issued by Government for
the purpose of revenue, any mark, put or impressed upon such stamp for the purpose of denoting
that the same has been used, or knowingly has in his possession or sells or disposes of any such
stamp from which such mark has been erased or removed, or sells or disposes of any such stamp
which he knows to have been used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 263 of IPC
186 Prohibition of fictitious stamps-
(1) Whoever
(a) makes, knowingly utters, deals in or sells any fictitious stamp, or knowingly uses for any
postal purpose any fictitious stamp; or
(b) has in his possession, without lawful excuse, any fictitious stamp; or
(c) makes or, without lawful excuse, has in his possession any die, plate, instrument or materials
for making any fictitious stamp, shall be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred
rupees.
(2) Any such stamp, die, plate, instrument or materials in the possession of any person for
making any fictitious stamp may be seized and, if seized, shall be forfeited.
(3) In this section “fictitious stamp” means any stamp falsely purporting to be issued by
Government for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, or any facsimile or imitation or
representation, whether on paper or otherwise, of any stamp issued by Government for that
purpose.
(4) In this section and also in sections 178 to 181 (both inclusive), and sections 183 to 185 (both
inclusive) the word “Government”, when used in connection with, or in reference to any stamp
issued for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, shall, notwithstanding anything in clause
(12) of section 2, be deemed to include the person or persons authorised by law to administer
executive Government in any part of India or in any foreign country.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 263 A of IPC
187. Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or composition from
that fixed by law- Whoever, being employed in any mint lawfully established in India, does any
act, or omits what he is legally bound to do, with the intention of causing any coin issued from
that mint to be of a different weight or composition from the weight or composition fixed by law,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 244 of IPC
188.Unlawfully taking coining instrument from mint-Whoever, without lawful authority,
takes out of any mint, lawfully established in India, any coining tool or instrument, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 245 of IPC
CHAPTER XI
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
189. Unlawful assembly-(1) An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful
assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is
(a) to overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central Government or any State
Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise
of the lawful power of such public servant; or
(b) to resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
(c) to commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
(d) by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain
possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the
use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce
any right or supposed right; or
(e) by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is
not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.
Explanation. An assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently
become an unlawful assembly.
(2) Whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly,
intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful
assembly and such member shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Whoever joins or continues in an unlawful assembly, knowing that such unlawful assembly
has been commanded in the manner prescribed by law to disperse, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
(4) Whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything which, used as a weapon of
offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
(5) Whoever knowingly joins or continues in any assembly of five or more persons likely to
cause a disturbance of the public peace, after such assembly has been lawfully commanded to
disperse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation. If the assembly is an unlawful assembly within the meaning of sub-section (1),
the offender shall be punishable under sub-section (3).
(6) Whoever hires or engages, or employs, or promotes, or connives at the hiring, engagement or
employment of any person to join or become a member of any unlawful assembly, shall be
punishable as a member of such unlawful assembly, and for any offence which may be
committed by any such person as a member of such unlawful assembly in pursuance of such
hiring, engagement or employment, in the same manner as if he had been a member of such
unlawful assembly, or himself had committed such offence.
(7) Whoever harbours, receives or assembles, in any house or premises in his occupation or
charge, or under his control any persons knowing that such persons have been hired, engaged or
employed, or are about to be hired, engaged or employed, to join or become members of an
unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
(8) Whoever is engaged, or hired, or offers or attempts to be hired or engaged, to do or assist in
doing any of the acts specified in sub-section (1), shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
(9) Whoever, being so engaged or hired as referred to in sub-section (8), goes armed, or engages
or offers to go armed, with any deadly weapon or with anything which used as a weapon of
offence is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 141 to 145, 150, 151, 157 and 158 of IPC
Section 141
In Maiku v. State of UP
146
: the Court held that if a person forms an assembly with an object that
is not unlawful, they cannot be convicted under Sections 141, 143, 147, and 149 of the Indian
Penal Code.
In Tanaji v. State of Maharashtra
147
,the Supreme Court ruled that in cases of an impromptu free
fight between two groups, the members of such groups would not be considered to have formed
an unlawful assembly.
146
AIR 1989 SC 67
147
(1993) 8 SCC 340
In Amar Singh v. State of Punjab
148
, the Court held that an assembly comprising fewer
than five individuals does not qualify as an unlawful assembly under Section 141. Consequently,
such an assembly cannot be the basis for an offence under Section 149.
In Haramant v. State of Karnataka
149
,the Court emphasized that the common object of an
unlawful assembly must be deduced from the specific facts and circumstances of each case. This
involves considering factors such as the composition of the assembly, the weapons used, and the
nature of injuries inflicted.
190 Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of
common Object- If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly
knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of
the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 149 of IPC
In State of Punjab v. Sanjiv kumar @ Sanju
150
and in State of Karnataka v. Chikkahottappa
151
In these cases, the Court provided that mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a
person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and
that object is one of those set out in Section 141. If the common object of an unlawful assembly
is not proved, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 149. -
In Lalji v. State of U.P.
152
, the Court held that if certain accused persons form an unlawful
assembly and any member commits an offence in furtherance of the assembly's common object,
or one that members knew was likely to be committed in pursuit of that object, every member of
the unlawful assembly is liable for that offence.
In Pulen Phukan v. State of Assam
153
The Court set aside the conviction of the accused on
the ground that the version given by the complaint seems to be tutored along with this there were
no corroborative injury reports.
In Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar
154
and in Madan Singh v. State of Bihar
155
the Court
held that it cannot be universally asserted that an individual accused of being a member of an
unlawful assembly must have committed an overt act to establish membership. It suffices that the
accused understood the assembly's unlawful nature and its potential to engage in acts falling
under Section 141.
In Kalicharan v.State of U.P
156
According to the facts of the case five accused persons
were named in the charge sheet and court held that if one of them was acquitted then the charge
under s.148 and 149 IPC could not be sustained.
InYunis v. State of Madhya Pradesh
157
In this case, the Court provided that even if no
overt act is imputed to a particular person, when the charge is under section 149, I.P. Code the
presence of the accused as part of unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction.
148
AIR 1987 SC 826
149
1994 Cr LJ 1422 (SC)
150
AIR 2007 SC 2430
151
AIR 2008 Sc 2692
152
AIR 1989 SC 754
153
AIR 2023 SC 1639 : AIR ONLINE 2023 SC 224
154
AIR 2004 SC 997
155
(2004) 4 SCC 622
156
AIR 2023 SC 63
157
2003 Cr LJ 817 (SC)
In Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa , the Court held that the common object must be
shared by all members of the assembly, meaning they should all be aware of and agree to it. This
common object can be formed through express agreement after mutual consultation, but this is
not necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members, with others joining and
adopting it. Once formed, the common object can be modified, altered, or abandoned at any
stage.
In Bolineedi Venkataramaiah v. State of A.P.
158
the Court held that when a group of
members chases the deceased and inflicts multiple injuries resulting in the victim's death, all
members can be held guilty of murder, even if some did not actively participate in the act.
In Sita Ram v. State of U.P.
159
, the Court ruled that the common object of an unlawful
assembly must be inferred from the facts and circumstances. If the accused inflicted injuries on
the victim's head without causing internal injury or injuries to vital parts, the common object can
be said to be merely assaulting the victim.
In Amar Singh v. State of Punjab
160
the Court held that when only seven persons were
charged under Sections 148/149, and three were acquitted, the remaining persons cannot be
convicted under Sections 148/149 if there is no case that others were involved.
In Joy Singh v. State of Maharashtra ,
161
, the Supreme Court ruled that alternative
convictions of the accused under Section 149 and Section 34 are not illegal.
In Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana
162
, the Court held that under Section 34, the
focus is on the physical presence and active participation in the crime. In contrast, Section 149
emphasizes that merely being a member of an unlawful assembly with a common object, as
defined in Section 141, is sufficient.
In Jivan Lal v. State of M.P. the Supreme Court ruled that if the accused are charged under
Section 149, their conviction under Section 34 is not illegal, provided no prejudice is caused to
the accused by not framing a distinct charge under Section 34.
In Ramkishan v. State of Rajasthan
163
the Supreme Court held that even if no specific
charge indicating the applicability of Section 149 was framed, as long as all the ingredients of
Section 149 were clearly indicated in the charges against the appellants, the omission to mention
Section 149 does not invalidate the charges.
In another case Ananta Kathod Pawar v. State of Maharashtra
164
,the Court held that if a
sudden and free fight occurs between two groups, resulting in injuries to members of both
groups, it is improper to convict members of one group under Sections 147 or 148 and for
substantive offences with the aid of Section 149. Each accused person is liable only for their
individual acts, if the prosecution provides specific evidence.
158
AIR 1994 SC 76
159
AIR 1993 SC 350
160
A.I.R 1987 SC 826
161
1996 SCC (Cri) 672
162
AIR 2000 SC 1833
163
1997) 7 SCC 518:
164
(1997) 11 SCC 564
In Kanwarlal v. State of M.P.
165
the Court ruled that in cases of free fights between two
parties, unless it is shown that a particular accused caused the injuries, no one can be held
responsible under Section 149.
In Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar
166
, the Court held that if the number of members in
an unlawful assembly is large, it is prudent to require the identification of the accused by at least
two reliable witnesses.
191. Rioting-(1) Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly, or by any
member thereof, in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, every member of such
assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting.
(2) Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used
as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 146 to 148 of IPC
192. Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot-if rioting be committed; if not
committed.-Whoever malignantly, or wantonly by doing anything which is illegal, gives
provocation to any person intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause
the offence of rioting to be committed, shall, if the offence of rioting be committed in
consequence of such provocation, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both; and if the offence of rioting be not
committed, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 153 of IPC
193. Liability of owner, occupier, etc., of land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes
place.
(1) Whenever any unlawful assembly or riot takes place, the owner or occupier of the land upon
which such unlawful assembly is held, or such riot is committed, and any person having or
claiming an interest in such land, shall be punishable with fine not exceeding one thousand
rupees, if he or his agent or manager, knowing that such offence is being or has been committed,
or having reason to believe it is likely to be committed, do not give the earliest notice thereof in
his or their power to the officer in charge at the nearest police station, and do not, in the case of
his or their having reason to believe that it was about to be committed, use all lawful means in
his or their power to prevent it and, in the event of its taking place, do not use all lawful means in
his or their power to disperse or suppress the riot or unlawful assembly.
(2) Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is the owner or
occupier of any land respecting which such riot takes place or who claims any interest in such
land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or who has accepted or derived
any benefit therefrom, such person shall be punishable with fine, if he or his agent or manager,
having reason to believe that such riot was likely to be committed or that the unlawful assembly
by which such riot was committed was likely to be held, shall not respectively use all lawful
means in his or their power to prevent such assembly or riot from taking place, and for
suppressing and dispersing the same.
165
2003 Cr LJ 62 (SC)
166
AIR 1997 SC 322
(3) Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is the owner or
occupier of any land respecting which such riot takes place, or who claims any interest in such
land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or who has accepted or derived
any benefit therefrom, the agent or manager of such person shall be punishable with fine, if such
agent or manager, having reason to believe that such riot was likely to be committed, or that the
unlawful assembly by which such riot was committed was likely to be held, shall not use all
lawful means in his power to prevent such riot or assembly from taking place and for suppressing
and dispersing the same.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 154 to 156 of IPC
194.Affray- (1) When two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public
peace, they are said to commit an affray.
(2) Whoever commits an affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to sections 159 and 160 of IPC
195.Assaulting or obstructing public servant when suppressing riot, etc- (1) Whoever
assaults or obstructs any public servant or uses criminal force on any public servant in the
discharge of his duty as such public servant in endeavouring to disperse an unlawful assembly, or
to suppress a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand
rupees, or with both.
(2) Whoever threatens to assault or attempts to obstruct any public servant or threatens or
attempts to use criminal force to any public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public
servant in endeavouring to disperse an unlawful assembly, or to suppress a riot or affray, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 152 of IPC
196.Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, etc, and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony (1)
Whoever
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through
electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion,
race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever,
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities; or
(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquillity; or
(c) organises any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the
participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it
to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to
use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste
or community and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or
alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to
fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 153 A of IPC
197.Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration (1) Whoever, by words either
spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication
or otherwise,
(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being
members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true
faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty
and integrity of India; or
(b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes that any class of persons shall, by reason
of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or
community, be denied, or deprived of their rights as citizens of India; or
(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any
class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to
cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other
persons; or
(d) makes or publishes false or misleading information, jeopardising the sovereignty, unity and
integrity or security of India,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 153 B of IPC
CHAPTER XII
OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
198. Public servant disobeying law, with intent to cause injury to any person. Whoever,
being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is
to conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he
will by such disobedience, cause injury to any person, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration.
A, being an officer directed by law to take property in execution, in order to satisfy a decree
pronounced in Z’s favour by a Court, knowingly disobeys that direction of law, with the
knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause injury to Z. A has committed the offence defined in
this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 166 of IPC
In K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat
167
, the Court held that for an offence under Section 166, it is
essential that the offender must have committed the act while being a public servant and must
167
(2000) 6 SCC 195
have acted in disobedience of any legal direction regarding the manner in which he should have
conducted himself as a public servant.
199. Public servant disobeying direction under law. -Whoever, being a public servant,
(a) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which prohibits him from requiring the
attendance at any place of any person for the purpose of investigation into an offence or any
other matter; or
(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any other direction of the law
regulating the manner in which he shall conduct such investigation; or
(c) fails to record any information given to him under sub-section (1) of section 173 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in relation to cognizable offence punishable under
section 64, section 65, section 66, section 67, section 68,
section 70, section 71, section 74, section 76, section 77, section 79, section 124,
section 143 or section 144,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months
but which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 166 A of IPC
200. Punishment for non-treatment of victim Whoever, being in charge of a hospital,
public or private, whether run by the Central Government, the State Government, local bodies or
any other person, contravenes the provisions of section 397 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 166 B of IPC
201- Public servant framing an incorrect document with intent to cause injury.- Whoever,
being a public servant, and being, as such public servant, charged with the preparation or
translation of any document or electronic record, frames, prepares or translates that document or
electronic record in a manner which he knows or believes to be incorrect, intending thereby to
cause or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause injury to any person, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine,
or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 167 of IPC
202. Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade- Whoever, being a public servant, and being
legally bound as such public servant not to engage in trade, engages in trade, shall be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both or
with community service.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 168 of IPC
203.Public servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property -Whoever, being a public
servant, and being legally bound as such public servant, not to purchase or bid for certain
property, purchases or bids for that property, either in his own name or in the name of another, or
jointly, or in shares with others, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and the property, if purchased, shall be
confiscated.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 169 of IPC
204. Personating a public servant -Whoever pretends to hold any particular office as a public
servant, knowing that he does not hold such office or falsely personates any other person holding
such office, and in such assumed character does or attempts to do any act under colour of such
office, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 170 of IPC
205. Wearing garb or carrying a token used by a public servant with fraudulent intent. -
Whoever, not belonging to a certain class of public servants, wears any garb or carries any token
resembling any garb or token used by that class of public servants, with the intention that it may
be believed, or with the knowledge that it is likely to be believed, that he belongs to that class of
public servants, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 171 of IPC
CHAPTER XIII
OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS
206. Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceedings. -Whoever absconds in
order to avoid being served with a summons, notice or order proceeding from any public servant
legally competent, as such public servant, to issue such summons, notice or order, ––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;
(b) where such summons or notice or order is to attend in person or by agent, or to produce a
document or an electronic record in a Court shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 172 of IPC
207.Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing publication thereof.
Whoever in any manner intentionally prevents the serving on himself, or on any other
person, of any summons, notice or order proceeding from any public servant legally competent,
as such public servant, to issue such summons, notice or order, or intentionally prevents the
lawful affixing to any place of any such summons, notice or order or intentionally removes any
such summons, notice or order from any place to which it is lawfully affixed or intentionally
prevents the lawful making of any proclamation, under the authority of any public servant legally
competent, as such public servant, to direct such proclamation to be made,––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;
(b) where the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person or by agent, or to
produce a document or electronic record in a Court, with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 173 of IPC
208. Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant. -Whoever, being legally
bound to attend in person or by an agent at a certain place and time in obedience to a summons,
notice, order, or proclamation proceeding from any public servant legally competent, as such
public servant, to issue the same, intentionally omits to attend at that place or time or departs
from the place where he is bound to attend before the time at which it is lawful for him to depart,
––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;
(b) where the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person or by agent in a
Court with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
Illustrations.
(a) A, being legally bound to appear before a High Court, in obedience to a subpoena issuing
from that Court, intentionally omits to appear. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.
(b) A, being legally bound to appear before a District Judge, as a witness, in obedience to a
summons issued by that District Judge intentionally omits to appear. A has committed the
offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 174 of IPC
209. Non- appearance in response to a proclamation under section 84 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023- Whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time
as required by a proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 84 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, or with community service, and where a
declaration has been made under sub-section (4) of that section pronouncing him as a proclaimed
offender, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 174 A of IPC
210. Omission to produce a document or electronic record to a public servant by a person
legally bound to produce it. - Whoever, being legally bound to produce or deliver up any
document or electronic record to any public servant, as such, intentionally omits so to produce or
deliver up the same, ––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;
(b) and where the document or electronic record is to be produced or delivered up to a Court
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
Illustration.
A, being legally bound to produce a document before a District Court, intentionally omits to
produce the same. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 175 of IPC
211. Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person legally bound to
give it.-Whoever, being legally bound to give any notice or to furnish information on any subject
to any public servant, as such, intentionally omits to give such notice or to furnish such
information in the manner and at the time required by law,––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;
(b) where the notice or information required to be given respects the commission of an
offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or in order to
the apprehension of an offender, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both;
(c) where the notice or information required to be given is required by an order passed under
section 394 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 176 of IPC
212. Furnishing false information- Whoever, being legally bound to furnish information on any
subject to any public servant, as such, furnishes, as true, information on the subject which he
knows or has reason to believe to be false, ––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both;
(b) where the information which he is legally bound to give respects the commission of an
offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or in order to
the apprehension of an offender, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Illustrations.
(a) A, a landholder, knowing of the commission of a murder within the limits of his estate,
wilfully misinforms the Magistrate of the district that the death has occurred by accident in
consequence of the bite of a snake. A is guilty of the offence defined in this section.
(b) A, a village watchman, knowing that a considerable body of strangers has passed through
his village in order to commit a dacoity in the house of Z, a wealthy merchant residing in a
neighbouring place, and being legally bound to give early and punctual information of the above
fact to the officer of the nearest police station, wilfully misinforms the police officer that a body
of suspicious characters passed through the village with a view to commit dacoity in a certain
distant place in a different direction. Here A is guilty of the offence defined in this section.
Explanation. In section 211 and in this section the word “offence” include any act committed
at any place out of India, which, if committed in India, would be punishable under any of the
following sections, namely, 103, 105, 307, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of
section 309, sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 310, 311, 312, clauses (f) and (g) of
section 326, sub-sections (4), (6), (7) and (8) of section 331, clauses (a) and (b) of section 332
and the word “offender” includes any person who is alleged to have been guilty of any such act.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 177 of IPC
213. Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to make it. -
Whoever refuses to bind himself by an oath or affirmation to state the truth, when required so to
bind himself by a public servant legally competent to require that he shall so bind himself, shall
be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 178 of IPC
214. Refusing to answer public servant authorised to question. - Whoever, being
legally bound to state the truth on any subject to any public servant, refuses to answer any
question demanded of him touching that subject by such public servant in the exercise of the
legal powers of such public servant, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with
both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 179 of IPC
215. Refusing to sign a statement. -Whoever refuses to sign any statement made by him, when
required to sign that statement by a public servant legally competent to require that he shall sign
that statement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 180 of IPC
216. False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person authorised to
administer an oath or affirmation.- Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or affirmation to
state the truth on any subject to any public servant or other person authorised by law to
administer such oath or affirmation, makes, to such public servant or other person as aforesaid,
touching that subject, any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be
false or does not believe to be true, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 181 of IPC
217.False information, with intent to cause a public servant to use his lawful power to
injure another person. - Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows
or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
cause, such public servant
(a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state
of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him; or
(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
Illustrations.
(a) A informs a Magistrate that Z, a police officer, subordinate to such Magistrate, has been
guilty of neglect of duty or misconduct, knowing such information to be false, and knowing it to
be likely that the information will cause the Magistrate to dismiss Z. A has committed the
offence defined in this section.
(b) A falsely informs a public servant that Z has contraband salt in a secret place, knowing
such information to be false, and knowing that it is likely that the consequence of the information
will be a search of Z’s premises, attended with annoyance to Z. A has committed the offence
defined in this section.
(c) A falsely informs a policeman that he has been assaulted and robbed in the
neighbourhood of a particular village. He does not mention the name of any person as one of his
assailants, but knows it to be likely that in consequence of this information the police will make
enquiries and institute searches in the village to the annoyance of the villagers or some of them.
A has committed an offence under this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 182 of IPC
218.Resistance to taking of property by lawful authority of a public servant. - Whoever
offers any resistance to the taking of any property by the lawful authority of any public servant,
knowing or having reason to believe that he is such public servant, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 183 of IPC
219 Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public servant-. Whoever
intentionally obstructs any sale of property offered for sale by the lawful authority of any public
servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 184 of IPC
220- Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of public servant.
Whoever, at any sale of property held by the lawful authority of a public servant, as such,
purchases or bids for any property on account of any person, whether himself or any other,
whom he knows to be under a legal incapacity to purchase that property at that sale, or bids for
such property not intending to perform the obligations under which he lays himself by such
bidding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 185 of IPC
221. Obstructing public servants in discharge of public functions. -Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine
which may extend to two thousand and five hundred rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 186 of IPC
222.Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give assistance. - Whoever,
being bound by law to render or furnish assistance to any public servant in the execution of his
public duty, intentionally omits to give such assistance, ––
(a) shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month,
or with fine which may extend to two thousand and five hundred rupees, or with both;
(b) and where such assistance be demanded of him by a public servant legally competent to
make such demand for the purposes of executing any process lawfully issued by a Court or of
preventing the commission of an offence, or suppressing a riot, or affray, or of apprehending a
person charged with or guilty of an offence, or of having escaped from lawful custody, shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 187 of IPC
223. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant. -Whoever, knowing that, by
an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is
directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his
possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, ––
(a) shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or
risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend
to two thousand and five hundred rupees, or with both;
(b) and where such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or
safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both.
Explanation. It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or
contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order
which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.
Illustration.
An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such an order,
directing that a religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys
the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 188 of IPC
In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of U.P.
168
, the Court held that for Section 188 to apply, the
following elements must be proven:
1. An order must be promulgated by a public servant.
2. The public servant must be lawfully empowered to promulgate the order.
3. The person must have knowledge of the order and must have been directed by it to either
abstain from certain actions or to take specific actions regarding property in their possession and
under their management, and must have disobeyed the order.
4. The disobedience must cause or tend to cause:
(a) obstruction, annoyance, or risk of it to any person lawfully employed; or
(b) danger to human life, health, or safety; or
(c) a riot or affray.
224. Threat of injury to public servant.- Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any
public servant, or to any person in whom he believes that public servant to be interested, for the
purpose of inducing that public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to do any act,
connected with the exercise of the public functions of such public servant, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 189 of IPC
225. Threat of injury to induce a person to refrain from applying for protection to public
servant. Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any person for the purpose of inducing
that person to refrain or desist from making a legal application for protection against any injury
to any public servant legally empowered as such to give such protection, or to cause such
protection to be given, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 190 of IPC
226. Attempt to commit suicide to compel or restrain exercise of lawful power. -
Whoever attempts to commit suicide with the intent to compel or restrain any public servant
from discharging his official duty shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, or with community service.
CHAPTER XIV
OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE
227. Giving false evidence. -Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express
provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject,
makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not
believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.
Explanation 1. A statement is within the meaning of this section, whether it is made verbally
or otherwise.
Explanation 2. A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning
of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a
thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not
know.
Illustrations.
168
1968 Cr LJ 281 (DB)
(a) A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for one thousand rupees, falsely
swears on a trial that he heard Z admit the justice of B’s claim. A has given false evidence
(b) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he believes a certain signature to
be the handwriting of Z, when he does not believe it to be the handwriting of
Z. Here A states that which he knows to be false, and therefore gives false evidence.
(c) A, knowing the general character of Z’s handwriting, states that he believes a certain
signature to be the handwriting of Z; A in good faith believing it to be so. Here A’s statement is
merely as to his belief, and is true as to his belief, and therefore, although the signature may not
be the handwriting of Z, A has not given false evidence.
(d) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he knows that Z was at a
particular place on a particular day, not knowing anything about the subject. A gives false
evidence whether Z was at that place on the day named or not.
(e) A, an interpreter or translator, gives or certifies as a true interpretation or translation of a
statement or document which he is bound by oath to interpret or translate truly, that which is not
and which he does not believe to be a true interpretation or translation. A has given false
evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 191 of IPC
228. Fabricating false evidence. -Whoever causes any circumstance to exist or makes any false
entry in any book or record, or electronic record or makes any document or electronic record
containing a false statement, intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement may
appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public
servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false statement,
so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion
upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of
such proceeding is said “to fabricate false evidence”.
Illustrations.
(a) A puts jewels into a box belonging to Z, with the intention that they may be found in that
box, and that this circumstance may cause Z to be convicted of theft. A has fabricated false
evidence.
(b) A makes a false entry in his shop-book for the purpose of using it as corroborative
evidence in a Court. A has fabricated false evidence.
(c) A, with the intention of causing Z to be convicted of a criminal conspiracy, writes a letter
in imitation of Z’s handwriting, purporting to be addressed to an accomplice in such criminal
conspiracy, and puts the letter in a place which he knows that the officers of the police are likely
to search. A has fabricated false evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 192 of IPC
229. Punishment for false evidence. - (1) Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in
any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in
any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees.
(2) Whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any case other than that referred
to in sub-section (1), shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to five thousand
rupees.
Explanation 1. A trial before a Court-martial is a judicial proceeding.
Explanation 2. An investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court, is
a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court.
Illustration.
A, in an enquiry before a Magistrate for the purpose of ascertaining whether Z ought to be
committed for trial, makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this enquiry is a
stage of a judicial proceeding, A has given false evidence.
Explanation 3. An investigation directed by a Court according to law, and conducted under the
authority of a Court, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take
place before a Court.
Illustration.
A, in an enquiry before an officer deputed by a Court to ascertain on the spot the boundaries of
land, makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this enquiry is a stage of a
judicial proceeding, A has given false evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 193 of IPC
230. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of capital
offence.- (1) Whoever gives or fabricates false evidence, intending thereby to cause, or knowing
it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which is
capital by the law for the time being in force in India shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees.
(2) If an innocent person is convicted and executed in consequence of false evidence referred to
in sub-section (1), the person who gives such false evidence shall be punished either with death
or the punishment specified in sub-section (1).
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 194 of IPC
231. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence
punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment. -Whoever gives or fabricates false
evidence intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any
person to be convicted of an offence which by the law for the time being in force in India is not
capital, but punishable with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of seven years or
upwards, shall be punished as a person convicted of that offence would be liable to be punished.
Illustration.
A gives false evidence before a Court, intending thereby to cause Z to be convicted of a dacoity.
The punishment of dacoity is imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to ten years, with or without fine. A, therefore, is liable to imprisonment for life or
imprisonment, with or without fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 195 of IPC
232. Threatening any person to give false evidence. - (1) Whoever threatens another with any
injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that
person is interested, with intent to cause that person to give false evidence shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or
with both.
(2) If innocent person is convicted and sentenced in consequence of false evidence referred to in
sub-section (1), with death or imprisonment for more than seven years, the person who threatens
shall be punished with the same punishment and sentence in the same manner and to the same
extent such innocent person is punished and sentence
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 195 A of IPC
233. Using evidence known to be false. -Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true
or genuine evidence any evidence which he knows to be false or fabricated, shall be punished in
the same manner as if he gave or fabricated false evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 196 of IPC
234. Issuing or signing false certificates. - Whoever issues or signs any certificate required by
law to be given or signed, or relating to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in
evidence, knowing or believing that such certificate is false in any material point, shall be
punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 197 of IPC
235. Using as true a certificate known to be false. - Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use
any such certificate as a true certificate, knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall
be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 198 of IPC
236. False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence.- Whoever,
in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any Court or any public servant
or other person, is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any
statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to
be true, touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall
be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 199 of IPC
In Dy. G.M., Inter-State Bus Terminal v. Sudershan Kumari
169
, the Supreme Court found that
the respondent had submitted a false affidavit, allegedly attested by a non-existent Oath
Commissioner. Consequently, the Court convicted the respondent under Section 199, sentencing
her to six months of imprisonment and imposing a fine of Rs. 1,000, with an additional six-week
sentence in default of payment.
237. Using as true such a declaration knowing it to be false. - Whoever corruptly uses or
attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any material point,
shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
Explanation. A declaration which is inadmissible merely upon the ground of some informality,
is a declaration within the meaning of section 236 and this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 200 of IPC
238. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen
offenders.
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any
evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the
offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the
offence which he knows or believes to be false shall,
(a) if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with
death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(b) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may
extend to ten years, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
169
AIR 1997 SC 1902
(c) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, be
punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may
extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or
with fine, or with both.
Illustration.
A, knowing that B has murdered Z, assists B to hide the body with the intention of screening B
from punishment. A is liable to imprisonment of either description for seven years, and also to
fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 201 of IPC
In Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra
170
, the Court held that even if the accused is acquitted
of the offence under Section 302, a conviction under Section 201 is still permissible.
To bring home an offence under section 201, , the ingredients to be established are: (1)
committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under section 201 must have the
knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the
said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence and (iv) the act should have been
done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he
should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false.
In Ram Saran Mahto v. State of Bihar
171
, the Court held that for a conviction under Section 201,
two essential elements must be established: (1) the accused must have known or had reason to
believe that an offence was committed, and (2) the accused must have caused the disappearance
of evidence of the offence. The prosecution must prove both of these elements to secure a
conviction under Section 201.
In Ram Singh v. State of H.P.
172
, The Court ruled that if it is proven that the accused
committed the murder of a theft suspect during a police investigation and also disposed of the
dead body, their convictions under Sections 302/120-B and 201/120-B must be upheld.
In Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar
173
the Court ruled that conviction under section 201 cannot
be based unless the accused possessed the mens rea, meaning they knew the death of the
deceased was not natural and knowingly participated in the destruction of evidence.
In Mahesh Mahto v. State of Bihar
174
, the Court held that the accused, who assisted the
main perpetrator in carrying and disposing of the dead body in the river, is guilty under Section
201.
239. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform. -
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,
intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to
give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 202 of IPC
240. Giving false information respecting an offence committed.-Whoever, knowing or having
reason to believe that an offence has been committed, gives any information respecting that
170
2007) 7 SCC 502
171
AIR 1999 SC 3435
172
1997 SCC (Cri) 729
173
AIR 1994 SC 1068
174
AIR 1997 SC 3567
offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation. —In sections 238 and 239 and in this section the word “offence” includes any act
committed at any place out of India, which, if committed in India, would be punishable under
any of the following sections, namely, 103, 105, 307, sub-sections (2),
(3) and (4) of section 309, sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 310, 311, 312,
clauses (f) and (g) of section 326, sub-sections (4), (6), (7) and (8) of section 331, clauses (a) and
(b) of section 332.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 203 of IPC
241. Destruction of document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence-.
Whoever secretes or destroys any document or electronic record which he may be lawfully
compelled to produce as evidence in a Court or in any proceeding lawfully held before a public
servant, as such, or obliterates or renders illegible the whole or any part of such document or
electronic record with the intention of preventing the same from being produced or used as
evidence before such Court or public servant as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully
summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 204 of IPC
242. False personation for the purpose of act or proceeding in suit or prosecution.
Whoever falsely personate another, and in such assumed character makes any admission
or statement, or confesses judgment, or causes any process to be issued or becomes bail or
security, or does any other act in any suit or criminal prosecution, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 205 of IPC
243. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in
execution.- Whoever fraudulently removes, conceals, transfers or delivers to any person any
property or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property or interest therein
from being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence which has been
pronounced, or which he knows to be likely to be pronounced, by a Court or other competent
authority, or from being taken in execution of a decree or order which has been made, or which
he knows to be likely to be made by a Court in a civil suit, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend
to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 206 of IPC
244. Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution.
Whoever fraudulently accepts, receives or claims any property or any interest therein, knowing
that he has no right or rightful claim to such property or interest, or practises any deception
touching any right to any property or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that
property or interest therein from being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine, under a
sentence which has been pronounced, or which he knows to be likely to be pronounced by a
Court or other competent authority, or from being taken in execution of a decree or order which
has been made, or which he knows to be likely to be made by a Court in a civil suit, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 207 of IPC
245 Fraudulently suffering decree for sum not due -Whoever fraudulently causes or suffers a
decree or order to be passed against him at the suit of any person for a sum not due or for a larger
sum than is due to such person or for any property or interest in property to which such person is
not entitled, or fraudulently causes or suffers a decree or order to be executed against him after it
has been satisfied, or for anything in respect of which it has been satisfied, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both.
Illustration.
A institutes a suit against Z. Z, knowing that A is likely to obtain a decree against him,
fraudulently suffers a judgment to pass against him for a larger amount at the suit of B, who has
no just claim against him, in order that B, either on his own account or for the benefit of Z, may
share in the proceeds of any sale of Z’s property which may be made under A’s decree. Z has
committed an offence under this section.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 208 of IPC
246. Dishonestly making false claims in Court. Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or
with intent to injure or annoy any person, makes in a Court any claim which he knows to be
false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 209 of IPC
247.Fraudulently obtaining decree for sum not due. -Whoever fraudulently obtains a decree
or order against any person for a sum not due, or for a larger sum than is due or for any property
or interest in property to which he is not entitled, or fraudulently causes a decree or order to be
executed against any person after it has been satisfied or for anything in respect of which it has
been satisfied, or fraudulently suffers or permits any such act to be done in his name, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 210 of IPC
248.False charge of offence made with intent to injure. Whoever, with intent to cause injury
to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or
falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or
lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person,
(a) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
five years, or with fine which may extend to two lakh rupees, or with both;
(b) if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for ten years or upwards, shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 211 of IPC
In State of Punjab v.Brij Lal
175
: the Court clarified that while section 211 requires a false
complaint to be filed in Court to invoke it, section 182 pertains to false complaints made to the
police or a public servant, without needing to involve a Court. Therefore, offenses under section
175
AIR 1969 SC 355
182 and section 211 are distinct, and a person charged under section 182 cannot simultaneously
face charges under section 211.
249. Harbouring offender. - Whenever an offence has been committed, whoever harbours or
conceals a person whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the offender, with the intention
of screening him from legal punishment shall,
(a) if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(b) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may
extend to ten years, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(c) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, and not to
ten years, be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term
which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the
offence, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation. ––“Offence” in this section includes any act committed at any place out of India,
which, if committed in India, would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely,
103, 105, 307, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 309, sub-sections (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of section 310, 311, 312, clauses (f) and (g) of section 326, sub-sections (4), (6),
(7) and (8) of section 331, clauses (a) and (b) of section 332 and every such act shall, for the
purposes of this section, be deemed to be punishable as if the accused person had been guilty of
it in India.
Exception. This section shall not extend to any case in which the harbour or concealment is by
the spouse of the offender.
Illustration.
A, knowing that B has committed dacoity, knowingly conceals B in order to screen him from
legal punishment. Here, as B is liable to imprisonment for life, A is liable to imprisonment of
either description for a term not exceeding three years, and is also liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 212 of IPC
250. Taking gifts, etc., to screen an offender from punishment. Whoever accepts or attempts
to obtain, or agrees to accept, any gratification for himself or any other person, or any restitution
of property to himself or any other person, in consideration of his concealing an offence or of his
screening any person from legal punishment for any offence, or of his not proceeding against any
person for the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment shall,
(a) if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(b) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may
extend to ten years, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(c) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment not extending to ten years, be punished
with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to
one-fourth part of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 213 of IPC
251. Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening offenders. -
Whoever gives or causes, or offers or agrees to give or cause, any gratification to any
person, or restores or causes the restoration of any property to any person, in consideration of
that person’s concealing an offence, or of his screening any person from legal punishment for
any offence, or of his not proceeding against any person for the purpose of bringing him to legal
punishment shall, ––
(a) if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(b) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment which may
extend to ten years, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(c) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment not extending to ten years, be punished
with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to
one-fourth part of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or
with both.
Exception. The provisions of this section and section 250 do not extend to any case in which
the offence may lawfully be compounded.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 214 of IPC
252. Taking gift to help to recover stolen property, etc.-Whoever takes or agrees or consents
to take any gratification under pretence or on account of helping any person to recover any
movable property of which he shall have been deprived by any offence punishable under this
Sanhita, shall, unless he uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and
convicted of the offence, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 215 of IPC
253. Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose apprehension has been
ordered.- Whenever any person convicted of or charged with an offence, being in lawful
custody for that offence, escapes from such custody, or whenever a public servant, in the
exercise of the lawful powers of such public servant, orders a certain person to be apprehended
for an offence, whoever, knowing of such escape or order for apprehension, harbours or conceals
that person with the intention of preventing him from being apprehended, shall be punished in
the manner following, namely:––
(a) if the offence for which the person was in custody or is ordered to be apprehended is
punishable with death, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
(b) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years, he
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, with or without fine;
(c) if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year and not to
ten years, he shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for
a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for
such offence, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation.––“Offence” in this section includes also any act or omission of which a person is
alleged to have been guilty out of India, which, if he had been guilty of it in India, would have
been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or
otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India, and every such act or
omission shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be punishable as if the accused
person had been guilty of it in India.
Exception. The provisions of this section do not extend to the case in which the harbour or
concealment is by the spouse of the person to be apprehended.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 216 of IPC
254. Penalty for harbouring robbers or dacoits. Whoever, knowing or having reason to
believe that any persons are about to commit or have recently committed robbery or dacoity,
harbours them or any of them, with the intention of facilitating the commission of such robbery
or dacoity, or of screening them or any of them from punishment, shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation. For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether the robbery or dacoity is
intended to be committed, or has been committed, within or without India.
Exception. The provisions of this section do not extend to the case in which the harbour is
owned by the spouse of the offender.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 216 A of IPC
255. Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person from punishment
or property from forfeiture.- Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any
direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant,
intending thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from
legal punishment, or subject him to a less punishment than that to which he is liable, or with
intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or any
charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 217 of IPC
256. Public servant framing incorrect records or writing with intent to save a person from
punishment or property from forfeiture. Whoever, being a public servant, and being as such
public servant, charged with the preparation of any record or other writing, frames that record or
writing in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to cause, or knowing it to be
likely that he will thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or to any person, or with intent
thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal
punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property
from forfeiture or other charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 218 of IPC
257.Public servant in judicial proceedings corruptly making reports, etc., contrary to law.
Whoever, being a public servant, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces in any
stage of a judicial proceeding, any report, order, verdict, or decision which he knows to be
contrary to law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 219 of IPC
258. Commitment for trial or confinement by a person having authority who knows that he
is acting contrary to law-. Whoever, being in any office which gives him legal authority to
commit persons for trial or to confinement, or to keep persons in confinement, corruptly or
maliciously commits any person for trial or to confinement, or keeps any person in confinement,
in the exercise of that authority knowing that in so doing he is acting contrary to law, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 220 of IPC
259. Intentional omission to apprehend on part of a public servant bound to apprehend. -
Whoever, being a public servant, legally bound as such public servant to apprehend or to keep in
confinement any person charged with or liable to be apprehended for an offence, intentionally
omits to apprehend such person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape, or intentionally
aids such person in escaping or attempting to escape from such confinement, shall be punished,
(a) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, with
or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, was
charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, an offence punishable with death; or
(b) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, with
or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, was
charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, an offence punishable with imprisonment for life
or imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years; or
(c) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, with
or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, was
charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, an offence punishable with imprisonment for a
term less than ten years.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 221 of IPC
260. Intentional omission to apprehend on part of a public servant bound to apprehend a
person under sentence or lawfully committed. Whoever, being a public servant, legally
bound as such public servant to apprehend or to keep in confinement any person under sentence
of a Court for any offence or lawfully committed to custody, intentionally omits to apprehend
such person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape or intentionally aids such person in
escaping or attempting to escape from such confinement, shall be punished,
(a) with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to fourteen years, with or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to
have been apprehended, is under sentence of death; or
(b) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, with
or without fine, if the person in confinement or who ought to have been apprehended, is subject,
by a sentence of a Court, or by virtue of a commutation of such sentence, to imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term of ten years, or upwards; or
(c) with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or
with fine, or with both, if the person in confinement or who ought to have been apprehended, is
subject by a sentence of a Court to imprisonment for a term not extending to ten years or if the
person was lawfully committed to custody.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 222 of IPC
261. Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public servant. - Whoever,
being a public servant legally bound as such public servant to keep in confinement any person
charged with or convicted of any offence or lawfully committed to custody, negligently suffers
such person to escape from confinement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 223 of IPC
262. Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension. Whoever intentionally
offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself for any offence
with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted, or escapes or attempts to escape
from any custody in which he is lawfully detained for any such offence, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
Explanation. The punishment in this section is in addition to the punishment for which the
person to be apprehended or detained in custody was liable for the offence with which he was
charged, or of which he was convicted.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 224 of IPC
263. Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another person. - Whoever,
intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of any other
person for an offence, or rescues or attempts to rescue any other person from any custody in
which that person is lawfully detained for an offence,
(a) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both; or
(b) if the person to be apprehended, or the person rescued or attempted to be rescued, is
charged with or liable to be apprehended for an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; or
(c) if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is charged with or
liable to be apprehended for an offence punishable with death, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine; or
(d) if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is liable under the
sentence of a Court or by virtue of a commutation of such a sentence, to imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for a term of ten years or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; or
(e) if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is under sentence
of death, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a
term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 225 of IPC
264. Omission to apprehend, or sufferance of escape, on part of a public servant, in cases
not otherwise provided for. Whoever, being a public servant legally bound as such public
servant to apprehend, or to keep in confinement, any person in any case not provided for in
section 259, section 260 or section 261, or in any other law for the time being in force, omits to
apprehend that person or suffers him to escape from confinement, shall be punished
(a) if he does so intentionally, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and
(b) if he does so negligently, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 225 A of IPC
265. Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension or escape or rescue in cases not
otherwise provided for. Whoever, in any case not provided for in section 262 or section
263 or in any other law for the time being in force, intentionally offers any resistance or illegal
obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself or of any other person, or escapes or attempts
to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, or rescues or attempts to rescue any
other person from any custody in which that person is lawfully detained, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 225 B of IPC
266. Violation of condition of remission of punishment. -Whoever, having accepted any
conditional remission of punishment, knowingly violates any condition on which such remission
was granted, shall be punished with the punishment to which he was originally sentenced, if he
has already suffered no part of that punishment, and if he has suffered any part of that
punishment, then with so much of that punishment as he has not already suffered.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 227 of IPC
267. Intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in judicial proceedings.
Whoever, intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant,
while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend
to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 228 of IPC
268.Personation of assessor. Whoever, by personation or otherwise, shall intentionally cause, or
knowingly suffer himself to be returned, empanelled or sworn as an assessor in any case in
which he knows that he is not entitled by law to be so returned, empanelled or sworn, or knowing
himself to have been so returned, empanelled or sworn contrary to law, shall voluntarily serve as
such assessor, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 229 of IPC
269.Failure by person released on bail bond or bond to appear in Court. -Whoever, having
been charged with an offence and released on bail bond or on bond, fails without sufficient cause
(the burden of proving which shall lie upon him), to appear in Court in accordance with the terms
of the bail or bond, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation. The punishment under this section is
(a) in addition to the punishment to which the offender would be liable on a conviction for
the offence with which he has been charged; and
(b) without prejudice to the power of the Court to order forfeiture of the bond.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 229 A of IPC
CHAPTER XV
OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, CONVENIENCE,
DECENCY AND MORALS
270. Public nuisance. A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an
illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the
people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause
injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public
right but a common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or
advantage.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 268 of IPC
271. Negligent act is likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life. Whoever
unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to
be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 269 of IPC
272. Malignant acts likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life. Whoever
malignantly does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to
spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 270 of IPC
273 Disobedience to quarantine rule. Whoever knowingly disobeys any rule made by the
Government for putting any mode of transport into a state of quarantine, or for regulating the
intercourse of any such transport in a state of quarantine or for regulating the intercourse
between places where an infectious disease prevails and other places, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 271 of IPC
274. Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale. Whoever adulterates any article of
food or drink, so as to make such article noxious as food or drink, intending to sell such article as
food or drink, or knowing it to be likely that the same will be sold as food or drink, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 272 of IPC
275. Sale of noxious food or drink. Whoever sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or
drink, any article which has been rendered or has become noxious, or is in a state unfit for food
or drink, knowing or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 273 of IPC
276. Adulteration of drugs. Whoever adulterates any drug or medical preparation in such a
manner as to lessen the efficacy or change the operation of such drug or medical preparation, or
to make it noxious, intending that it shall be sold or used for, or knowing it to be likely that it
will be sold or used for, any medicinal purpose, as if it had not undergone such adulteration, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 274 of IPC
277. Sale of adulterated drugs. Whoever, knowing any drug or medical preparation to have
been adulterated in such a manner as to lessen its efficacy, to change its operation, or to render it
noxious, sells the same, or offers or exposes it for sale, or issues it from any dispensary for
medicinal purposes as unadulterated, or causes it to be used for medicinal purposes by any
person not knowing of the adulteration, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 275 of IPC
278.Sale of drug as a different drug or preparation Whoever knowingly sells, or offers or
exposes for sale, or issues from a dispensary for medicinal purposes, any drug or medical
preparation, as a different drug or medical preparation, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to
five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 276 of IPC
279. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir. Whoever voluntarily corrupts or
fouls the water of any public spring or reservoir, so as to render it less fit for the purpose for
which it is ordinarily used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with
both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 277 of IPC
280.Making atmosphere noxious to health. Whoever voluntarily vitiates the atmosphere in any
place so as to make it noxious to the health of persons in general dwelling or carrying on
business in the neighbourhood or passing along a public way, shall be punished with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 278 of IPC
281. Rash driving or riding on a public way. - Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any
public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause
hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or
with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 279 of IPC
In State v. Santanam
176
the Court found the accused, a military personnel, guilty of rash
and negligent driving under section 279. This decision followed after he consumed alcohol,
drove a military truck in a zigzag manner, and collided with a moped rider, resulting in fatal
injuries, as well as causing two other accidents on the road.
In Dwarka Das v. State of Rajasthan
177
the Court found the driver of a city bus guilty
under sections 279 and 304-A after he fatally struck a cyclist on the road while driving erratically
and at a high speed.
In State v. Major Singh
178
, it was held that pedestrians have the right to walk on the sidewalk,
and if there is none, they can walk on the side of the road. All drivers have a duty towards
pedestrians, and no driver has the right to hit a pedestrian walking on the side of the road. The
truck driver’s failure to notice pedestrians ahead and apply brakes to avoid hitting the pedestrian
indicates negligence. It was not claimed that the pedestrian suddenly jumped in front of the
truck. No evidence suggested that the pedestrian was not walking on the side of the road or
suddenly moved into the truck's path. A driver must be aware of road conditions, traffic density,
and the presence of pedestrians, adjusting their speed and driving accordingly. If a driver fails to
do so and hits a pedestrian from behind, it constitutes criminal negligence.
176
1998 Cr LJ 3045 (Karn).
177
1997 Cr LJ 4061 (Raj).
178
1967 AIR 63
In Mann Parkash v. State of Haryana
179
, A truck driver was driving the truck at a high
speed, climbed on a footpath and hit the deceased from behind. The Court held that he is guilty
under sections 279 and 304-A.
282.Rash Navigation of vessel- Whoever navigates any vessel in a manner so rash or
negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 280 of IPC
283. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy. Whoever exhibits any false light, mark or
buoy, intending or knowing it to be likely that such exhibition will mislead any navigator, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and with fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 281 of IPC
284. Conveying person by water for hire in unsafe or overloaded vessel Whoever
knowingly or negligently conveys, or causes to be conveyed for hire, any person by water in any
vessel, when that vessel is in such a state or so loaded as to endanger the life of that person, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 282 of IPC
285. Danger or obstruction in public way or line of navigation. Whoever, by doing any act,
or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge, causes
danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any public way or public line of navigation, shall
be punished with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 283 of IPC
286. Negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance. -Whoever does, with any
poisonous substance, any act in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be
likely to cause hurt or injury to any person or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order
with any poisonous substance in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable
danger to human life from such poisonous substance, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to
five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 284 of IPC
287. Negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter.-Whoever does, with fire
or any combustible matter, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or to be
likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person or knowingly or negligently omits to take such
order with any fire or any combustible matter in his possession as is sufficient to guard against
any probable danger to human life from such file or combustible matter, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 285 of IPC
288. Negligent conduct with respect to explosive substance. -Whoever does, with any
explosive substance, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or to be likely to
cause hurt or injury to any other person, or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order
with any explosive substance in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable
danger to human life from that substance, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
179
1996 Cr LJ 663 (P&H)
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 286 of IPC
289.Negligent conduct with respect to machinery. Whoever does, with any machinery, any act
so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
other person or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any machinery in his
possession or under his care as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life
from such machinery, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 287 of IPC
290. Negligent conduct with respect to pulling down, repairing or constructing buildings,
etc.Whoever, in pulling down, repairing or constructing any building, knowingly or negligently
omits to take such measures with that building as is sufficient to guard against any probable
danger to human life from the fall of that building, or of any part thereof, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 288 of IPC
291. Negligent conduct with respect to animals. -Whoever knowingly or negligently omits to
take such measures with any animal in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any
probable danger to human life, or any probable danger of grievous hurt from such animal, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 289 of IPC
292. Punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided for Whoever
commits a public nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this Sanhita shall be punished
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 290 of IPC
293.. Continuance of nuisance after injunction to discontinue. - Whoever repeats or continues
a public nuisance, having been enjoined by any public servant who has lawful authority to issue
such injunction not to repeat or continue such nuisance, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 291 of IPC
294. Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc. (1) For the purposes of sub-section (2), a book,
pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object, including
display of any content in electronic form shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or
appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items)
the effect of any one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt
persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the
matter contained or embodied in it.
(2) Whoever
(a) sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts into circulation, or
for purposes of sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in
his possession any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or
any other obscene object whatsoever in whatever manner; or
(b) imports, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or
knowing or having reason to believe that such object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or
publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation; or
(c) takes part in or receives profits from any business in the course of which he knows or has
reason to believe that any such obscene objects are, for any of the purposes aforesaid, made
produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner
put into circulation; or
(d) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged or is
ready to engage in any act which is an offence under this section, or that any such obscene object
can be procured from or through any person; or
(e) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section,
shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, and, in the
event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to five years, and also with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.
Exception. This section does not extend to
(a) any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure
(i) the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the
ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure is in
the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern; or
(ii) which is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes;
(b) any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in
(i) any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient Monuments and
Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958; or
(ii) any temple, or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any
religious purpose.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 292 of IPC
295. Sale, etc., of obscene objects to child.-Whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes, exhibits or
circulates to any child any such obscene object as is referred to in section 294, or offers or
attempts so to do, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to three years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand
rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and also with fine which may extend to
five thousand rupees
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 293 of IPC
296. Obscene acts and songs. -Whoever, to the annoyance of others,
(a) does any obscene act in any public place; or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 294 of IPC
In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana
180
, In this case, the Court ruled that no offence is
committed if the act is not obscene, does not occur in a public place, if the song recited or uttered
is not near any public place, or if it does not cause annoyance to others. 297.Keeping lottery
office. -(1) Whoever keeps any office or place for the purpose of drawing any lottery not being a
180
(1996) 4 SCC 17
State lottery or a lottery authorised by the State Government, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or
with both.
(2) Whoever publishes any proposal to pay any sum, or to deliver any goods, or to do or forbear
from doing anything for the benefit of any person, on any event or contingency relative or
applicable to the drawing of any ticket, lot, number or figure in any such lottery, shall be
punished with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 294 A of IPC
CHAPTER XVI
OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION
298.Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult religion of any class.
Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by
any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or
with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or
defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 295 of IPC
299. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by
insulting its religion or religious beliefs. Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic means or otherwise,
insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine,
or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 295 A of IPC
300.Disturbing religious assembly. - Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly
lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship, or religious ceremonies, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 296 of IPC
301.Trespassing on burial places, etc.- Whoever, with the intention of wounding the feelings of
any person, or of insulting the religion of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of
any person are likely to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted
thereby, commits any trespass in any place of worship or on any place of sepulchre, or any place
set apart for the performance of funeral rites or as a depository for the remains of the dead, or
offers any indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance to any persons assembled for the
performance of funeral ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 297 of IPC
302.Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of any person.
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters
any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any gesture in the sight of
that person or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
NOTE- This section corresponds to section 298 of IPC